

# **The Productive Safety Net Programme IV End-line Program Performance Report (2021)**

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## Acronyms

BCC	behavioral change communication
CCC	Community Care Coalition
CFSTF	Community Food Security Task Force
DA	Development Agent
DS	Direct Support
FSTF	Food Security Task Force
HEW	Health Extension Worker
HH	Household Head
KAC	Kebele Appeals Committee
KFSTF	Kebele Food Security Task Force
LICU	Livelihoods Implementation Coordination Unit
MFI	microfinance institution
PASS	Payroll and Attendance Sheet System
PDS	permanent direct support
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
PW	Public Work
RFSTF	Regional Food Security Task Force
RUSACCO	Rural Savings and Credit Cooperative
SNNP	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People (region)
TLU	Tropical Livestock Unit
VSLA	Village Savings and Lending Association
WFSTF	Woreda Food Security Task Force
WOFED	Woreda Office of Finance and Economic Development
WOLSA	Woreda Office of Labor and Social Affairs

## Executive Summary

This section contains the key findings in Chapters 3–10, summarized by chapter and by the research questions listed in the terms of reference for this study.

### Chapter 3

**RQ5: How was PSNP4 adapted to address the COVID-19 pandemic? RQ13: Assessing PSNP Targeting – specifically are the committees established according to the PIM and local level implementers aware of their roles and responsibilities?**

- At the woreda level, turnover of key staff declined over the full period in which the Productive Safety Net Programme IV (PSNP4) operated. The onset of the pandemic did not coincide with an increase in turnover; if anything, turnover appears to have fallen. Most key personell received training and the proportion of those trained did not fall after midline, a reflection, possibly of the limited woreda-level turnover that occurred. Resources – PSNP documentation, computers and printers, and cashiers – remained largely unchanged between 2016 and 2021, with no noticeable drop between 2018 and 2021. Vehicle availability, and changes in availability, varied by region: improving in Somali, significantly worsening in Amhara and SNNP, and sometimes improving and sometimes worsening in Afar and Oromiya. Putting this all together, with reference to RQ5, we see no evidence that the woreda-level PSNP structures or resources described here were adapted to address the COVID-19 pandemic.
- Apart from SNNP, increasingly the composition of the Kebele Food Security Task Forces (KFSTF) *does not* resemble what was envisaged in the Project Implementation Manual (PIM). Particularly striking are the reductions in representation from members of the kebele council and of technical experts, such as Health Extension Workers (HEWs) and Development Agents (DAs), in Afar, Oromiya, and Somali. Also noteworthy are reductions in civil society groups such as elders or youth, with SNNP again the exception. With respect to whether committees are established according to the PIM, at the kebele level, apart from SNNP and to a certain extent Amhara, the answer seems to be no. As we only have quantitative data on this, we cannot say why this occurred. It is possible that because relatively little retargeting occurred after 2016, certain groups (such as elders) were seen as no longer being needed for the KFSTFs, but this is speculation.
- Turnover of KFSTF members is high: between 70 percent (Oromiya) and 83 percent (Afar) of KFSTF members were on the force for two years or less. Further, turnover was higher in four regions (Afar, Amhara, Oromiya, SNNP) in 2021 than in 2018, meaning that when the pandemic began (in March 2020), most KFSTF members had at most one year of experience with PSNP operations. Possibly as a consequence of this turnover, recordkeeping is well below what was envisaged in the PSNP4 PIM. As a general rule (with SNNP again somewhat of an exception), client lists are not posted publicly, nor are payment dates (possibly because many kebeles do not have this information themselves). It is unclear why this occurred. We do not know if these changes were conscious decisions as a result of the pandemic, but they are clearly problematic for implementation and monitoring of the program. They imply a reduction in kebele-level ability to implement aspects of the PSNP and also suggest that PSNP clients and other households in localities where the PSNP operates are unlikely to have good information on program operations – such as when they will be paid. Chapters 5 and 6 have more on these issues.

### Chapter 4

**RQ9: For how long PSNP households were in the program? RQ13: Assessing PSNP Targeting.**

- With respect to RQ9, in the Highlands, it is possible to assess the duration of PSNP participation over the six-year period from 2016–2021. During this time, 74 percent of households in the study sample were either never or always PSNP clients over the entire period. This does not differ across regions.

Mean years of participation (conditional on any PSNP participation) are 4.7 in Amhara, 4.6 in Oromiya, and 4.9 in SNNP, and 4.8 across all three regions. In the Lowlands, an analogous assessment can be done for the four-year period from 2018–2021. During this time, 45.6 percent of households were never PSNP clients and 33.3 percent were clients in all four years, meaning that 78.9 percent of the sample fell into those two groups. Further, most retargeting occurred in the early part of these time periods, with later entry reflecting, as shown in our qualitative work, very modest new entries resulting from household death, dissolution, or migration.

- This high degree of continuity of participation and little evidence of substantial entry or exit meant that it was not feasible to repeat the quantitative assessments of targeting found in the baseline and midline reports; for the vast majority of PSNP clients in our study, inclusion was based on their circumstances five or six years ago, not now. Instead, the focus of the discussion is on the processes by which targeting and the limited amount of retargeting occurred and on perceptions of their success.
- Regional and woreda officials reported that all committees that have a role in targeting are in place in both the Highlands and Lowlands, and for the most part carry out their responsibilities in line with the PIM. They note differing levels of awareness and capacity, particularly in the more remote areas of Afar, and that committee performance can be variable.
- Efforts to improve targeting are continuing in both the Highlands and Lowlands, including training, collaboration with kebele social workers and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and closer supervision, particularly to minimize the influence of kebele officials over the targeting committees. Amhara relaxed the household cap and encourages woredas to use the resources freed up by those leaving the program to move existing households toward full family targeting, rather than bringing in new households; this is seen as a means of accelerating progress toward graduation. In the Lowlands, exercises to correct inclusion and exclusion errors were conducted in parts of Somali, which involved woreda officials and a system of house-to-house verification, as well as retargeting in parts of Afar to accommodate the reorganization of kebeles. Traditional leaders continue to exercise significant influence over targeting decisions in the Lowlands, either formally as members of targeting committees, or informally through the status they hold.
- The absence of major retargeting exercises together with the prohibition on Focus Group Discussions with community members (due to COVID-19) make it challenging to assess perceptions of fairness and accuracy. PSNP officials in the Highlands and Lowlands and traditional leaders (in the Lowlands) perceive that targeting processes are seen as fair, transparent, and accurate, and that they do not lead to tensions at the community level; however, kebele officials expressed greater concern that targeting was leading to community tensions. A recurrent concern related to those whose circumstances were only marginally different from those targeted and who might have been eligible for inclusion had the resource envelope been larger. While a striking degree of consensus arises among PSNP officials that the right households are included in the PSNP, almost all those sampled in the Lowlands and about one-half those in the Highlands (slightly less than at midline) report that potentially eligible households are excluded by administrative quotas. As time has passed, these households may now be less food secure than those already in the program but who have not yet progressed to a stage where graduation is possible. Lastly, the household cap continues to be a challenge and a grievance, particularly in Afar, where large family sizes are common.

## Chapter 5

**RQ19: Social Accountability and Grievance Redress: staff and decision-makers awareness of the KAC and its mandate (RQ19c); households' awareness of their rights under the PSNP (RQ19a); establishment and functioning social accountability mechanisms (RQ19c); their usefulness and responsiveness to complaints (RQ19b).**

- Qualitative data show that at the regional, woreda, and kebele level, program implementers are mostly aware of the Kebele Appeals Committee (KAC) and its role in handling appeals and complaints at kebele level. This is true in both the Highlands and the Lowlands.
- Knowledge of the existence of the PSNP is widespread (in all regions, above 50 percent of households have heard about the PSNP) but not universal (the highest awareness is in Afar, at 84 percent). But in most regions, only one-quarter to one-third of households are aware of the Community Food Security Task Force (CFSTF) and even fewer can name a CFSTF member (5–17 percent) or are aware that CFSTF is responsible for selecting PSNP clients (2–8 percent). Awareness of KACs is low, ranging from 10.7 percent (Afar) to 26.8 percent (Amhara), and few households can actually name a KAC member.
- In nearly all the different ways that the data were disaggregated, knowledge of basic PSNP operations and rights is low. Fewer than 15 percent of households of any type (PSNP/non-PSNP; client card/no client card) could correctly state how many days after their month's work is complete they had to wait before receiving payment. Knowledge that each day's work entitled a household to 3 kilograms of grain was similarly low. The only question that generated a meaningful number of correct answers related to the maximum number of days per month that one person can work on PSNP Public Works. Public Works participants were more likely to provide correct answers to this question than Direct Support clients. Just under two-thirds of households in Amhara (64 percent) provided either the 5 days or the 10–25 days response, the highest correct response for any question by any disaggregation.
- The quantitative community surveys show that most (84 percent) kebeles have a KAC, ranging from 64.6 percent in Oromiya to 98.5 percent in Amhara. KACs typically have around six members and composition is broadly in line with what was envisaged in the PIM. The PSNP4 PIM emphasizes that no overlap should exist between members of the KAC and those responsible for PSNP implementation. Evidence that this stipulation is being followed is mixed. Most strikingly, the chairperson of the kebele council is often a member of the KAC (this percentage ranges from 55.4 to 91.9 depending on the region), even though the PIM indicates that this should not be the case. Further, out of the 223 KACs for which we have data, in 62 percent the chairperson of the kebele council is both a member of the KAC and the KFSTF. Our qualitative data show similar patterns, both in terms of the existence of KACs (KACs are reported to be in place in all but one kebele sampled within the 11 woredas included in the 2021 evaluation) and their membership. It was noted, however, that involvement of kebele officials is seen as a way of compensating for the lack of availability of community members to serve in KACs. It is uncommon for KACs to post a list of grievances; across all kebeles in our survey, only 19.5 percent did so.
- Effectiveness is difficult to judge because very few households are aware of KACs and what they do. The end-line quantitative community data indicate that more than one-half (55.8 percent) of kebeles in the sample report that no appeals were successful and another 27 percent report that less than one-half were successful. This, together with the fact that few households are aware of KACs, suggests that these social accountability mechanisms are functioning poorly. While that appears to be largely true, it is important to note that in many cases, there do not appear to be additional resources that would allow appeals to be successful. The study's qualitative data suggest that the involvement of various community constituents, while advantageous in terms of transparency and local knowledge, also has some downsides, where these individuals are too busy to attend to KAC functions. In the Lowlands, links between formal social grievance structures and traditional authority figures appear to be working increasingly effectively, and in both the Highlands and Lowlands, play a useful role in resolving operational issues apart from those related to the Livelihoods Component.

**RQ5: How was PSNP4 adapted to address the COVID-19 pandemic?**

- The qualitative survey analysis did not find any specific examples of changes in social accountability structures. COVID-19 and displacement have contributed to increased requests for targeting in some locations, as people returned to the kebele and/or lost their jobs. These requests are directed to kebele officials and not the KAC, and are not handled as part of the appeals and complaints process.

**RQ4: Has PSNP improved human development outcomes? the Temporary Direct Support (TDS) component of PSNP 4 (the nutrition sensitive aspects of PSNP 4.).**

- PSNP guidelines determining the inclusion of clients in the Temporary Direct Support (TDS) component were refreshed in the PSNP4 (the nutrition sensitive aspects of PSNP4.). Apart from Afar, these are well understood at the woreda level, but less so at the kebele level. Only 58 percent of kebele respondents in Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNP correctly identified the four-month cut-off for moving pregnant women to TDS, as did 54 percent of Somali respondents and just 6 percent of respondents in Afar. Wide variations arose in understanding of when women can return to Public Works after giving birth, with the correct answer (12 months) given by 72 percent of respondents in Afar, 71 percent in Amhara, 29 percent in Oromiya, 14 percent in Somali, and 12 percent in SNNP. Responses from women who had been or were pregnant indicated that 37 percent were discouraged from stopping work by CFSTFs and only 42.5 percent were actually shifted to TDS. Women who did return to Public Works postpartum typically did so much earlier than envisaged in the PIM.

**Chapter 6**

- **RQ15: (i) Are payments to clients timely and predictable?** Payments are not timely or predictable. Between Tir and Sene EC2012, only 44 percent of PSNP clients received five or six payments. A direct comparison between Tir and Miazia in EC2012 and EC2013 finds that the mean number of payments during this four-month period fell from 2.7 to 1.6. Across the full sample, the percentage of PSNP client receiving all four payments during this period collapsed, falling from 43 percent to 9 percent.
- **RQ15:(iii) Are clients asked by officials or community members to use their transfers for specific purposes?** No. Such requests are very rare.
- **RQ15(iv) How far/how long do clients have to travel to receive their transfers? How many receive their transfers at a place no more than three hours from home? What is the average cost incurred to receive the transfers? What is the difference in time and cost, if any, between those receiving food and those receiving cash transfers?** Among households reporting receiving payments from Tir 2013 onward, mean travel times (by foot) were 35 minutes in Somali, 55 minutes in SNNP, 102 minutes in Amhara, 112 minutes in Oromiya, and 164 minutes in Afar. No client in SNNP or Somali had to travel more than three hours from home. In the other regions, the percentages doing so were 9 percent (Amhara), 15 percent (Oromiya), and 27 percent (Afar). No meaningful difference existed by transfer modality (cash or in-kind). Average costs associated with travel to receive PSNP payments were very low (0.2–5.5 Birr) in Amhara, Oromiya, Somali, and SNNP. Only in Afar, where they average 19.9 Birr, were they significant. Instances of harassment or theft were exceedingly rare in all regions.
- **RQ15(v): Who in the household collects the transfer and whether there are differences between households receiving food and cash transfers.** The household head is the person who usually collects the PSNP transfer. This is true in all regions, with the percentage of heads collecting transfers ranging from 79 percent (Somali) to 90 percent (Amhara). No difference arises when payment is disaggregated by type.
- **RQ15(vi): Do clients have client cards? Were they asked to pay for these cards?** In the Highlands, between 79 percent (Oromiya) and 89 percent (Amhara) of PSNP clients reported having a client card. Only 25 percent and 34 percent of PSNP households in Afar and Somali, respectively, had client cards. In Afar, Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNP, most clients reported that they are not asked to pay for their cards, while 29 percent in Somali did report such payment. We think – but we do not know for certain – that this arises because clients are asked to pay for photos.

- **RQ15(vii): Is the information on the client card clear? Does it help them understand their entitlements and responsibilities?** Knowledge of key program rights is limited. The possession of a client card has no association with respondents' ability to correctly describe their entitlements and responsibilities.

## Chapter 7

**RQ18: PSNP public works and links to services: What is the process for selecting the public works sub-projects to be constructed through the PSNP? To what extent does this planning process include other types of activities as detailed in the PIM? and who participates in public works planning (PSNP clients, Kebele and Woreda officials)?**

- The description of the Public Works selection and planning process by kebele, woreda, and regional officials is broadly consistent with that in the 2018 midline performance report. The basic elements are common: some degree of community-level discussion and prioritization, facilitated by DAs, which is consolidated, reviewed, and endorsed by the kebele and then cascaded upward to the woreda for technical review and final approval. The emphasis given to these various elements differs across regions and woredas, with more prominence given to the process of community engagement in Amhara and to the woreda's technical direction in Oromiya. More evidence exists now than at midline that the Pastoral Public Works Guidelines are being used in the Lowlands and are leading to changes in both the types of projects implemented and the modalities for doing so, including adjustments to the timing of the Public Works schedule. The qualitative interviews also suggest a more balanced and complementary process of decision making between kebele and woreda in Somali region, with the kebele setting priorities and the woreda providing technical support and advice. When asked who takes decisions about public works, informants in Somali were more likely to point to the KFSTF, and those in Afar to the communities in the first instance and to the woreda as the ultimate decision maker.
- Households report more limited participation than that described by officials, though it is possible that COVID-19 affected the ability of KFSTFs to hold community meetings. Only 20 percent of households in the Highlands and only 4 percent in the Lowlands had knowledge about such meetings taking place in their communities. Of these that knew meetings were carried out in the communities, 80 percent in the Highlands and 65 percent in the Lowlands participated in those meetings. A little less than 50 percent of those who participated commented on the choice of these projects, suggesting that those that participate are more likely to comment. Examples of specific measures to promote women's participation, such as separate forums or mobilization and advice, were found in only 4 of the 11 Highland woredas where qualitative fieldwork was undertaken. Elsewhere there was only reliance on routine mechanisms such as women's presence in community discussions or their membership (and sometimes leadership) of development groups and committees. In the Lowlands, no specific measures are being taken to increase the participation of women in public works planning, which remains stronger in Somali than in Afar. We found no examples of specific measures relating to persons with disabilities.
- Overall, 53 percent of households reported that Public Work subprojects have had benefits for their household and 38 percent for their community. When disaggregated by PSNP status, PSNP households are roughly more likely to report benefits at community level than non-PSNP households, and non-PSNP households are more likely to report benefits at the household level than PSNP households. When disaggregated by subproject type, more than one-half of households in all regions reported access roads are the most important infrastructure built through Public Works. Soil and water conservation on communal land (14 percent) and water harvesting (13 percent) are, respectively, the second and third most important subprojects.

**RQ18: (a) Who within the household carries-out the work requirement of the PSNP? (b) How far are the public works sites from the home? (c) How many days were worked by each person in the household? How many hours each day? (d) What services (including childcare) are provided near the work site? (e) Are those participating in public works provided with the necessary inputs (tools, materials)? Are they asked to bring these or pay for these inputs?**

- In terms of household participation in Public Works, nearly 85 percent of Public Work days are carried out by the head of the household (in both male- and female-headed households). In either case, children under 18 years old rarely participate in Public Works. The same is true with spouses in female-headed households. Women in male-headed households carry out relatively more Public Works than men in female-headed households. The median distance to a Public Works site in all regions is one hour. The average household works for about 12 days per person per month in the main Public Works months, but slightly lower than 12 days from July to December. Important regional deviations from the average are observed: in Oromiya the average person works about 8 days per month, while in SNNP the average person works around 13 days per month. On average, women worked 3.4 hours per day and men worked 3.9 hours per day. The median for both men and women is 4 hours per day.
- The provision of childcare at worksites is abysmally low: only 2.4 percent of Public Works participants indicated that childcare was available at their worksite. This low figure is consistent with reports obtained during qualitative survey work. Both the quantitative and qualitative data show that in the Highlands, with a few exceptions, such as where specialist equipment is required, PSNP clients are expected to provide their own tools for public works. Tools are provided in some work locations in the Lowlands, but these are insufficient and in some cases of poor quality. Twelve percent of Public Works participants report that they were asked to pay for tools or materials. The provision of first aid at Public Works sites also remains very limited.

***RQ5: How was PSNP4 adapted to address the COVID-19 pandemic?***

- Adaptation appears to have been tailored by regional and woreda offices. Generally, Public Works were more affected in 2021 than 2020, as evidenced by the reduction in the percentage of PSNP clients reporting that they worked during January, February, March, and April 2021. In the Lowlands, Public Works activities were more severely affected. Public Works were suspended in both regions for between four and six months in 2021 [EC], although this did not affect areas in Afar, where the Public Works timetable ran from September to February rather than January to June. Regional, woreda, and kebele officials all pointed to changes made in the types of activities undertaken and a slower rate of implementation. Particularly in the Lowlands, Public Works were done in smaller groups, with fewer participants per site, and in some cases working in shifts. Responses from households participating in Public Works activities were consistent with these qualitative data. Over one-third (36 percent) of households reported that the pandemic had caused changes in operations. The most important changes were working in smaller groups (37 percent), working in shifts (32 percent), working fewer days (32 percent), and using masks when working on Public Works (29 percent).

*Chapter 8*

***RQ20: PSNP 4's Livelihoods component***

- The single most important finding is that very few PSNP clients (1 percent) have adopted a livelihood activity.
- Of the three pathways, the on-farm pathway (crops and animal fattening) is the one most fully implemented. This is the pathway that people have most experience with and have adequate resources for. It is also one that provides immediate benefits and market opportunities. For many woredas this is the only viable pathway. Of the very few PSNP clients taking up a livelihood, few use the off-farm pathway. Commonly reported challenges facing clients include lack of experience, stricter loan conditions (for example, a shorter grace period), and the need to obtain a business license. Evidence also exists of insufficient training of DAs and support given to PSNP clients to develop business plans for this pathway. The wage employment pathway is nonexistent. Lack of employment opportunities and limited skills by PSNP clients remain key constraints to operationalize this pathway, and remote locations and high transport costs limit the pursuit of employment opportunities. Poor planning and coordination between the various stakeholders involved is also a challenge. All livelihood activities have been adversely affected by lack of technical support, follow-up, and coaching,

particularly for off-farm and employment pathways. These are affected by high turnover of field-level staff, particularly DAs. Budgetary constraints also limit the capacity to implement monitoring and follow-up activities by woreda officials.

- The COVID-19 pandemic has had a varied impact on the Livelihoods Component across woredas/kebeles. Most woredas report having received guidance from the zone or regional level on health and safety procedures and changed PSNP plans accordingly. Public Works, transfer payments, and retargeting were affected in some areas. Reports also exist of cases of business activities of PSNP clients being affected, which impacted negatively on loan repayment. Some microfinance institutions (MFIs) extended repayment periods as a result. At kebele level, however, most respondents reported no changes to plans to address the COVID-19 disruption. Conflict and instability affected SNNP directly, including PSNP livelihood activities, structures, and data.
- Only 9 percent of the 2,278 PSNP clients in our sample are aware of the Livelihoods Component; this percentage is highest in Oromiya (13 percent) and lowest in SNNP (7 percent). Only 5 percent have joined the livelihood component since Tir 2011 EC. The percentage for participation in specific livelihood activities (selecting a livelihood activity, receiving training) is even smaller (2 percent of the full sample). Few PSNP clients (7 percent) have been able to save regularly and of this small percentage, median savings are only 250 Birr.
- With the important caveat that few households (5 percent) take out loans, RUSACCOs (Rural Savings and Credit Cooperatives) account for 24 percent, MFIs for 20 percent, friends/neighbors for 16 percent, and relatives for 14 percent of loans obtained. No differences are found by region or by PSNP/non-PSNP status. Data from MFIs show that the size of loans can be high, anywhere from 4,000–30,000 Birr, but the term of the loans is short (usually one year), interest rates are high, and other conditions (such as depositing savings in the MFI) are frequently a prerequisite for getting a loan. The majority of PSNP clients (63 percent) who currently have loans report difficulty repaying them.

## Chapter 9

### RQ16: Administration of Contingency budgets

- **16a: How are woreda contingency budgets used, especially in relation to the kebele appeals system and temporary inclusion of households with malnourished children?** Woreda contingency budgets are used for the three purposes outlined in the PIM: to deal with exclusion errors; to support households with children screened as malnourished; and to assist those affected by localized shocks. All woredas in Afar and Somali indicated that woreda contingency budgets were used to support people affected by shocks. Across all regions, some also target individuals with specific needs, such as those living with HIV or affected by COVID-19, the elderly who lack support, or those displaced from other regions. All woredas (in the Highlands) except one reported that they assist households caring for malnourished children, but only woredas in SNNP and Amhara explicitly referenced the PSNP appeals system as a means of identifying excluded households. Those in Oromiya, Somali, and Afar emphasised those not targeted by PSNP due to resource constraints or whose needs were not being fully met by the program (particularly large families).
- **16b: How are households selected to receive support from the woreda contingency budget? Is this process fair and transparent?** The selection process uses PSNP targeting and appeals committees and incorporates measures designed to enhance public accountability and consent (such as community wealth ranking and the posting of decisions in a public place). The description of the selection process was consistent across regions. All woreda officials self-reported that it is fair and transparent. However, Sodo Zurya in SNNP reported that a large number of complaints reach woreda officials.
- **16c: How many months of support does each household receive? Do households receive their complete entitlement? Are these transfers timely and predictable?** Support provided through contingency funds is given for a period of two and six months. Woreda officials perceive that it is self-



reported to be timely, predictable, and provided in full. However, in 2013 [EC] several regions experienced delays in receipt of the woreda contingency budget, and concerns arose about predictability in parts of Amhara. By contrast, woreda officials in Afar and Somali stated that transfers to households from the contingency budget were neither timely nor predictable.

- **16d: How are households selected to receive support from the federal contingency budget? Is this process fair and transparent?** The selection process also uses PSNP structures and procedures and is self-reported by officials as fair and transparent. It is guided by assessment reports that determine the quotas given to each woreda, which then allocate quotas to affected kebeles. In Afar and Somali, officials point to the involvement of locally respected figures, such as elders, in targeting decisions as something that helps to promote selection that is fair and transparent.
- **16e: How does the federal contingency budget protect people against larger than ‘localized’ shocks?** Most woredas believe that federal contingency funds are not sufficient to protect all those in need. In some cases, woredas receive only a proportion of the support they request from the federal level. In others, the level of need is simply greater than the resources available, particularly when unanticipated crises compound predictable food shortages among populations where vulnerability is already high. Our qualitative data indicate that in some – but not all – woredas, federal contingency funds are used to assist internally displaced persons (IDPs).<sup>1</sup>

**RQ5: How was PSNP4 adapted to address the COVID-19 pandemic.**

- It does not appear that any adaptations were undertaken specifically because of COVID-19. There was no evidence that regions or woredas had received explicit guidance on this from the FSCD. When asked whether the woreda or federal contingency budgets were used to respond to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, woreda and regional officials provided mixed and contradictory responses. It appears that federal contingency budgets were used for this purpose in all regions, but that woreda contingency budgets were, generally, not used for this purpose.

## *Chapter 10*

- Our core result is that virtually no graduation has taken place since the midline survey in 2018. Both our quantitative and qualitative data show this. Respondents to our qualitative surveys did not provide a single reason why this occurred; however, several reoccurring themes emerge. Three can be highlighted:
  - In PSNP4, graduation is to be facilitated through a variety of supporting activities including specific livelihood pathways, lump-sum livelihood asset transfers, training and extension, access to microfinance, and help to transition to off-farm employment. Apart from the livestock pathway, respondents perceive that it has not been possible to provide these supporting activities at a scale that would permit meaningful levels of graduation. The employment pathway is seen as having been particularly problematic. Other forms of support, for example, continued access to PSNP transfers for 12 months, have also been lacking.

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<sup>1</sup> As part of our qualitative work, we asked woreda and regional officials whether woreda or federal contingency budgets were used to respond to the impacts of conflict or displacement. Of the 17 woredas sampled, 2 woredas (Bolosso Sore and Zeway Dugda) stated that they had used their contingency budgets to assist IDPs. Six others (Loko Abaya, Fadis, Mekdela, Libo Kemkem, Angolela Tera, and Errer) were hosting displaced people who were being assisted from regional or federal sources (in some cases Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA), in others not clearly specified). Regional officials in Amhara confirmed that federal contingency budgets were being used to address the impact of displacement, while those in Oromia said that displaced PSNP clients were being assisted by their host woreda. The RTRMTC in SNNP said that neither federal nor woreda contingency budgets were being used in cases of conflict or displacement, contrary to the information from woreda informants in Bolosso Sore.

- COVID-19 appears to have played an indirect role. Strikingly, no respondents stated that they had received direct instructions to stop or slow graduation because of the pandemic. Instead, COVID-19 was seen to have interfered with the processes associated with preparing households to graduate, most notably the closure of marketplaces (which adversely affected the off-farm employment pathways and the profitability of livelihood-related activities) and prohibitions on meetings and gatherings.
- Some localities, most notably SNNP (but not Amhara), have a poor understanding of how graduation is supposed to work. The absence of graduation benchmarks in SNNP exemplifies this.

#### **RQ14: Assessing Graduation**

- *RQ14(a): To what extent are the right households (as defined by the eligibility criteria in the PIM) graduated from the PSNP?* It is not possible to answer this question because: (i) there are simply not enough graduated households to assess whether the right households are being graduated; and (ii) in a number of localities, especially SNNP, there are no graduation benchmarks that could be used to assess whether the “right” households graduated.
- *RQ14(b): How is graduation carried out (as compared with the PIM)? To what extent do households and communities participate in the process of identifying and selecting households for graduation?* In Amhara, respondents to our qualitative surveys at all levels provide similar descriptions. A wealth assessment is carried out using a regionwide, uniform benchmark. The DA/CFSTF identifies those who qualify to graduate. The community evaluates the results of the DA/CFSTF and KFSTF. Clients can register complaints to the KAC if they do not agree with the DA/CFSTF and KFSTF assessments. In other regions, officials responsible for graduation were less clear on these processes, in part because so little graduation had taken place. Because there has been so little graduation, it is not possible to use our quantitative household data to assess the extent to which households participate in this process.
- *RQ14(c): Is the graduation process transparent? Are people aware of the graduation criteria? Does this experience differ between male and female-headed households?* Most regional respondents were aware of the requirements of graduation benchmarks, but the responsibility for setting these benchmarks differed across regions. Amhara’s clear, uniform benchmark was understood at all levels, whereas in Oromiya and SNNP this responsibility seems to have been devolved to woredas. This has led to some confusion at the woreda level, with differing benchmarks across woredas. At the household level, too few households graduated to assess quantitatively whether graduation is understood or is perceived to be transparent. That said, the absence of clear criteria in some localities, together with the fact that few graduated households were interviewed prior to graduation, or told that they would be graduating, suggests that graduation is not fully transparent.
- *RQ14(d): Do people (those selected for graduation, those who remain in receipt of PSNP transfers, and others) perceive the fairness and accuracy of the graduation process?* There are not enough graduated households to answer this question quantitatively.
- *RQ14(e): For households that have graduated from the PSNP, what support (technical, financial, or other) have they received to ensure that they do not fall back into the PSNP?* Most graduated households have not received technical or financial support.
- *RQ14(f): Have graduates from PSNP sustained / built their assets and livelihoods?* There are not enough graduated households to answer this question quantitatively. Note that the finding that there has been little graduation is consistent with the results discussed in chapter 4 on targeting.

#### **RQ9: For how long PSNP households were in the program?**

The results indicate that households are not being moved in and out; rather, those selected during the early years of PSNP4 remained in the program.



# Chapter 1: Introduction

## 1.1. Background

Beginning in 2005, the Government of Ethiopia and a consortium of donors implemented a new response to chronic food insecurity in rural Ethiopia. Rather than annual appeals for assistance and ad hoc distributions, the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) was established.

The PSNP “...provides transfers to the food insecure population ... in a way that prevents asset depletion at the household level and creates assets at the community level”. Unlike annual emergency appeals, it was conceived as a multi-year program so as to provide recipients with predictable and reliable transfers. The PSNP uses a mix of geographic and community-based targeting to identify beneficiaries. Approximately 80 percent of participants receive six months of employment on labour intensive public works projects. These emphasize reversing environmental degradation, improving water control and improving road access. The remainder, largely households whose primary income earners are elderly or disabled, receive unconditional transfers. Payments are made in both food and cash.

Despite its achievements, the precarious nature of livelihoods in localities means that a social protection intervention like the PSNP is still required in these areas. Additional efforts are needed to integrate the programme with nutrition and agricultural extension services. Clear awareness of these on the part of the Ethiopian government and its development partners led to the design and adoption of PSNP 4.

PSNP 4’s overall Project Development Objective is to achieve: ‘Increased access to safety net and disaster risk management systems, complementary livelihoods services and nutrition support for food insecure households in rural Ethiopia’ (World Bank 2014: 21). It will attempt to achieve this through: 1. Support for building core instruments and tools of social protection and DRM systems; 2. Delivery of safety net and enhanced access to livelihoods services for vulnerable rural households; 3. Improved programme management and institutional coordination. A prominent theme of PSNP 4 is the desire to integrate frameworks and move towards a ‘systems approach’ (Ministry of Agriculture (2014)). This requires the necessary administrative structures and institutional capabilities to consolidate overlapping areas into a more integrated and predictable safety net.

A number of innovations in the design of the PSNP 4 contribute to these objectives. First, programme support will be organized around the idea of ‘livelihood pathways’, with packages of support (transfers, technical assistance, access to credit, training) tailored for different categories of chronically food insecure households. The incorporation of a livelihoods component in PSNP 4 builds on the architecture and delivery mechanisms established under the Household Asset Building Programme (HABP), which no longer exists as a separate program. The provision of new livelihood transfers (start-up capital), drawing on practice from other contexts, it is hoped will help to increase the prospects of graduation, which have been disappointing thus far. It is intended by this merging that support for building livelihoods and supporting graduation is closely integrated with other programme components that work well, including the delivery of transfers and public works implementation. A second innovation is the goal of shifting the Permanent Direct Support caseload to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA). This recognizes that there are categories of households that have very little or no prospect of ‘graduation’ and will always need some level of assistance, such as the old, chronically sick, or disabled. One of the strengths of the PSNP was establishing robust delivery systems

and capacity at all administrative levels down to the kebele-level. The hope was that in the PSNP 4 the operational capacity of the MOLSA will be expanded at the woreda and kebele-levels.

## 1.2. Objectives, research questions, and focus

### 1.2.1 Objectives of the evaluation

The PSNP4 End-line Evaluation provides:

- i. An independent assessment of progress in program performance across all components (as detailed under the research questions below) and implementing agencies and identify key factors negatively or positively influencing program performance.
- ii. A rigorous assessment of the impact of the PSNP in terms of poverty reduction (measured by consumption), resilience to shocks, food security and human development indicators. Impacts will be differentiated by household characteristics, as well as duration and predictability of transfers.
- iii. Insights in to why and how changes in program delivery and impacts have been achieved.

Three reports document the findings with respect to these three objectives, namely: **Program Performance Report** and **two reports on Progress towards Outcomes**. The Performance report provides a basic analysis of program performance (inputs, activities, and outputs), with analysis of program performance across implementing agencies, regions and highland as compared with lowland areas. It will triangulate data obtained from key informant interviews and households surveys in the RQs where this is possible. The companion Outcome Reports, entitled “*Program Outcomes: Highlands*”, and “*Program Outcomes: Lowlands*”, furnish information on the outcomes of the PSNP and provide evidence of attribution.

With the end-line study, these objectives are accomplished by addressing 20 Research Questions (RQ). Table 1.1 summarises how the structure of the three reports matches onto the list of RQs provided in the modified Terms of Reference.

**Table 1.1: Research Question map**

Number	Research Question	Report	Chapter
RQ1	To what extent has the PSNP improved food security (including dietary diversity) among households participating in the program?	Outcomes (Highlands) Outcomes (Lowlands)	4
RQ2	Has PSNP impacted household resilience to shocks?	Outcomes (Highlands) Outcomes (Lowlands)	5
RQ3	Has PSNP reduced poverty?	Outcomes (Highlands) Outcomes (Lowlands)	7
RQ4	Has PSNP improved human development outcomes?	Performance Outcomes (Highlands)	5 8
RQ5	How was PSNP4 adapted to address the COVID-19 pandemic?	Performance	5 6 7 9
RQ6	Were payments to clients timely and predictable?	Performance	6
RQ7	How are impacts differentiated by duration and predictability of transfers?	Outcomes (Highlands) Outcomes (Lowlands)	10
RQ8	How are impacts differentiated by household characteristics?	Outcomes (Highlands) Outcomes (Lowlands)	4 5 7 9

RQ9	For how long PSNP households were in the program?	Performance	4 10
RQ10	What is the relation between PSNP and HFA participation?	PSNP4 Evaluation – Main Findings	
RQ11	Has participation in the PSNP influenced the labor allocation and work intensity decisions of beneficiary households?	Outcomes (Highlands) Outcomes (Lowlands)	6
RQ12	How does the shock responsive component of PSNP (the federal contingency budget) protect people against covariate shocks?	Outcomes (Highlands) Outcomes (Lowlands)	5
RQ13	Assessing PSNP Targeting	Performance	3 4 8
RQ14	Assessing Graduation	Performance	10
RQ15	Assessing Transfers (Payments) performance	Performance	6
RQ16	Administration of Contingency budgets	Performance	9
RQ17	Use of transfers	Outcomes (Highlands) Outcomes (Lowlands)	3
RQ18	PSNP public works and links to services	Performance	7
RQ19	Social Accountability and Grievance Redress	Performance	3
RQ20	PSNP Livelihood component	Performance	8

The Performance Report has 8 substantive chapters (chapters 3-10) in addition to this introductory chapter and chapter 2 on data and methodology.

## Chapter 2: Data and Methodology

### 2.1. Performance report preparation and methods

This report provides an independent assessment of progress in program performance across all components and implementing agencies at federal, regional, Woreda and community-levels. An important component of this work is to report and triangulate the experience and perception of the clients and non-clients. Assessing performance at each level (as compared with the Program Implementation Manual- PIM) reflects the decentralized nature of program implementation, and the differing roles and responsibilities of each level of government. The research questions addressed in this report are framed in terms of the output and activity level indicators of the PSNP4 log-frame. It covers PSNP4 operations in the Lowlands (Afar, Somali) and Highlands (Amhara, Oromiya, SNNP).<sup>2</sup> The Tigray region is not included due to security concerns.

### 2.2. Sampling and data collection

#### 2.2.1. Quantitative data

As in 2016 and 2018, the principal source of quantitative information is the survey implemented by the Central Statistics Authority (CSA) with support from IFPRI. In 2021, these data were collected between April and May 2021; this is close to the timing of the 2018 survey which was June/July 2018 (rainy, lean season) but later than the baseline data which were collected in January/February 2016 (dry, postharvest season). The timing of the 2021 surveys was dictated by the need to ensure that PSNP activities had been undertaken in 2021 (these data are needed for many of the research questions addressed in this Report) but also by the need to ensure that data collection was completed well in advance of national elections scheduled for June 2021.

The design of the quantitative sample was based on careful power calculations conducted to determine the minimum number of sample enumeration areas and households needed to be able to identify impacts of the PSNP 4. This involved carefully stratifying the sample between PW and DS households as well as the inclusion of non-beneficiary households into the sample. The sampling strategy (including the statistical power calculations) are described in the 2016 baseline report.<sup>3</sup>

Data collection followed a “cascading” design with information collected at the Woreda, Kebele and household level. The primary purpose of the Woreda quantitative survey was to collect information on how the flow of funds from regions to beneficiaries works in practice and the resources used to support those flows. It also included questions on contingency planning, targeting and Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA) and other assistance programs. In 2018, these data were collected in 109 Woredas. With Tigray not in the sample, the data covered 86 woredas in the 2021 round. Interviews were completed by experienced survey supervisors who were instructed to meet with staff associated with the Woreda Food Security Office (WFSO) as well as those knowledgeable of the payment system. Ideally, they were supposed to speak with the Head of the Food Security Office, the WOFED chief accountant, the PSNP accountant, and PSNP cashiers.

A quantitative community survey and a community price questionnaire were also fielded. In the community survey, the community is defined as the Kebele. Enumerators were instructed to interview at least five people who were knowledgeable about the community (e.g., community leaders, Kebele chairpersons, elders, priests, teachers). They included at least one member of the Kebele Food Security Task Force and at least

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<sup>2</sup> Strictly speaking there are four regions since the new Sidama regional state has emerged. See the note below regarding Sidama.

<sup>3</sup> The details of these calculations will also be included in the data and methodology chapter of the Outcomes Reports in which their significance would be more apparent.

one woman. The community questionnaire covered the following topics: location and access; water and electricity; services; education and health facilities; production and marketing; migration; wages; prices of food grains in the last year; operational aspects of the PSNP, including questions about the operations of the FSTFs, public works, and direct support; the Kebele Appeals Committees; and on graduation. Questions were also asked about the Livelihood Component, on attitudes toward targeting and on moving pregnant women to Temporary Direct Support. The community price questionnaire collected data on local wages and prices, the latter used to value in-kind consumption as well as the local value of in-kind PSNP and HFA transfers. A total of 197 community surveys were conducted at end-line. The household questionnaire is a multi-topic instrument collecting information on household participation in the PSNP, their knowledge of PSNP operations and data needed to construct outcome indicators that are required for the Outcomes Report.

In the Highlands, we use a longitudinal household (or panel) design. The revised ToRs for IFPRI required using a longitudinal household design in the Lowland regions of Afar and Somali. After extensive consultation, both with IFPRI and internally, CSA decided that this was not feasible.<sup>4</sup> For this reason, in the Lowlands we used a hybrid longitudinal-cross sectional design. Specifically, the Lowlands survey took place in the same Woredas surveyed in 2016 and 2018 but selected a new sample of households. The attraction of this approach is that it allowed us to assess changes in PSNP implementation over time in the same localities while eliminating concerns regarding attrition at the household level.

The total number of households interviewed during the baseline survey in 2016 was 9,274 households across all regions (7,291 in the Highlands and 1,983 in the Lowlands). These households were located in 112 Woredas (88 in the Highlands and 24 in the Lowlands) and 336 Enumeration Areas (264 in the Highlands and 72 in the Lowlands).

In 2018, 6,998 households were re-interviewed in the Highlands. The 293 households not interviewed represent an attrition rate of 4.0 percent. Attrition was highest in Oromiya (5.5 percent) and lowest in SNNP (2.9 percent) with some of the attrition due to security problems that prevented CSA teams from visiting survey sites in Darolebu Woreda in Oromiya region and Yirgacheffe Woreda in SNNP. The remaining attrition was random. In the Lowlands, 1,983 households were surveyed in 2016 and 1,945 households in 2018.

A major change in the 2021 was the exclusion of the Tigray region from the quantitative survey. As a consequence, the Highlands sample is smaller than that used in the baseline and midline performance reports. A total of 5,111 households form the Highlands sample in the end-line survey. These households reside in 196 EAs from 66 woredas. Two EAs (one in Liben woreda and another in Adea Berga woreda, both in Oromiya) were not covered by the CSA due to security challenges. This partly accounts for the household attrition that occurred in the course of the three rounds. A total of 382 households (7 percent or 3.5 percent per round) dropped with the highest attrition rate recorded in Oromiya sub-sample (11 percent or 5.5 percent per round) and the lowest in SNNP (3 percent or 1.5 percent per round).

As noted above, a new sample of households is drawn for each round in the Lowlands (Afar and Somali). In 2021, this sample is composed of 2084 households from 70 EAs and 23 woredas.

Another major development since the midline survey is the establishment of the new Sidama Regional State in 2020 from the Sidama zone of SNNP after a referendum. In the PSNP4 study sample there are four woredas from that region (previously zone) out of the 22 in SNNP. In light of the fact that the new regional state was formed in the middle of the last year of PSNP4, it was deemed reasonable to retain SNNP as the region for the purposes of this report.

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<sup>4</sup> CSA gave two reasons: (a) concern that in highly mobile populations (especially in Afar), it would not be possible to trace households interviewed in 2018 or 2016, leading to unacceptably high rates of sample attrition; and (b) Difficulties in distinguishing between households where surnames are similar (for example, where these are clan-based names).



### 2.2.2. Qualitative data

In the Highlands, 11 *Woredas* were selected for in-depth qualitative work. These were allocated as follows: Amhara (3), Oromiya (4), SNNP (3), Sidama (1).<sup>5</sup> These were chosen based in the following criteria:

- Representation of livelihood zones
- Coincidence with quantitative household survey work;
- Woredas that have the e-payment pilot;
- Woredas that have implemented the livelihoods transfer;
- Representation of Woredas from the previous sample frame;
- Woredas with HFA caseload;
- Woredas with displaced populations.

**Table 2.1: Highland Woreda sample**

Region	Woredas	2018 evaluation	E-payment	Livelihood transfer	HFA	IDPs
Amhara (3)	Angolele Tera	X	X			
	Mekdela			X	X	
	Libo Kemkem	X	X		X	X
Oromiya (4)	Chiro	X	X		X	
	Kuyu	X	X			
	Fadis				X	X
	Zeway Dugda	X				
SNNP (3)	Arbaminch Zuria	X	X			
	Boloso Sore	X				
	Sodo Zurya			X		
Sidama (1)	Loko Abaya	X				

In the Lowlands, six *Woredas* were selected for in-depth qualitative work equally allocated across Afar (3) and Somali (3). Woredas were chosen based on the following criteria:

- Representation of Woredas from the previous sample frame;
- Woredas that have the e-payment pilot;
- Woredas that have HFA caseloads;
- Woredas that have displaced populations;
- Coincidence with quantitative household survey work;

<sup>5</sup> Loko Abaya is now part of the new Sidama regional state is identified as such in this sub-section. For reasons noted above, the analysis and results are reported for SNNP.

**Table 2.2: Lowland Woreda sample**

Region	Woredas	2018 evaluation	E-payment	HFA	IDPs
Somali	Errer	X			X
	Gursum	X			
	Shinile	X	X	X	
Afar	Ewa	X			
	Elidar	X		X	
	Dubti	X	X		X

*Note:* In the Afar sample, Gewane woreda has been replaced by Dubti woreda due to security concerns.

In both the Highlands and Lowlands, we implemented a cascading set of interviews, holding key informant interviews (KIIs) at the regional, Woreda and Kebele level. Because of restrictions relating to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, we did not undertake focus group discussions at the household level.

In the Highlands, at the regional level, there were 2-3 KIIs: one interview with the chair and/or members of the Food Security Task force (if not available then leads of Technical Committees Chairs on Systems Development (BoA, FS-DRM, BOLSA), Public Works (Natural Resources) and Livelihoods (Ag. Extension/Livestock/Food Security)); one interview with a member/technical lead on the Transfers and Resource Management Technical Committee; and one interview with the chair and/or members of the LICU Livelihood Unit. In the Lowlands, there will be 2-3 KIIs with regional officials: One interview with the chair and/or members of the Food Security Task force (if not available then leads of Technical Committees Chairs on Systems Development (BOLSA), Public Works (Natural Resources) and Livelihoods (Ag. Extension/Livestock/Food Security)); and one interview with a member/technical lead on early warning and transfers.

At the Woreda level, there were 4-5 KIIs in the Highlands: One or two 2 interviews with the chair and/or members of the Woreda Food Security Task force (WFSTF); 1 interview with members/technical leads on Livelihoods and Public Works; 1 interview with a member/technical lead on the Transfers and Resource Management Technical Committee; and one interview with an MFI and/or cooperative promotion agency. There will be 2-3 KIIs at the Woreda level in the Lowlands: One interview with the chair and/or members of the Woreda Food Security Task force (WFSTF) (including someone from public works as well as WFP and NGOs, in particular in Somali Region). If the full WFSTF was not available to meet together, then we carried out these separate interviews: 1 interview with members/technical leads on Livelihoods and Public Works; one interview with a member/technical lead on the Transfers and Resource Management Technical Committee

At the Kebele level, there were three KIIs: one discussion with members of the Kebele Food Security Task Force (KFSTF); and 1-2 discussions with Development Agents (DAs). In the Lowlands, we also carried out one discussion with traditional leaders.

### **2.3. Methods**

Descriptive statistics, presented in tabular and figure form, and quantifying of qualitative interviews supported by appropriately selected key quotations are the primary method used in this report.

## Chapter 3: PSNP Structures

### 3.1. Introduction

The Project Implementation Manual (PIM) of PSNP 4 outlines the nature and roles of structures and processes created to implement the program. These exist at several levels, most notably the woreda and the kebele. They provide two core functions: (1) They are the means through which important aspects of program implementation (targeting, payments) are carried out; and (2) They are conduits of information from the regions, to woredas, to kebeles, and ultimately to PSNP clients and other households residing in localities where the PSNP operates.

This chapter updates findings from the 2016 Baseline and 2018 Midline Performance Reports on the existence and functioning of these structures. We are especially interested in observing whether they have been significant changes over the period 2018-2021. This information contributes to addressing **RQ5: How was PSNP4 adapted to address the Covid-19 pandemic?** By reporting on whether implementation structures (apart from social accountability structures which are covered in chapter 5) were altered in light of the Covid-19 pandemic on program operations. We draw heavily on quantitative data collected at the Woreda and Kebele level. Doing so also contributes information relevant to **RQ13: Assessing PSNP Targeting** - Are the committees established according to the PIM and local level implementers aware of their roles and responsibilities?

Section 3.2 describes woreda structures and how they have changed over time. Section 3.3 describes kebele structures and section 3.4 summarizes.

### 3.2. Woreda structures

We begin with staffing of Woreda Food Security Task Forces (WFSTF). Across all five regions, our data show that key personnel are mostly men (Figure 3.1), overwhelmingly so in the case of senior positions: 87 percent of WFSO Heads; 90 percent of WOFED Chief Accountants; 83 percent of PSNP Accountants; and 59 percent of PSNP cashiers. These percentages are similar to what was observed at baseline in 2016 and there are small variations in these percentages across regions. In Afar, Amhara, Oromiya and SNNP, the percentage of WFSO heads, WOFED Chief Accountants, PSNP Accountants, and PSNP cashiers who have completed university ranges from 82 to 95 percent. Education levels of key staff are lower in Somali; just 66 percent of WFSO heads and WOFED Chief Accountants had post-secondary education.

**Figure 3.1: Percent of senior positions held by men, 2021, all regions**






Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of years spent in current post and Woreda, by position, region, and survey year. Longer periods of time spent in post is an indicator of lower levels of staff turnover. Across all regions, the percentage of individuals in post for less than one year was 12 percent (Head, Food Security Office), six percent for the WOFED Chief Accountant and less than five percent for the PSNP accountant and cashier. This indicates that the onset of the pandemic was not associated with increased staff turnover in these staff positions.

**Figure 3.2: Distribution of years spent in current post and Woreda, by position, region, survey year**


**Head, Woreda Food Security Office**




**WOFED Chief Accountant**



### PSNP accountant




### PSNP cashier



Source: PSNP 4 Baseline, Midline and Endline Woreda Quantitative Survey

Nearly all Heads of Food Security Offices and PSNP4 accountants have received training, 92 and 91 percent respectively with little variation by region (Figure 3.3). WOFED chief accountants and PSNP4 cashiers are less likely to have been trained (60 percent across all five regions), especially in Amhara and SNNP regions.

**Figure 3.3: Share of officers receiving related work training by position, year and region**




Source: PSNP 4 Baseline, Midline and Endline Woreda Quantitative Survey



Generally, as Figure 3.4 shows, woreda officials reported that PSNP documentation is available.<sup>6</sup> Exceptions are materials related to graduation and the livelihood component in Afar and Somali, neither of which are widely implemented in the Lowlands.

**Figure 3.4: Percentage of woredas holding PSNP4 documents, by document, region, and year**



Source: PSNP 4 Baseline, Midline and Endline Woreda Quantitative Survey

The number of working computers and printers available for exclusive PSNP has either increased or remained constant (Table 3.1)

<sup>6</sup> Note that enumerators did not ask for physical proof that these documents were available.


**Table 3.1: Cashiers, working computers, and printers, by region and year**

Region	Number of cashiers work exclusively for the PSNP			Number of working computers available for exclusive PSNP use			Number of working printers available for exclusive PSNP use		
	Mean								
	2016	2018	2021	2016	2018	2021	2016	2018	2021
Afar	0	1	1.0	2	2	2.7	2	1	1.8
Amhara	2	2	1.1	6	5	7.0	3	3	3.3
Oromiya	1	2	1.3	4	3	4.1	3	2	2.1
Somali	1	2	4.0	3	4	2.5	1	2	1.5
SNNP	1	1	1.1	3	4	3.7	2	2	1.8

Source: PSNP 4 Baseline, Midline and Endline Woreda Quantitative Survey

Availability of vehicles, when needed, has improved in Afar, Somali and Oromiya, which the former two reporting better access in 2021 than in Oromiya (around 60% in comparison to 41%); see Figure 3.5. By contrast, availability deteriorated in Amhara and SNNP and there was a dramatic drop from 70% at baseline to 5% in SNNP. We do not know why this occurred.

**Figure 3.5: Share of woredas reporting availability of Government owned vehicles when needed**



Source: PSNP 4 Baseline, Midline and Endline Woreda Quantitative Survey

### 3.3. Kebele structures


The KFSTF is a decision-making body that oversees all planning and implementation of PSNP activities on behalf of the Kebele Cabinet (PIM, section 18.3.2.1). It consists of three broad groups: Kebele leadership (Chairperson or other members of the Kebele council; Kebele administrators or managers); representatives of specific community constituencies (elders, youth, women, clan leaders); and technical experts whose job descriptions include supporting the safety net (Health Extension Workers and/or Volunteer Community Health Workers; Development Agents; Social Workers; and, where they exist members of the Community Care Coalition (CCC)).

Detailed results are found in Annex Figure A3.1. The following trends are apparent. First, KFSTF composition in SNNP largely matches what is envisaged in the PIM. There is little change over time, with

the exception of increased inclusion of social workers and members of the CCC. Second, kebele council representation falls in Afar, Oromiya and Somali, both between 2016 and 2021 and between 2018 and 2021. Third, representation from certain civil groups, most notably elder and youth and falls, especially in Oromiya and Somali. Fourth, participation by technical experts – Health Extension Workers and Development Agents – falls in Afar, Oromiya and Somali, again both between 2016 and 2021 and between 2018 and 2021.

Figure 3.6 shows the duration of membership by region and survey year. This gives a sense as to whether, over time, the continued presence of the same individuals creates the possibility of “institutional memory” on KFSTF operations or if there is a high degree of member turnover. In terms of turnover, these data suggest that it is high. In Oromiya and Afar 70% and 83%, respectively, of KFSTF members had been on the KFSTF for two years or less. Turnover was higher in Afar, Amhara, Oromiya and SNNP in 2021 than it was in 2018. This implies that, when the pandemic began (in March 2020), some KFSTF members had, at the best, one prior year of experience on PSNP operations.

**Figure 3.6: Percent of individuals who have been KFSTF members for two years or less, by region and year**



As we did in the baseline and endline surveys, the quantitative community questionnaire obtained information on specified activities that KFSTFs should undertake. Enumerators were instructed to not only ask about whether certain types of records were kept, but also to request to see these records to verify their existence. Results show that in 77 percent of our surveyed kebeles, minutes of meetings were kept by KFSTFs and 72 percent of these were able to show these when requested. Roughly four out of five (83 percent) of kebeles had lists of beneficiaries, however the percentage of kebeles that could show these to our enumerators was below 80 percent in all regions except for SNNP. Among kebeles who had these lists, only half posted them publicly. Fewer than half of all kebeles had a list of payment dates and only half of these posted these publicly.

**Table 3.2: Kebele Food Security Task Force (KFSTF) record keeping, by region, 2021**


Region	Percent of KFSTFs:						
	Keep minutes of its meetings	At least one minutes seen	Have a list of PSNP participants	At least one list seen	Posted the current list of beneficiaries in a public place in the Kebele	Kebele has a list of payment dates	Posted the list of payment dates in a public place in the Kebele
Afar	69	64	75	56	26	47	53
Amhara	100	74	98	71	49	47	46
Oromiya	62	65	77	59	48	47	18
Somali	34	42	57	70	30	23	50
SNNP	97	83	92	84	75	66	76
All regions	77	72	83	70	51	48	50

Source: Quantitative Community Survey.

To see whether these record keeping activities had changed over time, we looked more closely at whether participant lists were publicly posted (in other words, does the kebele keep such a list AND do they post it publicly); and whether the KFSTF had a list of payment dates AND posted these in a public place – important for making sure that PSNP clients know when to expect their payments. The posting of client lists is described in the PIM as one mechanism for ensuring fair and transparent client selection (section 2.3) – a key PSNP principle - and is an important part of community-based triangulation of targeting (PIM, section 3.7.1) A second principle is timely, predictable, and appropriate transfers (PIM, section 2.3. As the PIM notes, transfers can be considered predictable if PSNP clients have timely knowledge of their eligibility for the programme, and they know what type of transfer they will receive, how much of this transfer they will receive and when they will receive it. Posting client lists and dates of payments contributes to meeting this principle.


We calculated the percentage of kebeles who posted this information publicly using the community surveys fielded in 2016, 2018 and 2021. Results are shown in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. Figure 3.7 shows that PSNP4 client lists – as a general rule – were not posted publicly. The only region that comes close to meeting this requirement is SNNP. Further, in the other regions, the percentage of kebeles posting client lists fell in comparison to the midline. It is possible that, because of turnover in staffing of KFSTFs, that new members do not know about this requirement, but we do not know for certain.

**Figure 3.7: Percent kebeles who have a PSNP client list that they post publicly, by region and survey year**



PSNP4 payment dates were rarely posted publicly. The best performing region is SNNP and there, only half of all kebeles did so. In all other regions, the percentage of kebeles posting payment dates fell between 2018 and 2021.

**Figure 3.8: Percent kebeles who have a list of payment dates that they post publicly, by region and survey year**



### 3.4. Summary

Taken all together, these results tell two different stories.

At the woreda level, turnover of key staff has declined over the full period in which PSNP4 has operated. The onset of the pandemic did not coincide with an increase in turnover; if anything turnover appears to have fallen. Most key personal have received training and the proportion of those trained did not fall since midline, a reflection, possibly of the limited woreda level turnover that occurred. Resources – PSNP documentation, computers and printers, and cashiers – remain largely unchanged between 2016 and 2021, with no noticeable drop between 2018 and 2021. Vehicle availability, and changes in availability varied by region: improving in Somali, significantly worsening in Amhara and SNNP and sometimes improving and sometimes worsening in Afar and Oromiya. Putting this all together, with reference to RQ5, we see no evidence that the woreda level PSNP structures or resources described here were adapted to address the Covid-19 pandemic.

A different story emerges at the kebele level. Apart from SNNP, over time increasingly the composition of the KFSTFs *does not* resemble what is envisaged in the PIM. Particularly striking are the reductions in representation from members of the kebele council and of technical experts, such as HEWs and DAs, in Afar, Oromiya and Somali. Also noteworthy are reductions in civil society groups such as elders or youth,


with SNNP, again, being the exception. With respect to whether committees are established according to the PIM, at the kebele level, apart from SNNP and to a certain extent Amhara, the answer seems to be no.


Turnover of KFSTF members is high with between 70 (Oromiya) and 83 (Afar) percent of KFSTF members had been on the KFSTF for two years or less. Further, turnover was higher in four regions (Afar, Amhara, Oromiya, SNNP) in 2021 than it was in 2018 meaning that when the pandemic began (in March 2020), most KFSTF members had, at most, one year of experience with the operations of the PSNP. Possibly as a consequence of this turnover, record keeping is well below what is envisaged in the PSNP 4 PIM. As a general rule (with SNNP again being something of an exception), client lists are not posted publicly, nor are payment dates (possibly because many kebeles do not have this information themselves). We do not know if these changes were conscious decisions as a result of the pandemic, but they are clearly problematic for the implementation and monitoring of the program. They imply a reduction in kebele-level ability to implement aspects of the PSNP and also suggest that PSNP clients and other households in localities where the PSNP operates are unlikely to have good information on program operations – such as when they will be paid. We return to these concerns in chapters 5 and 6.





## Chapter 3 annex

**Figure 3.9: Composition of the *Kebele* Food Security Task Force (KFSTF), by region**









Source: Baseline, midline and endline quantitative Community Survey.

## Chapter 4: Targeting

### 4.1. Introduction

The baseline survey in 2016 found that targeting in the highlands was working well. There were few inclusion or exclusion errors, the latter largely associated with caseload quotas than shortcomings in practice. The midline survey in 2018 confirmed that progress had been maintained, although under-coverage and the application of the household cap were proving challenging. By contrast, studies have raised repeated concerns about targeting in the lowlands. Although the baseline found a high level of awareness among woreda and kebele officials about how targeting should be done, the poorest households in Afar and Somali were not benefiting from the PSNP as they should. Consequently, the targeting chapter of the 2018 midline performance report looked in depth at the lowlands. It identified numerous efforts to strengthen practice, including translating guidelines and experimenting with guidance tailored to pastoral areas, posting targeting lists in public places, improving the representation of women and youth on targeting committees, and providing refresher training. However, the effectiveness of these efforts appeared mixed with the poorest households in Afar and Somali continuing to be among the least likely to participate in the PSNP.

Mindful of these findings, this chapter re-visits the targeting of PSNP4. It contains results relevant to two research questions. (i) **RQ9: For how long PSNP households were in the program?** For PSNP households: when they were enrolled first? did they ever exit and return? and if so, how many times, and when they were enrolled last? What were the reasons for exiting the program? What was the reason for re-entering the program? For the comparison group: were they ever enrolled in the program? for how long? and when they exited?<sup>7</sup> and (ii) **RQ13: Assessing PSNP Targeting:** To what extent are PSNP safety net transfers targeted to the right people (as defined by the eligibility criteria in the PIM)? When selected for participation in the PSNP, are people correctly assigned to the appropriate client category? How is the targeting process carried out? Are the committees established according to the PIM and local level implementers aware of their roles and responsibilities? To what extent do households participate in the targeting process? Are these processes fair and transparent? Are people aware of the eligibility criteria and targeting procedures? How do people perceive the fairness and accuracy of the targeting process?<sup>8</sup>

The organization of the chapter is shaped by our findings. Specifically, as we detail in sections 4.2 and 4.3, in both the Highlands and the Lowlands, there is a high degree of continuity of participation and little evidence of substantial entry or exit. For this reason, it is not feasible to repeat the quantitative assessments of targeting found in the baseline and midline reports; for the vast majority of the PSNP clients in our study, their inclusion was based on their circumstances five or six years ago, not now. Instead, we focus on the processes by which targeting and the limited amount of re-targeting that has occurred and assessments of how successful this has been. This material is found in sections 4.3 and 4.4. The chapter uses information from Key Informant Interviews conducted at the regional, woreda and kebele level along with quantitative data from the woreda, kebele and household surveys to address these research questions.

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<sup>7</sup> RQ9 also includes the question, “Were any households graduated at various points in time covered by/ in between the surveys?” This is addressed in chapter 10.

<sup>8</sup> RQ13 also includes the question, “Are individuals entitled to Temporary Direct Support transferred to this client list according to the PIM provisions?” This is addressed in chapter 5.

## 4.2. Duration and constancy of participation: Insights from the qualitative fieldwork

In this section, we address RQ9: “For how long are PSNP households in the program?” by drawing on insights gained from analyzing our qualitative data. Did local officials undertake a significant amount of re-targeting, with consequences for duration and constancy of participation. If they did so, why? Was this an action undertaken under local initiative or did it reflect instructions received from woreda or kebele officials? Conversely, if re-targeting was limited, what were the reasons given for this? We first summarize our findings from the Highlands (Amhara, Oromiya, SNNP), then the Lowlands (Afar, Somali). We also summarize responses to questions about whether any re-targeting was done in light of Covid-19.

### 4.2.1. Highlands

We asked regional officials whether retargeting had taken place in the last three years and whether there were differences with past practice. All highland regions confirmed that it had, although the debate among members of the RFSTF in Oromiya illustrates the difference between the annual recertification exercise, which updates the client list to reflect graduation, successful appeals, and household circumstances, and the less frequent full retargeting.

R1: Yes, retargeting was done every year. R2: Retargeting is done to replace PSNP clients who have left the program by their own choice/decision or have died; usually these people are replaced by their close family members. R3: Look, this is not retargeting as long as the clients were not evaluated against the eligibility criteria and those who don't fulfil the criteria are removed from the program and other community members who fulfil the criteria replace them. In my opinion, there was no retargeting carried out during the last two years. *[ORO-RFSTF]*

In PSNP, retargeting is conducted annually. This provides an opportunity to correct any errors. The retargeting conducted since Hamle 2010 [EC] has no difference to the previous periods.

Since PSNP 4, the criteria used for retargeting are exposure to chronic food insecurity, residence, and correction of inclusion and exclusion errors. There is also a need to replace members leaving from death, change of residence, and graduation. *[SNN-RFSTF]*

However, there was a change in a related aspect of client selection, namely the encouragement of full family targeting in Amhara. The midline survey found that the household cap was the most frequently cited factor influencing targeting outcomes. The federal government then decided that full family targeting would be allowed if budgets permit; no additional funds are made available for this purpose. Rather than use resources freed up by those exiting the program to bring in new households, the approach in Amhara is to increase the number of beneficiaries within targeted households to accelerate their progress towards graduation. An implication of this is that there may be less new entry into the program since 2018, something we return to in section 4.3.

To improve targeting we encouraged woredas to exercise full family targeting as far as possible. We also provided training especially for new staffs. There was no new guidance issued related to targeting. *[AMH-RFSTF]*

We asked WFSTF members to describe what had been done to improve targeting during the evaluation period. Like their regional colleagues and kebele officials, most woreda officials in the highlands refer to any change to the client list as ‘retargeting’; the exception was Kuyu.

We make retargeting every year by identifying dead clients, [those who have] changed their residence, those who have graduated themselves by not participating in public works, and households who have graduated by fulfilling graduation benchmarks. *[AMH-MEK-WFSTF]*

Yes, retargeting was carried out every year except this year. The reason is that we are planning to undertake full targeting for PSNP 5 by the end of June this year. *[ORO-CHI-WFSTF]*

No, mass retargeting has not been carried out since Hamle 2010 [EC], but replacement of clients in place of those who have left the program / kebele or have died has been undertaken in some kebeles, but not in all. *[ORO-KUY-WFSTF]*

Both Mekdela in Amhara and Arbaminch Zuria in SNNP describe working towards full family targeting rather than bringing in new households, echoing the earlier statement by the RFSTF in Amhara.

We improved targeting by trying to make it full family, using the resources of those who have graduated. In such a way we reduced the targeting errors and appeals cases. *[AMH-MEK-WFSTF]*

We have been using retargeting to improve the household cap of PSNP clients considering full family targeting. We don't retarget new households. *[SNN-ARB-WFSTF]*

#### **4.2.2. Lowlands**

Regional officials in the Lowlands were clear that full retargeting last took place in 2009 [EC], before the evaluation period. There was some further retargeting in newly created woredas of Afar in 2011 [EC], but since these new woredas included kebeles from old woredas their existing targeting lists were used. The region trained staff in the new woredas and introduced the household cap, although the RFSTF describes capping the registration of household members, not just the number receiving transfers.<sup>9</sup>

Retargeting on a large scale has not been done in our region since 2010 [EC]. Before that, full retargeting was done twice, in 2008 and 2009 [EC]. Since then, only replacements were made for those beneficiaries who died and for some divorced households. *[SOM-RFSTF]*

R1: In 2009 [EC] we implemented full targeting. In 2011 [EC] we also did retargeting according to the PSNP 4 PIM in some newly created woredas. These included kebeles from the other old woredas therefore no new targeting was done; we handed over the master list of beneficiaries already targeted. R2: We also provided training and different formats for the newly created woreda experts on how to implement public works and some refresher training on retargeting compared with PSNP 3. The major change during retargeting was that we only registered five people in each household or applied the household cap. *[AFA-RFSTF]*

We also explored how Lowland regions dealt with the household cap. The replies of RFSTF members illustrate their limited room to maneuver, balancing community demand on the one hand with the operating constraints of the program on the other. Those in Somali had taken no particular action while those in Afar had focused on managing expectations.

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<sup>9</sup> The PIM (3-8) states that all household members should be registered, even if transfers are limited to a maximum of five.

We never practiced any mechanism to manage the challenge as it is sensitive. If we try to make it full family household cap by extending the number of beneficiaries within the targeted households, it requires us to reduce/exclude the number of beneficiary households and this is another challenge. Hence, we never practiced it. *[SOM-RFSTF]*

R1: Honestly speaking, the household cap was the main challenge in both the old and the newly created woredas where targeting and retargeting were implemented. All community members were complaining about this kind of registration. However, we resolved the complaint by increasing awareness of the rule of PSNP among clan leaders and community members. We also told the woredas that we can't resolve this issue here at the regional level. R2: I remember in 2011 [EC] during a meeting with the federal [level] that we mentioned this issue. However, they told us they can't do anything because of resource limitation. *[AFA-RFSTF]*

Consistent with the information provided at the regional level, both woreda and kebele officials emphasized that re-targeting was limited, prompted by administrative boundary changes or household circumstances such as migration or death.

In 2011 [EC] we conducted [retargeting] in which we corrected inclusion and exclusion errors. We removed some and corrected missing individuals like those who had died or moved to other areas and replaced them with others. The WFSTF planned the retargeting and deployed TAs to the kebeles to carry out the retargeting exercise with the kebele committees, correcting issues that arose after their earlier targeting. This was different from the previous [exercise] in that it only corrected minor errors. *[SOM-GUR-WFSTF]*

We have never undertaken retargeting in this kebele during this period. We have [only] replaced PSNP members who have died. *[SOM-GUR-KFSTF]*

Retargeting was done every year to replace people who had died in a household. [Otherwise], there is no new registration or retargeting in the kebele as the first targeted people have still not been graduated or shifted to any [other] type of PSNP client. *[AFA-EWA-KFSTF]*

R1: Our woreda exercised retargeting in all kebeles in 2011 [EC] according to the PSNP 4 PIM. For instance, in one kebele [this was] to add new beneficiaries because some part of the sub-kebele was removed from our kebele and included in other kebeles in other woreda. R2: For the other kebeles [in our woreda] we only changed the beneficiary name [to someone from] the same household if he had passed away or moved to another place. *[AFA-DUB-WFSTF]*

We did retargeting in 2011 [EC]. The main reason was that some parts of our sub-kebele were moved and included in another kebele. The beneficiaries (130 community members) of that sub-kebele were re-registered in another kebele and we replaced them with new beneficiaries who had been appealing for a long time. The other main reason is that some beneficiaries (20 members) left our kebele to live in Dubti town. Because of these reasons we included approximately 150 new beneficiaries in PSNP. These were selected from households left out because of the quota and other community members whom [the targeting committee] believed were poor. *[AFA-DUB-DA]*



Interestingly, retargeting in Errer did not involve a change in procedure but did lead to a change in the level of complaints, associated with the fact that transfer were now made in cash.

There was one time retargeting was carried out in this woreda where some corrections were made, like removing some households that had better livelihoods and some who had moved for example to Dire Dawa and adding some needy households. Compared to earlier targeting, this time complaints were many due to [the fact] that people were interested in the cash. When the payment became in cash, the household members were limited to five while it was more than five when payments were in food. *[SOM-ERR-WFSTF]*

#### **4.2.3. COVID-19**

We wondered if any re-targeting had been done in either the Highlands or Lowlands to extend coverage to households affected by Covid-19; the only reference was to an accelerated process in Angolela Tera. In the lowlands there was no mention of households being affected.

[The Covid-19 pandemic] only created time pressure. Previously retargeting was a two-month exercise but during Covid we did it within two weeks. *[AMH-ANG-KFSTF]*

There was a plan to undertake retargeting through the collection of household socio-economic data in 2012 [EC] but this plan was interrupted by Covid. *[SID-LOK-WFSTF]*

In our kebele up to now we didn't have any households affected by Covid-19 so we didn't change the targeting because of it. *[AFA-DUB-DA]*

However, the WFSTF in Sodo Zurya reported efforts to incorporate Covid-related impacts in future targeting, while the DA in Loko Abaya described steps taken to protect existing PSNP clients from Covid-related impacts.

The contingency budget was used to address the needs of people who lost their casual work due to Covid. About 120 beneficiaries have been assisted by the woreda contingency. Though not yet implemented, a retargeting exercise has been done that has also included the impacts of Covid. This is on hold due to regional guidance to hold retargeting. *[SNN-SOD-WFSTF]*

There were no changes in targeting made to extend coverage to those households affected by Covid. There was continuation of transfer to the households [already] included because of the consideration that any exclusion in this period would result in clients falling into problems. There was no new targeting and no graduation. *[SID-LOK-DA]*

### **4.3. Duration and constancy of participation: Insights from the household survey**

We now triangulate what officials told us had happened about re-targeting with data from the household survey; doing so also allows us to quantitatively measure the duration and constancy of participation. Respondents in both the Highlands and the Lowlands self-report their PSNP status both currently and in preceding years. We use their responses to create a variable that equals one if the household either participated in Public Works or received Direct Support in different years. This allows us to calculate the number of years that households were PSNP clients. By merging the midline and endline data, we can


assess continuity of annual participation in the Highlands over a six-year period, Tir 2008 to the endline interview date, or in Gregorian Calendar terms, from January 2016 to approximately April 2021. Further, we can compare continuity of annual participation in the Highlands and Lowlands over a four-year period, January 2018 to approximately April 2021. Annex 1 describes how we do this in more detail.

We begin with the six-year data sequence from the Highlands. Results are shown in Figure 4.1. We disaggregate by initial PSNP status in January 2016 – that is, whether the household had been selected to be a PSNP client at the start of PSNP4 (the left side of Figure 4.1) or had not been selected to be a PSNP client (the right side of Figure 4.1). Because there is little variation by region, we focus on the “All Regions” results.

Starting with households that were selected to be PSNP clients in January 2016, we see that 70 percent were clients for all six years (2016 to 2021 inclusive). Another 11 percent were clients for five out of six years. We also see that eight percent were clients for only one year. Since this group consists of households selected as clients in 2016, one years’ participation implies that they were dropped from the program after 2016 and not re-included subsequently. We also note that conditional on being selected in 2016, the mean number of years a household was a PSNP client was 5.1 (with virtually no variation by region).

Next, consider households not selected to be PSNP clients in January 2016. Across all regions, 77 percent were never clients. Another 10 percent were clients for five years. Since this group consists of households who were not selected as clients in 2016, five years’ participation implies that they were added to the program after 2016.

**Figure 4.1: Number of years household is PSNP client, Highlands, by region and participation status in 2016**



Number of years household is PSNP client

Source: Household midline and endline surveys, Highlands.

What about the households that either appear briefly in the PSNP, for only one or two years, or appear in all years but one (number of years as PSNP client =5)? Consider Table 4.1. This shows, by region and duration of PSNP participation, which years these households were PSNP clients. To understand how to read this table, consider the number found in the column for 2016, the set of results for PSNPs client for only one year, and the Amhara region. This tells us that in Amhara, for households that were only PSNP clients for one year, 52 percent of those households were clients in 2016. A further 38 percent were clients only in 2017; in other words, if an Amhara household only received PSNP payments for one year, it was most likely in either 2017 or 2018, not afterwards. We see similar patterns for other regions in cases where households were PSNP clients for only one or two years.

Now consider the bottom panel of Table 4.1. This shows when households received PSNP benefits when they were clients in all years but one between 2016 and 2021. For those households, the most likely year in which they were excluded was 2016 - between 39 and 54 percent of households (depending on the region) receiving PSNP payments for five years between 2016 and 2021 did not receive these in 2016.

**Table 4.1: Years when household was PSNP client between 2016 and 2021, by selected duration of PSNP participation and Highland region**

	Year in which household was a PSNP client (percent)					
	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
PSNP client for only one year						
Amhara	52	38	2	1	1	7
Oromiya	44	48	2	1	2	2
SNNP	75	20	3	1	1	1
All regions	57	35	2	1	1	4
PSNP client for only two years						
Amhara	87	88	2	0	11	12
Oromiya	76	82	15	13	4	11
SNNP	80	86	11	7	9	7
Total	82	86	8	6	8	10
PSNP client for five years						
Amhara	47	80	95	98	98	82
Oromiya	39	80	93	99	98	91
SNNP	54	77	89	100	95	86
Total	46	79	92	99	97	87

Source: Household midline and endline surveys, Highlands.

Putting these results together suggests the following: (a) conditional on selection into the PSNP, participation was constant for Highlands households between 2016 and 2021 (71 percent were PSNP participants for five or six years over this time period); (b) households that were included for five years out of six were usually excluded in 2016 but included thereafter; (c) households that were included for only one or two years were usually included in 2016 and 2017 but excluded after that. This suggests a pattern whereby there was some movement in and out of the program in the first years of PSNP4 but


after 2017, participation (or non-participation) was constant. This small amount of re-targeting is consistent with what regional, woreda and kebele officials told us (section 4.2).

In addition, we looked at the sample of households who were not PSNP clients in 2020. Only two percent of these households became PSNP clients in 2021. This tells us that very few households became PSNP clients after the start of the pandemic.

Next, we re-do this exercise using data only from the endline survey. As explained above, this allows us to directly compare constancy of PSNP participation in the Highlands and Lowlands. Results are shown in Figure 4.2 using the same format as Figure 4.1. In the Highlands, consistent with what we saw using the six-year span of data, there is very little movement in or out of the PSNP. Of the households that were PSNP clients in 2018, 92 percent were clients in all four years between 2018 and 2021. Among the households that were not clients in 2018, 94 percent were never clients between 2018 and 2021.

In the Lowlands, 86 percent of the households who were not PSNP clients in 2018 were never clients. But of those households that were PSNP clients in 2018, only 71 percent were clients for all years between 2018 and 2021.

**Figure 4.2: Number of years household is PSNP client, Highlands and Lowlands, by region and participation status in 2018**



0 1 2 3 4

To understand a little more about what is happening in the Lowlands, we tabulated the years when the household was a PSNP client by duration of participation. Results are shown in Table 4.2.

Beginning with households that were only participant for one year, it appears that this is because 48 percent of them enter the program in 2021 (Tir EC2013). However, across all Lowland households, the percentage of households who, between 2018 and 2021, only received PSNP payments for one year, is small, 4 percent. So, to contextualize the results found in the top panel of Table 4.2, note that as of January 2020 (Tir EC2012), there were 1,023 households in our Lowland sample that had not been PSNP clients. Of these households, only 40 entered the PSNP the following year. When we disaggregate this number by region and woreda, we see that these 40 households are concentrated in three woredas (Berhahile and Hadeleala in Afar, and Kebribeyah in Somali). In ten woredas, there were no new entrants as of January 2021 and in another eight woredas, only one household in each became a new PSNP client in January 2021.

Table 4.2 also indicates that among households that only PSNP payments for three out of four years, many had been dropped in 2021 (this is shown by the fact that among these households, only 26 percent were clients in 2021 compared to 84-97 percent in other years). But this too appears to be woreda-specific, with three woredas in Somali and two woredas in Afar accounting for 67 percent of the households that, having been PSNP clients continuously for three years, were dropped in 2021.

**Table 4.2: Years when household was PSNP client between 2018 and 2021, by selected duration of PSNP participation and Lowland region**

	Year in which household was a PSNP client (percent)			
	2018	2019	2020	2021
PSNP client for only one year				
Afar	22	11	20	48
Somali	28	15	13	45
All regions	24	13	16	47
PSNP client for three years				
Afar	78	98	91	33
Somali	89	96	95	20
All regions	84	97	93	26

Source: Household endline surveys, Lowlands.

#### 4.4. Regional, woreda, and kebele perspectives on targeting processes

Our discussions with regional, woreda and kebele officials about the extent, or not, of re-targeting provided an opportunity for them to reflect on how targeting processes had worked during PSNP4 and how they had evolved. Starting with structures, woreda officials in the Highlands indicated that committees were in place,<sup>10</sup> and that for the most part their members understand their responsibilities

<sup>10</sup> The DA in the sampled kebele in Boloso Sore stated that there is no KAC.

and carry these out. These observations are consistent with results presented in chapter three. There are some concerns about their level of responsiveness (Angolela Tera), awareness of their roles (Loko Abaya), and the impact of turnover (Arbaminch Zuria). The WFSTF in Sodo Zuria notes that the circumstances in which relief assistance is targeted help to increase awareness of the committees' roles.

Yes, we have KFSTF, CFSTF and KAC established in all 11 PSNP kebeles. Yes, they are aware of their role and responsibilities. Maybe the problem is they may not be as responsive as they should be, and sometimes the clients may bypass them and come to the woreda. But we are correcting this through continuous awareness raising and training and things are improving from time to time. *[AMH-ANG-WFSTF]*

Now there are 21 kebeles in the woreda and all have KFSTF, CFSTF, and KAC though their strength varies.... With regard to awareness of roles and responsibilities there are problems. The gaps in awareness are reflected in the prevalence of targeting errors including inclusion and exclusion errors. The problem originates from [the fact] that the PSNP is not given high priority. *[SID-LOK-WFSTF]*

The roles of the KFSTF and KAC are highly affected by high turnover rates due to frequent promotions and demotions as well as transfers to other kebeles. The KFSTFs and KACs could not be functional due to these factors. For instance, the KACs have no well documented records at kebele level. *[SNN-ARB-WFSTF]*

The roles are clear to all. Particularly the roles of the committees become more visible during the arrival of contingency budgets that require the inclusion of the neediest. *[SNN-SOD-WFSTF]*

Woreda officials in Somali also confirmed that the relevant committees are established in all kebeles and that their members are aware of their roles and responsibilities, although only the WFSTF in Shinile explicitly referred to the CFSTF. In Gursum, members of the kebele administration divide themselves between the various groups.

There are three committee per kebele: KFSTF, targeting committee, and appeals committee. All these committees are the basis of program implementation. They have full understanding of their roles which are different [and take place] at the same and different times... The names of the respective committees are posted in the kebele so that everyone knows their existence. *[SOM-ERR-WFSTF]*

In the kebeles we have KFSTF, transfer [targeting] committee, and KAC. They all know their roles well. The kebele administration is the center for all these committees. The administration members divide [themselves] between the different committees. *[SOM-GUR-WFSTF]*

In Afar, there were four pastoralist kebeles in Dubti where the CFSTF does not yet operate. Our interview with the DA in Dubti suggests that sub-kebele representatives or sub-clan leaders play an important role in program decisions at this level. In Ewa and Elidar, all three structures are in place but have differing levels of awareness and organisational capacity, in some cases a consequence of their location.

R1: All KFSTFs and KACs were established a long time ago in all our kebeles. But the CFSTF was established only in seven kebeles and we are still working to establish it in the other four which



are pure pastoralist kebeles. R2: We provide different types of awareness creation support for the established committees about their role in the implementation of PSNP 4. *[AFA-DUB-WFSTF]*

The members [of the targeting committee] travel to each sub-kebele and gather the sub-kebele representative (sub-clan leaders) and ask them to provide the names of community members who are very poor and [should be] registered to PSNP, because the sub-clan leaders know which households should be included. *[AFA-DUB-DA]*

All kebeles have had KFSTF, CFSTF and KAC members since the program started. But the level of awareness of their roles and responsibilities differs in terms of active participation and acceptance in the community. In most kebeles there are members [who are] community representatives [and] who have an active role and acceptance in [dealing with] complaints and appeals relating to targeting and food distribution. *[AFA-EWA-WFSTF]*

R1: For example, if you visit Dichotto kebele, you can see their documentation and organization. And in kebeles like Manda, Bure, Gewah, Galafi, Dichotto and Wuhalamat, these committees (KFSTF, CFSTF, KAC) are organized. R2: [But in] the other remote kebeles which are inaccessible due to lack of road, the KFSTF, CFSTF and KAC are established but have some gaps in their organization (awareness of PSNP 4 guidelines) and implementation. *[AFA-ELI-WFSTF]*

With regard to changes or improvements in targeting in highland kebeles, none of those in Oromiya (consistent with the woreda responses) report any steps taken to improve targeting since the midline. In Amhara, the focus has been on strengthening participation and accountability. There were few references by kebele informants to training on targeting. The KFSTF in Libo Kemkem noted that this had previously been given yearly, but not in 2020 due to Covid, and not in 2021 due to budget constraints. Members of the KFSTF in Loko Abaya had received training, while those in Boloso Sore had attended a meeting in the woreda, both of which had been helpful. Interviews with DAs confirm that targeting has not been a priority in recent training which has focused on the livelihoods component, public works / BCC, and PSNP in general. The DA in Arbaminch Zuria mentions training on the client registry.

There was an improvement in retargeting between Hamle 2010 [EC] and Tahisas 2013 [EC]. By making the process more participatory, this minimized the influence of kebele officials. The CFSTF, KFSTF and KAC and the community were made to freely involve in the process which helped in targeting the right beneficiaries. *[AMH-MEK-KFSTF]*

To improve the quality of the targeting we present the targeting result to communities at got level, and then we will check it at kebele level too. *[AMH-ANG-KFSTF]*

We took part in the training organized by the woreda in 2012 [EC] which helped us improve targeting in our kebele. *[SID-LOK-KFSTF]*

There was a meeting convened at woreda level in Tahisas 2012 [EC]. The kebele head of the economy sector, the chair of KFSTF, and the head of agriculture participated. The meeting aimed to provide orientation about improving targeting, [for example] that the selection of clients needs to be based on wealth ranking resulting from a wealth survey of individual households. Accordingly, we have a plan to apply new targeting as per the orientation for PSNP 5. *[SNN-BOL-KFSTF]*

I attended trainings on PSNP clients' registry using GPS as well as livelihood client targeting, saving, financial literacy, and business plan preparation in March and April 2012 [EC]. *[SNN-ARB-DA]*

Highland woredas in Amhara and SNNP took several measures to improve targeting. These included: (i) training (Mekdela, Angolela Tera, Boloso Sore, Arbaminch Zuria); (ii) supervision of kebele officials (Angolela Tera, Libo Kemkem, Sodo Zuria); (iii) enlisting the support of kebele social workers (Libo Kemkem); and (iv) strengthening committee structures in partnership with an NGO (Chiro). Loko Abaya had planned a process of household data collection to inform retargeting which was interrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic.

We have provided training to DAs, KFSTFs and CFSTFs to strengthening the targeting process. By periodically reviewing the asset level of the clients we make graduation and include people who have been wrongly excluded and identified through the appeals system. *[AMH-MEK-WFSTF]*

We conducted a one-day training on targeting in Meskerem 2011 [EC] to improve the targeting process and outcome... Following the training, we carried out retargeting in the PSNP kebeles. The community conducted the selection process based on the wealth ranking criteria and food security status of the prospective clients. *[SNN-BOL-WFSTF]*

In 2010 [EC] there was a woreda direction that kebele officials and relatives be excluded from the PSNP beneficiary list. This measure was made effective in the presence of woreda officials and the respective KFSTFs. Accordingly, retargeting was done to include households that are eligible for PSNP. In 2011 [EC] clearing of errors continued and was further strengthened. Now it is considered shameful to see relatives of kebele officials as PSNP beneficiaries. Besides, nowadays the youth are sensitive and standing for justice. *[SNN-SOD-WFSTF]*

To improve targeting we have made the social workers collect information home to home and keep periodic records that make the targeting process based on accurate and precise information. Besides this, the involvement of kebele officials / cabinet members and their influence over the decisions of the CFSTF/KFSTF are restricted. *[AMH-LIB-WFSTF]*

R2: Since 2010 [EC] retargeting was more participatory, transparent, and fair. We say this because during this period we have introduced village-level targeting committees, then community level and at the end kebele level. R3: In addition, KACs were strengthened through training and awareness creation. R4: Community participation was encouraged and promoted with a focus to avoid inclusion and exclusion [errors] during targeting and retargeting. R5: The presence of an NGO helped us improve retargeting because they played a great role in providing training and awareness creation sessions. *[ORO-CHI-WFSTF]*

As part of our quantitative woreda survey in the Lowlands, we asked respondents if they had received information from regional food security offices and if they had provided training to kebeles. Table 4.3 shows that training and information from region to woreda was widespread in 2021, and unchanged from earlier years, though in Afar there were fewer instances of regional staff visiting the woreda. It is not clear if this was a consequence of Covid or of budget constraints.

**Table 4.3: Training on targeting, Lowlands, by region and survey year**

	Region					
	Afar			Somali		
	2016	2018	2021	2016	2018	2021
	<b>Percent answering yes</b>					
In the last 12 months, have you received any information from the regional food security office on how to select PSNP beneficiaries?	83	83	83	78	100	90
If information was received:						
Did you receive this information at a meeting or training called by the region?	100	80	90	100	86	89
Did regional staff provide this information when they visited this woreda?	60	100	70	100	86	89
Did you contact regional staff requesting information?	80	90	100	100	100	100
Did regional staff send you documentation on how to select beneficiaries?	100	80	60	100	100	100
In the last 12 months, have you provided information or training to kebeles on how to select PSNP beneficiaries?	67	90	75	78	100	80
If training was provided:						
Did you provide this information at a meeting or training that you called?	88	89	88	100	100	100
Did you travel to kebeles to provide this information or training?	38	67	75	100	100	88
	<b>Median</b>					
How many kebeles did you travel to in order to provide this information or training?	9	9	4	18	16	20

Note: Number of woredas in this sample are: In 2016, Afar, 12; Somali, 9. In 2018, Afar, 12; Somali, 7. In 2021, Afar, 12; Somali, 13. Source: Woreda quantitative survey

Table 4.4 shows that nearly all woredas had provided training to kebeles at some point in the last three years and that most travelled to kebeles to do so. This is not entirely consistent with what kebele officials told us when asked the same questions. Kebele officials were less likely to say that they had received information, though in Afar they concurred that there had been a reduction in travel by woreda officials to kebeles.

**Table 4.4: Training/information on targeting at the Kebele level, percent by region and year**

Information/Training	Afar			Somali		
	2016	2018	2021	2016	2018	2021
Percent answering yes						
Do you feel you have all the information you need to ensure that the PSNP is properly targeted in this kebele? (% yes)	69	67	47	66	50	31
In the last 12 months, have you received any information from the woreda food security office on how to select PSNP beneficiaries? (% yes)	81	77	19	76	38	46
<i>For those who received information:</i>						
Did you receive this information at a meeting or training called by the woreda? (% yes)	52	89	100	77	78	75
Did regional staff provide this information when they visited this kebele? (% yes)	31	33	0	32	89	50
Did you contact woreda staff requesting information? (% yes)	52	89	100	68	89	44
Did woreda staff send you documentation on how to select beneficiaries? (% yes)	72	71	100	77	100	75

Source: Table 2.5, Berhane et al (2017); Table 6.11 (Berhane et al, 2019) and End-line Community Quantitative Survey.

We also asked WFSTF members to comment on the extent to which households participate in the PSNP targeting process. Participation is perceived to be active in some, but not all woredas.

The CFSTF involves the community in planning public works activities, identifying beneficiaries, and identifying clients who should be graduated based on the benchmarks... Households are involved in targeting through CFSTF meetings. They provide their opinion and endorse the targeted beneficiaries in their *got* (sub-kebele). They are also involved in appealing if they have complaints of any kind. *[AMH-MEK-WFSTF]*

Households are actively participating in targeting. Some who believe that there are more needy [people] than themselves leave PSNP willingly. Besides that, the beneficiaries selected by the committees are evaluated (*gimgema*) at community meetings. *[SNN-SOD-WFSTF]*

The participation of households in targeting is not that much and requires more efforts to change this situation. There are gaps in community participation regarding targeting and there is a plan to bring changes in 2013 [EC]. *[SID-LOK-WFSTF]*

In the Lowlands, household participation in Somali also takes place through community meetings. The WFSTF in Gursum highlights individuals' sense of personal responsibility. In Afar, participation takes place further upstream in the selection of targeting committee members.

Households were voluntary and cooperative during the retargeting. They presented their ID cards to the selection committee to review. They were willing to come to meetings for discussion and correction. If they did not volunteer, it would be difficult. The other amazing thing in this woreda is that, if one person is moving to another area, they leave the ID card with the neighbour to report to the kebele and consider retargeting when possible. We train households to submit their complaints on time and they help us [by] doing this. [SOM-GUR-WFSTF]

There are targeting committees in the kebeles who are selected by and represent the community. The targeting committee is responsible for selecting the poorest households using the traditional social structure called *Fiemet Abba* (a community representative under the clan/community leader). These people know the condition of every household in their community. Then the list of selected people is presented to the targeting committee, community leaders, religious leaders, kebele administration, women and youth representatives for verification. [AFA-ELI-WFSTF]

The midline survey had found that the degree to which community participation can influence targeting decisions in lowlands was variable. While many kebeles had improved the representation of women and young people on targeting committees, such measures on their own were insufficient to change the quality of participation. Given this finding, we re-visited this concern, asking DAs to comment on the extent to which households participated in the targeting process.<sup>11</sup> As the interviews with woreda officials have indicated, participation appears to be more direct in Somali and more indirect in Afar, through community representatives on targeting committees (Ewa and Dubti) or on the PSNP council (Elidar), and in the case of Ewa and Dubti by also selecting them.

Households were openly participating in the retargeting exercise. If they felt injustice, they were complaining to the appeals committee. The appeals committee were willing [to use] the retargeting to correct errors. [SOM-GUR-DA]

The beneficiaries are identified and proposed by the elderly and religious people from their community. The targeting committee selects these people as per the criterion and posts the list for public comment and discussion. In this case any household could comment or present his appeal to the KAC and [the] case [be] solved. Therefore, households participate actively through identifying the beneficiaries and participating in the public meeting and can also present their appeal. [SOM-ERR-DA]

The KFSTF announces a meeting at sub-kebele level and asks the people to select the targeting committee (clan leaders, elders, women). These members know each household's living condition or status and they are the ones who decide which households will be included. Therefore, I could say that community participation was mainly in selecting committee members for the targeting process. [AFA-EWA-DA]

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<sup>11</sup> Because of Covid-related restrictions on gatherings, it was not possible to undertake Focus Group Discussions with households on this issue.

In the 2011 [EC] retargeting process, beneficiary households participated through their representatives who are the members in the kebele PSNP council, which includes elders, women, youth, and other groups in the community. Hence, they participate indirectly through their representatives. [AFA-ELI-DA]

Beneficiary households participate in targeting through their representatives who are the members in the kebele PSNP community targeting committee, which includes clan leader, religious person, school director, and two people (one male and one female) who are respected by the communities and selected by them... [Households] participate indirectly through their representatives and can also present their appeal to the KAC. [AFA-DUB-DA]

Traditional leaders continue to exercise significant influence over targeting decisions in lowlands. They may be members of targeting committees (Gursum, Error, Ewa, Elidar) and/or KFSTFs (Dubti), or provide information to those groups based on their knowledge of each household.

Some elders and religious people are added in the targeting committee. They are always sworn to be just and fair between the people. The elders know the specific situation in their respective sub kebele. Religious individuals are the most reliable when it comes to targeting. [SOM-ERR-KFSTF]

The customary leader was one of the committee members of KFSTF. The clan leader knew in his tribe which households were poor and which households were categorized under direct support or public works. [AFA-DUB-KFSTF]

Customary leaders are members of the beneficiary selection committee in the kebele. So, they are responsible for both selection of beneficiaries and complaint resolving. [AFA-ELI-KFSTF]

After various observations and discussions with community members and clan representatives of each sub-kebele, we jointly decide whom to select [as] the beneficiaries and provide [this] to the targeting committee. [AFA-ELI-TL]

The traditional leader in Gursum described targeting as ‘the main activity’ for elders. As well as their role in identifying specific households, his counterpart in Dubti emphasized their responsibility to report changes in household circumstances, while both the KFSTF and the traditional leader in Error highlight their broader function of ensuring social harmony.

[Elders] are used to avoid the clan conflicts related to the program. [SOM-ERR-KFSTF]

Elders have a specific role. They are part of the selection committee to ensure the fairness of the targeting. The elders are required for ensuring justice among the beneficiaries. [SOM-ERR-TL]

DAs in Shinile and Gursum described a mix of additional efforts to correct previous targeting errors. The process in Shinile was more thorough than had been followed in the past, including a door-to-door headcount supported by woreda officials, while the DA in Gursum acknowledged that the annual recertification had not usually been done.

There was retargeting in this kebele before one year from now. The purpose was to correct some inclusion and exclusion errors. This was based on an order from the region to conduct the

retargeting. Recently married households were included. This retargeting was an opportunity. During the first targeting, people were afraid [of] the woreda administration and the job was not done seriously. They used to sit and list the beneficiaries. This created lots of targeting problems. Like you could see some family having only three children but documented as a large-sized household. This retargeting was very different. One TA and one cabinet [member] came from the woreda and the KFSTF with the health extension worker carried out a head-counting mission from house to house. Each one presented the members of his household and these were recorded. The TA registered the names and later he handed the lists over to me. *[SOM-SHI-DA]*

In 2012 [EC], or late 2011 [EC], we implemented retargeting. The reason was to correct some inclusion and exclusion errors. Some new households were added while some households wrongly targeted in the past, such as households of three people but registered as five, were corrected. This was a normal exercise [that is] supposed to be carried out every year but is not usually done. *[SOM-GUR-DA]*

Lastly, we asked PSNP officials whether they had issued or received guidance on adjusting targeting in areas affected by conflict or displacement. No regional guidance had been issued in the highlands: officials noted that targeting guidance for this purpose is issued from the federal level and that regional experts only support assessment teams. Woreda officials confirmed that they had received no guidance, other than how to respond to the long-term displaced in Chiro; those in Libo Kemkem also referred to the PSNP residency requirement. The WFSTF in Mekdela expressed surprise at the lack of guidance given current levels of displacement. Their counterparts in Angolela Tera indicated that the presence of displaced people had altered their targeting priorities.

R2: Yes, we are given guidance to target displaced people who have lived in one place / kebele for more than two years. R3: Other displaced people are supported with a different budget allocated from the federal government. *[ORO-CHI-WFSTF]*

No such experience [of receiving guidance on adjusting targeting]. Even if we want to, the rules do not allow us to do so because PSNP clients should be permanent residents of the kebele. *[AMH-LIB-WFSTF]*

So far there is no guidance and direction given by the regional government. We are surprised that the region is not giving such guidance as we are experiencing a high number of displaced people coming to the woreda... due to conflict. *[AMH-MEK-WFSTF]*

We changed our priority from needy people in the rural kebeles to displaced people in the woreda town. We did this because the displaced are needier than the permanent residents of the woreda. *[AMH-ANG-WFSTF]*

In the lowlands, the RFSTF in Somali referred to guidance given in partnership with the DRM Bureau on targeting and other matters, while the RFSTF in Afar was more explicit that woredas are directed to take account of displacement in targeting decisions.

In areas where there are IDPs we are working in close collaboration with our partner, the Bureau of Disaster Risk Management. We work together and provide some technical advice and support to the woredas in the process of targeting and other related activities. *[SOM-RFSTF]*

We give woredas direction and guidance to retarget the most affected and displaced community members for PSNP (public works and PDS). Also, after the assessment held in the new woredas we give direction to select the most affected households for HFA. *[AFA-RFSTF]*

We also asked PSNP officials whether displaced people are supported by the PSNP or by HFA. Among those for whom this question was relevant, none reported using PSNP except in Chiro, and specifically for the long-term displaced.

R1: Displaced people who have lived in one place (kebele) for more than two years are supported by PSNP because they have become permanent residents of the kebele. R2: Other displaced people are supported by a different budget from the federal government. *[ORO-CHI-WFSTF]*

#### **4.5. Regional, woreda, and kebele perspectives on targeting performance**

##### **4.5.1. Highlands**

We invited regional officials to discuss the factors that affect targeting outcomes. As we found at the midline, the household cap continues to be a key issue.

The only factor that has affected targeting outcomes is the household cap which has limited the number of household members targeted for transfers to five. This is not fair; usually it is households with large family numbers that are poor and qualify for PSNP targeting, and that are affected by this policy. *[ORO-RFSTF]*

The main challenge was the quota limitation and household cap. Many of our communities have an extended household, and therefore the amount they receive compared to their household size is always not enough. *[AFA-RFSTF]*

At the midline in 2018, officials in highland woredas were confident that the PSNP was reaching those defined as eligible by the PIM and that targeting outcomes had improved in the course of PSNP 4. However, all but one of the 12 sampled woredas also reported that some who might otherwise have been eligible for support were excluded, largely because of the caseload quota. We again asked woreda officials to comment on whether the PSNP is targeted to the right people and whether any households or groups are wrongly excluded. Their answers suggest a slightly more mixed picture. Eight of the 11 sampled woredas still report that targeting is carried out in line with the PIM and is seen as fair and transparent, and that errors have gradually been reduced through retargeting and graduation. Informants in one woreda, Fadis, expressed slightly differing views on their performance, noting that the lack of annual recertification or retargeting meant that they could not be entirely confident of their claims.

R1: PSNP has reached successfully the intended/needy beneficiaries. PSNP clients were targeted according to the criteria described in the PIM in a fair and transparent manner. R2: We haven't done retargeting on an annual basis but from the beginning, the right people were targeted and clients are receiving their transfers accordingly. R3: Had we done retargeting yearly we would have been in a better position to address the right people. R4: Although we say everything is good, we can't claim that there is no problem because of the absence of retargeting and we may have to think about it. *[ORO-FAD-WFSTF]*



In the other two woredas – Boloso Sore and Loko Abaya – there was an acknowledgement of a lower level of performance as well as a significant number of inclusion errors.

We believe that about 75% of PSNP beneficiaries are the intended beneficiaries while 25% are those that should not have been included (inclusion errors). We believe that the inclusion errors will be resolved during Sene 2013 [EC] when retargeting is accomplished. *[SID-LOK-WFSTF]*

We witnessed that there was corruption in targeting the wrong persons as clients in some kebeles. We can say that about 85% of the targeting and retargeting processes and outcomes were successful and used the eligibility criteria indicated in the PIM. *[SNN-BOL-WFSTF]*

Under-coverage continues to be an issue but in this evaluation was raised in about half the sampled highland woredas compared with nearly all in 2018. Exclusion errors were acknowledged in Boloso Sore but described as negligible in Amhara, and where they occurred, were corrected through the woreda contingency budget.

PSNP was successful in reaching the intended beneficiaries but due to shortage of resources all the needy were not reached. *[ORO-ZEW-WFSTF]*

R1: It is not wrongly excluded but knowingly excluded because of shortage of resources. R2: The quotas kebeles are provided with don't match the number of needy [people]. R3: Therefore, they have to somehow pick one and leave another because there is nothing they can do. All community members know this. *[ORO-FAD-WFSTF]*

Yes, we have wrongly excluded households from the program. We believe that there could be errors that happened during the targeting process and/or [due to the] absence of a strong KAC in the kebele. *[SNN-BOL-WFSTF]*

In phase three of PSNP there were [exclusion errors] but in PSNP 4 they are minor. If it happens, we correct it with the 5% contingency fund and replace them through graduation, as it is allowed to replace graduates with new clients in PSNP 4. *[AMH-LIB-WFSTF]*

WFSTF officials in the highlands do not believe that PSNP targeting has led to tensions at the community level; in their view, communities participate in a process which is felt to be fair and transparent and know how to appeal. The few incidents mentioned either fell outside the evaluation period or were minor and temporary.

We did not observe any tensions during the retargeting conducted in 2011 and 2012. We believe that this was the outcome of fair and transparent targeting. *[SNN-ARB-WFSTF]*

There is no tension generated by targeting at community level since it is done with the full participation of the community in fair and transparent ways. If there are grievances and complaints, they can appeal to the KAC, and if they are not satisfied with the decision, they can file their appeal at the woreda level. *[AMH-MEK-WFSTF]*

R1: Yes, targeting has generated tension. This was when the list of targeted households was posted. They said that this many people are targeted from that community while only this many are targeted from my community. R2: Such complaints sometimes reach up to the woreda

administration in the form of an appeal. R3: But these tensions are not long-lasting; they are forgotten after a few days. *[ORO-CHI-WFSTF]*

Kebele officials in the highlands also believe that the right people are targeted by the PSNP, just as they did at the midline. They point to the proper application of targeting criteria and the existence of mechanisms to prevent error, as illustrated by the KFSTF in Arbaminch Zuria.

The public works foremen attempt to include their relatives but the KFSTF evaluates and rejects it. Thus, the included beneficiaries are those who are eligible for support. *[SNN-ARB-KFSTF]*

However, four of the eleven kebeles in the highland sample (Libo Kemkem, Boloso Sore, Arbaminch Zuria, and Chiro) note that while the selection may have been correct at the time of targeting, the position of households has since changed such that others may now be more deserving of inclusion, and yet those originally targeted have not progressed sufficiently to reach graduation.

What has been done in this kebele is correct. But there are people who are excluded from the program because of the limited quota. There are [also] people who have got better since they joined the program (even though they don't qualify to graduate) as a result of which they are better off compared to those who are not targeted. *[AMH-LIB-KFSTF]*

Many poorer households than the PSNP clients may exist now (which was not the case during initial targeting) [but] it is impossible to accommodate them because the available resource is limited. Such households are supported through other means when available. *[ORO-CHI-KFSTF]*

Based on wealth ranking, the poorest of the poor have been targeted by the criteria we have been given by the woreda. Since there are people who are in a similar level of poverty with that of those targeted, having even a chicken can make a difference. *[AMH-MEK-KFSTF]*

We probed further by asking KFSTF members in the highlands whether anyone had been incorrectly included in, or excluded from, the PSNP. The replies of all eleven kebeles were consistent: no better-off households were now included (past errors had since been corrected), but some eligible households were excluded by the quota. Responses from DAs largely corroborated this view.

No, there are not [better-off community members included in the programme] because we have corrected past errors through retargeting and the graduation system. Since the community fully participates in the targeting and retargeting process there is no room to do so. *[AMH-MEK-KFSTF]*

We know that there were people excluded due to resource limitation. There were also people targeted erroneously to either the public works or direct support component or vice versa. We gave priority to people who are the most disadvantaged defined by the eligibility criteria. Unless the resource limitation issue is addressed once and for all, there will be persons excluded from the program whether we like it or not. *[SID-LOK-KFSTF]*

R2: By and large, PSNP transfers are targeted to the right people and based solely on the PSNP guideline. However, we can't say that there is no problem, that is, a few households that aren't supposed to be targeted may have become PSNP clients. R3: [But] we are trying to correct this every time we learn about it. *[ORO-CHI-DA]*

#### **4.5.2. Lowlands**

Our baseline and midline evaluations of targeting in the Lowlands identified myriad reasons – at both the woreda and kebele level - why targeting might have deviated from what was outlined in the PIM. These included concerns regarding the level of resources relative to need, insufficient understanding of PSNP targeting criteria, difficulties in identifying who was eligible (and who was not) and differences in norms regarding fairness. Mindful of this, it is helpful to contextualize knowledge and perceptions of targeting in the Lowlands by updating information we collected from officials as part of the woreda and kebele quantitative surveys.<sup>12</sup>


In all survey rounds, we provided woreda respondents with a series of vignettes, short descriptions of households and asked whether such households should be selected into the PSNP and whether they should undertake Public Works or receive Direct Support. Vignettes 1, 2 and 4 have a single correct answer; vignettes 3 and 5 were deliberately written with some ambiguity, permitting more than one correct answer. Responses to these vignettes from the baseline survey in 2016 and the endline in 2021 are reported in Figure 4.3. To make these easier to read, we have bolded the correct answer(s) along with the percentage of woredas providing these correct answers.

In Afar, responses change relatively little over time. Vignette 2 (on Direct Support) is nearly always answered correctly and about 75 percent of woredas give correct responses to vignettes 1 and 3. Only answers to vignette 5 (targeting based on the household receiving an adverse shock) improved over time. By contrast, the percentage of woredas answering vignettes 1, 2 and 3 correctly declined over time.

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<sup>12</sup> These questions were not asked in the Highlands in 2021.

**Figure 4.3: Percentage of woredas providing correct responses to targeting vignettes, by region and survey year**



*Vignette 1: The household consists of a man and woman and three school-age children. They own an ox. Each year, they have a small surplus of food production that they sell in the market.*

*Correct response: Not eligible for PSNP*

*Vignette 2: The household consists of an elderly widow with no children to help her. She is not able to farm for herself.*

*Correct response: Receive Direct Support*

*Vignette 3: The household consists of an elderly man, his wife and an able-bodied adult son. They can farm one timad of land but do not grow enough food to feed themselves throughout the year.*

*Correct response: Receive Public Works (the able-bodied son) or Direct Support (the elderly man)*

*Vignette 4: The household consists of a man and woman and three school-age children. Both are able bodied. However, they only grow enough food to feed themselves for 9 months of the year.*

*Correct response: Receive Public Works*


*Vignette 5: The household consists of a man and woman and three school-age children. In most years, they grow enough food to feed themselves. However, recently, the man suffered an injury while farming. The household could not harvest its crops and have had to sell all their animals to buy food.*

*Correct response: Receive Public Works (the woman) or Direct Support (because of the injured man)*

Source: Woreda quantitative survey

Interestingly, these results stand in contrast to those a different question we asked woreda officials; namely whether they were confident that they had all the information needed to ensure that the PSNP was correctly targeting (Figure 4.4).<sup>13</sup> All officials in Somali were confident that they had this information even though they were less likely to correctly answer the vignettes described above. We also asked this question to kebele officials; in both Afar and Somali, kebele officials were less confident than woreda officials that they had the information they needed.

**Figure 4.4: Percentage of officials that are confident that they have all the information needed to ensure that the PSNP is properly targeted, Lowlands, by region, survey year and respondent**



Source: Berhane (2017), Berhane (2019), Endline Woreda quantitative survey, Endline quantitative community survey.

For training to be effective, it is important that woreda officials understand and support the selection process used to identify PSNP clients. To assess this, as we did in 2016 and 2018, we again asked woreda and kebele officials in Afar and Somali a series of “forced choice” questions. (In a forced choice question, the respondent is given two or more alternatives and asked to choose which statement they agree with most.) Full results are found in Appendix Figures A4.ZZ and A4.ZZZ. The dominant sense one gets from viewing these figures is that there is no clear or pattern, save the following. In general, Woreda officials were more likely to give correct responses than were kebele officials. Second, kebele officials were much more likely to state that they perceived that there would be tensions if PSNP payments went to some households but not others and this perception had increased between 2016 and 2021.

Given these data, it is striking that, like their counterparts in the Highlands, Lowland woreda officials were generally confident that the right people were being targeted, although all describe households being unintentionally excluded by the quota. Those in Ewa use contingency budgets and HFA to mitigate the impact of under-coverage.

<sup>13</sup> These questions were not asked in the Highlands in 2021.

No exclusion [of certain households or groups] is made from the program, but because of resource limitation there are households not included even though they are eligible based on the criteria. *[SOM-SHI-WFSTF]*

Because of quota limitation, some rightful community members were excluded from PSNP during the retargeting process and still complain to the KAC. We believe that the selection process was successful in addressing the intended beneficiaries because we followed the eligibility criteria as stated in the PIM. *[AFA-DUB-WFSTF]*

The overall performance is successful in reaching the intended eligible beneficiaries as the first targeting was carried out long time [ago] as per the PSNP PIM 4... even if some members of eligible households based on the criteria are left without benefit from the program. For those households without any support, the woreda contingency and HFA channels are used to address these gaps during shocks and [if] regular support is required. *[AFA-EWA-WFSTF]*

Lowland officials also mentioned the reorganisation of woredas and kebeles if kebeles are transferred without the budget to match. In these cases, they use HFA to cover the shortfall.

The major factors that affected [the targeting] outcomes of PSNP 4 are the household cap, which did not enable us to improve the food security status of client households, the creation of new woredas, and the scaling up of kebeles. For those kebeles which shifted from one region to another, the new region is challenged by a shortage in budget [because] the resources are not also shifted. For example, in Gursum woreda, 13 kebeles were moved from Oromiya to Somali. Oromiya region simply transferred the list of PSNP beneficiaries but without the resources. In this case Somali region has no budget allocation for these kebeles in its plan. To cope with this problem the region pays for these beneficiaries from HFA as a temporary solution. *[SOM-RFSTF]*

The main factors relate to the creation of new woredas in our region and the household cap. For instance, three new woredas were created in our region and we already retargeted. But before starting to transfer resources a conflict began and more people were displaced. So we stopped implementing PSNP and transferred all the targeted beneficiaries to HFA and notified the federal government. *[AFA-RFSTF]*

Echoing the views of their regional colleagues, woreda officials in lowlands identify the reorganisation of woredas and kebeles, the beneficiary quota, and the household cap, as the three main factors affecting targeting. Like their highland counterparts, they do not believe that targeting is responsible for community-level tension, with the exception of those in Ewa who describe the impact of the household cap on large or polygamous families. Our quantitative results presented in Table 4.10 are consistent with this finding, but we note that this was the perception of woreda officials, not kebele officials who were tasked with telling people that they could not be included in the PSNP. Woreda officials stated that community validation meetings and discussion were helpful in addressing these tensions.

Yes, there are tensions of retargeting as the size of family numbers was decreased (household cap) in 2009 [EC] for most households with new-born and polygamy. As a solution, in 2011 [EC] all KFSTF and KAC members were informed to work closely with elders and clan leaders who have

a visible role in such cases for the retargeting to be effective in the coming year of the program. *[AFA-EWA-WFSTF]*

There is no tension in our woreda because of retargeting. People discuss the issues and solve them. *[SOM-SHI-WFSTF]*

Complaints are limited due to [the fact] that communities are given a platform to gather where the selected households are validated in front of the mass of [the] people. *[SOM-ERR-WFSTF]*

Similar views were expressed by at the kebele level. KFSTF members and DAs believe that the right people are targeted in line with the criteria in the PIM. Their assessment is based not just on the correct implementation of procedures and the presence of checks and balances, but on their view of those selected to sit on targeting committees.

We believe the right people were selected... [Members of] the selected targeting committee were reliable. They were sworn at the beginning to be fair for the whole community. *[SOM-ERR-KFSTF]*

We probed further to ask whether better-off people had been included, or eligible people excluded. The replies of all kebeles were consistent: none had been incorrectly included, and if they had, retargeting had corrected this. However, several people with a profile and status very similar to those targeted had been excluded by the quota. (Note that this was raised in Somali, a finding also consistent with what we see in Table 4.11).

The retargeting corrected such inclusion error. Currently these people are not in the list. *[SOM-ERR-KFSTF]*

We didn't include better-off people because the resource is not even enough for all the eligible households in our kebele, therefore we excluded even these rightful people. *[AFA-ELI-KFSTF]*

There are some households excluded because of shortage of resources, even though they are eligible as per the criteria. The resource limitation forced us to take the worst cases... Comparison shows all are in the same category, but there could be small differences in their assets. These differences are used to differentiate [between them], otherwise both are in the poorest of the poor category. *[SOM-SHI-KFSTF]*

Lowland kebeles continue to struggle with the application of the household cap in societies where large families are common. Five of the six KFSTFs describe the transfers as being insufficient for such households.

PSNP never considers a large family beyond five household members. Those with large families are suffering with shortage of food even if targeted for the program as the transfer is not sufficient for the whole household. *[SOM-SHI-KFSTF]*

When we implemented retargeting last year, we only registered five people in each household. Some community members are still complaining about this rule because some of them have very large family sizes and it is difficult for them to feed all the family members. But we told them that it was a rule and we can't change it. *[AFA-DUB-KFSTF]*

We asked lowland DAs to give their views on whether community members believe PSNP targeting to be fair and accurate. The only persistent grievance is under-coverage, particularly in Afar, while in Somali, complaints appear to be effectively managed through discussion or the appeals system.

Our clients are human beings. They always have concerns if not selected. To help express their concerns, they can complain and discuss them with the appeals committee in the kebele. They are usually convinced at the committee level. Mostly they understand why they were not selected after discussion. *[SOM-GUR-DA]*

In the case of our kebele, all the people want to be selected due to lack of job and drought. Hence, the non-selected people might raise a complaint about why they are being left out of the targeting. But, as PSNP can serve only a limited number of people in our kebele, the KAC and KFSTF tried to convince them how PSNP works and why they are not included. But up to now the eligible but not included community members still complained a lot. *[AFA-ELI-DA]*

The views of traditional leaders in lowlands were consistent with those of the DAs and KFSTFs. All believe that targeting is done fairly and that most community members also believe it to be so, except those affected by the quota.

Because of quota limitation, there are lots of complaints from the community. There are people supposed to be targeted but due to the quota [are not]. The consequences are still affecting us for the appeals committees. Except for the quota limitation, I believe that the retargeting was fair. *[AFA-EWA-TL]*

Yes, people see it as fair and transparent. We believe that if someone wants to be biased, Allah sees him. People also oversee and correct him/her when they feel something is wrong. *[SOM-ERR-TL]*

Lowland DAs were also asked whether those selected for the PSNP were then correctly assigned to the appropriate client category (public works, permanent direct support, and temporary direct support). DAs in all six sampled woredas replied in the affirmative, although the response of the DA in Shinile suggests that the temporary direct support category may extend beyond the specific categories described in the PIM.<sup>14</sup>

Targeting/retargeting and assigning to the appropriate client category was the most difficult task we have done. The disabled, the old, and all those people who can't work are targeted in PDS. Those households who are able to work but are very poor are targeted to public works. Some beneficiaries who it is confirmed cannot work because of sickness and pregnant mothers will not do public works and will be assigned to TDS. *[SOM-SHI-DA]*

Finally, we note that a particular feature of targeting in Lowlands is the treatment of polygamous households. At both the baseline in 2016 and the midline in 2018, we found that this was done in line with the PIM – i.e. that each wife and her children were treated as one household and independently assessed

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<sup>14</sup> The categories are pregnant and lactating women (up to one year after birth) and primary care-givers of malnourished children (3-7). However, the DA may simply be referring to instances when public works clients are temporarily exempted from public works activities when they are sick.



for their eligibility for PSNP, with the husband counted in one of the households. This is illustrated by the KFSTFs in Errer and Gursum.

Polygamous households are treated separately. We don't listen to the husband since he can be biased. Usually, the names of the women are included. The targeting committee decides which household will be included or both. For example, if a woman has livestock while the other doesn't, the one with no livestock is targeted. Always we see such complaints and we tolerate whatever we face. [SOM-ERR-KFSTF]

In polygamous households the selection depends on their economic status. The economic status of the wives could be different. In this case, only the poor wife is selected for PSNP. If both are the poorest of the poor and eligible, both can be included in the program. [SOM-GUR-KFSTF]

However, it appears that resource constraints are influencing practice in this area. In Shinile, polygamous households are only assessed independently if they live in separate compounds.

In our kebele, if polygamous households are living in one compound (the same place) we consider them as one household because of resource limitation. If they live in separate places, we consider them as separate households. [SOM-SHI-KFSTF]

In Afar, a limit of two wives appears to operate, with different solutions applied in different woredas. In Dubti, the husband and one wife are registered together and the other wives are registered as a separate household. In Elidar, the wives are treated as separate households but only two are registered, which can lead to tension.

R1: If a man has two wives, the first wife is registered with him as one household and the other wife is registered as another household. R2: If the husband has more than two wives, he is registered together with one wife and the other wives are registered as another household. [AFA-DUB-KFSTF]

Yes, [the registration of polygamous households] is one of the critical challenges we have at the kebele level. Some men have more than two wives and families. Because of the limitation of the kebele quota (maximum two wives per family), usually only two of the families which are very poor will be selected as PSNP beneficiaries. The remaining wives and families of that person will be excluded which creates complaints and sometimes conflict. ... This regulation of safety net and the tradition of our community are difficult to harmonize. [AFA-ELI-KFSTF]

#### 4.6. Summary

This chapter has assessed aspects of the targeting of PSNP4, addressing **RQ9: For how long PSNP households were in the program?** And **RQ13: Assessing PSNP Targeting.**

With respect to RQ9, in the Highlands, we can assess duration of PSNP participation over a six year period, 2016-2021. During this time, 74 percent of households in our sample are either never or always PSNP clients over the period 2016-2021. This does not differ across regions. Mean participation in years (conditional on any PSNP participation) is 4.7 in Amhara, 4.6 in Oromiya and 4.9. in SNNP and 4.8 across all three regions. In the Lowlands, we can assess duration of PSNP participation over a six four period,

2018-2021. During this time, 45.6 percent of households are never PSNP clients and 33.3 percent are clients in all four years, meaning that 78.9 percent of our sample fall into those two groups. Further, most re-targeting occurred in the early part of these time periods with later entry reflecting, as shown in our qualitative work, very modest new entries resulting from household death, dissolution, or migration.

As noted in the introduction, this high degree of continuity of participation and little evidence of substantial entry or exit meant that it was not feasible to repeat the quantitative assessments of targeting found in the baseline and midline reports; the vast majority of the PSNP clients in our study, their inclusion was based on their circumstances five or six years ago, not now. Instead, we focus on the processes by which targeting and the limited amount of re-targeting that has occurred and perceptions of how successful this has been.

With reference to elements of RQ13 (“Are the committees established according to the PIM and local level implementers aware of their roles and responsibilities?”), regional and woreda officials reported that all committees that have a role in targeting are in place in both highlands and lowlands and for the most part carry out their responsibilities in line with the PIM. They note differing levels of awareness and capacity, particularly in the more remote areas of Afar and that committee performance can be variable. These reports are consistent with our quantitative description of PSNP structures found in chapter three.

We note that there continue to be efforts to improve targeting in both the Highlands and Lowlands, including training, collaboration with kebele social workers and NGOs, and closer supervision, particularly to minimize the influence of kebele officials over the targeting committees. Amhara has relaxed the household cap and encourages woredas to use the resources freed up by those leaving the programme to move existing households towards full family targeting, rather than bring in new households; this is seen as a means of accelerating progress towards graduation. In lowlands, there have been exercises to correct inclusion and exclusion errors in parts of Somali which involved woreda officials and a system of house-to-house verification, as well as re-targeting in parts of Afar to accommodate the reorganization of kebeles. Traditional leaders continue to exercise significant influence over targeting decisions in lowlands, either formally, as members of targeting committees, or informally, through the status they hold.

The absence of major re-targeting exercise together with the fact that we could not do Focus Group Discussions with community members makes it challenging to assess perceptions of fairness and accuracy. PSNP officials in the Highlands and Lowlands and traditional leaders (in the Lowlands) perceive that targeting processes are seen as fair, transparent, and accurate, and that they do not lead to tensions at the community level; however, kebele officials expressed greater concern that targeting was leading to community tensions. A recurrent concern related to those whose circumstances are only marginally different from those targeted and who might have been eligible for inclusion were the resource envelope larger. While there is a striking degree of consensus among PSNP officials that the right households are included in the PSNP, almost all those sampled in lowlands and about half those in highlands (slightly less than at the midline) report that potentially eligible households are excluded by the administrative quotas. As time has passed, these households may now be less food secure than those already in the program but who have not yet progressed to a stage where graduation is possible. Lastly, the household cap continues to be a challenge and a grievance, particularly in Afar where large family sizes are common.

## Chapter 4 annex

In this annex, we explain in detail how we measure PSNP participation with the data available to us. To do so, we note that in the endline survey, we asked respondents in both the Highlands and the Lowlands to self-report their PSNP status. Specifically, they were asked:

- Did this household participate in a PSNP public works activity between TIR 2010 and TAHISAS 2011?
- Did this household participate in a PSNP public works activity between TIR 2011 and TAHISAS 2012?
- Did this household participate in a PSNP public works activity between TIR 2012 and TAHISAS 2013?
- Did this household participate in a PSNP public works activity between TIR 2013 and “today” (ie the interview date)?

And

- Did this household receive Direct Support payments between TIR 2010 and TAHISAS 2011?
- Did this household receive Direct Support payments between TIR 2011 and TAHISAS 2012?
- Did this household receive Direct Support payments between TIR 2012 and TAHISAS 2013?
- Did this household receive Direct Support payments between TIR 2013 and “today” (ie the interview date)?

Recall that the survey in the Highlands is longitudinal. In the midline survey, we asked these households:

- Did this household participate in a PSNP public works activity between TIR 2008 and TAHISAS 2009?
- Did this household participate in a PSNP public works activity between TIR 2009 and TAHISAS 2010?
- Did this household participate in a PSNP public works activity between TIR 2010 and the interview date?

And

- Did this household receive Direct Support payments between TIR 2008 and TAHISAS 2009?
- Did this household receive Direct Support payments between TIR 2009 and TAHISAS 2010?
- Did this household receive Direct Support payments between TIR 2010 and the interview date?

For each year, we use responses to these questions to create a variable that equals one if the household either participated in Public Works or received Direct Support. This allows us to calculate the number of years that households were PSNP clients. By merging the midline and endline data, we can assess continuity of annual participation in the Highlands over a six-year period, Tir 2008 to the endline interview date, or in Gregorian Calendar terms, from January 2016 to approximately April 2021. Further, we can compare continuity of annual participation in the Highlands and Lowlands over a four-year period, January 2018 to approximately April 2021. (We cannot go back further than 2018 because the Lowlands survey is cross-sectional and recall questions on past PSNP participation do not extend to the period before 2018.)

Our data on PSNP participation includes using recall data. To assess its accuracy, note that the our midline survey – fielded in May-June 2018 asked about PSNP participation between TIR EC2010 and the interview date (roughly from January – May GC2018). Our endline survey asked respondents to recall their past



PSNP participation, including the period TIR – Taxis EC2010 (roughly from January – August 2018). Thus, we can compare what respondents said, in 2018, about their PSNP status at that time with what they recalled that status when asked in 2021. Results are given in Table A4.1. The diagonals show consistency of response: 48.7 percent of respondents stated that they were not PSNP participants in 2018, when asked in 2018 and when they were asked to recall their 2018 PSNP status in 2021; and 38.7 percent of respondents stated that they were PSNP participants in 2018, when asked in 2018 and when they were asked to recall their 2018 PSNP status in 2021. In other words, 87.4 percent of respondents gave the same response to the 2018 status question when asked in 2018 and when they were asked to recall their status three years later. This gives us confidence in the use of these recall questions.



**Table 4.5: Comparing contemporaneous and recall questions on 2018 PSNP status**


		In 2018, respondents stated that they were:	
		Not a PSNP participant	PSNP participant
In 2021, respondents described their 2018 PSNP status as:	Not a PSNP participant	48.7	7.0
	PSNP participant	5.6	38.7

Source: Household endline surveys, Highlands.

**Figure 4.5: Woreda attitudes toward targeting, by region and survey year, Lowlands**












Source: Berhane et al (2016), Berhane et al (2019) and PSNP 4 Endline Woreda Quantitative Survey.

**Figure 4.6: Kebele attitudes towards targeting, by region and survey year, Lowlands**









Source: Berhane et al (2016), Berhane et al (2019) and PSNP 4 Endline Community Quantitative Survey.

## Chapter 5: Social Accountability

### 5.1. Introduction

Effective operation of PSNP 4 relies on social accountability mechanisms in which clients and potential clients understand their rights and responsibilities, can voice concerns about the operation of the PSNP 4 and seek redress for their grievances. The PIM for phase 4 addresses the issue of social accountability for the first time, locating this within the Government of Ethiopia's wider Social Accountability Programme. The Kebele Appeals Committee (KAC) is the main operating body that serves this accountability function for the PSNP 4. Mechanisms to deal with grievances were in place in previous phases of the program, the main procedural change in this phase being that the Kebele Appeals Committee (KAC), to which complaints are addressed, must be independent from the Kebele and Community Food Security Task Forces.

Within this context, this chapter addresses **RQ19: Social Accountability and Grievance Redress**. Specifically<sup>15</sup>: (b) Are households aware of the role of local committees, including the *Kebele* Appeals Committee? Do they feel that the KAC is useful and respond to complaints? (c) Are the KACs established and functioning according to the PIM? Are staff and decision-makers aware of the KAC and its mandate? It will contribute to addressing **RQ5: How was PSNP4 adapted to address the Covid-19 pandemic?** Specifically, it will assess whether changes were made to social accountability and grievance redress provisions, and if so, how, and why. Finally, as requested by the WB-DCT, in this chapter we will report on nutrition sensitive activities related to the PSNP, focusing on exposure to health and nutrition services and exposure to PSNP benefits during pregnancy and lactation. This information is relevant to **RQ4: Has PSNP improved human development outcomes?**

The chapter uses information from Key Informant Interviews conducted at the Woreda and Kebele level along with quantitative data from the Kebele level to address RQ5 and RQ19(c). Note that because of Covid-related restrictions on gatherings, it was not possible to undertake qualitative interviews (such as Focus Group Discussions) with PSNP clients. Quantitative data collected at the household level will be used to address RQ19(a) and RQ19(b).

### 5.2. Kebele Appeals Committees

#### ***(a) Are the KACs established and functioning according to the PIM?***

The quantitative community questionnaire asked key respondents if there was a Kebele Appeals Committee (KAC) operating in their kebele. Table 5.1 shows their responses by region with data from the 2018 midline survey included for comparison purposes. Across all regions, 84 percent of kebeles reported having a KAC with an average size of 6.3 members. Consistent with these findings, in the qualitative surveys, all but one kebele in the Highlands and all kebeles in Afar and Somali reported the existence of a KAC. The percentage of kebeles with KACs fell slightly between 2018 and 2021 in Afar, Amhara, and SNNP, fell considerably in Oromiya but rose substantially in Somali region. Mean KAC size remained largely unchanged over time.

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<sup>15</sup> As requested, material covering RQ19(a) (Do PSNP clients know their rights and responsibilities under the PSNP? Does this differ by client characteristics?) is found in chapter 6.

**Table 5.1. Existence of Kebele Appeals Committees, by region and survey year**

Region	Kebele has a Kebele Appeals Committee			KAC size	
	Percent			Mean	
	2018	2021		2018	2021
Afar	92	83		6	6
Amhara	100	98		7	7
Oromiya	89	65		6	7
Somali	36	74		5	5
SNNP	97	94		6	7
All five regions	89	84		6	6

Source: Midline Performance Report. Community quantitative survey: 2021.

According to the PIM (section 10.3.2), membership in the KAC should include the following: an elected Kebele Council member (not the Chairperson), a Development Agent, 1-2 members of the Community Care Coalition (if it exists in the kebele), a Health Extension Worker or Volunteer Community Health Workers, a social worker (if represented in the kebele), and 2 elder representatives (with at least one female). The PIM also allows some regional variation in composition to accommodate other respected individuals such as clan or religious leaders (section 10.5).

Table 5.2 provides information on the composition of KACs in kebeles where they exist. There is some evidence that their composition follows what is outlined in the PIM – most notably the fact that most have an elected Kebele council member, a Development Agent and a male elder. Some, but not all, also have a HEW or VCHW, a female elder, a member of the CCC and a social worker. Not all kebeles have CCCs or social workers which may explain, in part, why those percentages are lower.

Several key informants in the Highlands also provided information about KAC membership. Consistent with Table 5.2, they described members that were outlined in the PIM (such as Development Agents, elders, health extension workers) but also model farmers, kebele managers and in one case, a militia commander.

**Table 5.2: KAC membership, by region and survey year**

Kebeles reporting that KAC includes:																
Region	Chairperson of the kebele council		Another member of the kebele council		A member of the Community Care Coalition		A female elder		A male elder		A DA		A social worker		A HEW or VCHW	
	Percent															
	2018	2021	2018	2021	2018	2021	2018	2021	2018	2021	2018	2021	2018	2021	2018	2021
Afar	70	77	70	67	53	53	55	63	97	83	88	60	46	27	76	37
Amhara	52	55	91	92	30	23	56	51	94	94	83	86	27	42	82	69
Oromiya	84	76	88	76	50	48	60	79	91	88	84	74	39	48	73	71
Somali	33	73	100	54	100	50	100	35	100	65	100	43	67	35	67	27
SNNP	85	92	79	86	30	66	41	45	93	94	89	92	47	57	83	74
All five regions	69	74	85	80	45	47	57	54	94	88	95	77	42	44	78	62

Notes: DA – Development Agent; HEW – Health Extension Worker; VCHW - Volunteer Community Health Worker.

Source: Midline Performance Report. Community quantitative survey: 2021.

There is a Community Appeal Committee chaired by an assigned kebele cabinet member, DA secretary, women/youth representatives, elderlies (one of which is a women), militia commander, one member from PSNP development group and cluster leader are members. [AMH-MEK-KFSTF]

We have KAC in our kebele comprising the chairman of the kebele, a youth representative, representative of women, head teacher, health extension, agriculture officer, traditional Leader, model Farmer, kebele manager. [SID-LOK-KFSTF]

A feature of PSNP4 was the recognition that in some localities, particularly Afar and Somali, it made sense to include traditional leaders in processes of social accountability, either as members of the KAC (more common in Somali) or in their own right and in partnership with the kebele administration (more common in Afar). In 2021, we asked traditional leaders to describe their roles in the implementation of the PSNP. They identified multiple parts of the programme, including identifying eligible beneficiaries, mobilising community members for public works, and mediating between kebele officials and the community. The breadth of their involvement means that in practice they influence decisions about both targeting and appeals. In terms of appeals and grievances, traditional leaders have a dual role in that one will be a member of the KAC while others support or engage with the appeals process to differing degrees. They described four functions: (i) acting as members of the KAC; (ii) helping the KAC reach a decision; (iii) helping individuals navigate the appeals process; and (iv) mediating between kebele and community.

In the case of appeals, we help our community members with complaints to appeal to the KAC. We also help the KAC make the right decision by providing appropriate information about the complainant household.... We work with the KAC. We have roles in hearing and solving problems with them. A traditional leader is also a member of the KAC. [SOM-SHI-TL]

As an elder we may receive complaints from the community regarding the kebele and the [PSNP implementing] committees. If that arises, then we mediate between them and try to solve it at the kebele level. [SOM-GUR-TL]

When there are complaints and appeals from people, we look for solutions together with the KAC as the community believed us in similar cases. [AFA-EWA-TL]

PSNP appeals are handled at KAC level. If the KACs need further discussion and final decisions they bring the issue to us and, together with them, we look for a solution for a final way forward.... In my clan I know who is poor and who is not. If the right people are complaining, I take the issue to the KAC. [AFA-ELI-TL]

The responses from traditional leaders suggest that the justification for their role rests on their knowledge of individuals in the community, the trust in which they are held, and their sociocultural responsibility for dispute resolution. RFSTF members echoed these points when asked to describe the role of traditional leaders in appeals processes and decisions as did KFSTF interviewees.

The role of a traditional leader is huge because he, together with the sub-clan leaders, knows the status of each member of the community within his clan. Moreover, the community members accept his judgment. [AFA-RFSTF]

Traditional leaders facilitate and support complaint-resolving mechanisms. [AFA-ELI-KFSTF]

The PSNP 4 PIM emphasizes that there should be no overlap between the members of the KAC and those responsible for PSNP implementation, particularly targeting; no member of a KAC should also be a member of a KFSTF or CFSTF. Evidence that this stipulation is being followed is mixed. Most strikingly, the Chairperson of the kebele council is often a member of the KAC (this percentage ranges from 55.4 in Amhara to 91.9 in SNNP) even though the PIM indicates that this should not be the case. Further, out of the 223 KACs for which we have data, in 62 percent the Chairperson of the kebele council is both a member of the KAC and the KFSTF. Consistent with these results, our qualitative interviews indicated that in some kebeles, membership of KFSTFs did not overlap while in others, it did.

Initially there was one single body (KFSTF) to target and to receive complaints. But, later, this approach was changed. The KAC was established, and training was given to strengthen the KAC. Segregation of responsibilities between KFSTF and KAC was made since EFY 2011. *[ORO-CHI-KFSTF]*

The KAC is different from the targeting group. They are separate from each other. *[SOM-ERR-KFSTF]*

In the recent past, there was a change in how appeal cases are handled. This change happened in EFY 2011 when the woreda was selected as a pilot that resulted in staffing changes at kebele level. Though the KAC already existed, it was not fulfilling the expected role. All KAC members were community members and were not fulfilling their mandates because they were occupied in their own activities. However, after the pilot, the kebele security head, who is a government civil servant, was appointed as chair of the KAC. He is following up and controlling all activities related to KAC. This has brought improvement regarding the ways appeals are resolved. *[SNN-BOL-KFSTF]*

As much as possible we give direction to the WFSTF to differentiate the members of KAC and targeting. But still in some newly created woredas the clan leaders and kebele leaders have participated in both committees. However, in other woredas we could say the KAC members were different from targeting members. *[AFA-RFSTF]*

The KAC members are different from targeting members. The KAC members include the clan leader, kebele parliament house speaker, women, respected men, and religious leader. But for targeting it is the clan leader, sub-clan leaders, school director, and kebele vice-leader. So, except for the clan leader, the targeting and KAC are different members. *[AFA-DUB-KFSTF]*

We note several additional performance metrics for KACs. The PIM states that KACs are required to meet and report quarterly and to publish the list of grievances they hear and their outcome. Data on these were collected as part of the community quantitative survey which took place largely in Miazia EC2013. Respondents indicated that the date of the last KAC meeting was Ginbot, Miazia or Megabit EC2013 (36 percent), Yekatit EC2013 (11 percent) and Tir Ec 2013 (11 percent). The remaining KACs held their most recent meeting either in Meskerem-Tahsis EC2013 (23 percent) or in EC2012 or earlier (17 percent). Given the interview dates, this implies that at most only about 47 percent of KACs (=26+11) were meeting quarterly. As Table 5.3 shows, it is uncommon for grievances to be published in a public place.

**Table 5.3: Percent kebeles publishing list of grievances, by region**

Region	Percent kebeles publishing list of grievances
Afar	0
Amhara	27
Oromiya	13
Somali	19
SNNP	26
All five regions	20

Source: Community quantitative survey: 2021.

We also asked woreda informants to comment on whether the KACs were functional, and whether PSNP clients were aware of their role. In the Lowlands, four of the six sampled woredas responded to this question. Three four (Shinile, Error, and Elidar) felt that the KACs were generally functioning well. The fourth (Ewa) mentioned shortcomings in awareness and acceptance, although when subsequently commenting on KAC effectiveness they also pointed to improvements in the handling of appeals. A mixed view of functionality was also found in woreda interviews in the Highlands

People are making appeals to KAC when they have complaints. Though the structure exists in all kebeles, functionality is an issue. There is also a gap on the awareness of the people about KAC or its existence and such people are coming to the Woreda Food Security Coordination Desk. *[SID-LOK-WFSTF]*

We know that the KAC is generally not functional and therefore people are obliged to take their appeals to kebele administration and, if they are not satisfied there, they bring it to our woreda office. *[SNN-BOL-WFSTF]*

The fact that clients continue to direct their complaints and grievances through a variety of other avenues apart from KACs - including kebele and woreda administrations and DAs - suggests that unawareness about KAC and engrained practices of seeking redress through senior kebele officials may be a more widespread issue.

The starting point is mostly the KAC. However, sometimes complaints come directly to the woreda food security coordination, woreda administration, and zone food security coordination. *[SNN-SOD-WFSTF]*

They make an appeal or complaint to different entities including the appeals committee (KAC), the development agent, the Kebele chairman, any of Kebele administration team members, Woreda administration, and Woreda agriculture and in HFA case some directly appeal to Woreda RDM office. *[ORO-FAD-WFSTF]*

Given that senior kebele administrators are also often members of KACs themselves, it is unclear whether, when someone approaches kebele officials with an appeal or complaint, they direct this to the individual official or the KAC. It is likely that many people do not make such fine distinctions, in which case the responsibility rests with kebele officials to bring appeals and complaints they receive to the full KAC for consideration.

***(b) Are staff and decision-makers aware of the KAC and its mandate?***

We asked WFSTF and KFSTF members about the process for directing appeals or complaints. Although many respondents confirm the KAC to be the first port of call, several indicated that appeals and



complaints are directed to the kebele administration. Where the KAC plays a central role, it reviews the evidence and passes on recommendations to the kebele administration. When cases are not satisfactorily addressed at kebele level they are referred to the woreda administration – this can either be done by the KAC or those appealing may take their cases directly to those levels.

Complaints and grievances are submitted to KAC in writing. The KAC investigates the appeals; reviews the evidence and makes recommendations for correction. *[ORO-KUY-KFSTF]*

Appeals are made to the Kebele administration, KAC, the DA or Kebele manager. If they are not satisfied by the response, they appeal to woreda agriculture office and administration. *[ORO-ZEW-WFSTF]*

Complaints and grievances are submitted to KAC. The KAC looks into the appeals, reviews the evidence on the cases appealed, and passes on their recommendation to kebele for correction. If not resolved at kebele level, it will be passed to woreda for final resolution. The cases will be filed in a designated format prepared for the purpose. *[ORO-CHI-KFSTF]*

If people have complaints of any kind, they first submit their appeal to the Community Appeal Committee. If they don't get satisfactory answer, their case is referred to KAC and even they can submit their case to the woreda food security. But most of the appeal cases get answer at Community Appeal Committee and KAC levels. *[AMH-MEK-KFSTF]*

We also asked about who is responsible for responding to appeals and complaints by PSNP clients. Except for woredas in Oromiya (where the kebele administration performs this role, typically communicating verbally to the person who made the appeal/complaint), responses are usually provided by the KAC.

The KAC provide responses if people have any complain/appeal. The complainants avail their case to the KAC, the committee reviews the case and provides the response in written form within 10 days but in some cases it can go up to 30 days. *[AMH-MEK-WFSTF]*

It is the KAC that responds to complaints and appeal cases from community members. The KAC convenes meetings regularly once in three months. But when the contingency budget arrives they convene meetings once per month. *[SNN-SOD-WFSTF]*

It is the kebele management. Any appeal is reviewed together with KAC and agreements and decisions made are communicated in person by the Kebele chairman to the person who appealed. *[ORO-ZEW-WFSTF]*

One respondent detailed the process in relation to targeting appeals specifically.

We observed that in the respective PSNP kebeles of our woreda, retargeting complaints were presented to members of the KAC. In the first instance, at community level, they forwarded their appeal cases to the retargeting committee. If the retargeting committee working at community level did not respond to their appeals satisfactorily, they would bring their appeal cases to KAC. After this, the kebele retargeting committee and the kebele food security task force scrutinized and posted the names of the targeted clients at kebele office where every resident of the kebele could see it. If they still could not be satisfied with the outcome of the retargeting process, their appeal cases were seen by the KAC. *[SNN-ARB-WFSTF]*

Questions about process were also asked in the Lowlands. This generated a range of responses that diverged both within and across localities. For example, when speaking with WFSTFs in Somali, all

replied that it would be the KAC, which may then forward an issue up the hierarchy if it is unable to resolve it.

In each kebele there are appeals committees who receive complaints from the communities. They resolve them with the KFSTF at the kebele level. If they can't resolve them, they submit them to the WFSTF. If the woreda can't resolve them, it writes a minute and refers them to the regional PSNP team. But there are few complaints not handled in the kebele. Some women, religious leaders, and traditional leaders are part of the committees but there is no separate group that receives complaints other than the appeals committee. *[SOM-GUR-WFSTF]*

However, when traditional leaders were asked the same question, some of their replies diverged.

Truly speaking, people don't formally complain. You could see them complaining informally, but you don't see them submitting their complaints to appeals committees or to elders. If a complaint reaches elders, this is known as a formal complaint. *[SOM-GUR-TL]*

In Elidar (Afar), both woreda and kebele officials identified the KAC as receiving complaints while the traditional leader pointed to himself, although his response suggests that he is also a member of the KAC. The opposite description was provided in Dubti, where the traditional leader pointed to the KAC and PSNP officials to the clan leader.

People present their complaints to the complaint hearing committee. Most of the complaints are solved by this committee. The only two challenges we have never obtained a solution for, both at the kebele and woreda level, are the reduced numbers of people registered in PDS households and family members excluded due to the household quota. *[AFA-ELI-KFSTF]*

In our area all these complaints I mentioned are coming to me. I take them to other members of the KAC and we discuss it together. If we support the appeal then we forward it to the kebele leader.... Our communities prefer to bring and discuss any claims or appeals [with us] before going to the higher officials at kebele or woreda levels. *[AFA-ELI-TL]*

First they complain to the clan leader. Then the clan leader forwards the complaint to the KAC... The clan leader and sub-clan leaders know every member in our kebele. They also trust his judgment. So when they have any complaint, they take it to the clan leader. If he can resolve it, together with his sub-clan leaders, he does so. If he can't, he forwards it to the KAC. *[AFA-DUB-KFSTF]*

They present their complaint to the KAC of our kebele. The KAC carefully looks into the issue and provides a solution to the kebele administration / chairman who can turn it into action. If the issue can't be resolved at the kebele level it will be presented to the woreda leader or WFSTF. *[AFA-DUB-TL]*

Our qualitative conversations with woreda and kebele officials were also a natural place to discuss their perceptions of the effectiveness of KACs. Woreda FSTF officials were asked if KACs respond to complaints in a fair and timely manner. Responses were mixed. In Amhara woredas, respondents reported positively on the process, noting that appeals are often resolved at the kebele level, within a relatively short period of time. By contrast, KACs were not perceived to operate effectively in SNNP.

We think it is fair and timely because 95% of the appeals are resolved at kebele level. It often takes a week at kebele level. If it comes to the woreda level, it takes 15 days. *[AMH-LIB-WFSTF]*

We provide response to appeal cases at kebele level within 10 days after the case filed but in some cases it might take more time. The cases are reviewed in detail and most of the time fair responses are provided by KAC and woreda food security units. *[AMH-MEK-WFSTF]*

The majority of the community complaints are presented to the KAC but their timeliness and fairness is still an issue because of the issues related to KAC strength. *[SID-LOK-WFSTF]*

Limited availability of KAC members, their limited understanding of their roles and responsibilities and delays at woreda level also contributed to delays.

Sometimes convening the KAC in 3 months may be a constraint. The KAC members get busy with their personal lives, and this may have an implication on timeliness. *[SNN-SOD-WFSTF]*

If the appeal is made at woreda, may take longer may be a week or two, until the woreda assign the right person to look in to and examine the case. *[ORO-KUY-WFSTF]*

There are times and places where KAC doesn't respond fairly and timely because of different reasons including capacity, not fully knowing and understanding their roles and responsibilities. *[ORO-KUY-WFSTF]*

Respondents also noted that factors outside the control of the KACs limit their effectiveness, particularly those relating to the number of clients who can be included in the program.

There is a formal appeals committee but without a functional role as the major appeal or complaint is targeting, and there has been no way to have new cases for targeting for a long time. *[AFA-EWA-KFSTF]*


The common complaints in our kebele are about why they are excluded from the safety net even if they are as poor as the selected beneficiaries, and the small quantity of food compared with the large family size. Even if their complaint is acceptable to us, we don't help them because of the fixed quota given by the woreda. *[AFA-DUB-KFSTF]*

There was no solution to some cases, such as the grievances of PDS clients and the household cap. But complaints like the number of hours spent on public works, or those concerning pregnant women, were solved. *[AFA-ELI-KFSTF]*

***(c) Are households aware of the role of local committees, including the Kebele Appeals Committee? Do they feel that the KAC is useful and respond to complaints?***

In brief, few households are aware of the Kebele Appeals Committee and so of those individuals are only aware of them either because they are on the committee, or they are related to someone who is on the KAC (Figure 5.1). Note that the midline performance report found awareness of KACs higher than that reported in 2021 (it was 18, 39, 27, 26 and 39 percent in Afar, Amhara, Oromiya, Somali and SNNP respectively).


**Figure 5.1: Percent households who are aware of the KAC, by region**



Source: Household survey: 2021.

If households are to use the KAC to file a grievance, they need to know who is a member of the KAC. Even when they are aware that the KAC exists (see Annex Table A5.1), few households can do so (Figure 5.2).

**Figure 5.2: Percent households who can name a KAC member, by region**



Because so few households are aware of the KAC and even fewer can name a member, we do not have a sufficient number of observations to assess whether households perceive that the KAC is useful and respond to complaints.

**(d) Additional findings relating to the KACs**

*(i) What issues do KACs address*

As part of our qualitative survey, we asked informants to describe the most common issues that KACs were asked to address. These are described in Table 5.4. Not surprisingly, targeting and the household cap are the most widely cited topics but payment issues are also frequently and widely mentioned. The qualitative interviews also reveal the day-to-day concerns that the KACs are addressing.

Some people complain that they have lost their client card or that transfers delay beyond the distribution day. These people submit their complaint to the appeals committee which then submits it to the KFSTF. The KFSTF writes a letter requesting the Somali Microfinance Institution to take action, which then checks their payroll and gives support. [SOM-ERR-WFSTF]

Some of the common complaints the appeals committee receive are that people can't come to do public works because some livestock have been lost, or they are sick. For the sick people, the KAC contacts the health post to confirm and leave is given. [SOM-ERR-KFSTF]

**Table 5.4: Complaints heard by KACs as reported by RFSTF and WFSTF, by region**


	Region									
	Afar		Amhara		Oromiya		SNNP		Somali	
Issue	RFSTF	WFSTF	RFSTF	WFSTF	RFSTF	WFSTF	RFSTF	WFSTF	RFSTF	WFSTF
Household cap	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Targeting	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Graduation				X						
Payment delays or missed payments	X			X		X	X	X	X	X
Small transfer amounts				X		X				X
Incomplete food basket					X					
Differential treatment of public works and PDS clients		X								
Lost client cards										X
Distance to public works sites									X	
Lack of first aid and safety measures at work sites									X	
Distance to distribution points									X	

Source: Qualitative surveys with RFSTF and WFSTF

*(ii) Are appeals successful?*

As part of the community quantitative survey, we asked respondents, “Since Meskerem EC2013, how many households have appealed to the KAC because they have been excluded from the PSNP?” and how many of these appeals were successful. The striking feature of Figure 5.3 is how few appeals are successful – more than half (56 percent) of the kebeles in our sample report that no appeals were successful and another 27 percent report that less than half were successful.<sup>16</sup> In this regard, 36 percent of the unsuccessful households were informed that their household is not eligible for the PSNP4 benefits, 5 percent lodged their appeal late, and 4 percent were given other reasons. In contrast, 54 percent claim that no reason was given for their unsuccessful appeal.

**Figure 5.3: Percent of appeals to the Kebele Appeals Committees since Meskerem EC2013 that were successful, by region**



Source: Endline quantitative community data.

*(iii) Use of KACs in relation to the livelihood component, humanitarian assistance, and conflict and displacement*

In the Highlands, we asked regional FSTF members whether appeal committees were able to address complaints related to livelihood component activities, such as access to loans. Our respondents explained these complaints were not addressed. This is either because committees are not strong

<sup>16</sup> The PIM notes that where an appeal has been unsuccessful at the KAC level, clients should be informed that they can appeal to the woreda level. We did not collect data on the number of appeals made to woreda authorities or whether they were successful.

enough to address this type of issues or because these are beyond their sphere of responsibility. The Amhara RFSTF noted that loans are decided based on technical decisions which are not seen as matters that can be contested by clients.

In most localities in both the Highlands and the Lowlands, KFSTF respondents explained that humanitarian assistance and PNSP grievances are dealt in the same manner by the KAC. In the sampled kebele in Mekdela woreda, although the process and people involved are the same, the committee dealing with humanitarian assistance grievances is given a different name. The one noted exception was Error (Afar), where both the WFSTF and the KFSTF stated that the role of the KAC is limited to PSNP. In Dubti, woreda and kebele officials gave contradictory responses with the WFSTF stating that HFA-related compliance is handled by the KAC while the KFSTF indicated that HFA related issues were handled by the clan leader and kebele leader together.

We asked WFSTF and KFSTF members whether conflict or displacement had generated complaints or grievances. In the Highlands, most respondents reported no conflict and displacement and no related complaints or grievances. Respondents in three kebeles (Bolosso Sore woreda, in SNNP, and Angolela Tara and Mekdela woredas, in Amhara) confirmed there have been requests for support by displaced people. One respondent explained that these complaints are directed to the kebele administration, and not to the PSNP appeals structures.

People who are displaced and settle in this woreda avail their complaints not through PSNP structures rather they can complain to agriculture office. [In practical terms they avail their case to kebele administration] [AMH-MEK-WFSTF]

Apart from households displaced by flooding in Dubti, this was not an issue in Afar. However, all three woredas in Somali reported complaints arising from conflict-related displacement, although they did not explicitly link these with the KACs.

Complaints from IDP households and those kebeles detached from Oromiya are high. These kebeles aren't receiving their entitlement under PSNP because they have not been released from their previous administration. Host communities also complain about the burden their displaced relatives place on them in sharing their limited resources. [SOM-GUR-WFSTF]

Complaints regarding displacement and conflict come from some of the kebeles. Usually it's the kebele administration in the host kebele that reports such complaints. [SOM-ERR-WFSTF]

#### *(iv) Grievances related to Covid-19*

We asked KFSTF respondents whether Covid-19 had led to an increase in the number of households in their kebele asking to be included in the PSNP, and if so, who handled these requests. In three of the 11 sampled kebeles (in Kuyu, Angolela Tara and Mekdela woredas), Covid-19 was reported to have increased requests for targeting, as people returned to the kebele and/or lost their jobs. One respondent explained that these requests were put to the KFSTF, not the KAC.

There was a number of households (daily laborers, demobilized militaries, etc) requesting to be included in PSNP because of loss of jobs due to the Covid-19 pandemic impact on economy. Since there were no resources, the requests were not addressed. [ORO-KUY-KFSTF]

Due to Covid-19, youths who had been working in towns returned to the kebele since they lost their jobs due to the lockdown. They asked to be included in the PSNP. They put their case to the KFSTF not to KAC. But we cannot include them because of limitation of quota; we have 555 beneficiaries in the waiting list. [AMH-MEK-KFSTF]



In the Lowlands, we asked KFSTF members whether Covid-19 had led to an increase in the number of households in their kebele asking to be included in the PSNP, and if so, who handled these requests. Only one of the six sampled (Error) said that this was an issue, linking it with the economic consequences of the pandemic.

Covid-19 brought lots of complaints. We are in trouble when it comes to inflation due to Covid-19. The KAC also receives such complaints from the communities. But there is no response we can provide given that PSNP is fixed. *[SOM-ERR-KFSTF]*

### 5.3. Nutrition-sensitive aspects of PSNP4

PSNP guidelines determining the inclusion of clients in the Temporary Direct Support (TDS) component were refreshed in the PSNP 4. Specifically, a provision for temporary direct support is made for pregnant and lactating women (up to one year after birth) and primary care-givers of malnourished children. Pregnant women can shift to TDS as soon as they receive a letter from a health worker (usually at 4 months into the pregnancy or before). Application of these guidelines requires that program implementers are aware of these stipulations. To assess this awareness, our quantitative woreda and community surveys asked respondents when pregnant women should be moved to TDS and at what point, post-partum, they were permitted to return to public works employment.

At the woreda level, these guidelines are now generally well-understood. All woreda level respondents in SNNP and Somali could correctly describe when pregnant women are moved to TDS as did 89 percent of respondents in Amhara and 73 percent in Oromiya. Only in Afar was awareness relatively low, with only 42 percent correctly identified this requirement; another 42 percent reported the pre-PSNP4 stipulation of six months. In both the Highlands and Lowlands, approximately two-thirds of woreda-level respondents knew that women should be moved back to public works 12 months post-partum. There were isolated cases where woreda officials reported an earlier cut-off, six months.

At the kebele level, these guidelines are less well-understood. Only 58 percent of kebele respondents in Amhara, Oromiya and SNNP correctly identified the four-month cut-off as did 54 percent of Somali respondents and just six percent of respondents in Afar. There are wide variations in understanding of when women can return to public works after giving birth, with the correct answer (12 months) given by 72 percent of respondents in Afar, 71 percent in Amhara, 29 percent in Oromiya, 14 percent in Somali and 12 percent in SNNP.

At the kebele level, we also asked about the stipulation that mothers of severely acutely malnourished children be moved to TDS. This too is not widely understood; across all woredas, about 60 percent of respondents knew this, again with wide regional variations ranging from 86 percent in Afar to 48 percent in Somali.

Mindful of these findings, consider the results of questions asked to female spouses/heads in PSNP Highland households who reported being pregnant since May 2018. These are reported in Table 5.5. As the number of respondents is relatively small, we also report results from the midline survey, and we do not disaggregate by region. Among the 1,499 women in our sample, 349 (23 percent) were in households receiving PSNP benefits when they learned they were pregnant. Of those 349 women, 43 percent (150 women) were working on public works when they learned they were pregnant. Just over half of those 150 women (53 percent), stopped working after they learned they were pregnant, at about 4.9 months of pregnancy. Only about 33 of pregnant women stopped work by 4th month of pregnancy. 64 percent of women were advised by health workers to stop working during pregnancy, a 14 percentage point increase over that recorded in the midline survey. Just over a third of women (37 percent) were discouraged from stopping work by CFSTFs. Only 42.5 percent were actually shifted to TDS, a slight increase over that reported in the midline survey.

**Table 5.5: PSNP benefits during pregnancy**

Indicator	Midline	Endline
Among those ever pregnant since Ginbot EC 2008/2011 (May 2016/2018)	<b>N = 1,718</b>	<b>N = 1,499</b>
HH received PSNP benefits when pregnant	29 %	23%
Respondent worked on public works	13 %	43%
Among those working on public works when pregnant:	<b>N = 221</b>	<b>N = 150</b>
Stopped working after learning that she was pregnant	49 %	53%
When stopped working (months pregnant)	4.8 months (N=110)	4.9 months (N=80)
Continued to work until birth	2%	3%
Wished to have stopped earlier	59%	54%
Advised by health worker to stop work	49%	64%
Advised by Development Agent to stop work	46%	52%
Discouraged from stopping work by Community Food Security Task Force	31 %	37%
Household received Direct Support payments after stopped working	36 %	4%

Notes: 2018 results from midline performance report. 2021 results from household quantitative survey.

Almost half (48 percent) of women resumed working on public works, at about 6.7 months after delivery (Table 5.6). Only 15% returned after 12 months. With the caveat that the sample sizes are small, two-thirds of women reported that working affected breastfeeding, largely because in the absence of child care facilities (as reported in the midline evaluation 81 percent of worksites did not have childcare for infants) mothers had to leave their children at home.

**Table 5.6: PSNP benefits during lactation (\*PSNP households only)**

Indicator	Midline	Endline
Among those who worked on public works when pregnant <sup>a</sup> :	<b>N = 221</b>	<b>N = 150</b>
Resumed working after giving birth	39%	48%
When resumed working (months after giving birth), mean (median)	5.6 (6)	6.7(6)
Among those who did <u>not</u> resume working after giving birth:		
Reasons for <u>not</u> resuming work:		
Public works not operating	17%	27%
Advised by health worker not to return to work	9%	8%
Did not want to return to work	7%	7%
Household received direct support	20 %	10%
Other	47 %	28%
Among those who resumed working after giving birth:	<b>N = 56</b>	<b>N = 70</b>
Work affected breastfeeding	54 %	67%
Ways work affected breastfeeding:		
No place to BF at worksite	25 %	51%
Had to leave child at home	48 %	74%
Too tired from work	12 %	26%
Not produced enough breastmilk	4 %	4%
Supervisors did not permit BF during work hours	5 %	13%
Left child at a child care center during work	8 %	
No, no center exists	81 %	
No, center not accessible	6 %	
No, did not want to leave child	5 %	

<sup>a</sup> Note that some women are currently pregnant and are excluded from the percentages reported in this table.  
Notes: 2018 results from midline performance report. 2021 results from household quantitative survey.

An important component of PSNP4 links clients to health and nutrition services provided by Health Extension Workers (HEWs). Table 5.7 shows that contact with HEWs, as measured by whether mothers knew the names of HEWs or whether they had received a home visit declined in all regions as did the likelihood that these contacts included counselling on breastfeeding or complementary feeding.<sup>17</sup> Our data do not provide specific information on why this occurred. Here are some *speculative* explanations: (a) HEWs were diverted to help respond to the coronavirus pandemic, resulting in them having less time available for nutrition related activities; (b) HEWs were concerned about meeting individuals in environments where they (the HEWs) might be exposed to Covid; (c) Mothers were concerned about going to health posts, particularly if they had to wait in crowded waiting rooms and thus potentially be exposed to Covid. There is no difference in these contacts between PSNP and non-PSNP households.

**Table 5.7: Contact with Health Extension Workers in past 3 months, by survey year, region and PSNP status**

	Survey year	Amhara	Oromiya	SNNP	Non-PSNP	PSNP
				Percent		
Knows a local HEW	2018	45	42	58	-	-
	2021	36	34	48	38	42
In the last 3 months, was visited by the HEW at home	2018	16	11	23	-	-
	2021	13	7	15	10	13
Discussed breastfeeding or complementary feeding with HEW*	2018	79	59	71	-	-
	2021	61	66	65	64	63

Notes: 2018 results from midline performance report. 2021 results from household quantitative survey.

These data were not collected in Afar or Somali. Disaggregation by PSNP status not available for 2018. \* Conditional on having contact with HEW in the last three months.

Lastly, regarding the monitoring of the physical growth of children less than 24 months of age and the promotion of appropriate age-specific feeding practices. Growth Monitoring and Promotion is typically carried out by the HEWs and involves measuring the height, weight and Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) of children less than 2 years of age as well as providing nutrition counselling to caregivers. There are three key results (See Table 5.8): (1) monitoring of heights and weights declined between 2018 and 2021, while measurement of MUAC (used to assess severe acute malnutrition) increased in Amhara and Oromiya; (2) Counselling on optimal infant and young child feeding practices (IYCF) fell in all regions; and (3) In 2021, there is little meaningful difference in access to growth monitoring between PSNP and non-PSNP households. We do not know why this occurred. It is possible that it is a consequence of reduced contact with HEWs.

**Table 5.8: Exposure to growth monitoring and promotion in past 3 months, by survey year, region and PSNP status**

	Survey year	Amhara	Oromiya	SNNP	Non-PSNP	PSNP
				Percent		
Weight was measured	2018	24	22	29	-	-
	2021	19	13	16	15	17
Height was measured	2018	19	18	27	-	-
	2021	16	11	14	12	16
MUAC was measured	2018	20	14	24	-	-
	2021	24	15	16	17	20
Counselled on IYCF practices*	2018	59	53	82	-	-
	2021	28	16	21	20	24

N Notes: 2018 results from midline quantitative survey. 2021 results from household quantitative survey. These data were not collected in Afar or Somali. Disaggregation by PSNP status not available for 2018.\* Conditional on receiving any form of growth monitoring.

## 5.4. Summary

This chapter has focused on the social accountability mechanisms found within the PSNP. Their effectiveness requires that: staff and decision-makers aware of the KAC and its mandate (RQ19c); that households are aware of their rights under the PSNP (RQ19a); these social accountability mechanisms are established and functioning (RQ19c); and that they are useful and respond to complaints (RQ19b).

Our qualitative data show that at the regional, woreda and kebele level, program implementers are mostly aware of the KAC and its role in handling appeals and complaints at kebele level. This is true in both the Highlands and the Lowlands.

Knowledge of the existence of the PSNP is widespread (in all regions, the percent of households who have heard about the PSNP is above 50 percent) but not universal (highest awareness is found in Afar, 84 percent). But in most regions, only a quarter to one-third of households are aware of the CFSTF and even fewer can name a CFSTF member (five to 17 percent) or are aware that CFSTF is responsible for selecting PSNP clients (two to eight percent). Awareness of KACs is low, ranging from 10.7 (Afar) to 26.8 percent (Amhara) and few households can actually name a KAC member.

In nearly all the different ways that we disaggregate the data, knowledge of basic PSNP operations and rights is low. Fewer than 15 percent of households of any type (PSNP/non-PSNP; client card/no client card) could correctly state how many days after their month's work is complete that they had to wait before receiving payment. Knowledge that each day's work entitled a household to three kilograms of grain was similarly low. The only question that generated a meaningful number of correct answers related to the maximum number of days per month that one person can work on PSNP Public Works. Public Works participants were more likely to provide these correct answers to this question than Direct Support clients. Just under two-thirds of households in Amhara (64 percent) provided either the five day or the 10-25 day response; the highest correct response for any question by any disaggregation.

Our quantitative community surveys show that most, 84 percent, kebeles have a KAC with this figure ranging from 64.6 percent in Oromiya to 98.5 percent in Amhara. KACs typically have around six members and composition is broadly in line with what is envisaged in the PIM. The PSNP 4 PIM emphasises that there should be no overlap between the members of the KAC and those responsible for PSNP implementation. Evidence that this stipulation is being followed is mixed. Most strikingly, the Chairperson of the kebele council is often a member of the KAC (this percentage ranges from 55.4 to 91.9 depending on the region), even though the PIM indicates that this should not be the case. Further, out of the 223 KACs for which we have data, in 62 percent the Chairperson of the kebele council is both a member of the KAC and the CFSTF. Our qualitative data shows similar patterns, both in terms of the existence of KACs (KACs are reported to be in place in all but one kebele sampled within the 11 woredas included in the 2021 evaluation) and their membership. It was noted, however, that involvement of kebele officials is seen as a way of compensating for the lack of availability of community members to serve in KACs. It is uncommon for KACs to post a list of grievances; across all kebeles in our survey, only 19.5 percent did so.

Effectiveness is difficult to judge because so few households are aware of KACs and what they do. Our endline quantitative community data indicates that more than half (55.8 percent) of the kebeles in our sample report that no appeals were successful and another 27 percent report that less than half were successful. This, together with the fact that few households are aware of KACs, suggests that these social accountability mechanisms are functioning poorly. While that appears to be largely true, it is important to note that in many cases, there do not appear to be additional resources that would allow appeals to be successful. Our qualitative data suggest that the involvement of various community constituents, while advantageous in terms of transparency and local knowledge, also has

some downsides, where these individuals are too busy to attend to KAC functions. In the Lowlands, links between formal social grievance structures and traditional authority figures appear to be working increasingly effectively and in both the Highlands and Lowlands, play a useful role in resolving operational issues apart from those related to the Livelihood Component.

This chapter also contributes to RQ5 (*“How was PSNP4 adapted to address the Covid-19 pandemic?”*) We did not find any specific examples of changes in social accountability structures in our qualitative work. Covid-19 and displacement have contributed to increases in requests for targeting in some locations, as people returned to the kebele and/or lost their jobs. These requests are directed to kebele officials and not the KAC and are not handled as part of the appeals and complaints process.

This chapter also includes nutrition sensitive aspects of PSNP4. PSNP guidelines determining the inclusion of clients in the Temporary Direct Support (TDS) component were refreshed in the PSNP 4. Apart from Afar, these are well-understood at the woreda level. However, at the kebele level, these are less well-understood. Only 58 percent of kebele respondents in Amhara, Oromiya and SNNP correctly identified the four-month cut-off for moving pregnant women to TDS as did 54 percent of Somali respondents and just six percent of respondents in Afar. There were wide variations in understanding of when women can return to public works after giving birth, with the correct answer (12 months) given by 72 percent of respondents in Afar, 71 percent in Amhara, 29 percent in Oromiya, 14 percent in Somali and 12 percent in SNNP. Responses from women who had been or were pregnant indicated that 37 percent were discouraged from stopping work by CFSTFs and only 42.5 percent were actually shifted to TDS. Women who did return to Public Works post-partum typically did so much earlier than envisaged in the PIM.

## Chapter 5 annex

**Table 5.9: Percent households who can name a KAC member, by region**

Region	Cannot name a KAC member		Can name a KAC member	
	And are unaware that KAC exists	But are aware of KAC		but are a KAC member or are related to a KAC member
Afar	87.4	7.9	2.9	1.8
Amhara	68.9	18.2	9.2	3.8
Oromiya	83.9	10.3	4.1	1.7
Somali	80.4	11.0	6.3	2.3
SNNP	80.5	8.5	8.7	2.2
All regions	79.3	11.6	6.7	2.4

Source: Household survey: 2021.

## **Chapter 6: Payments**

### **6.1. Introduction**

The focus of this chapter is on PSNP payment, their processes as seen through the perspectives of PSNP clients, client understanding of those processes and payments themselves with a focus on timeliness, frequency, predictability, and completeness. Where appropriate, we disaggregate by mode of payment. As such it provides information for two research questions: RQ15: Assessing Transfers (Payments) performance; and RQ6: Were payments to clients timely and predictable?

The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 address RQ15(v): Who in the household collects the transfer and whether there are differences between households receiving food and cash transfers. Section 6.3 provides descriptive information on client cards – this is relevant to RQ15(vi): Do clients have client cards? Were they asked to pay for these cards? - while section 6.4 assesses whether possession of a client card helps PSNP beneficiaries understand the program (and thus contributes to RQ15(vii): Is the information on the client card clear? Does it help them understand their entitlements and responsibilities?).

Section 6.5 describes PSNP clients' experiences in accessing payments. This provides data relevant to: RQ15: (iv) How far/how long do clients have to travel to receive their transfers? How many receive their transfers at a place no more than three hours from home? What is the average cost incurred to receive the transfers? What is the difference in time and cost, if any, between those receiving food and those receiving cash transfers? and; RQ15: (iii) Are clients asked by officials or community members to use their transfers for specific purposes? Section 6.6 describes payments in terms of their modalities, timeliness, frequency, predictability, and completeness, thus answering RQ15: (i) Are payments to clients timely and predictable? And RQ15: (ii) Do clients receive their complete entitlement? If not, why not? Section 6.7 summarizes.

### **6.2. Who collects PSNP payments?**

Survey participants were asked about the identity of the person who usually collected PSNP payments between Tir EC2012 (January 2020) and Miazia EC2013 (April 2021). In the vast majority of cases (96 percent in the Highlands; 95 percent in the Lowlands), only one person does so. Table 6.1 indicates whether this person is the household head or some other person by region and transfer type.



**Table 6.1: who collects payments, by region and payment type**

Region	Payment type	Number of observations	Who collects payment	
			Household head	Other household member
			Percent	
Amhara	All	893	91	9
	Food	186	91	9
	Cash	841	90	10
	Both food and cash	165	90	10
Oromiya	All	680	87	13
	Food	373	89	11
	Cash	525	87	14
	Both food and cash	232	89	11
SNNP	All	770	89	11
	Food	42	79	21
	Cash	759	89	11
	Both food and cash	34	74	27
Afar	All	596	85	15
	Food	506	86	14
	Cash	197	88	12
	Both food and cash	125	86	14
Somali	All	450	79	21
	Food	35	86	14
	Cash	428	78	22
	Both food and cash	18	83	17
All Regions	All	3389	87	13
	Food	1142	88	12
	Cash	2750	87	13
	Both food and cash	574	88	12

Source: Household endline survey, 2021.

Put simply, the household head is the person who usually collects the PSNP transfer. This is true in all regions (87 percent), with percentage of heads collecting transfers ranging from 79 (Somali) to 90 (Amhara) percent. There is no difference when we disaggregate by payment type.

We wondered if the identity of the person collecting transfers was correlated with the identity of the person who decided how these transfers would be used. Results are shown, by region, in Table 6.2

**Table 6.2: Cross-tabulation of who collects payments and who decides how they will be used**

		If	
		The Household head usually collects the payment	Someone other than the head collects the payment
	Who usually makes decisions about how the transfer is used ...	Percent	
Amhara	Head	62	27
	Spouse	8	23
	Head and spouse joint	24	29
	Other household members	6	21
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
Oromiya	Head	84	39
	Spouse	6	33
	Head and spouse	9	17
	Other household members	2	10
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
SNNP	Head	84	48
	Spouse	5	28
	Head and spouse	9	10
	Other household members	2	14
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
Afar	Head	79	48
	Spouse	10	24
	Head and spouse	9	18
	Other household members	2	9
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
Somali	Head	68	52
	Spouse	11	27
	Head and spouse	17	17
	Other household members	3	4
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
All regions	Head	75	41
	Spouse	8	27
	Head and spouse	15	19
	Other household members	2	13
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Household endline survey, 2021.

Table 6.2 shows that when the head collects the payment, (s)he is the person who in most cases, decides how it is used. This is especially pronounced in Oromiya and SNNP, where around 84 percent of heads who collect the payment also decide how it is used. It is somewhat less pronounced in Amhara where 24 percent of household heads, jointly with their spouses, decide how the payment is used when the head collects the payment.<sup>18</sup>

### 6.3. Client cards

All PSNP clients are supposed to be issued a Client Card. The costs associated with issuing these are supposed to be covered by regional and woreda administrative budgets; PSNP clients are not supposed to pay for their client cards.

Restricting our sample to households who reported receiving PSNP payments at endline, either through Public Works participation or receipt of Direct Support, we find that 67 percent of PSNP clients had a client card. However, this average hides large regional differences. In the Highlands, between 79 (Oromiya) and 89 percent (Amhara) of Highlands households reported having a client card, percentages that were broadly comparable to results reported in the 2018 (midline) performance report. By contrast, only 25 and 34 percent of PSNP households in Afar and Somali respectively had client cards; these were lower percentages than that reported in 2018. It is worth noting that in the Highlands, PSNP participants were less likely to have client cards if they had not been initially selected to receive PSNP payments; but were included either after appeal or after discussion at a public meeting.<sup>19</sup> Differences at the woreda level reflect this, especially in Amhara where woredas which had a greater percentage of households without cards also had a greater percentage of households in the program as a result of an appeal or a discussion at a public meeting.

**Table 6.3: Percent beneficiaries with client cards and percent asked to pay for these, by region and survey round**

Region	PSNP clients hold client card (percent)		PSNP clients who report having to pay for their client card (percent)	
	2018	2021	2018	2021
Amhara	94	89	7	5
Oromiya	79	79	22	11
SNNP	92	84	14	15
Afar	32	25	6	5
Somali	51	34	14	29
All regions	72	67	14	12

Source: 2018 results taken from Table 10.2, Berhane et al (2019). 2021 results from Quantitative household data, 2021.

In Afar, Amhara, Oromiya and SNNP, most clients were not asked to pay for their cards; but 29 percent in Somali did so. It is worth noting that the problem does not appear systemic at the regional level; rather, there are a few woredas in each region where the practice of charging for cards is widespread.

<sup>18</sup> We re-calculated the results shown in Table 6.2 by payment type but did not find any difference. In 74 percent of PSNP client households receiving cash, the household head decided how the transfer would be used; in 75 percent of PSNP client households receiving food, the household head decided how the transfer would be used;

<sup>19</sup> The percentages of clients with cards in the Highlands were: 80 percent if initially selected; 71 percent if not initially selected but included after discussion at a public meeting; and 74 percent if not initially selected but included after appeal to the Kebele Appeals Committee.


For example, in Afar, most reports of payments occurred in only one woreda. In Somali, no one reported having to pay for their cards in two woredas whereas 65 percent did so in Erer. In the 2018 performance report, we noted that – contrary to what is stated in the PIM – clients in some localities were being charged for the photographs that are pasted onto the cards, but not the cards themselves and that might account for some of the responses reported in Table 6.3.

#### **6.4. Client cards and client understanding of the PSNP**

The PSNP4 PIM notes that in addition to providing proof that a household has been targeted for inclusion, the client card also summarizes key aspects of the programme, for example: how many days each household can participate in public works (five days per person with a maximum of 15 days per person per month); and when payments will be received (20 days after months-end for cash payments and 30 days for food payments). It also states that beneficiaries will be informed of transfer levels (here we focus on food payments since the daily wage for these, 3kg per person day worked, is common across all regions). Our household quantitative survey instrument asked PSNP beneficiaries about their knowledge of the programme. Responses are shown in Table 6.4.

In brief, even though client cards are widely distributed and even though programme details are printed on these cards, knowledge of key programme rights is limited. In no region, for any of the four questions that we asked regarding the client rights did more than 50 percent of our respondents provide a correct response. Apart from the maximum days of work per month, fewer than 20 percent of respondents knew the correct answer to these questions.

**Figure 6.1: PSNP clients' knowledge of their rights, by region**



Source: Quantitative household data 2021.

Table 6.4 makes clear that possession of a client card has no bearing on respondents' ability to correctly answer these questions. In the 2018 midline report, it was noted that individuals who are unable to read do not find the information on the card useful<sup>20</sup>. That report also noted that local food security task forces could assist such individuals in understanding how the program works. As we saw in chapter 4, PSNP clients now have little, if any, contact with these task forces.

**Table 6.4: PSNP clients' knowledge of the programme, by client card status**

(percent)	Highlands		Lowlands		All Regions	
	Has client card	Does not have client card	Has client card	Does not have client card	Has client card	Does not have client card
Percent providing correct response						
Max days person can work per month	24	19	40	44	27	24
Max days wait for cash payment	11	10	5	5	10	9
Max days wait for food payment	4	3	8	7	5	4
Daily wage if paid in grain	12	15	12	10	12	14

Source: Quantitative household data 2021.

## 6.5. Experiences accessing payments

The PSNP's logframe specifies that the distribution site for payment should not be further than three hours' walking distance, one way (Government of Ethiopia, 2014. Annex 17.1, Output 2 indicators). Among households reporting receiving payments from Tir 2013 onwards, mean travel times were 35 minutes in Somali, 55 minutes in SNNP, 102 minutes in Amhara, 112 minutes in Oromiya and 164 minutes in Afar. Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of travel times by region and, in the case of the Highland regions, compares these to 2014.<sup>21</sup>

In all Highland regions, travel times to payment points during PSNP4 were lower relative to the final years of PSNP3. In the Lowlands, travel times have fallen since 2018. In two regions – SNNP and Somali – the goal of ensuring that the distribution site for payment should not be further than three hours' walking distance has been met. In Amhara and Oromiya, 9 and 15 percent (respectively) of PSNP clients had to travel for more than three hours to reach a payment. However, in both regions, these lengthy travel distances were concentrated in a small number of woredas. For example, in Amhara, more than 25 percent of clients in four (out of 22) woredas reported traveling for more than three hours. By contrast in 15 other Amhara woredas, fewer than 10 percent of PSNP clients reported travelling three hours or more. Similarly, in Oromiya more than 25 percent of clients in four (out of 18) woredas reported traveling for more than three hours. In eight other woredas, fewer than 10 percent reported doing so. In Amhara, clients reporting receiving food transfers were more likely to report travelling for more than three hours (17.8 percent v 8.1 percent for cash transfers) while there was no meaningful difference in travel time by

<sup>20</sup> In the Highlands, 63 percent of household heads never attended school; in the Lowlands, 79 percent of household heads never attended school.

<sup>21</sup> Because the quantitative baseline survey (fielded in 2016) was purposely administered before the payments under PSNP 4 had (properly) began (in January/February), questions about distances and travel times to payments sites were not asked.

payment modality in Oromiya (16.3 percent report travelling for more than three hours to receive cash payments v 13.1 percent travelling for more than three hours to receive food payments). <sup>2223</sup>


The one region that continues to lag in terms of this performance indicator is Afar where 27 percent of beneficiaries travel three hours or more to get payments, a five percentage point improvement over 2018. These lengthy travel times are not a consequence of payment modalities – 31 percent of cash recipients travelled more than three hours as did 27 percent of food recipients. Rather, as is the case, lengthy travel times are concentrated in a small number of woredas, reflecting limited road access and the fact, observed in 2018, that some beneficiaries grazing cattle in locations far away from the distribution centers.

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<sup>22</sup> For cash payments, we also compared travel times between clients receiving cash at a standard PSNP pay point and client receiving an e-payment. These comparisons need to be treated cautiously because only a limited number of woredas in Amhara, Oromia, SNNP and Somali used e-payments. Consequently, differences in travel times are confounded by differences in road access, terrain and so on. With this caveat, we note that clients receiving e-payments had slightly *longer* mean travel times in Amhara (99 v 95 minutes for standard pay points), SNNP (65 v 55 minutes for standard pay points), and SNNP (50 v 38 minutes for standard pay points) but much shorter mean travel times in Oromia (48 v 120 minutes for standard pay points).

<sup>23</sup> Using the data we have on the last cash payment received, in our sample e-payments were used in 12 woredas and were received by 307 households - 9 woredas in Amhara, 2 woredas in Oromiya, and 1 woreda in SNNP.

**Figure 6.2: Travel times to pay point, by region and year**



Source: 2014 and 2018 results taken from Figure 10.4, Berhane et al (2019). 2021 results from Quantitative household data, 2021.



A consequence of the improvements in access to pay points is a reduction in the percentage of PSNP beneficiaries who stay overnight at the pay point (see Table 6.5). This has been lower under PSNP4 than it was under PSNP3. Average costs associated with travel to receive PSNP payments are between 0 and 6 Birr in Amhara, Oromiya, Somali and SNNP. Only in Afar are they notable, averaging 20 Birr. Lastly, instances of harassment or theft while clients travel to payments sites are exceedingly rare in all regions.

**Table 6.5: Beneficiaries' experiences with travel to the payment site, by region and year**

Region	Survey year	Distance to payment site (km)	Average cost incurred for travel/overnight stay at payment site (birr)	Beneficiaries had to stay overnight at the payment site (percent)	Beneficiaries were subject to harassment during the travel to/ from the payment site (percent)	Beneficiaries were robbed of food or cash during the travel to/from the payment site (percent)
Amhara	2014	8.0	4	11	1	1
	2018	9.1	1	3	1	0
	2021	5.7	1	7	1	1
Oromiya	2014	10.2	11	15	1	1
	2018	6.5	3	5	1	1
	2021	6.3	6	5	1	1
SNNP	2014	6.4	6	4	2	1
	2018	3.3	0	1	1	1
	2021	3.3	1	2	1	0
Afar	2014	13.9	34	39	1	1
	2018	12.4	15	27	1	1
	2021	13.1	20	22	0	0
Somali	2014	7.8	4	7	1	1
	2018	1.8	2	3	2	1
	2021	1.1	0	0	0	0
All Regions	2021	5.4	6	7	1	1

Source: 2014 and 2018 results taken from Table 10.5, Berhane et al (2019). 2021 results from Quantitative household data, 2021.

PSNP client were also asked if officials or community members requested that they use transfers for specific purposes, sharing their transfers with other community members or giving some of their transfer to a person in a position of authority. Table 6.6 shows that such requests are rare.

**Table 6.6: Beneficiaries' experiences with travel to the payment site, by region and year**

	Amhar a	Oromiy a	SNN P	Afa r	Somal i	All Region s
Percent						
Cash payments						
Request they be shared with other community members	1	3	2	0	1	1
Give some to person in authority	1	4	4	0	1	2
Food payments						
Request they be shared with other community members	1	3	0	0	0	1
Give some to person in authority	0	0	0	1	0	0

Source: Quantitative household data 2021.

## 6.6. Payments: Timeliness, frequency, predictability, and completeness

### 6.6.1. *Timeliness, frequency, predictability*

We begin with now turn to payments themselves, beginning with timeliness, frequency, and predictability. Our data for this section consists of households that report that (a) they were selected either to be either Public Works participants or Permanent Direct Support clients in either EC2012 or EC2013 AND (b) reported receiving at least one payment between Tir EC2012 and Miaza EC2013.

We begin by examining when households report they are paid. In examining these data, note the following: (1) Ordinarily, the bulk of PSNP public works takes place between January and June, that is, between Tir and Sene. This is a specific design feature of the program, aimed at ensuring that it does not interfere with agricultural activities; (2) That said, there can be instances where public works start early (for example, in parts of Afar so as to avoid working in the hottest months), there can be delays in starting public works and woredas are given a little flexibility to complete public works activities after Ginbot if that suits local cropping cycles better; (3) Permanent Direct Support clients should receive payments every month; (4) The pandemic started in Ethiopia in late March 2020; and (5) We have 16 months of payments data, running from January 2020 to April 2021 (that is, from Tir EC2012 to Miazia EC2013).

Mindful of these points, consider Figure 6.3. This shows the percentage of PSNP clients reporting receiving a payment, by month and region, between Tir EC2012 and Sene EC2012, that is between January and June 2020.<sup>24</sup> There are three features that we highlight. First, there is no region and/or month where the

<sup>24</sup> Households were asked, for each month from Tir EC2012 to Miazia EC2013 if: (a) they received a payment from PSNP; (b) what was the type of payment (cash, grain, pulses etc); (c) if cash, whether this was an e-payment; (d) the quantity of payment (in birr or kilograms); and (e) the payment frequency. We asked about payment frequency to capture whether these were payments being made monthly, or whether they were for two, three or six months or for "the entire period". This allowed us to make sure we captured lump sum payments. Where the client card was available, we took this information from the client card; otherwise, we relied on respondents' recall. In previous performance reports, we compared client recall data to data from the PASS system, and we compared client recall

percentage of PSNP clients who receive payments in that region and month equals (or indeed comes close to equaling) 100 percent. This implies that, in any given month, over this period that there are some PSNP clients who do not receive a payment. Second, there are regional differences in the percentage of clients who receive a payment. This percentage is generally higher in the Highland regions, with the highest percentage of clients receiving a payment found in SNNP, followed by Amhara. Apart from Tir EC2012 in Afar, the percentage of PSNP clients who receive a payment in any given month is always lower in Afar and Somali. Third, note that there is a black, vertical rule running down the middle of Figure 6.3. This distinguishes the percentage of payments made, by month, *prior* to the start of the Covid-19 pandemic and the percentage of payments made, by month, *after* the start of the pandemic. A visual inspection suggests that there is no change in these percentages pre and post Covid. If we look across all regions, we find that on average, a PSNP client received 2.0 payments in the three months before the outbreak of the pandemic and 1.8 payments in the three months after the pandemic began. In other words, at least initially, the pandemic did not have a major effect on the frequency with which PSNP clients were paid.

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data to data taken from client cards. These showed similar mean levels of payments as well as similar distributions of payments, giving us confidence in the use of recall data.

Figure 6.3: Percent PSNP clients receiving payment, by region and month, Tir-Sene 2012




Table 6.7 shows the distribution of PSNP households by the number of payments that they received between Tir and Sene EC2012. Given the results of Figure 6.2 (specifically the fact that there are no region-months where all clients received a payment), given that Public Works only start in Tir in some localities, and given that some payments might have been made lump sum after the onset of the pandemic, we do not expect everyone to have received six months of payments. However, if payments are being made in a timely and predictable way, we would not expect to see clients zero<sup>25</sup>, one or two payments over this six-month period. However, Table 6.7 shows that there is a high percentage of households receiving fewer than three payments between Tir and Sene 2012: 52 percent in Afar, 18 percent in Amhara, 35 percent in Oromiya, 70 percent in Somali and 14 percent in SNNP.


**Table 6.7: Number of payments received by region, Tir-Sene 2012**

Number of payments	Afar	Amhara	Oromiya	Somali	SNNP	All
	Percent					
0	3	2	2	7	1	3
1	18	6	13	35	6	13
2	31	10	20	28	7	17
3	8	21	19	11	10	14
4	6	10	10	4	11	9
5 or 6	34	41	36	16	65	44
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Next, consider Figure 6.4. This includes data on the percent of PSNP clients who received a payment, by month and region, between Tir and Miazia EC2012 (January-April, 2020) and Tir and Miazia EC2013 (January-April, 2021). We want to use this graph to compare, by region, whether the percentage of PSNP clients receiving a payment in a particular month, changed between 2020 and 2021. For this reason, within each region, the data are ordered by month-year pairs. So, for example, the first two columns for Afar are Tir EC2012 and Tir EC2013, followed by Yekatit EC2012 and Yekatit EC2013 and so. In all cases, the percent of clients receiving a payment is lower in EC2013 than it is in EC2012. The magnitude of this reduction is large. Aggregating across all regions, the percent of PSNP clients being paid fell, across years from 75 to 42 percent in Tir, 62 to 41 percent in Yekatit, 65 to 45 percent in Megabit and 66 to 30 percent in Miazia.


<sup>25</sup> Our sample for this analysis consists of households who were PSNP clients in either EC2012 or EC2013. Some of these households received payments in EC2013 but not EC2012 which is why they have zero payments in EC2012

**Figure 6.4: Percent PSNP clients receiving payment, by region and month, Tir-Miaza EC2012 and Tir-Miaza EC2013**



Given the pattern seen in Figure 6.3, we would expect that the average number of payments fell between EC 2012 and EC 2013. We can assess this directly for the period Tir-Miazia in both years. Across all regions, the mean number of payments during this four-month period fell from 2.7 in EC2012 to 1.6 in EC2013. As Figure 6.5 shows, across the full sample, the percentage of PSNP client receiving all four payments during this period falls from 43 to 9 percent. Some of this fall may be a result of moving to lump sum payments as the pandemic continued. Our survey instrument asked respondents to indicate whether the payment they received was for one month, two months, three months or some other time period. For EC 2012, 21 percent of PSNP clients receiving a payment in Megabit EC2012 stated that this was for a two- or three-month payment (ie a lump sum) as did 20 21 percent of PSNP clients in Miazia EC2012. By contrast, 24 percent of PSNP clients receiving a payment in Megabit EC2013 stated that this was a two- or three-month payment; for Miazia EC2013, 30 percent of PSNP clients received payments covering two or three months.

**Figure 6.5: Distribution of number of payments received, Tir-Miazia, all regions, by year**



Lastly, we consider whether payment frequency was related to whether the PSNP client was undertaking Public Works or receiving Permanent Direct Support and whether, among households receiving cash payments in the Highlands, these payments were received in the form of hard cash or through an e-payment delivery mechanism. Results are shown for the periods Tir-Miazia EC2012 and EC 2013 in Table 6.8.

Table 6.8 shows that there is little difference in payment frequency by client status or, in the Highlands, whether cash payments were made through an e-payment delivery mechanism or as hard cash at a PSNP pay point. Further, in all instances fewer payments were made between Tir and Miazia in EC2013 compared to the same period of time in EC2012. Note that we do not disaggregate by mode of payment (cash versus in-kind). Our payments data show that the use of these modalities differs sharply by region. For example, between Tir and Miazia EC2012, the percentages of PSNP clients paid *only* in cash were 99, 94 and 78 in SNNP, Somali and Amhara respectively. In the same time period, 82 percent of PSNP clients in Afar were *only* paid in in-kind. We cannot meaningfully compare the frequency of cash and in-kind payments because we cannot tell whether any differences reflect something specific to the transfer modality or something specific to the region where it is used.

**Table 6.8: Mean number of payments received by region during Tir-Miazia, by year, all regions**

	Number of payments	
	EC2012	EC2013
Public Works participant	2.7	1.6
PDS client	2.7	1.7
Received cash through e-payments	3.1	2.0
Received hard cash	3.0	1.9


### 6.6.2. Completeness

We now turn to the level of payments received by PSNP clients. We begin by comparing levels of the total value of payments (in Birr) received – in cash and in-kind - between Tir and Miazia in EC2012 and EC2013.<sup>26</sup> Results are shown in Figure 6.6. The striking result is that the mean level of payments per PSNP client household, for the same time period, falls in every region and thus for the sample as a whole. In percentage terms, these reductions are large, falls of 50 percent in Afar, 27 percent in Amhara, 38 percent in Oromiya, 33 percent in Somali and 42 percent in SNNP. For the full sample, mean payments fell by 39 percent in the first four months the PSNP operated in EC2013 compared to EC2012. Note that in Somali, SNNP and to a lesser extent Amhara, nearly all payments are made in cash. The figures reported do not adjust for inflation so the reduction in purchasing power of these cash transfers is even larger than the reduction in amounts received. As a robustness check, we re-calculated these results using medians rather than means. The reductions in median payments are smaller (suggesting that some of the change between EC2012 and EC2013 was due to a typically high payments to a small number of households, especially in Afar) but the reductions in payment size continue to exist. In percentage terms, these average payment reductions are: 26 percent in Afar, 14 percent in Amhara, 24 percent in Oromiya, 27 percent in Somali, 40 percent in SNNP and 23 percent across the full sample.

<sup>26</sup> In cases where clients receive in-kind payments of grain, we value these using kebele level grain prices observed in the month where those payments were made.




**Figure 6.6: Mean value (Birr) of total payments received between Tir-Miazia, by region and survey year (EC)**



Next, we look at average payments per month between Tir and Miazia in both EC2012 and EC2013. To do so, we divide the total value of payments received in each period by the number of payments received in that period. To minimize the effects of extreme values, we then calculate the median payment for each survey year. Results are shown in Figure 6.6. In three regions – Amhara, Somali and SNNP – the median monthly payment is higher in EC2013 than it was in EC 2012. However, the magnitude of this change is relatively small: an increase of 16 percent in Amhara, 11 percent in Somali and 19 percent in SNNP. Median monthly payments are essentially unchanged in Oromiya and they fall by 24 percent in Amhara.

Putting this all together, we see that the number of payments made in the first four months of PSNP operations (Tir-Miazia) was much lower in EC2013 than it was in EC 2012 (Figures 6.3 and 6.4). This happened everywhere. The size of each payment, expressed in Birr per month, rose only modestly in EC2013 compared to EC2012 and did not rise in all regions (Figure 6.7). Consequently, total payments fell (Figure 6.6).

**Figure 6.7: Median monthly payments (Birr) between Tir-Miazia, by region and survey year**



## 6.7. Summary

Here, we summarize our results by showing how they answer the Research Questions listed in the introduction.

**RQ15(i) Are payments to clients timely and predictable?** Payments are not timely or predictable. Between Tir and Sene EC2012, only 44 percent of PSNP clients received five or six payments. We can directly compare the mean number of payments received between Tir and Miazia in EC2012 and EC2013. We find that the mean number of payments during this four-month period fell from 2.7 in EC2012 to 1.6 in EC2013. Across the full sample, the percentage of PSNP client receiving all four payments during this period collapses, falling from 43 to 9 percent.

**RQ15:(iii) Are clients asked by officials or community members to use their transfers for specific purposes?** No, they are not. Such requests are rare.

**RQ15(iv) How far/how long do clients have to travel to receive their transfers? How many receive their transfers at a place no more than three hours from home? What is the average cost incurred to receive the transfers? What is the difference in time and cost, if any, between those receiving food and those receiving cash transfers?** Among households reporting receiving payments from Tir 2013 onwards, mean travel times were 35 minutes in Somali, 55 minutes in SNNP, 102 minutes in Amhara, 112 minutes in Oromiya and 164 minutes in Afar. No client in SNNP or Somali had to travel more than three hours from home. In the other regions, the percentage doing so were 9 percent (Amhara), 15 percent (Oromiya) and 27 percent (Afar). There was no meaningful difference by transfer modality (cash or in-kind). Average costs associated with travel to receive PSNP payments are very low (0.2-5.5 Birr) in Amhara, Oromiya, Somali and SNNP. Only in Afar, where they average 19.9 Birr, are they significant. Instances of harassment or theft are exceedingly rare in all regions.

**RQ15(v): Who in the household collects the transfer and whether there are differences between households receiving food and cash transfers.** The household head is the person who usually collects the PSNP transfer. This is true in all regions, with percentage of heads collecting transfers ranging from 79 (Somali) to 90 (Amhara) percent. There is no difference when we disaggregate by payment type.

**RQ15(vi): Do clients have client cards? Were they asked to pay for these cards?** In the Highlands, between 79 (Oromiya) and 89 percent (Amhara) of PSNP clients reported having a client card. Only 25 and 34 percent of PSNP households in Afar and Somali respectively had client cards. In Afar, Amhara, Oromiya and SNNP, most clients are not asked to pay for their cards; but 29 percent in Somali did so.

**RQ15(vii): Is the information on the client card clear? Does it help them understand their entitlements and responsibilities?** Knowledge of key programme rights is limited. The possession of a client card has no association with respondents' ability to correctly describe their entitlements and responsibilities.

## Chapter 7: Implementation of Public Works

### 7.1. Introduction

In this chapter, we turn our attention to the implementation of Public Works. We begin by considering process, directly addressing RQ18: PSNP public works and links to services. It will focus on questions relating to the planning of public works: What is the process for selecting the public works sub-projects to be constructed through the PSNP? To what extent does this planning process include other types of activities as detailed in the PIM? and describing who participates in public works planning (PSNP clients, Kebele and Woreda officials)? It will report on household perceptions regarding their participation in the selection of sub-projects and the extent to which households report benefits to themselves, their livelihoods or their community from the assets created through the PSNP public works.

Next, we will describe households' participation in PW. By so doing, it will contribute to answering RQ18: PSNP public works and links to services. It will address the following topics: (a) Who within the household carries-out the work requirement of the PSNP? (b) How far are the public works sites from the home? (c) How many days were worked by each person in the household? How many hours each day? (d) What services (including childcare) are provided near the work site? (e) Are those participating in public works provided with the necessary inputs (tools, materials)? Are they asked to bring these or pay for these inputs?

Finally, it will contribute to addressing RQ5: How was PSNP4 adapted to address the Covid-19 pandemic? Specifically, it will describe changes made to the implementation of public works, including any suspensions of work requirements, the reasons for those changes and whether these were provided through guidelines from FSCD or if the adaptation was individually tailored by regions or Woreda offices.

### 7.2 Process: Planning Public Works

PSNP planning is a multi-level process that starts with the preparation of community and kebele plans. Public works sub-projects in highland areas are identified by following the Community Based Participatory Watershed Development Guidelines. The PIM underscores the importance of community participation and the need to give careful consideration to the active participation of women, encouraging them to take leadership positions in the planning process wherever possible. Public works planning must also incorporate the operational provisions introduced in PSNP 4, specifically a 50 percent reduction in women's workload, exemptions for temporary direct support clients, and time for PSNP clients to take part in community BCC sessions as part of their work norms.

#### 7.2.1. *Selection and planning process*

Our qualitative fieldwork generated rich data on project selection and planning processes. For this reason, we summarize our results from the Highlands first, then the Lowlands.

#### 7.2.2. *Highlands*

##### Kebele

We asked KFSTF members and DAs to describe how public works sub-projects are selected and who decides which ones are implemented. They sketched a broadly bottom-up process: communities identify and prioritize local problems and potential solutions, assisted by the DAs, who then work with the KFSTF to consolidate and approve a final kebele public works plan and submit this to the woreda.

The responses of kebele informants suggest some variation in the quality of community engagement. At one end of the spectrum is Amhara, where the starting point of the planning process is at the local level discussions by communities in development groups and the CFSTF, with the DAs providing facilitation and technical advice. At the other end is Oromiya, where projects appear to be proposed by DAs or kebele-level committees and presented to communities for information or discussion. This is consistent with the finding of the midline survey in 2018 that community engagement with the planning process was strongest in Amhara and weakest in Oromiya.

The got community (through watershed committees) identify and prioritise local problems. Then the kebele DAs assist the watershed committees to identify solutions to identified problems. This is the basis of public works plans. *[AMH-ANG-KFSTF]*

Guided by the woreda checklist, the DA approaches the development groups in each got/sub-kebele and facilitates the planning process with the community. The community select the public works activities based on the problem in their locality. After collective agreement is reached, the DA compiles the plan and sends it to the KFSTF. *[AMH-LIB-DA]*

We [DAs] prepare the list of public works activities supported by the woreda public works technical team. This list is discussed in the community then compiled and presented to the kebele management for review and decision. *[ORO-KUY-DA]*

Activities are proposed by the DA in consultation with the woreda public works technical people. The proposed activities are presented to communities and discussed so that they know what types of public works will be done and where they will be. The final decision on the types and sites of public works activities is made by the kebele administration. *[ORO-FAD-KFSTF]*

Elsewhere the process lies somewhere in-between. The DA in Boloso Sore said that they coordinate the public works planning process at community level, while the DA in Sodo Zuria said that they select sub-projects based on ideas from community members. In Arbaminch Zuria the replies of the KFSTF and the DA were completely contradictory on this point.

The kebele DA lists the type of activities for implementation. There are no community consultations. *[SNN-ARB-KFSTF]*

In our kebele public works planning starts at the community level. The community identifies the priorities. These are reviewed and compiled by the KFSTF and transferred to the woreda office. *[SNN-ARB-DA]*

### Woreda

We asked the Woreda Public Works Unit (WPWU) to describe the steps followed in selecting public works sub-projects, and we asked the WFSTF to comment on the balance of top-down and bottom-up planning and the application of the integrated watershed management approach. Their responses were broadly consistent with those of kebele informants. Woreda officials in Amhara describe got-level planning and

selection of projects by the CFSTF or development groups, guided by checklists, templates, and/or indicative plans sent by the woreda. This is then cascaded upwards for technical review and final approval. A similar community-based and multi-level approach is described in SNNP. In Oromiya (with the exception of Kuyu), the responses suggest a stronger level of direction from the woreda.

The development groups (15-20 members) in each got (sub-kebele) select the public works activities and send their plan to the KFSTF. The KFSTF reviews and consolidates the plans from each got and sends the endorsed kebele public works plan to the woreda food security unit with an official letter and the minutes of the meeting attached. The woreda public works specialist organises a review by the public works technical committee and approval by the public works steering committee. The final public works plan is officially referred back to each PSNP kebele. *[AMH-MEK-WPWU]*

The communities residing in each sub-catchment convene a watershed consultation meeting with the NRM DA. They assess and prioritise the gaps and plan what to do and where. In this process, areas to be developed by PSNP and by community mobilisation are differentiated. Then activities are identified, filled in the PSNP planning format, and presented to the KFSTF for review and approval. *[SNN-BOL-WPWU]*

The woreda public works unit prepares possible and technically applicable public works types which are reviewed by the WFSTF. Then the list is presented to the community for discussion and comment. The final list is approved by the KFSTF and implemented. *[ORO-ZEW-WPWU]*

WFSTF views on the balance between top-down and bottom-up planning note that this shifts with the nature of the activity:

The balance between top-down and bottom-up planning approach depends on the types of activities implemented. Those that require more technical support and budget are inclined to a top-down approach. *[SID-LOK-WFSTF]*

Bottom-up planning is more dominant, but a top-down approach is essential for technical issues. *[SNN-SOD-WFSTF]*

Woreda officials in nine of the 11 sampled woredas said that they follow the integrated watershed management approach; the two woredas where this was not mentioned were Zeway Dugda and Kuyu in Oromiya.

### Region

Regional officials describe the public works planning process in similar terms to those in the kebele and woreda: the Amhara RFSTF focuses on project selection through got-level participation, while the SNNP RFSTF highlights the role of the watershed planning committee. The statement by the Oromiya RFSTF that selection starts in the community appears to contradict the more top-down and directive process described by some kebele and woreda officials.

The selection of public works sub-projects is done by community participation at got level by the CFSTF and then at kebele level by the KFSTF. Then the woreda review and approve the kebeles' selection. *[AMH-RFSTF]*

The community watershed approach is being followed in the selection of public works sub-projects. The watershed planning committee selects sub-projects for implementation. These are submitted to the woreda public works technical committee. Those approved by the committee are presented to the woreda NRM for evaluation and then to the WFSTF for approval. *[SNN-RFSTF]*

The public works' selection process starts at community level. DAs organise community discussions and identify types of public works activities with the support of woreda sector offices. *[ORO-RFSTF]*

Regional officials in both Oromiya and SNNP state that the planning process includes the activities specified in the PIM:

Public works activity planning starts by reviewing the PSNP manual, so all activities recommended in the PIM are considered unless they are not appropriate for technical reasons. *[ORO-RFSTF]*

On the subject of PIM alignment, the qualitative interviews reveal two examples in Amhara of how kebele and woreda officials have made changes to the public works planning process which they believe has led to better results. The first is in Mekdela, where the KFSTF and DA both note an improvement in the last two years as public works planning follows more closely the requirements of the PIM and distinguishes more clearly between PSNP public works and mass mobilisation activities.

In the past there was a tendency for public works activities to be selected by kebele officials and for all development activities which require labour to be done by public works participants. Since 2010, PSNP public works has had its own plan.... Reporting is based on planned activities and in accordance with a standardised format sent from the woreda... The type and place of public works activities are clearly identified and easily measured. This resulted in good performance that can tangibly be observed and makes us proud to talk about it. *[AMH-MEK-KFSTF]*

The second example is from Libo Kemkem, where the WPWU describes a change in their use of the public works capital budget which they believe leads to better impact:

For the capital budget, members of the woreda public works technical committee used to come up with their own plans and share the available resource. Recently we understood that this approach to resource allocation has less impact, so this year we agreed to select an unfinished dam and complete it with 4 million birr. *[AMH-LIB-WPWU]*

The WFSTF in Angolela Tera, on the other hand, highlighted the small size of their capital budget which they believe limits the type of activity they can plan for:

The capital budget allocation is based on caseload and ours is small. As a result of this our budget is also small. It should be based on efficiency. There are woredas which can't use their budget while we are short, and it is affecting our public works performance. Because of this, our public works are mostly concerned with nursery management. *[AMH-ANG-WFSTF]*



### 7.2.3. Lowlands

The 2018 midline performance report found that public works planning in all lowland woredas had some degree of community involvement but that this varied in nature, scope, and intensity, and that its purpose was generally to review a plan that had already been drafted. The selection of public works sub-projects rested largely with kebele officials. In 2021 we found some evidence of change. Planning in Afar appears to be more community-based, while the contributions of kebele and woreda informants in Somali region suggest a more balanced and complementary process of decision-making at these two levels. The responses of kebele and woreda informants to questions on the public works planning process were broadly similar.

We asked KFSTF members and DAs to describe the process for identifying and selecting public works sub-projects and who decides which ones are carried out. The KFSTFs in Ewa, Elidar, and Gursum describe a process that starts at the community level, specifically with sub-kebele representatives in Afar who discuss and select priorities with others in their community.

In our kebele we have four sub-kebeles. Each has its own representative who discusses with the community to select their public works' needs. Then each sub-kebele representative presents their plan at the kebele level. *[AFA-ELI-KFSTF]*

The DA supports the community to identify and prioritise the public works. The KFSTF discuss and approve it and send to the woreda. *[SOM-GUR-KFSTF]*

In the other woredas the KFSTF referred to itself, or its technical sub-committee, as the starting point but still with some level of community engagement.

The kebele technical committee, which includes a teacher, one woman, one youth, and the DA, plan the public works with the community and forward to the KFSTF. The KFSTF accepts or rejects the planned activities and sends those it accepts to the woreda. *[AFA-DUB-KFSTF]*

The KFSTF prepares the plan with the participation of the community. *[SOM-SHI-KFSTF]*

The responses of the DAs were generally consistent with those of the respective KFSTF although they were less likely to mention the community's role.

At the beginning of every year the KFSTF sit together and produce the annual public works plan. This is submitted to the woreda agriculture office which then presents our plan to the WFSTF which reviews, amends according to the annual budget, and approves. Then we receive the final approved plan. *[SOM-GUR-DA]*

The KFSTFs in Dubti and Errer commented on the interaction between kebele and woreda during the planning process. The former emphasises that the final project selection rests with the woreda, while the latter describes how the balance between woreda and kebele has shifted.

After the woreda technical committee has done its technical screening of the public works plan, the WFSTF selects the public works activities and sends them to us. We implement the public works that were selected by the WFSTF. *[AFA-DUB-KFSTF]*

Previously we used to get an order from the woreda telling us to do some planned public works in the PIM like construct soil bunds. But for the last two years the KFSTF and the DA decide what work will be done in the kebele while also accommodating the woreda's recommendation. We use at least 50 percent of our plan. For example, we may plan road clearing instead of soil bunds. *[SOM-ERR-KFSTF]*

In terms of where decision-making lies, kebele respondents in Somali region were more likely to point to the KFSTF, while those in Afar distinguished between the community's initial role in deciding public works priorities and the woreda's ultimate role in approving the final plan. However, as we note below, this community-level decision-making takes place within clear priorities set by certain woredas. The replies by woreda informants were broadly consistent with those of the kebele. They describe a planning process that is somewhat locally rooted and to which they give technical support.

During the planning process we give direction to the KFSTF to prepare a public works plan based on the preference of the community and discussed with community members. The KFSTF sends us the plan and the woreda technical committee, which comprises different sector office experts, reviews it according to the public works pastoral guidelines. After making some amendments to the plan it is forwarded to the WFSTF for the final decision. *[AFA-DUB-WFSTF]*

The need comes from the community and the community themselves prepare their plan. The woreda does not interfere in their preference. We provide technical support and give advice to the KFSTF on how to identify the public works plans. *[SOM-SHI-WFSTF]*

We also asked what instruction or direction the woredas give kebeles about public works planning, and what kebeles receive. In Somali region the instruction seems largely procedural, whereas in Afar the woredas appear to be more directive about the type of activities that should be carried out (Table 7.1). However, this is not necessarily unwelcome, as the comment below by the KFSTF in Dubti shows. The statement by the KFSTF in Error is also consistent with their observation above of a more equal relationship between woreda and kebele. The response by the KFSTF in Shinile illustrates the attempt in this woreda to incorporate PSNP requirements in public works planning.

The woreda gives us direction to focus on natural resource rehabilitation activities. We accept this direction because in our kebele we understand that the main challenge is that most of the time the canals are filled with mud and prosopis so water cannot flow to the farmland which is also covered by prosopis. *[AFA-DUB-KFSTF]*

Previously we used to get instructions telling us to do public works activities planned from above that were not appropriate. It was challenging. At one time we used to fear the woreda and do whatever they instruct... That is not existing now. We plan, we share with them, and we work together based on the agreed public works. *[SOM-ERR-KFSTF]*

Yes, we get instructions from the woreda. They guide us on who should participate in public works, about the privileges of pregnant and lactating women, that children below 18 should not participate, and how to involve public works beneficiaries during Covid-19, etc. *[SOM-SHI-KFSTF]*

**Table 7.1: Instruction / direction on public works given by woreda and received by kebele**

Region	Woreda	WFSTF	WTRMTC	KFSTF
Somali	Shinile	Advise how to prioritise and plan in relation to woreda priorities Technical support to implementation	Provide awareness, direction, and supervision	Guidance on participation, PIM requirements, Covid-19
	Gursum	Provide planning formats and assign specialist DAs to support kebele DA	Direct how to prepare public works plan and technical support in prioritising problems	Instruction on priority areas of the public works activities to be planned Technical support to planning and implementation
	Errer	Advise on suitability of activities to site	Provide guidelines and overall direction Advise full community participation and proper use of implementation guidelines	Limited direction now Woreda monitors the agreed plan and orders the days to start the job
Afar	Ewa	Guide revision of the plan to clarify share of PSNP public works by kebele	No response	Tools and technical support for the selected public works
	Elidar	Prioritise water harvesting and natural resource improvement	Technical support to DAs, such as NRM techniques Direction on Covid-19 restrictions	Technical guidance, such as using the pastoral guidelines properly and providing planning formats
	Dubti	Prioritise clearing water canals and bush on farmland (agro-pastoralists) and access to water (pastoralists)	No response	Direct us to focus on rehabilitating natural resources

We also asked DAs what guidance or training they had received and whether woreda staff had visited the kebele to give additional technical support. Their replies are summarised in Table 7.2. All the DAs had been visited and supported by woreda and regional officials but only those in Shinile and Gursum had received regular training. The DA in Shinile explained the impact of the training which extended beyond its technical content.

Some of the training was on how to practise ‘do no harm’, which means that our implementation should not bring harm to the people and environment, such as taking care of potential risks like flooding that could follow public works activities... We received it as useful training. It changed our attitude that public works can also create problems to the community unless properly managed. We understood that doing public works is not just an obligation to get payments, it’s

about community development which needs to be carefully handled and avoid any potential future harm. *[SOM-SHI-DA]*

**Table 7.2: Guidance / training on PSNP implementation and woreda visits received by DAs**

Region	Woreda	Training	Visits
Somali	Shinile	2-3 times by region in 2012 [EC], including on 'do no harm'	Regional and woreda staff twice each year, cascading training they receive to the kebele
	Gursum	Several by region in last 2 years, including water management, erosion control, climate change	Several visits from specialist TAs monitoring public works
	Error	No training	Woreda staff in 2011 [EC] showed us how to design irrigation canals and rural roads and provided hand tools
Afar	Ewa	No training	Woreda experts during implementation of natural resource activities, such as technical support on soil conservation in 2011 [EC]
	Elidar	No training	Woreda experts in 2011 and 2012 [EC] guided us to focus on road construction to sub-kebeles, and provided public works planning formats
	Dubti	Training by federal ministry on public works planning and Environmental and Social Management Framework in 2011 [EC]	Woreda natural resource experts in 2011 and 2012 [EC] advised on terracing and area closure during public works implementation

#### **7.2.4. Timing of public works**

As the description by regional officials in Afar of their differing public works schedules illustrates, the PIM (section 4.2) gives regions the latitude to adjust the timing of public works to accommodate seasonal variation in climate and production systems. A region may have a maximum of three public works and transfer schedules to suit its different woredas. Disbursements from the federal and regional levels should follow these schedules. Given this, in the Lowlands we asked KFSTF members whether the timing of public works was appropriate for their kebele and found some improvement on the midline survey. In 2018 there was no evidence that the schedule was being adjusted. At that time, KFSTFs in three of the four sampled woredas in Afar felt that implementing public works during the hot dry season between April and June was not appropriate. In 2021 there is evidence of change. In effect there are two public works seasons in Afar that accommodate the region's differing seasonal calendars and livelihood systems: January to June in woredas closer to the highlands, and September to February for those in the east and extreme lowlands. However, the budget for implementing public works is still released in accordance with the January-June season. The KFSTF in Dubti confirmed that the schedule has been changed, in line with the RFSTF's statement, while those in Ewa and Elidar still have concerns.

In our kebele we start the public works in September and stop in February. This is the appropriate time for implementation because the weather is coolest. *[AFA-DUB-KFSTF]*

The timing of public works, between December and June, is not appropriate because it is the hot dry period. Working before food arrives has become challenging, and the accomplishment and performance of public works activities are impaired. [AFA-ELI-KFSTF]

Most community members are pastoralists, but the timing of public works does not follow their mobility patterns which could allow them to work properly. [AFA-EWA-KFSTF]

In Somali region, the KFSTF in Shinile reported that the timing is not problematic, consistent with their view in 2018. The response of the KFSTF in Gursum suggests that the timing has been shifted slightly later in the year (March to August) and is appropriate. Only the KFSTF in Errer raised concerns about managing varied livelihood systems and the degree of control they can exercise.

Public works in our case range from Megabit to Nehasie. We coordinate our agricultural work with public works activities. As the transfer is important for our agricultural work that makes us food secure, we prefer the timing. [SOM-GUR-KFSTF]

We have challenges here. The timing is not suitable for such different people: some are farmers and others are pastoralists. We always report our appropriate time but it is not allowed. We need to have our full say regarding the appropriateness of the public works. [SOM-KFSTF-ERR]

#### **7.2.5. Pastoral Public Works Guidelines**

As part of our qualitative work in the Lowlands, we asked respondents about their knowledge and use of the Pastoral Public Works Guidelines. In 2018, knowledge of their content among KFSTF members was limited: six of the eight sampled knew of the guidelines and two of these six said that they implemented them. In 2021 the replies of regional and kebele informants suggest some improvement. We again asked KFSTF members whether they were aware of the guidelines and whether they had been adopted. All six sampled knew of them and said they were being used, although their replies suggest that the guidelines are more of a tool for the DA than for the KFSTF as a whole.

We have the guidelines and the DA uses them to plan and implement the public works. [SOM-SHI-KFSTF]

Yes, there is a manual where our DAs are able to brief us for various possible public works activities that are matched with our kebele interest. [AFA-EWA-KFSTF]

We also asked the RFSTF in Somali and Afar whether there have been any changes in public works activities since the Pastoral Public Works Guidelines were issued. Both regions report using the guidelines to ensure appropriate contextualisation of public works.

Yes, there are changes... Most of the activities are related to water harvesting, pasture management, and animal health clinics, which is different from the highlands. The activities are more effective in improving the lives of pastoral people as they are relevant to their livelihoods. [SOM-RFSTF]

Starting from the 2011 [EC] fiscal year, we planned and modified our public works activities to contextualise the woredas' natural resources, environment, and livelihoods. For instance, in woredas that border highland areas of Amhara and Tigray our public works activities focus on NRM schemes such as soil conservation. In those near the Awash River we focus mainly on small-

scale irrigation. In the rest of the woredas, which are desert and areas of water shortage, our focus is water harvesting schemes. *[AFA-RFSTF]*

We are also starting to be effective in implementing public works almost for 12 months depending on the different context of woredas in our region. This means we implement in different time periods, from September to February and from January to June, according to the weather conditions of the woredas. *[AFA-RFSTF]*

However, there were some inconsistencies in the data. In Errer, for example, the KFSTF reported that they use the guidelines, but the DA did not have them. Furthermore, the replies by woreda officials on this topic, summarized in Table 7.3, were more equivocal than those in the region and kebele. Only four of the six WFSTFs and two of the WTRMTCs referred to them by name.<sup>27</sup> Gursum woreda uses the highland guidance, contradicting the KFSTF statement above.

We follow the programme PIM which describes the suitable public works by livelihood such as pastoral and agro-pastoral. *[SOM-GUR-WFSTF]*

We follow the PSNP public works guidelines of the highlands as we are agro-pastoralists. *[SOM-GUR-WTRMTC]*

**Table 7.3: Application of the Pastoral Public Works Guidelines (woreda informants)**

Region	Woreda	WFSTF	WTRMTC
Somali	Shinile	Only PIM mentioned	Not mentioned
	Gursum	Only PIM mentioned	Follow highland guidelines
	Errer	Yes	Yes
Afar	Ewa	Yes	Not mentioned
	Elidar	Yes	Yes
	Dubti	Yes, but at woreda level	Not mentioned

#### **7.2.6. Participation in public works planning**

We asked woreda and regional officials to tell us who participates in public works planning. In the Highlands, answers were broadly similar and contained some or all of the following:

- Kebele: community members, PSNP clients, local development groups, elders, religious leaders, youth representatives, the KFSTF, and DAs.
- Woreda: various technical experts, sector offices, and committees.

Most WPWU informants use terms such as ‘community at large’ or ‘general community members’ to suggest that community involvement in public works planning is broad-based; the WPWU in Arbaminch Zuria and Fadis explicitly referred to the participation of non-PSNP clients in selection and planning. However, one of the DAs in Kuyu gave a contrary view which points to a differing degree of ownership between households:

<sup>27</sup> It is possible that ‘PIM’ is meant as shorthand to include the pastoral guidelines.

General community members including non-PSNP households are participating in public works planning. *[SNN-ARB-WPWU]*

Public works activities are considered by non-PSNP households to belong to PSNP clients alone as they are paid for it. *[ORO-KUY-DA]*

In the Lowlands, the midline survey in 2018 had found that community participation in public works planning, particularly of women, appeared to be stronger in Somali than in Afar but that it was still largely reactive, as it was at the baseline in 2016. The qualitative interviews carried out in 2021 suggest that there has been little change, particularly in efforts to involve women. We asked woreda officials who participates in public works planning. Most described something fairly broad-based, involving men, women, and youth, traditional and religious leaders, and kebele officials. The WFSTF and WTRMTC in Ewa both commented on the increased prominence of community-based planning, associated with the work of an NGO.

There have been good lessons about the role of community participation in public works planning. *[AFA-EWA-WFSTF]*

I think there are good practices of bottom-up approaches to planning with the experience of NGO working in the kebele. *[AFA-EWA-WTRMTC]*

The 2018 midline survey found some evidence of improved participation by women in Amhara and parts of SNNP, but not in Oromiya. In 2021 we again asked both KFSTF members and DAs whether any specific efforts were made to promote women's participation in public works planning. The only regions where kebele informants described any specific measures were SNNP and Sidama. These included a separate women's forum and active encouragement (door-to-door) by the women's affairs kebele head. Elsewhere, DAs in Oromiya (Kuyu, Fadis, and Chiro) explicitly state that no measures are taken to promote women's participation in public works planning. KFSTF members and DAs in other woredas describe only measures that might be considered routine, such as women's presence during community discussions or their membership of development groups and committees. There is a tendency to assume that female representation in a particular structure, such as the KFSTF or watershed committee, is sufficient to ensure that women's interests are adequately considered.

Women are represented in the KFSTF to promote the special interests of women. Hence, their interests/needs will be considered in decisions about the types of PW activities and the priorities given to women. *[ORO-CHI-KFSTF]*

Yes, there are specific efforts to include women in planning and implementing public works. Women are members of the KFSTF, the KAC, the watershed committee, the early warning committee, and the job creation task force. All these committees in one or the other way influence the planning and implementation of the public works component. *[AMH-ANG-KFSTF]*

However, the DA in Kuyu acknowledged women's limited leverage, while the DA in Angolela Tera notes that, even if women are able to articulate their priorities, these may not be met with the resources available.

Women discuss equally with the community, but there is no mechanism that can enforce their interest if that is different from what is presented in the public works plan. *[ORO-KUY-DA]*

Women participate in the planning process through their development group. They often choose activities like road or pond construction, but due to limited resources we prioritise activities that can be done with the capacity we have. *[AMH-ANG-DA]*

Woreda and regional informants also commented on women's participation. Some believe that this is high, given women's significant stake in PSNP and the nature of the projects being implemented. Others caution that however good the participation, men remain dominant and that women may be members of committees but not active.

The participation of women in public works planning is high. This is because men usually look after activities that generate additional income outside of PSNP while women highly participate in PSNP. About 30-40 percent of participants in public works planning meetings are women. *[SNN-BOL-WPWU]*

The participation of women, particularly in water projects, is very high. Sometimes women-led meetings are convened to make women identify their needs. This enhances better participation of women. *[SNN-ARB-WPWU]*

Women's participation is very high, but we can't deny the domination of men's ideas. *[ORO-KUY-WPWU]*

Though women are included in many of the committees, they are not active participants. *[AMH-LIB-WPWU]*

We asked both KFSTF and DA informants in the Lowlands whether any specific efforts were made to promote women's participation in public works planning. Other than encouragement to get involved, or their presence on committees and in community meetings, no additional measures were described. The DA in Afar illustrated the continuing cultural constraints on women's public role.

We plan most public works for women (such as road construction to water points), but still their participation is low because in our culture women can't discuss an issue with men in a meeting. *[AFA-ELI-DA]*

As we found at the midline in 2018, women in Somali are more active in public meetings and better represented in local structures. The female chair of the KFSTF in Shinile commented on women's role in PSNP more generally, while the WTRMTC in Shinile, responding to a question about how public works have changed in the past two years, noted the gendered difference in participation between urban and rural kebeles.

Women are encouraged to be part of the committee and to be the main implementers of public works because they benefit well from the income and the activities. Women in our kebele are more responsible than men: they are on time for public works and accomplish the tasks they are given. *[SOM-SHI-KFSTF]*

In urban kebeles, women are the only reliable public workers. Men don't usually participate in urban areas. But in rural areas, the opposite is true. Men participate in public works more than women. *[SOM-SHI-WTRMTC]*



We can triangulate the descriptions of community participation in Public Works planning with data collected from the quantitative household survey (Tables 7.4 (a) and (b)). Overall, 20 percent of households in the Highlands and only 4 percent of households in the Lowlands have had knowledge about such meetings taking place in their communities. Of these that knew meetings were carried out in the communities, 80 percent in the Highlands and 65 percent in the Lowlands participated in those meetings. A little less than 50 percent of those that participated have commented in the choice of these projects, suggesting that those that participate are likely to comment.

In this regard, the low household participation rate by this measure is likely to be partly explained by compliance with COVID-19 protocols which restrict public gatherings.

**Table 7.4: Participation in PSNP Public Works planning (%), by region**

<b>a) Highlands</b>				
<b>Participation in public work planning</b>	<b>Amhara</b>	<b>Oromiya</b>	<b>SNNP</b>	<b>All</b>
Since Meskerem EC2013, has there been a meeting in this community to discuss what types of public work projects should be undertaken? Yes (%)	21	17	21	20
If there was a meeting, did you attend?	78	84	80	80
If you attended, were those attending asked to comment on the choice of project? Yes (%)	49	37	37	42
If you attended, did you or other members of your household comment on the choice of project	36	31	37	35
<b>b) Lowlands</b>				
<b>Participation in public work planning</b>	<b>Afar</b>	<b>Somali</b>	<b>All</b>	
Since Meskerem EC2013, has there been a meeting in this community to discuss what types of public work projects should be undertaken? Yes (%)	3	4	4	
If there was a meeting, did you attend?	72	59	65	
If you attended, were those attending asked to comment on the choice of project? Yes (%)	42	38	40	
If you attended, did you or other members of your household comment on the choice of project	39	29	34	

Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data, 2021

### **7.2.7. Perceptions of benefits of Public Works projects**

Our last topic in this section is an assessment of the extent to which households report benefits to themselves, their livelihoods or their community from the assets created through the PSNP public works. We assess this by type of public works sub-project and PSNP client status. Table 7.5 summarizes the results by PSNP status and region. Overall, 53 percent of households have reported public work sub-projects have

had benefits for their household and 38 percent for their community. When disaggregated by PSNP status, PSNP households are roughly more likely to report benefits at community level than non-PSNP and non-PSNP households are more likely to report benefits at the household level than PSNP households.

**Table 7.5: Percentage of households reporting that their household and community benefited from public works created**

Region	PSNP HH (%)	Non-PSNP HH (%)	All HH (%)
<b>Household level benefits</b>			
Afar	52	62	56
Amhara	46	45	46
Oromiya	52	48	52
Somali	78	75	77
SNNP	56	51	56
<b>All</b>	52	58	53
<b>Community level benefits</b>			
Afar	23	16	19
Amhara	52	44	52
Oromiya	45	41	45
Somali	32	23	26
SNNP	56	57	56
<b>All</b>	45	23	38

Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data, 2021

When disaggregated by sub-project type, more than half of households in all regions reported that the construction or rehabilitation of an access road was the most important infrastructure developed through public works (Table 7.6). Soil and water conservation on communal land (14 percent) and water harvesting (13 percent) are, respectively, the second and third most important sub-projects. There are some differences across regions. In Afar (23 percent) and Somali (17 percent), water harvesting is considered the second most valued while for Amhara (31 percent) and Oromiya (21 percent), soil and water conservation on communal land is the second most important sub-project.

**Table 7.6: Percentage of projects reported to be most important according to beneficiaries, by region**

Sub-projects	Afar (%)	Amhara (%)	Oromiya (%)	Somali (%)	SNNP (%)	All (%)
Access road	52	35	53	50	63	50
Water harvesting structures	23	8	8	17	6	13
Soil and water conservation (SWC) on communal land	2	31	21	6	12	14
Soil and water conservation (SWC) on private land	1	10	4	2	3	4
Other natural resource management projects	1	3	1	1	2	1
School	3	3	4	3	3	3
Health post	8	2	2	4	2	4
Springs/shallow well	4	1	1	2	2	2
Childcare center	0	0	0	1	0	0
Other	7	7	6	14	7	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data, 2021

When asked about the kind of infrastructure beneficiaries think should be built next, most respondents suggested access roads (29 percent), followed by water harvesting structures (22 percent) and soil and water conservation structures on communal land (10 percent) (Table 7.7). However, for Afar (32 percent) and Somali (24 percent), water harvesting structures remain important; and schools stand the third most important.

**Table 7.7: The kind of infrastructure households think should be built next, by region**

Reason	Afar (%)	Amhara (%)	Oromiya (%)	Somali (%)	SNNP (%)	All (%)
Access road	29	23	31	32	29	29
Water harvesting structures	33	18	19	24	14	22
Soil and water conservation (SWC) on communal land	7	16	8	7	13	10
Soil and water conservation (SWC) on private land	2	10	4	2	5	4
Other natural resource management projects	2	6	3	3	3	3
School	11	4	9	7	14	9
Health post	8	6	9	7	8	8
Springs/shallow well	2	3	2	4	4	3
Childcare center	1	0	1	1	1	1
Other	6	15	16	12	9	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data, 2021

### 7.3. Household participation in Public Works

*(a) Who within the household carries-out the work requirement of the PSNP? How is this decision made? Do women in the household have a say in the decision process? Is the domestic burden of women considered?*

We asked households who in the households decides on who works in the PSNP public works. Table 7.8 summarizes the percentages by region and household headship. Overall, in 76 percent of male-headed households, the decision about who carries out public works is made by the head. Some regional differences are observed in this regard. In Amhara, the male head and the spouse jointly make the decision in 23 percent of the households while in SNNP and Oromiya only 10 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of male-headed households involve the spouses in this decision-making process. SNNP is the extreme case where 88 percent of households reported typically this is a male head's role.

**Table 7.8: The person in the household deciding on who works in PSNP Public Works (%), by region**

	Afar	Amhara	Oromiya	Somali	SNNP	All
Male-headed households:						
Head	78	62	84	67	88	76
Spouse	9	10	5	14	5	8
Head and spouse jointly	10	23	10	16	6	13
Other	3	5	1	3	1	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Female-headed households:						
Head	85	79	87	79	88	84

Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data, 2021

We asked the reasons for selecting a specific household member to carry out the public works (Table 7.9). The majority of households (66 percent) stated that adult members are assigned to carry out public works because ‘public work is a physically demanding’ activity with other reasons - ‘work site is far away’ and ‘all household members who can participate have participated’ – cited by only eight and seven percent of Public Works participants respectively. Domestic tasks undertaken by women is rarely cited (seven percent).

**Table 7.9: Reasons for selecting specific adult household members to carry out the Public Works (%), by region**

Reason	Afar	Amhara	Oromiya	Somali	SNNP	All
Work is hard/physically demanding	74	63	70	64	64	66
They are unemployed/are not doing other work	4	4	3	7	5	4
Worksite is far away	7	8	13	6	7	8
It is dangerous to travel to worksite	1	1	1	0	1	1
Children would be left alone for too long	1	2	1	1	2	1
No place at worksite to leave children	1	1	0	1	1	1
Interferes with domestic tasks	4	8	5	9	8	7
Do not want women working alongside men	1	0	0	1	0	0
We were told that only men should work	0	0	0	0	1	0
We were told that both men and women must work	0	1	0	1	1	0
All household members who can work have participated	7	8	5	9	7	7
Other reason	1	5	2	2	4	3
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data, 2021

*(b) How far are the public works sites from the home?*

Table 7.0 reports the mean and median distance (in minutes) to a public work site. The median distance to a public work site in all regions is about an hour.

**Table 7.10: Distance (in minutes) from home to the public works sites**

Region	Mean (minutes)	Median (minutes)
Afar	81	60
Amhara	79	60
Oromiya	90	60
Somali	70	60
SNNP	80	60

*Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data, 2021*

*(c) How many days were worked by each person in the household? How many hours each day?*

To answer these questions, we first need to understand when Public Works are undertaken. The PSNP4 PIM states that public works can be conducted outside of the traditional January-June period. We asked households in which season they carry out their public works; their responses are summarized in Table 7.11. Across all regions, the majority of participants undertake their public works in the months January to June (the traditional public work months) with the percentages varying from 73 percent in June 2020 to 93 percent in January 2021. However, a significant share of participants are employed on PSNP Public Works in the second part of the (Gregorian) year. Note that the percentage of PSNP clients reporting doing Public Works employment was lower in January-April 2021 than in January-April 2020.

**Table 7.11: Percent of PW households undertaking Public Works, by month and by region**


	<b>Afar</b>	<b>Amhara</b>	<b>Oromiya</b>	<b>Somali</b>	<b>SNNP</b>	<b>All</b>
Jan-20	92	97	90	89	95	93
Feb-20	79	97	85	80	94	89
Mar-20	72	91	84	73	91	84
Apr-20	67	85	80	69	89	80
May-20	69	81	75	66	88	77
Jun-20	58	75	73	66	84	73
Jul-20	50	45	49	54	53	50
Aug-20	47	35	47	49	48	44
Sep-20	46	36	49	48	40	43
Oct-20	46	40	50	46	43	45
Nov-20	46	52	51	46	46	49
Dec-20	53	59	54	35	50	52
Jan-21	63	90	76	47	88	76
Feb-21	55	89	76	47	90	75
Mar-21	53	85	74	41	89	73
Apr-21	33	66	60	33	85	59

Note: The main public works season is shaded in dark green color. Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data, 2021


We can now turn to the question ‘who within the household carries-out the work requirement of the PSNP?’ Figure 7.1 shows our basic results. There are three findings. Nearly 85 percent of the public workdays are carried out by the head of the household (in both male-headed and female-headed households). In either case, children under 18 years old rarely participate in public works. The same is true with spouses in female-headed households. Women in male-headed households appear to carry out relatively more public works than men in female-headed households.

**Figure 7.1: Intra-household allocation of public works (% of all PW in the household), by month and household members**

**Male-headed households:**



**Female-headed households:**



Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data, 2021



Next, we disaggregate by region, month and headship. Table 7.12 and Table 7.13 report the intra-household allocation of public works, respectively, in the male- and female-headed households as percent of all public works in the household, by month and by region. The key finding from these two tables is that the lion's share of (about 71 - 91 of the male-headed and 86 – 98 percent of the female-headed) household public works is carried out by the head of the household in all months, regardless of whether the household is male- or female-headed.

The Somali region shows a slightly different picture: female members are likely to work for about 20 – 25 percent of the public works in male-headed household. By contrast, in all the other regions, female members contributed to less than 20 percent of the total public works in male-headed households. In female-headed households, males are likely to work less than 10 percent of the total household public works in all regions and all months. In other words, female members are likely to carry out higher share of public works in male-headed households than male members carry out in female-headed households. In all regions and months, adult children contribute for less than 2-3 percent of the total share of public works. An exception to this is in female-headed households of Amhara where, except between July – October, adult children contribute for up to 5 percent of total household public works (Table 7.9).

**Table 7.12: Intra-household allocation of public works in male-headed households (% of all PW in the household), by month and by region**

	Afar			Amhara			Oromiya			Somali			SNNP			All		
	M	F	C	M	F	C	M	F	C	M	F	C	M	F	C	M	F	C
Jan-20	90	9	2	90	10	1	87	12	1	77	22	1	88	12	1	87	12	1
Feb-20	90	8	2	89	10	1	88	11	1	74	24	1	87	13	1	87	12	1
Mar-20	89	9	1	89	11	1	87	12	1	73	25	2	87	12	1	86	13	1
Apr-20	89	10	1	89	11	1	87	12	1	74	25	2	86	13	1	86	13	1
May-20	90	9	2	89	11	1	88	10	1	71	27	2	87	13	1	87	13	1
Jun-20	92	7	2	91	9	1	89	10	1	73	27	1	87	12	1	88	12	1
Jul-20	93	7	0	88	12	0	85	12	2	79	20	1	85	15	1	86	13	1
Aug-20	95	6	0	90	9	1	85	13	2	80	19	1	85	14	1	87	12	1
Sep-20	91	7	2	88	11	1	86	13	2	82	16	2	85	15	1	86	13	1
Oct-20	94	5	1	89	11	1	86	13	2	82	16	2	86	14	0	87	12	1
Nov-20	93	6	1	88	12	1	85	13	2	85	13	3	86	14	1	87	12	1
Dec-20	89	10	2	88	12	1	85	13	2	88	9	3	86	13	1	87	12	2
Jan-21	89	10	1	90	9	1	86	12	2	77	21	2	87	12	1	87	12	1
Feb-21	88	10	2	89	10	1	87	11	2	74	24	1	86	13	1	86	12	1
Mar-21	89	10	1	89	10	1	86	13	1	74	25	2	87	12	1	86	13	1
Apr-21	94	6	0	89	10	1	88	10	2	74	24	2	86	13	1	87	12	1

Note: M = adult males, F = adult females and C = Children less than 18 years of age. Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data, 2021

**Table 7.13: Intra-household allocation of public works in female-headed households (% of all PW in the household), by month and by region**

	Afar			Amhara			Oromiya			Somali			SNNP			All		
	M	F	C	M	F	C	M	F	C	M	F	C	M	F	C	M	F	C
Jan-20	10	87	3	6	91	4	6	91	3	7	91	3	3	96	1	6	92	3
Feb-20	9	87	4	6	90	3	7	90	3	7	90	3	3	96	1	6	91	3
Mar-20	11	88	2	7	90	4	6	91	3	8	89	2	4	95	1	7	91	3
Apr-20	10	88	2	6	91	3	8	89	3	10	88	2	5	94	1	7	91	2
May-20	11	87	2	6	92	2	8	89	3	8	88	4	5	94	1	7	91	2
Jun-20	8	90	2	5	93	2	9	88	3	9	87	5	4	95	1	7	91	2
Jul-20	7	92	1	10	90	0	6	92	2	8	90	2	4	95	2	7	92	1
Aug-20	6	93	1	4	96	0	6	92	2	9	89	2	4	94	2	5	93	1
Sep-20	4	95	1	2	98	0	8	91	2	10	90	1	4	94	3	5	94	2
Oct-20	1	98	0	4	96	0	7	91	2	9	88	3	3	96	2	5	94	1
Nov-20	1	98	0	5	91	4	8	90	2	8	90	2	2	96	2	5	93	2
Dec-20	8	91	0	5	92	4	6	92	1	12	89	0	2	96	2	6	93	2
Jan-21	9	90	1	6	89	5	8	89	3	6	91	3	4	95	1	6	91	3
Feb-21	12	87	2	7	88	5	8	89	3	7	90	3	3	95	1	7	90	3
Mar-21	10	89	2	8	88	4	8	89	3	7	90	3	4	94	2	7	90	3
Apr-21	11	86	3	7	88	5	9	87	4	9	87	4	3	95	2	7	89	4

Note: M = adult males, F = adult females and C = Children less than 18 years of age. Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data, 2021

We asked households how many days men and women work in each month and region. This is summarized in Table 7.14. The average household works for about 12 days per person per month in the main public work months, but slightly lower than 12 days in the months July to December. Important regional deviations from the average are also observed: in Oromiya the average person works for about 8 days per month while in SNNP the average person works for around 13 days per month. These averages are below the 15 days cap on the maximum number of days each person can work per month. “We do not know why days worked was lower in Oromiya than elsewhere know for certain. But we do know that Covid-related restrictions seem to have had a larger impact on the implementation of Public Works in Oromiya than in other regions. For example, as discussed in section 7.4, informants noted that because of Covid-related restrictions related to social distancing, the types of public works undertaken were changed in a way that reduced the number of people who could work together.

**Table 7.14: Number of days worked per person, by month and by region**

	Afar	Amhara	Oromiya	Somali	SNNP	All
Jan-20	11.8	14.2	8.6	13.1	14.4	12.5
Feb-20	11.5	13.6	8.3	12.8	14.6	12.4
Mar-20	11.7	13.4	8.4	13.3	14.4	12.3
Apr-20	11.8	13.1	8.4	13.1	14.6	12.3
May-20	11.5	13.2	8.5	13.7	14.6	12.4
Jun-20	11.2	13.1	8.5	13.3	14.5	12.2
Jul-20	10.6	10.6	8.2	14.6	13.8	11.4
Aug-20	10.8	11.0	7.9	13.9	13.9	11.4
Sep-20	11.4	11.1	8.2	13.6	13.3	11.2
Oct-20	11.5	11.9	8.4	14.1	13.5	11.6
Nov-20	11.1	12.0	8.3	14.1	13.8	11.6
Dec-20	11.3	12.2	8.2	13.6	13.7	11.6
Jan-21	12.1	14.2	8.9	12.8	14.7	12.8
Feb-21	12.5	13.7	8.6	12.9	14.2	12.5
Mar-21	12.9	13.1	8.5	12.8	14.3	12.4
Apr-21	11.9	10.4	7.6	11.3	11.9	10.5

Note: The main public works season is shaded in dark green color. Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data, 2021

The PIM requires that women work for half of men’s workload to allow for women’s reproductive responsibilities. A follow up question is how many hours per day each person has worked in each month and region. We asked households how many hours per day men and women typically work in each region. Table 7.15 summarizes these responses by region and men and women. Overall, on average, women worked 3.4 hours per day and men worked 3.9 hours per day. The median work hours for both men and women are 4 hours per day. When disaggregated by region, men and women work an average of 4 hours per day while women in Oromiya work for an average of 3 hours per day. Women in Afar also worked for a relatively lower (an average of 3.1) hours a day compared to other regions other than Oromiya.


**Table 7.15: Mean number of hours worked, by region and by sex**

	Afar	Amhara	Oromiya	Somali	SNNP	All
<b>Means:</b>						
Men	3.9	4.3	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.9
Women	3.4	4.0	3.0	3.13	3.4	3.4
<b>Medians:</b>						
Men	4	4	4	4	4	4
Women	4	4	3	3	4	4

Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data, 2021

How important is public work in the overall workload of households? Figure 7.2 presents the public workload as share of the total annual workload by month and region. The findings can be summarized as follows. First, the share of public works in the Highland regions accounts for a relatively higher share of total workload during the traditional public work months of January to June. Second, it varies across regions. It ranges between 9 to 17 percent of total workload between January to June for Amhara, between 9 to 14 for Oromiya, and between 11 to 14 in SNNP. Third, the share of public work is relatively lower in the rest of the months of July to December. By contrast, public works account for a relatively higher share of total work burden in January in Somali (17 percent) and Afar (20 percent).


Figure 7.2: Public workload as a share of the total annual workload, by month and by region



Note: Data are percentages and add up to 100 in each region. Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data, 2021

To what extent do public works interfere with other activities, including farming? Overall, 18 percent of households from the highland regions report that public work has interfered with their farming activities. Regional averages were 23 percent in Amhara, 16 percent in SNNP and 15 percent in Oromiya. Figure 7.3 shows that this interference occurs most frequently when public works are carried out closer to the rainy season, namely April – June for Amhara, March-May for Oromiya, and March – June for SNNP.

**Figure 7.3: Share of households reporting that public works interfered with farming activities, by region and month**



Note: Numbers are percentages of households, and they sum up to 100 within a year.

*(d) What services (including childcare) are provided near the work site?*

The PIM requires that childcare is available at each work site or in the village. This is to ensure that PSNP clients can participate adequately in public works and that the burden of looking after young children does not fall on those of school-going age. Both the care of children and the construction of childcare facilities are an allowable use of public works labour.

The 2018 midline performance report found that childcare was available in only 25 percent of sampled woredas: two in SNNP and one in Amhara. Three years on, provision has declined. Among kebele informants, none of the KFSTFs reported that they arrange childcare; only Chiro in Oromiya has recently started doing so using an NGO-provided tent. Of the six DAs who replied to this question, five said that there was no provision, while the DA in Mekdela described only an informal arrangement:

Normally we prepare a temporary childcare space under trees on the public works sites. But women do not bring their children to the sites. Rather they leave them at home and insist on leaving early. [AMH-MEK-DA]

The reasons for the lack of provision vary: some informants explicitly state that women are not allowed to bring children to the public works site (KFSTF in Zeway Dugda and Kuyu, Oromiya), while others highlight the risks to small children and the distances involved (KFSTF in Libo Kemkem and Angolela Tera, Amhara).

Woreda informants agree that provision is very low. The WFSTF in Mekdela noted that the practice of leaving young children in the home is leading to precisely the result anticipated in the PIM.

Women leave their children at home. We observe children absent from school due to the fact that they are expected to take care of young children at home. [AMH-MEK-WFSTF]

The reasons given by woreda informants for the lack of childcare provision include the long distances to public works sites (Mekdela) and the small number of public works participants (Angolela Tera):

We don't have childcare centres at public works sites because we don't have large numbers of participants per kebele. The maximum number is 40-50 people and most of them are male, so there is no need to have such facilities. [AMH-ANG-WPWU]

In the Lowland, all woreda informants in Afar report that no childcare is provided, although most kebele informants describe informal arrangements being made when necessary.

There are no specific childcare facilities at public works sites. However, if a woman brings children, we select one woman from the workers and assign her to look after the children. [AFA-DUB-DA]

Until now we haven't prepared childcare in public works sites. This is because when women come to the site, they bring one extra woman to look after the children. [AFA-EWA-DA]

In Somali, woreda informants in Shinile and Error describe something similar to Afar. Only in Gursum is dedicated and organised provision being made.

Women put their children under the shade of trees. Sometimes we establish a temporary shelter and assign one female public works attendant to take care of the children while their mothers are working. Most times when women have small children, the men of the household go and do the work. [SOM-SHI-WTRMTC]

Last year we constructed small houses around the public works activities. We assign one woman to keep six children each in these temporary childcare centres. After a while another mother comes to breastfeed her baby and looks after the others, and the other mothers do the same in turn. [SOM-GUR-WFSTF]

Kebele informants in Somali region gave contradictory replies, with all DAs stating that no childcare is in place and all KFSTFs describing some level of informal arrangement.

As part of the quantitative household survey, we asked Public Works participants if childcare was provided at their worksites. Consistent with the results of the qualitative data, across all respondents only 2.4 percent indicated that childcare was available at their worksite. The regional breakdown was: Afar, 0.4 percent; Amhara, 4.5 percent; Oromiya, 1.9 percent; Somali, 2.9 percent; and 0.5 percent.



(e) Are those participating in public works provided with the necessary inputs (tools, materials)? Are they asked to bring these or pay for these inputs?

Woreda informants reported that PSNP clients usually use their own tools and, according to the WPWU in Sodo Zurya, complain about it. The only exceptions mentioned were tools and materials used in the nurseries (Boloso Sore, Mekdela, and Angolela Tera) and those needed for specialist or heavy-duty tasks, such as cracking rocks during road construction, which might be provided by the DA or kebele office. Tools supplied earlier in the programme are now lost or damaged and there is no budget to replace them. The views of woreda informants on this point vary: in SNNP, the WFSTF in Sodo Zurya advised that tools be provided through the capital budget (as the PIM allows), while the WFSTF in Arbaminch Zuria thought that such funds could be better used elsewhere:

Tools and materials required for public works activities were supplied by the programme during phases one and two, but thereafter their inclusion in the capital budget has ceased. Due to this, clients are using their own tools. We suggest consideration for including tools in the capital budget. [SNN-SOD-WFSTF]

We don't give attention to the delivery of tools and materials on the understanding that these would be brought by the clients themselves. Moreover, we believe that the money that would be allocated to tools and materials could be used for more useful community intervention support. [SNN-ARB-WFSTF]

The provision of tools and materials in the lowlands was perceived to be adequate at the baseline in 2016. By 2018, there were still sufficient tools in half the sampled woredas. In the other half, the number and quality had deteriorated leading PSNP clients to bring their own. In Shinile, women reported being required to pay for lost tools. In 2021, woredas still provide tools, although several mentioned shortages or quality concerns.

The public works tools are bought every year and distributed to the kebeles but it is very small... Since the tools are not enough, 70 percent of people bring their own. The annual budget for public works material in this woreda is very small (400,000 ETB per year) so not enough tools reach the kebele for the expected work. [SOM-SHI-WTRMTC]

We provide tools, but very limited because of shortage of budget. [SOM-GUR-WTRMTC]

The KFSTFs in SNNP, Sidama, and Oromiya all stated that public works participants use their own tools. Those in Amhara broadly concurred but gave slightly more detail: hand tools were provided in Libo Kemkem but PSNP clients preferred to use their own, while those distributed in previous phases of the programme were now damaged (Mekdela) or insufficient (Angolela Tera).

Only seven pickaxes and seven shovels have been supplied by PSNP in three years. We always request additional hand tools but due to budget limitation we don't get far. [AMH-ANG-KFSTF]

The KFSTF in Errer referred to the lack of sufficient tools when discussing the positive and negative impacts of public works. The instruction to avoid tool-sharing as part of Covid-19 control measures may have exacerbated existing shortages.

The negative impact of public works is that cutting prosopis creates many thorns, putting livestock and people at risk when they move. Hand tools are limited. We did not receive working tools for the last several years. [SOM-ERR-KFSTF]

People were told to follow the strict measures of Covid-19 control. They were told not to share the tools with other colleagues to limit the spread of the disease. [SOM-SHI-WTRMTC]

As part of the quantitative household survey, we asked Public Works participants if childcare was provided at their worksites. Consistent with the results of the qualitative data, the majority of Public Works participants (78 percent) brought their own tools. 12 percent of participants were required to pay for tools or materials

**Table 7.16: Share of Public Works participants reporting provision of tools and materials at work site, by region**

	Had to bring your own tools	Was provided with the necessary tools	Had to pay for the tools/ materials
	Percent		
Afar	59	35	4
Amhara	79	42	13
Oromiya	74	24	16
SNNP	58	40	4
Somali	81	18	5
All regions	78	29	12

Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data, 2021

Lastly, we note that the PIM requires that each public works site should have a first aid kit and states that first aid services are allowable expenditure under the capital budget. In 2018, very few woredas made first aid available and the same is true in 2021. When asked which services were available at public works sites, woreda informants in only four of the 11 sampled woredas mentioned first aid and these descriptions were somewhat vague. In the Lowlands, none of the sampled woredas reported that a first aid kit is provided. The practice is to rely on assistance from health extension workers or health posts. The necessity of first aid is illustrated by the KFSTF in Shinile in their description of the positive and negative impacts of public works.

The negative impact we face is that there are wounded people who have lost part of their body (loss of eye, bone fracture) while working on PSNP activities. *[SOM-SHI-KFSTF]*

## 7.4. Implementation of Public Works during COVID-19

We asked regional, woreda, and kebele informants to make a general assessment of PSNP 4 implementation, including public works, in the course of which those in three regions mentioned Covid-19. Both the RFSTF in Amhara and the KFSTF in Chiro included Covid-19 among a long list of external factors that had contributed to lower performance in 2012/2013 than in 2011 [EC] and had affected both the mobilisation and monitoring of public works. In the Highlands, the two principal effects of Covid-19 on public works were changes in the type of activity and a slower rate of implementation, the latter compounded by insecurity in Oromiya.

We avoided heavy duty public works activities due to the Covid-19 protocol, so that the volume of public works would be reduced. *[SNN-RMTC]*

The implementation of public works lags a little bit behind the plan, particularly in 2012 [EC] due to the Covid-19 pandemic. This was because public works clients were expected to carry out their activities as per the Covid protocol, and this therefore negatively impacted the outcome. In terms of quality, however, we attained good results. *[SNN-ARB-DA]*

This time last year we suspended public works activities for two months due to Covid. We also had to change to new types of activity, like fencing public structures, that don't require many

people working together. These have lowered the overall implementation performance of public works activities. [ORO-FAD-DA]

There has been a change in the types of public works activities, but only since Covid-19 began. Most public works activities became fencing of schools, health posts, kebele offices, and construction of additional classrooms. This was done by assigning some public works participants to provide fencing and construction materials, keeping a safe distance, and others doing the actual fencing and construction. [ORO-FAD-KFSTF]

We have tried to accomplish public works plans, but this has been affected by Covid-19. Sometimes also the road from Addis to Harar is blocked by *querroo*, and public works participants along the road get nervous, abandon the work and go home. [ORO-CHI-DA]

In the Lowlands, public works activities were more severely affected. Public works were suspended in both regions for between four and six months in 2012 [EC], although this did not affect areas in Afar where the public works timetable ran from September to February rather than January to June. Woredas in Afar describe food transfers continuing throughout the suspension as a form of temporary direct support. The RFSTF in Somali region also suspended some activities in border areas to reduce transmission. After work resumed, changes were made to ensure social distancing. The work was done in smaller groups, with fewer participants per site, working in shifts, and in one case (Elidar) restricted to household groups only. All of this has delayed implementation.

Covid-19 has reduced and delayed public works. Previously we used to arrange people in a 1:20 method. Now we are forced to arrange them in 1:5 to reduce the number of people per site. [SOM-SHI-WTRMTC]<sup>28</sup>

Before Covid-19, we used to bring all four sub-kebele public works beneficiaries to carry out public works. Currently that is not happening. We even limited the number of people working in a specific site. [SOM-ERR-KFSTF]

We ordered every public works household to work around their home as a family, without mixing with other people. [AFA-ELI-WFSTF]

Woreda informants in Elidar mentioned that projects funded through the capital budget were less affected since these are constructed by small numbers of semi-skilled workers who wear personal protective equipment, although there was no unskilled contribution from the community. The RFSTF in Afar directed woredas to provide masks and sanitisers to those working on capital projects, but for public works projects, the principal strategy was social distancing. The WTRMTC in Shinile also described support received from the health office.

People can't afford to buy masks daily. The health office helped us one time and provided awareness raising for public works attendants. People were told to follow the strict measures of Covid-19 control. [SOM-SHI-WTRMTC]

We triangulate these regional, woreda and kebele responses with data collected from Public Works participants. We asked them how the pandemic had affected the operation of the public works that they undertook. 36 percent of households reported that the pandemic had caused changes in operations (Table 7.17). The most important changes have been work in smaller groups (37 percent),

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<sup>28</sup> There is no explanation of this in the transcript, but it is assumed to be the ratio between supervisor and workers.

work in shifts (32 percent), work for fewer days (32 percent), and using masks when working on public works (29 percent).

**Table 7.17: Impacts of Covid 19 on public work implementation as described by Public Works participants, by region**

	Afar (%)	Amhara (%)	Oromiya (%)	Somali (%)	SNNP (%)	All (%)
Did the Covid-19 pandemic cause changes in the way public works were carried out at the sites	38	26	47	43	33	36
Specific Impacts:						
Work in smaller groups	34	27	46	45	38	37
Work in shifts	35	22	43	34	32	32
Given masks to wear when working on the PSNP	35	18	38	32	27	29
Work fewer days because the pandemic prevented PSNP public works from being undertaken?	32	24	40	36	30	32
Work fewer days because restrictions on movement prevented you from reaching the site where public works were being carried out	31	24	38	34	31	31
Work fewer days because you were concerned about contracting Covid-19?	30	22	39	33	29	30

## 7.5. Summary

This section summarizes the findings against the research questions listed in the introduction.

We begin by considering process, directly addressing RQ18: PSNP public works and links to services. It will focus on questions relating to the planning of public works: What is the process for selecting the public works sub-projects to be constructed through the PSNP? To what extent does this planning process include other types of activities as detailed in the PIM? and describing who participates in public works planning (PSNP clients, Kebele and Woreda officials)?

The description of the public works selection and planning process by kebele, woreda, and regional officials is broadly consistent with that in the 2018 midline performance report. The basic elements are common: some degree of community-level discussion and prioritisation, facilitated by DAs, which is consolidated, reviewed, and endorsed by the kebele and then cascaded upwards to the woreda for technical review and final approval. The emphasis given to these various elements differs across regions and woredas, with more prominence given to the process of community engagement in Amhara and to the woreda's technical direction in Oromiya. There is more evidence now than at the midline that the Pastoral Public Works Guidelines are being used in the lowlands and are leading to change in both the types of projects implemented and the modalities for doing so, including adjustments to the timing of the public works schedule. The qualitative interviews also suggest a more balanced and complementary process of decision-making between kebele and woreda in Somali region, with the kebele setting priorities and the woreda providing technical support and advice. When asked who takes decisions about public works, informants in Somali were more likely to point to the

KFSTF, and those in Afar to the communities in the first instance and to the woreda as the ultimate decision-maker.

Households report more limited participation than that described by officials, though it is possible that Covid-19 affected the ability of KFSTFs to hold community meetings. Only 20 percent of households in the Highlands and only 4 percent of households in the Lowlands have had knowledge about such meetings taking place in their communities. Of these that knew meetings were carried out in the communities, 80 percent in the Highlands and 65 percent in the Lowlands participated in those meetings. A little less than 50 percent of those that participated have commented in the choice of these projects, suggesting that those that participate are likely to comment. In only four of the 11 Highland woredas where we undertook qualitative fieldwork did we find examples of specific measures to promote women's participation, such as separate forums or mobilisation and advice. Elsewhere there was only reliance on routine mechanisms such as women's presence in community discussions or their membership (and sometimes leadership) of development groups and committees. In the Lowlands, no specific measures are being taken to increase the participation of women in public works planning which remains stronger in Somali than in Afar.

Overall, 53 percent of households reported public work sub-projects have had benefits for their household and 38 percent for their community. When disaggregated by PSNP status, PSNP households are roughly more likely to report benefits at community level than non-PSNP and non-PSNP households are more likely to report benefits at the household level than PSNP households. When disaggregated by sub-project type, more than half of households in all regions have reported access road is the most important infrastructure built through public works. Soil and water conservation on communal land (14 percent) and water harvesting (13 percent) are, respectively, the second and third most important sub-projects.

The chapter describes households' participation in PW. By so doing, it contributes to answering the following components of RQ18: (a) Who within the household carries-out the work requirement of the PSNP? (b) How far are the public works sites from the home? (c) How many days were worked by each person in the household? How many hours each day? (d) What services (including childcare) are provided near the work site? (e) Are those participating in public works provided with the necessary inputs (tools, materials)? Are they asked to bring these or pay for these inputs?

In terms of household participation in Public Works, we find that nearly 85 percent of the public workdays are carried out by the head of the household (in both male-headed and female-headed households). In either case, children under 18 years old rarely participate in public works. The same is true with spouses in female-headed households. Women in male-headed households carry out relatively more public works than men in female-headed households. The median distance to a public work site in all regions is an hour. The average household works for about 12 days per person per month in the main public work months, but slightly lower than 12 days in the months July to December. Important regional deviations from the average are also observed: in Oromiya the average person works for about 8 days per month while in SNNP the average person works for around 13 days per month. On average, women worked 3.4 hours per day and men worked 3.9 hours per day. The median work hours for both men and women are 4 hours per day.

The provision of childcare at worksites is abysmally low; only 2.4 percent of Public Works participants indicated that childcare was available at their worksite. This low figure is consistent with reports obtained during qualitative survey work. Both the quantitative and qualitative data show that In the Highlands, with a few exceptions, such as where specialist equipment is required, PSNP clients are expected to provide their own tools for public works. Tools are provided in some work locations in the Lowlands, but these are insufficient and in some cases of poor quality. 12 percent of Public Works

participants were asked to pay for tools or materials. The provision of first aid at public works sites also remains very limited.

RQ5: How was PSNP4 adapted to address the Covid-19 pandemic? Adaptation appears to have been tailored by regional and woreda offices. Generally, Public Works were more affected in 2021 than 2020 as evidence by the reduction in the percentage of PSNP clients reporting that they worked during January, February, March and April 2021. In the Lowlands, public works activities were more severely affected. Public works were suspended in both regions for between four and six months in 2012 [EC], although this did not affect areas in Afar where the public works timetable ran from September to February rather than January to June. Regional, woreda and kebele officials all pointed to changes made in the types of activities undertaken and a slower rate of implementation. Particularly in the Lowlands, Public Works were done in smaller groups, with fewer participants per site, and in some cases working in shifts. Responses from households participating in Public Works activities were consistent with these qualitative data. 36 percent of households reported that the pandemic had caused changes in operations. The most important changes have been work in smaller groups (37 percent), work in shifts (32 percent), work for fewer days (32 percent), and using masks when working on public works (29 percent).

## Chapter 8: Livelihood Pathways

### 8.1. Introduction

The livelihood component of the PSNP is designed to support the livelihoods of households and individuals involved in the program, to build household assets, increase incomes, and strengthen resilience to shocks. It builds on the architecture and delivery mechanisms established under the previous, and no longer active, Household Asset Building Program (HABP), which began in 2010, then superseding the Other Food Security Program (OFSP).

PSNP4 aims to provide tailored solutions to households and individuals according to their capacity along three livelihood pathways: crop and livestock, off-farm income generation, and wage employment. According to the program's Theory of Change, to graduate, households require a sequenced combination of technical and financial support, beginning with receipt of safety net transfers and followed by savings participation, financial literacy, livelihoods training, and access to finance. This support would be delivered through the formation of groups and targeting of poorer individuals to receive livelihood transfers, as well as intensive coaching and mentoring. Tailored technical assistance would be provided through institutions that have existing skill sets and mandate for the technical area, thus helping address constraints related to technical capacity.

Specifically, livelihood support comprises the following sequenced activities:

1. Group formation
2. Financial literacy training and savings promotion
3. Client consultation for livelihood selection
4. Training (tailored to livelihood pathways)
5. Business plan preparation and finance approval and referral (including livelihood transfers for the poorest clients)
6. Follow-up support

A Livelihood Checklist was added to PSNP4 to track participation in the livelihood component. This is included on the Client Card and is meant to be used both as a management tool (for the DA and the client to know what support the client should receive) and as an M&E tool.<sup>29</sup>

Different institutional actors to provide support to the Livelihood Component. As summarized in Table 8.1, these include: the Agricultural Extension Directorate, responsible for the crop and livestock livelihood pathway; the MSE agency, responsible for the off-farm livelihoods pathway; and BOLSA/MOLSA/WOLSA, for the wage employment pathway, with support from the MSE agency where appropriate. TVET is an implementing agency that provides technical training in the off-farm and wage employment pathways; Cooperative Promotion officers also provide cross-cutting support in financial literacy training, savings promotion, and market linkages. Lending agencies such as ACSI, RUSSACO and other local microfinance institutions provide credit to PSNP

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<sup>29</sup> As part of the new integrated livelihood component, a livelihood transfer has been being piloted across the highlands. This is discussed in a separate report.

clients to support livelihoods pathways. Livelihoods Implementation Coordination Units (LICU) at woreda, regional and federal levels coordinate.

**Table 8.1 Livelihood pathways, institutions and activities/services for safely net clients**

Pathway	Institution	Current activities/services to which safety net clients will be linked
Crop and livestock (on-farm pathway)	Agricultural Development Sector (particularly Agricultural Extension Directorate)  Livestock Resource Development Sector  Federal Cooperative Agency	DAs provide extension advice to rural households in crop, livestock, and NRM. DAs and subject matter specialists (SMSs) provide training at Farmer Training Centers (FTCs) and Pastoralist Training Centers (PTCs) as well as households and model farms, where available.  The Livestock Resource Development Sector provides technical support to both mixed crop and livestock livelihoods as well as pastoral livelihoods.  Cooperative Promotion Officers support the creation and strengthening of agricultural marketing and multipurpose cooperatives, and rural savings and credit cooperatives (RUSACCOs).
Off-farm income generation	MSE Agency (Regional Micro and Small Enterprise Development Agency [REMSEDA])  Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET)	One-stop service centers in rural towns bring together representatives from REMSEDA, TVET and MFIs. These one-stop services centers provide referrals for technical training by TVETs and support the development of group and individual business plans/enterprise development/access to credit for the development of micro and small enterprises. TVET trainers serve as “industrial extension” agents and advise MSEs on a variety of areas. There are currently over 1,200 one-stop service centers in Ethiopia, with plans for the development of several hundred more in increasingly rural areas.
Wage Employment	Bureau of Labor and Social Affairs (BOLSA)  REMSEDA  TVET	In some regions, BOLSA identifies investment opportunities and link registered unemployed clients to these opportunities.  One-stop service centres in rural towns register the unemployed and refer them to existing job opportunities. TVETs then provide market-led training for existing employment opportunities at 5 different qualification levels (level 1 being the lowest skill level—and representing the largest number of existing employment opportunities in rural Ethiopia—and level 5 being the highest skill level). The “cooperative training modality” employed entails the provision of 30% of the training by/at the TVET, and 70% of the training by/at the industry.

The 2018 mid-term evaluation found that the three livelihood pathways were unevenly implemented, with implementation farthest along for the on-farm pathway. However, this pathway faced challenges related to low credit supply, particularly in remote areas, and indebtedness from previous loans, which limited clients’ ability to participate. The off-farm pathway faced challenges of coordination between the various actors and shorter repayment periods discouraged loan uptake for business plans. Low capacity of WOLSA (not established at woreda level in all regions) and TVET resulted in limited support to clients on the wage employment pathway. The mid-term evaluation also confirmed that youth participation remained unaddressed with low awareness of the prioritization of young people. Women’s participation was broadly hitting the mark and the problems women faced in terms of credit access did not seem to be gender specific but related to wider issues of low loan recovery rates and high interest rates. Public works activities were found to have a positive impact on livelihood pathways (e.g. road rehabilitation improving access to markets and transportation to towns), although the connection between PWs and livelihood activities was found to be largely indirect and not deliberately planned.



With this backdrop, this chapter assesses progress with the integrated livelihoods component. Given concerns raised about implementation capacity, it documents – drawing on our qualitative survey instruments – we begin with an extensive assessment of ongoing effort to scale-up livelihood support to PSNP clients. We then turn, using our quantitative household data, to addressing **RQ20: PSNP Livelihood component**. This includes the following questions: Among PSNP clients who have received support on business plan preparation, do they believe that these business plans reflect their priorities, needs and capacities? Are PSNP clients saving regularly? How much are they saving, and for what? Have PSNP clients received the combination of both technical support (e.g. business plan preparation) and micro-finance services (credit)? Have PSNP clients received regular support from DAs? How frequent are these visits? How useful do they find these visits? Are PSNP clients accessing loans through MFIs, RuSACCOs or VSLAs? What is the average value of these loans? Are PSNP clients repaying loans? Do they experience any difficulties in repaying these loans and does this differ across financial service providers?

## **8.2. Regional and woreda perspectives on the Livelihoods Component**

### **8.2.1. Prevalent livelihood pathways**

Crop and livestock activities are seen as the most prominent livelihood pathway, estimated to account for 84% of PSNP clients in Amhara and 80% in SNNP, according to regional LICUs. Livestock farming, and animal fattening in particular, are the dominant activity. Experience, appropriate resources, and suitable agroecological and market conditions are highlighted as key determinants in the choice of this pathway by clients.

The on-farm crops and livestock livelihood pathway is the most prevalent in this woreda. This is because farmers are more interested as it goes with their skills and experience. They have inputs/resources, like land and fodder, which are important to run the business. *[AMH-LIB-WLICU]*

About 97% of the clients are engaged in crop and livestock pathway out of which the majority are on livestock fattening. This makes sense as the majority of the clients are residents of mid-land altitudes where farmland holding is scarce, and fattening does not require large holdings. *[SNNP-ARB-WLICU]*

R1. The two dominant business areas are milk production, fattening and shot (goat and sheep) rearing. R2. I think the businesses selected are the right ones and are in line with the experience and capacities of PSNP clients. If you take the highland Kebeles, they have ample forage and water for the animals, there is reasonably good enough grazing area on fresh grass. R3. Lowland and midland Kebeles are the best places for shots rearing; it makes real sense that these businesses are selected. *[ORO-CHI-WLICU]*

Merchants are coming to our woreda on market days for buying goats as they know that the area famous for its quality fattened goats. *[SID-LOK-WLICU]*

In some woredas, this is the only option available, as opportunities related to the other pathways, such as proximity of markets and demand for employment, remain limited.

The livestock pathway is the most preferred pathway because it is fruitful and the benefits are immediate. Moreover, it is what the clients were doing for years and are familiar with. [AMH-RLICU]

R1. Crop and livestock (on-farm) pathway is the most prevalent, because agriculture is the sole business of the community. R2. The community is not comfortable with off-farm and employment pathways, and these are not prioritized because the opportunity for employment and other related businesses is slim. [ORO-CHI-WLICU]

### **8.2.2. Implementation progress of livelihood pathways**

Relatively good implementation progress with the on-farm pathway is attributed not just to clients' experience and adequate resources and skills but also the capacity and experience of staff at all levels.

We have achieved high score in crop and livestock due to the fact that we have well-functioning and experienced staffs at all levels, from kebele to the woreda. These staffs take the PSNP activities as the main duties with full sense of ownership and responsibility. At kebele level there are DAs who coordinate, supervise, and provide training/technical supports to the clients. [AMH-ANG-WLICU]

As found in previous evaluations, the progress of PSNP4 livelihood component is less advanced for the off-farm and wage employment pathways. Off-farm livelihood activities, where they exist, typically include small businesses and crafts or petty trade.

In the area of off-farm there are small businesses such as trade in butter, and kiosk. There are also those that received skill training from TVET such as on masonry, wood works, and production of bricks and that started their own businesses. [SNNP-BOL-WLICU]

Those clients that do not have crop and livestock opportunities tend to go for off-farm opportunities. These include trading live animals and other businesses such as egg trade. [SNNP-ARB-WLICU]

Except for a few petty trade activities by women, the off-farm pathway required more financing and hence it was not implemented as such. [ORO-RLICU]

Lack of experience and unattractive loan conditions are commonly mentioned as challenges.

The off-farm business has huge potential but most of our clients have no prior experience and they do not dare to engage on the business. Equally important factor not to choose the off-farm pathway is short grace period for loan repayment (three months after they took the loan). [AMH-LIB-WLICU]

The off-farm pathway is constrained by availability of appropriate loan with respect to loan precondition (business license), loan size and loan maturity period. [the loan for off-farm has to be paid back in three and six months, unlike loans for on-farm which is payable in three years. [AMH-MEK-WLICU]

Additionally, there is insufficient capacity on the ground to support PSNP clients limits the pursuit of the off-farm pathway. This includes lack of adequate training and insufficient funding.

There was no livelihood technical support provided to PSNP participants or graduates such as on business plans. We ourselves have not got training on such aspects and did not provide the trainings to clients. *[SID-LOK-DA]*

We have budget shortage to train people in TVET. *[AMH-MEK-WLICU]*

In Amhara, the regional LICU questioned the promotion of off-farm activities that demanded high levels of capital and expensive training. He noted that there were inadequate expectations about the types of business that could be pursued, given the clients' (mainly women, youth and landless people) skill sets and borrowing capacity.

We are not using this potential of off-farm pathway properly. The main constraint is that there is no one on the ground to advise and assist the clients to engage in off-farm business. There is a misconception in Woredas that the off-farm pathway is/should be capital and training intensive. But what we should do in PSNP is promote small rural businesses that can be done by people with little skill and with small amount of loan. Otherwise, it will not be feasible. *[AMH-RLICU]*

The wage employment pathway continues to face challenges, particularly in Amhara and Oromiya. Insufficient skills and difficulties in attracting young people, because of lack of finance and transport, are some of the reasons highlighted.

The employment pathway is under performing as we are not successful in bringing attitudinal change in the youth because of lack of finance and transport. *[AMH-MEK-WLICU]*

The employment pathway is not that strong. We are working with some government projects, like irrigation projects, school construction and others, to create employment linkages. Most of the projects prefer to employ its own labour as they are not happy about the skill level of the people we ask them to employ. We have difficulties with regards to creating the required skills. *[AMH-RLICU]*

Poor planning and coordination between stakeholders also plays a part.

With regards to employment pathway different woredas have different potential for employment creation. The identification of potential areas was not done prior to planning for employment linkage. Hence, performance under this component is low. *[ORO-RLICU-4]*

The employment pathway has limitations as it requires the coordination several stakeholder institutions to properly engage the unemployed the rural youth in wage employment and group/individual business activities by arranging appropriate technical trainings with TVET institution. Private companies such as industrial parks have big role to employ the rural labor. It has been tried to engage them in rural road construction activities, coffee, and nursery development activities. *[SNN-RLICU]*

An exception to these concerns was found in all three SNNP woredas that took part in the qualitative study.

The employment pathway gives focus on linking the youth who are off school to employment opportunities through provision of short-term training by TVETs. The selection of the youth for employment is facilitated together with WOLSA. The majority of such youth are linked to private farms and construction projects. Members from the PSNP households are provided priority for employment opportunity. [SNN-ARB-WLICU]

Daily labourers coming from rural areas are engaged in wage employment activities in private farms in and around Sodo town. Moreover, TVET has given trainings on carpentry and masonry for 19 youth. They are doing business either organizing themselves under working groups or individually. [SNN-SOD-WLICU]

We asked regional LICUs to compare woreda performance and explain differentials where these were identified. Variation in performance is attributed to credit availability, accessibility and farmers' attitudes and awareness about the program.

We carry out evaluations every quarter and categorize woredas into performance categories. These frequent evaluations show that some woredas perform better than others. The main reasons for performance variation can be associated with accessibility, belief, attitude and awareness level of farmers. [AMH-RLICU]

The performance of the livelihood component of the PSNP4 is dependent on availability of financial resource for loans. Woredas with better sources of finance for credit have better performance. [ORO-RLICU]

In SNNP, changes to regional administration have created additional disruptions that are yet to be addressed and affect the latter region specifically.

I can mention five zones that are performing better than the other zones in the region. These include Wolayta, Gamo, Selte, and Kembata Timbaro, whereas Sidama (now a region) was the least performing zone in terms of loan repayment capacity and engagement in livelihood support activities. Reasons for this are: the credit service was/is generally low almost in all zones; staff and leadership turnover rate was very high, political instability, weak organizational capacity like RUSACCO; COVID pandemic adversely impacted business activities particularly off-farm pathway; and 24 woredas split due to the new regionalization which created confusions until things were sorted out and new staffs employed. [SNN-RLICU]

### **8.2.3. Institutional set up and capacity**

PSNP4 envisages that technical committees are established to support clients along the three livelihood pathways. These committees are now established at regional and woreda level in Amhara, SNNP and Oromiya. The regional FSTF respondents in the three regions described these as functional.

R1. The livelihood technical committees are established at regional level and in all the PSNP Woredas and are functional. R2. There is a regional livelihood technical team, who

organizes and conducts trainings to Woreda concerned personnel on livelihood components of the PSNP and provides technical support the Woredas require during implementation. R3. The Woreda livelihood technical team is responsible for training field staff that implement the program and monitor to ensure that, the program is implemented as per the implementation plan and guidelines. *[ORO-RFSTF]*

For SNNP, variation of performance across woredas was noted.

The livelihood technical committees are established and functional at regional and woreda levels, though the functionality of the technical committee varies from woreda to woreda. *[SNN-RFSTF]*

With regards to structure and staffing, challenges include the lack of adequate structures and sufficiently prepared staff to support the off-farm and employment pathways.

The employment pathway has staffing problem. Though people are assigned in WOLSA to handle this pathway, they don't have the experience and knowledge of the issue. *[AMH-RLICU]*

Regarding staffing and structure, the off-farm pathway is still a challenge. There is no ownership at woreda and kebele level to support it. *[AMH-RFSTF]*

Institutional set up is a challenge as 24 woredas in our region have no livelihood staff. There are no responsible DAs at kebele level in these woredas. *[SNN-RLICU]*

Staff turnover (particularly DAs) remains a concern across regions.

We know that DAs are engaged in several activities and they are not helping the households as expected. This situation has been aggravated by high DA and staff turnover and therefore the support given by the DAs in helping households to access credits has been limited. *[SNN-SOD-WLICU]*

DAs involvement in the livelihood support is crucial to make the businesses profitable. However, this crucial input is challenged by high DA turnover rate and it requires additional training for the newcomers. *[SID-LOK-WLICU]*

The main challenges of the livelihood component of PSNP4 are high staff turnover because of extremely low salary, budget shortage due to inflation, the vehicles are too old, and lack of accountability when project signatories do not fulfil what they promised. *[AMH-RLICU]*

#### **8.2.4. Client selection for livelihood support**

As per the PIM, the selection of PSNP clients for livelihood support should begin with a community consultation process, in which the livelihood component is explained and PSNP clients are offered the opportunity to participate. Households then self-select into the livelihoods component for that year. When demand is higher than implementation capacity, CFSTFs, with the support of DAs, select participants giving priority to women and young people.

We asked our regional and woreda LICU respondents about the process behind selecting livelihood households – who was involved in the selection and what criteria were used? All regional LICUs mentioned that community consultation is done prior to targeting and that the process is demand driven and facilitated by DAs.

The first thing to do is demand creation. So, the DAs conduct consultation sessions with PSNP clients. Then interested ones will be targeted. (...) The program is demand driven. The DAs create interest, and the client targets himself/herself. *[AMH-RLICU]*

Steps taken are described in detail by woreda LICUs. For example:

The process of selecting livelihood client starts with consultation by the DA at kebele level. During the consultation, clients are informed about the benefits of additional business. Then those who are interested to benefit from livelihood support apply for loan to the DA. The DA, together with KFSTF and ACSI worker reviews/ approves the list of people applied for the support. Then clients called up on to take financial literacy session with the DA and ACSI worker. (...) Based on the IGA/business they have selected technical training is organized. (...) Then a business plan is prepared and sent to the Woreda Agricultural Office food security unit that officially refers the business plan to be financed to the woreda ACSI. (...) Follow up and technical support is extended to the client based on prepared check list. The first follow up starts 15 days after the loan was given to verify the resource has been used for the intended purpose. In case of misappropriation, the client is made to return the remaining cash at hand so as to protect the client from being in difficult position to repay the loan. *[AMH-ANG-WLICU]*

One respondent noted that training had been provided to ensure that targeting was done correctly.

The head of the Woreda Food Security Desk, the vice head of the Woreda Agriculture Office and experts (focal persons from WOFED, Livestock, Cooperative and PSNP Staffs) were trained at regional level on the process of targeting. The same training was cascaded at woreda level. *[ORO-FAD-WLICU]*

PSNP clients seeking loans are selected by the kebele structures. According to LICU respondents, the selection is based on levels of poverty, gender, family size, perceived motivation, savings and repayment performance.

The poorest of the poor and women are prioritized and targeted. And business plan is prepared for those targeted and referred to financial institution. Then the financial institutions do their own socio-economic assessment of the targeted households and prioritize the clients based on their ability to pay back the loan and their track-record. *[AMH-MEK-WLICU]*

Prospective beneficiaries should be safety net clients first, shouldn't have any outstanding debt, be willing to participate, and need to have ethical financial utilization. *[SID-LOK-WLICU]*

Priority is given to PSNP clients that haven't received loans previously from MFI and clients who don't have outstanding debt. They are expected to be willing to take part in

the livelihood activities. They should be healthy and strong. Women do get priority in the selection process. *[SNN-RLICU]*

Self-motivation for work is the basis for selection. The selection is conducted by KFSTF. Then clients are checked about their fulfilments of conditions required for the intended activity. The list of those prioritized by KFSTF is sent to WFSTF for review and approval. The approved list is sent to Omo micro-finance for loans. Omo makes review on the basis of eligibility criteria and then approves. *[SNN-BOL-WLICU]*

Additional screening is carried out by MFIs and these have the final say regarding loan provision. Existing savings are often a condition that MFI use for approving loans.

All RUSACCO clients that have saved for 6 months are eligible for loans. But their personal characters are evaluated and their requests for loans are appraised by loan committees that exist in the respective kebeles. Their ages and ability to work is assessed. (...) Omo micro-finance too requires saving to be eligible for loans. The loan provisions are decided by a steering committee that exists at Omo micro-finance office at woreda level. (...) The client is assessed in terms of age and working capacity by the woreda MFI office. *[SNN-ARB-MFI]*

RUSACCO give loans based on members saving deposit. Therefore, member of RUSACCO receives a loan 3 times the saving amount deposited in the RUSACCO account. The coverage potential of livelihood clients on accessing loans is generally high but availability of loans is very limited. *[SNN-SOD-WLICU]*

#### **8.2.5. Technical support and financial literacy training**

Clients who have been prioritized for participation in livelihoods interventions are formed into groups (see section 8.3 for kebele perspectives on group formation). These groups are the basis for technical support, financial literacy training and initial savings activities. The PSNP4 envisages that groups are provided training, mentoring and coaching by a number of woreda and kebele actors, including MFIs/RUSACCOs, WOLSAs, TVET and DAs.

Gaps in training activities continue to be mentioned, particularly in relation to off-farm and wage employment pathways. Lack of sufficient training structures and budgetary constraints are some of the reasons for these gaps

We face budget shortages for training people in TVET. (...) We don't have one-stop service centres and we didn't do much in the off farm sector. Because of budget shortage we didn't support RUSACCOs and FTC this year. *[AMH-MEK-WLICU]*

We have two one stop service centres at Chacha and Kotu (TVET) but they are not enough to provide service to all the eleven PSNP kebeles. Even if there are one stop service centres we do not claim that clients get the service to the required level because they are far away from where the clients live. *[AMH-ANG-WLICU]*

The rolling out in linking clients to one-stop service centres and TVET trainings, support to RUSACCOs and FTCs, providing trainings at FTCs, enhancing access to on- and off -farm

inputs showed little progress due to budget limitation and little attention given by the stakeholders. *[AMH-LIB-WLICU]*

Youth that have been endorsed by the Woreda Food Security Desk were trained by TVET though the progress is not as expected because of shortage of admin budget. There is shortage of per-diem for the trainers and trainees lunch expenses. *[SNN-BOL-WLICU]*

The Covid-19 pandemic has affected technical support, with some training activities suspended and in SNNP, political instability created significant disruption.

Different trainings were suspended to avoid spread of the pandemic. Follow up and supervision of woredas were loose. *[ORO-RLICU]*

In EFY 2012, we couldn't make the planned activities. The region fell into unprecedented political turmoil which brought many things to standstill. Conflict, conflict-induced displacements and change in leadership have deterred mobility from the regional centre to zone or woreda centres and vice versa. Therefore, it was difficult to go and deliver the required technical support to zones and woredas. We couldn't organize technical trainings at regional level in Hawassa. *[SNN-RLICU]*

Besides technical training, livelihood clients receive financial literacy training from MFIs and RUSACCOs. MFIs mentioned financial literacy training activities carried out in almost all woredas. The effectiveness of this training is highlighted by some respondents.

ACSI provides one-to-two-hour training for three days on saving and credit services. It is helpful in that it assists them with business in which they are interested and able to create assets. *[AMH-LIB-MFI]*

Trainings are very effective, because clients were trained voluntarily in order to be able to achieve what they planned in their business plans. *[ORO-ZEW-MFI]*

Loan recovery rate from farmers has increased in the past two year's period. This was achieved due to the strengthening of trainings, business plan preparation and follow up when loans are dispersed. *[SNN-BOL-MFI]*

MFIs are also involved in several other activities related to the livelihood component, working alongside FSTFs and DAs in preparing/reviewing business plans, and follow up activities.

ACSI provides support to the livelihood component of the PSNP in financial literacy and loan. ACSI satellite workers work with the DA to provide technical support in preparing and reviewing business plans. Having reviewed the business plan, they make the client open saving book and start saving. Having started to save, ACSI provides the loan to the client and follows up on whether the client used the resource for the intended purpose. *[AMH-LIB-MFI]*

We are working closely with the WFSTF and agriculture field agents. We provide financial trainings starting by organizing financial literacy training, promote savings, organize clients in groups, help in preparing business plans and facilitate and provide loans. *[SNN-ARB-MFI]*



### **8.2.6. Livelihood checklist and client cards**

The Livelihood Checklist included in each PSNP Client Card tracks the sequenced combination of technical support provided to livelihood clients. We asked woreda LICUs what proportion of livelihood eligible PSNP households completed the different levels of livelihood checklists in their woreda. Only four woredas reported that livelihood PSNP households completed all different stages, three in Amhara and one in SNNP. In the three Oromiya woredas, there were difficulties in rolling out the livelihood component because of limited access to credit. It was claimed that this was related to outstanding debts relating to a prior loan provided by the World Bank.

Although some clients have got access to credit from RUSACCO, the serious challenge in rolling out the livelihood component is the absence of resource for the PSNP clients to get access to credit. This woreda was recipient of the World Bank loan in EFY 1997, which has not been collected yet. Our woreda was required to collect the outstanding loans to use as a revolving fund, which is difficult to collect. This has seriously hampered the livelihood component to progress. *[ORO-ZEW-WLICU]*

15 years ago, the woreda received a loan from the World Bank fund. The loan fund was handed over to RUSACCO when the project was phased out. It was supposed to be operated by RUSACCO but the outstanding loan was not collected due to various reasons. Hence, RUSACCO could not avail finance for credit. This has seriously affected success of the livelihood component. *[ORO-FAD-WLICU]*

Loko Abaya reported the lowest rates of completion of the various stages, due to limited support by DAs and insufficient resources to carry out capacity building activities. Boloso Sore (SNNP) also report relatively low checklist completion rates and similar problems with DA support and administrative and training budgets.

Almost all activities were not accomplished appropriately; they were underperformed. It indicates that the livelihood support activities are encircled with full of challenges which need due attention by the concerned parties at woreda and kebele levels. For instance, DA support given to clients has reduced from time to time. They considered the livelihood support activities as secondary or additional activity. Generally, our efforts to promote livelihood support activities don't get the required attention at woreda and kebele levels. Moreover, the livelihood capacity building budget is not sufficient to carry out planned activities (15-20,000 Birr). The other puzzle is that the budget is released at the end of the fiscal year and it is also unpredictable. *[SID-LOK-WLICU]*

There was delay in arrival of the admin budget for 2013 EFY until May though the size is small. In general, the flow of the admin budget during PSNP4 was very weak in terms of timeliness and amount. For instance, training budget for DA was being allocated based on number of DAs, number of days of training and specifying the training topic. However, this is not happening since EFY 2010. Moreover, the training budget for woreda experts is no longer available. *[SNN-BOL-WLICU]*

### **8.2.7. Credit provision to livelihood clients**

The 2018 mid-term evaluation identified credit provision to livelihood clients as an important challenge. We asked woreda LICUs and MFIs to estimate what proportion of PSNP clients accessed

loans and what was the average value of these loans Results are reported in Table 8.2. Reported amounts borrowed per client varied depending on the source of information, but figures for Amhara region are consistently higher. Low amounts of lending have been mentioned as a challenge for livelihood promotion activities.

The average value of the loan from Omo is 5,200 Birr. In the past it was 4,000 Birr but increased due to repeated comments that it is too small for business. However, the 5,200 Birr is still not enough for fattening. *[ORO-CHI-WLICU]*

Loan amount was 4,000 Birr till recently, but now it is decided to raise the loan amount to 12,000 Birr. (...) This loan maximum amount of 12,000 Birr is not enough to run big business like ox fattening but it is ok for small animals like goat/sheep. If one wants to do ox fattening they have to find complementary financing from other sources, which is usually unlikely. *[ORO-ZEW-MFI]*

**Table 8.2: Loans by PSNP clients**

Region	Woreda	Percentage of PSNP clients	Loan amount (MFI)	Loan amount (WLICU)
Amhara	Angolela Tera	More than 50%	30,000 Birr	25,000 Birr (MFI) 15,000 Birr (RUSACCO)
	Mekdela	90% (RUSACCO) 70% (ACSI)	15,000-20,000 Birr (ACSI) 20,000 Birr (RUSACCO)	15,000 Birr (ACSI) 20,000 Birr (RUSACCO)
	Libo Kemkem	20% (RUSACCO) 10% (ACSI)	25,000 Birr (ACSI) 10,000 Birr (RUSACCO)	30,000 Birr (ACSI) 5,000 Birr (RUSACCO) 1,500 Birr (VESA)
Oromiya	Chiro	20%	3,000-30,000 Birr	8,000 Birr
	Kuyu	n.a.	no credit reported to be provided to PSNP clients	4,000 Birr (RUSACCO)
	Fadis	38%	no credit reported to be provided to PSNP clients	6,000 Birr
	Zeway Dugda	25%	4,000-12,000 Birr	4,000-6,000 Birr
SNNP	Arbaminch Zuria	100%	4,000-13,800 Birr (OMO)	360-600 Birr
	Boloso Sore	49% (OMO) 85% (RUSACCO)	5,200 Birr (OMO) 5,000 Birr (RUSACCO)	5,200 Birr (OMO) n.a. (RUSACCO)
	Sodo Zurya	10-25% (RUSACCO)	4,000 Birr (OMO)	4,000 Birr (OMO) n.a. (RUSACCO)
	Loko Abaya	100 households (% n.a.)	4,000 Birr (OMO)	4,000 Birr (OMO)

Source: 2021 qualitative evaluation, MFI and WLICU respondents.

Shortage of capital by MFIs are a constraint noted by several respondents, particularly in Oromiya.

Our capital sources are limited and this is also a challenge in providing loan to all clients who want to take loans. *[ORO-ZEW-MFI]*

We don't have grant fund to provide credit the PSNP clients. *[ORO-KUY-MFI]*

We are only making transfer payments to PSNP clients. If we were provided with loan funds to be provided to the PSNP clients, we would be happy to serve them. *[ORO-FAD-MFI]*

We also asked MFIs about loan terms and conditions for PSNP clients. There is some variation, across woredas and MFIs, in interest rates, loan maturity period and other conditions applied (Table 8.3). In Oromiya, interest rates tend to be higher and the loan maturity period shorter. Compulsory savings are often a condition for credit. In some cases, there is a minimum amount of savings required or a land holding certificate.

**Table 8.3: Loan conditions for PSNP clients**

Region	Woreda	Interest rates	Loan maturity period	Other conditions
Amhara	Angolela Tera	15%	3 years	Group collateral
	Mekdela	15% (ACSI) 11-14% (COOP)	3 years (ACSI) 2 years-urban areas; 1 year-rural areas (COOP)	ACSI: group collateral; compulsory savings COOP: individual collateral; compulsory savings
	Libo Kemkem	15% (MFI) 11-12% (RUSACCO)	3 years (MFI) 1 year (RUSACCO)	MFI: Savings account and no outstanding loan RUSACCO: membership, savings, individual collateral
Oromiya	Chiro	14% (RUSACCO)	1 year (RUSACCO)	RUSACCO: group collateral
	Kuyu	17%	1 year	
	Fadis	17%	1 year	
	Zeway Dugda	17.5% (MFI) 13% (Farmers Union)	1 year	Savings
SNNP	Arbaminch Zuria	10% (OMO) 7.5-10% (RUSACCO)	2 years (OMO) 3-4 months (RUSACCO)	OMO: service charge, savings (10% of loan) RUSACCO: savings (30-50 Birr/month)
	Boloso Sore	8% (OMO) 12% (RUSACCO)	2 years (OMO) 1 year for on-farm activities and 6 months for off farm activities (RUSACCO)	OMO: savings (10% of loan) and land holding certificate RUSACCO: group collateral, savings
	Sodo Zuria	12% (OMO) 7.5-12% (RUSACCO)	2 years (OMO) 1-3 years (RUSACCO)	OMO: savings and land holding certificate RUSACCO: savings, group collateral
	Loko Abaya	15% (OMO)	18 months for on-farm activities, 12 months for off-farm activities	OMO: savings (10% of loan); land holding certificate; repayment on quarterly basis

Source: 2021 qualitative evaluation, MFI respondents.

We asked MFIs who was involved in decisions about loan approval. The process varies slightly depending on the type of MFI. Generally, KFSTF are responsible for targeting, the DA helps developing business plans and the MFI assesses clients' capacity to repay, decides whether or not to provide the loan and provides training services.

KFSTF targets them for the loan and we assess their capacity and then decide whether to give loan to them or not. DAs play major role in the preparation of business plan and following up the timely provision of the loan. *[AMH-MEK-MFI/ACSI]*

The selection is done by DAs in coordination with our field staff; the 1st prepared client list is reviewed and approved by KFSTF. The final approval is done by farmers union [the loan provider in this case]. After the approval by farmers unions the loan will be released. *[ORO-CHI-MFI]*

#### **8.2.8. Loan repayment**

We asked regional and woreda respondents about loan repayment and how outstanding loans were handled. Loan repayment is a problem in Oromiya and SNNP; repayment is reported to be generally high in Amhara.

We observed that the repayment rate of clients was 25% which showed a very low repayment rate. There are a variety of possible causes for this: animal death, unpredictable prices for agricultural products because prices of agricultural products are increasing from time to time so clients are forced to change or stop their business activities and thus cannot repay their loans timely. Some are misusing or diverting loans to other non-business activities. *[SNN-SOD-WLICU]*

In Omo micro-finance the main challenge is on repayment of loans. This is because when we go down to clients for repayments, we find individuals incapable of paying. *[SNN-SOD-MFI]*

We know that the repayment rate is generally low. It is 50% or less. There are various reasons for this. The household head could suddenly die and it would be difficult for the family to repay the loan. Some took the loan as a grant. Some lost their livestock due to diseases. Other unethically used the loan for personal uses. *[SID-LOK-WLICU]*

Outstanding loans is not an issue in our region. Generally, loan has to be paid back. But as indicated in the PIM, this is governed by the contract between the client and the financial institution. However, the main thing is to educate and make aware the clients. It is also very crucial to make the loan demand driven. Because demand driven loans are repaid better than supply driven loans. *[AMH-RLICU]*

Natural hazards (flooding, droughts) were frequently mentioned as reasons for low repayment.

Weather and climate factor also contributed to weak collection of outstanding loans. The area is vulnerable to drought. There is a drought every other year. *[ORO-FAC-WLICU]*

The difficulty HHs face in paying loan is when they face shocks like locust infestation last year. *[ORO-CHI-MFI]*

Lack of follow up by MFIs and lack of adequate loan recovering procedures were also noted, particularly in Oromiya.

Loan repayment is low. There is weak follow up among institutions responsible for outstanding loans collection. (...) A loan recovery committee was established at woreda and kebele level comprising different institutions/offices. But the committee was not functional. There is weak coordination and lack of ownership among the sectors. *[ORO-RLICU]*

Loan recovery committee established at woreda and kebele levels are not fully committed to collect the outstanding loans. In addition, heads of kebele administration have not taken the assignment of outstanding loan collection seriously. *[ORO-ZEW-WLICU]*

Attitudes towards loans and a sense that nothing happens if PSNP clients do not repay their loans were also highlighted.

The culture of paying loans is poor, therefore, for HHs to commit to their obligation to pay back loans requires tiresome effort, and it isn't easy. [ORO-CHI-WLICU]

There is also less attention by political authorities for loan repayments of the livelihood program as compared to loans for fertilizer. The livelihoods loans are not accorded priority by political leadership. Nothing happens to households that are not repaying loans particularly if the clients are in PSNP. The non-PSNP clients can be taken to court and are made to pay. However, for PSNP clients this is not done. [SNN-BOL-WLICU]

Covid-19 impacted negatively on loan repayment.

Before 2012 the repayment of PSNP client was good and promising but after COVID the woreda experience low repayment and an increase in outstanding loan. This is due to misinformation. PSNP clients were informed by an unknown entity that they should not pay loan in the context of the pandemic. [AMH-LIB-WLICU]

PSNP clients who participated in the “law enforcement operation” in northern Ethiopia (AMH-LIB-MFI) refused to pay their loans.

There were people who took loan from ORDA whose loan was totally made void on the ground that they involve in “law enforcement operation” in northern Ethiopia. There are also PSNP clients who participate in the “operation” who claim their loan should be nullified. Thus, they refuse to repay their loan. We have now 1.3 million outstanding loans provided through PSNP livelihood component in our woreda. We are now making field operation in collecting the outstanding loans, but we do not know whether the regional planning in addressing the problem. [AMH-LIB-WLICU]

#### **8.2.9. Perspectives on access to markets and linkages between Livelihoods Component and value chains**

We asked our regional and woreda respondents whether there had been any focus on strengthening access to markets. In Amhara, training had taken place (though interrupted during the pandemic), but there had been no deliberate effort to strengthening access to market in a more practical way.

We took good training of trainers in marketing in EFY 2012. But we couldn't cascade it to the woredas because of COVID. (...) But we are more production oriented and less considerate to marketing issue. And our marketing and business training to clients is not up to the required standard. For example, in the region we have done a lot in fattening, but this is not linked with abattoirs, hospitals and universities. (...) There is nothing significant we can mention with regard to linking the livelihood planning with the private sector. [AMH-RLICU]

Similarly, in Oromiya, training has taken place but there have been no further efforts to strengthen market linkages.

Different trainings on market linkage, value chain, and awareness creations were provided but there is shortage of budget to strengthen access to market beyond providing training. [ORO-RLICU]

Little effort has been made to strengthen market access to the livelihood supported PSNP clients. Fortunately, the woreda has good market access. It is located in the center of Assela, Adama, Meki, etc. Business people/traders come from every corner to buy the produce. [ORO-ZEW-WLICU]

In Chiro, however, some concrete producer organization and market linkages activities were highlighted.

We have organized milk producers groups in the kebeles found not far from the Chiro town so that they can bring to market in big volume and make whole sale. We also have organized egg producers group for the same purpose. We have linked milk producers with Chiro prison as they have reasonably high daily demand for milk. [ORO-CHI-WLICU]

In Sidama, there have been some unsuccessful attempts to improve market linkages, recently disrupted by political instability.

We tried to form marketing groups, linking buyers and sellers to attain reasonable prices for products supplied by livelihood clients. Nevertheless, this has not been materialized. We tried to introduce selling price of goats calculated per unit of weight but this effort has been interrupted due to political turmoil. [SID-LOK-WLICU]

#### **8.2.10. Linking Public Works with the Livelihoods Component**

We asked woreda and regional LICUs about progress in linking the livelihoods component with public works during planning and implementation. Some respondents reported progress in linking the two. Work to rehabilitate water holes, enclosures and hill sides has been linked to activities in horticulture, bee keeping and animal fattening by livelihood clients. Road works improved access to markets.

There are some efforts to link irrigation development with horticulture for some PSNP households. For example, in irrigation sites and farm plots that are covered with bench terrace constructed with PW labor we distributed lowland fruits for PSNP clients. PSNP livelihood clients are linked to available area closer to get fodder through cut and carry system. [AMH-MEK-WLICU]

For instance, Gare Dimtu hill was rehabilitated by PSNP public work and transferred to the livelihood component. Livelihood clients were given the hill side to engage in fattening and beekeeping to support their livelihoods. In addition, irrigation scheme at Sambaro was constructed by PSNP budget and PWs. And PSNP clients were organized on vegetable production by the irrigation. In addition to engaging in different IGAs, such as fattening and beekeeping, these PSNP clients can harvest sell grass from the enclosed area. [ORO-ZEW-WLICU]

The linkage between livelihood component of the PSNP and PWs is strong. Since 2011 EFY there are many areas that have been enclosed through PWs and livelihood beneficiary

farmers are using grasses through cut and carry. The enclosed areas also created opportunity for the development of beekeeping. There are two PW constructed ponds with 5,000m<sup>3</sup> and 10,000m<sup>3</sup> capacity that provide water for the livestock of the beneficiaries. The roads that have been built through the PWs have created access to markets. *[SNN-BOL-WLICU]*

Some woredas reported problems in managing PWs and coordinating these activities with the livelihood component (Angolela Tera, Kuyu, Fadis, Chiro and Sodo Zurya). For example:

The effort to link public work activities to the livelihoods component were not properly coordinated and implemented. The watershed management activities were done either on communal land or private land. The communal land is property of the whole community and the non-PSNP members of the community were not willing for the PSNP clients to discriminately benefit from the area closure or the watershed. *[ORO-KUY-WLICU]*

One regional LICU questioned whether the livelihood component (with a focus on individual livelihoods) is in line with community asset building objective of PWs.

It has to be noted that at program design level, the primary objective of the PW sub projects is community asset creation and among the nine PW sub-projects some are linkable with livelihood component, and some are not. For example, it is not going to happen if you think to link the social infrastructure construction with the livelihood component. You may not be allowed to use the capital budget to construct household water harvesting structure. These are inherent limitations of the program to link the PW component to livelihood component. *[AMH-RLICU]*

#### **8.2.11. Impact of COVID-19 on the Livelihoods Component**

The Covid-19 pandemic has had varied impact. Most woredas report having received guidance from the zone or regional level on health and safety procedures and changed PSNP plans accordingly.

The COVID protocol advises to strictly abide by the prevention methods at different levels. It includes the use of masks, sanitizers, washing hands as and when necessary, maintain the required spacing between persons, avoid unnecessary gathering, avoid sharing of tools and materials, avoid group works. *[SNN-BOL-WFSTF]*

The impact of implementing these procedures varied across regions and woredas. The regional FSTF in Oromiya handled the pandemic as another humanitarian crisis and followed the usual procedures.

PSNP plans were not changed due to COVID pandemic or any other humanitarian situation. We annually update the plan and it is under this updating process that we have taken some actions including: transferred 2 month transfers in September of this year to all PW participants, and advised woredas to arrange their working plan in a way that COVID transmission was controlled/minimized. *[ORO-RFSTF]*

Yet, impact on PWs and transfer payments were reported at woreda level in Oromiya.



We were forced to change types of the PW to fencing of different structures like health posts, schools, Kebele offices, farmer's schools and DA offices and residents. We were also forced to cut back the regular monitoring we used to conduct on PW sites. *[ORO-FAD-WFSTF]*

Transfers have slowed down due to the pandemic. This was because of the requirement to limit number of people collecting their transfers in one day and at one place, as a result payment were delayed, though not for long. *[ORO-ZEW-WFSTF]*

In SNNP, impacts were also noticeable in PW activities and transfer payments. Retargeting was also affected.

The COVID crisis has resulted in the suspension of those activities that required bigger groups such as school construction, and digging of ponds. Clients were made to work around their dwellings or their villages and in general focus was given to activities that require small groups involving 5 or less individuals. This resulted in under accomplishment of construction activities. *[SNN-RFSTF]*

There were changes in terms of number of people on group formation for PWs following COVID. This change was related to bring distancing. Groups that were requiring 5 to 6 people were reduced to 2. For instance, trench construction activities that were requiring a group of 3 people were reduced to one person. This brought increase in total number of person days. *[SNN-SOD-WFSTF]*

We were forced to postpone the EFY2012 retargeting. It has created delays in transfer payments. *[SNN-BOL-WFSTF]*

In Mekdela, supervision budgets were used to buy masks, sanitizer and soap to PW participants and when collecting their transfer.

Other emergency situations (diarrhea outbreak, locust infestations and droughts) were also highlighted for SNNP and Amhara as having disrupted PW activities and led to underperformance.

Diarrhea occurred partially in Konso, Gofa and South Omo and the PSNP budgets were shifted to development of water projects. In many of these places there was also locust problem. The combination of these resulted in low performance of activities. *[SNN-RFSTF]*

Due to the recurrent drought in the past three years we have changed our focus on PW activities and allocation of capital budget. In terms of PW our focus shifted to soil and water conservation as well as afforestation. As to capital budget we shifted more to maximize the use of our woreda water potential through small scale irrigation, water harvesting and construction of masonry dam. *[AMH-MEK-WFSTF]*

One MFI respondent noted that the loan maturity period for PSNP clients was extended from 1 to 2 years because of the locust infestation in Chiro (ORO-CHI-MFI).

#### **8.2.12. Impact of conflict on the Livelihoods Component**

Conflict and instability affected the implementation of the livelihood component in all regions. Support activities could not be carried out in some localities and there were impacts on savings and loan repayments.

We have experienced conflict in our woreda as the people of the region was demanding autonomy and as result the situation created chaos in different parts of the region which aggravated also unstable situation in our woreda. This had an impact on carrying out livelihood support activities in our woreda. We stopped delivering the livelihood support activities as mobility of people from place to place almost stopped for some time. There were no adjustments made to support livelihood clients in our woreda because there was no earmarked budget for that. *[SNN-LOK-WLICU]*

We have suffered from the uprising happened in Sodo township last year, in EFY2012. Our office and office furniture burnt down into ash. Our computers, paper files, were among vital resources we lost in fire blaze. All information related to livelihood had been burnt. Of course, we are now in the rehabilitated office and we got computers from other offices. *[SNN-SOD-WLICU]*

We were forced to suspend monitoring trips to kebeles because of the unrest during the last two years because roads were blocked by Qerroo (politically activated youth). This resulted in a rescheduling of fieldwork plan. *[ORO-CHI-WLICU]*

Conflict affected those woredas bordering Tigray Region in Semen Gonder and Waghimra Zones. Oromiya Special Nationality Zone is also a major conflict affected area. We are not able to give support to the woredas in this area. Western Amhara was relatively peaceful. But hosting IDP is a serious issue in western Amhara. Because the host family shares what it has, it affects their prospect to graduate. *[AMH-RFSTF]*

The conflict in Wolayta area impacted loan repayment. Our movements were being challenged by community members and we were accused about our efforts for loan repayments while individuals from the community were confronted for death. *[SNN-BOL-MFI]*

### **8.3. Kebele perspectives on Livelihoods Component implementation**

#### **8.3.1. Implementation progress of Livelihoods Component**

We asked kebele respondents (KFSTFs and DAs) to assess implementation of the livelihood component since Hamle 2010. Where performance is described as positive, this is mainly related to animal rearing activities.

Implementation is generally good, after they were selected, we have organized them in groups, provided them with trainings, then they received the LH transfers, some bought sheep and some goats and few oxen for fattening. We visit these HHs regularly and advise them on how to improve their handling of the animals. *[ORO-KUY-DA]*

Some livelihood clients have made great progress. They have created assets in the form of buying oxen for ploughing, caw and improved their houses by building new houses with iron sheet cover instead of grass. There are households that are engaged in vegetable production, milk production, egg production. For these groups, market linkages were established with traders and consumers in Chiro town. *[ORO-CHI-DA]*

Implementation of the livelihood pathways in our kebele is not satisfactory. Clients are not interested in taking loans. We have tried our level best to make awareness about the benefit of taking loans and being involved in business that benefit them most. There are few individuals who take loan and involve in sheep/goat fattening, ox fattening and poultry. In terms of off farm and employment nothing has been done since there are no market opportunities to get involved in off farm activities. As to wage employment there are no industries that are near to the kebele and we cannot make linkages. *[AMH-ANG-DA]*

I witnessed that almost all livelihood clients are engaged in the on-farm pathway except for one person who is doing petty trade. The on-farm clients are exclusively carrying out livestock fattening activities. The off-farm and wage employment pathways of the livelihood support component are almost non-existent in our kebele. Therefore, it is possible to say that the implementation of the livelihoods support component is not successful. *[SNN-ARB-DA]*

There were some limited experiences with trading activities reported in SNNP.

In the past two years on-farm pathway was the main livelihood support that attracted 30 clients. 12 clients were engaged in off-farm petty trade activities, including butter and coffee trading activities. *[SNN-BOL-DA]*

### **8.3.2. Challenges implementing the Livelihoods Component**

We asked KFSTF respondents and DAs what they thought the main challenges in PSNP implementation were. Apart from delays in paying livelihood transfers (this is discussed separately in the Livelihoods Transfer Report), small quotas and limited resources for the livelihood component remain important challenges, a pattern also noted in the 2018 mid-term evaluation. These challenges exacerbated the difficulties encountered with implementing Public Works

There was no budget for tools, seedlings and maintenance of FTC. There was shortage of finance available for credit to implement LH support. *[ORO-KUY-KFSTF]*

The challenges that we face are the delay of transfer, recurrent droughts in the past three years. *[AMH-MEK-KFSTF]*

Sometimes PW clients refuse to participate in PW activities. For example, the daily market rate is 200 – 300 Birr a day, while PW participants rate is much less that, it is 285 Birr for 5 days work (57 Birr/day). *[ORO-FAD-KFSTF]*

Payment rate for PW was below local market rate. Public work participating household, for instance with family size of 3, works for 15 days in a month and receives Birr 195 in a month but if he works on daily labor he gets 150 to 200 Birr per day although not on a

regular basis. In other words, if he works on daily labor for 3 – 5 days will get the amount of money he would get by working on PW for 15 days. *[ORO-CHI-KFSTF]*

Another challenge regarding Public Works relating to the inclusion of clients who should be receiving Permanent Direct Support.

The attitude towards and the mismanagement of PW labour is a challenge. There are clients that are wrongly classified as PW clients while they should be targeted as DS. This people can't properly perform the PW they are given. This is a challenge as it undermines the real available PW PD and thereby the achievements of the PW component. *[AMH-MEK-DA]*

A KFSTF respondent also noted difficulties in managing the problem of absenteeism in PWs in a context of political unrest.

There was reluctance by PW participants because there was no punishment for absentees. As the number of absentees was increasing the KFSTF conducted meeting and discussions with PW participants and a decision was made to penalize (to fine Birr 100) absentees. However, this was not successful because there was objection from the Woreda as it was perceived as adding fuel to the existing instability. Hence, PW participants were being paid without delivering what they were supposed to deliver. *[ORO-CHI-KFSTF]*

Challenges related to loan taking for livelihood activities were mentioned. In Angolela Tera, respondents noted:

The challenges we faced is that PSNP PW clients are less motivated to engage with livelihood support and only depend on the transfer. *[AMH-ANG-DA]*

Negative attitude towards loans affected the livelihood component. *[AMH-ANG-KFSTF]*

Attitudes towards lending vary across kebeles. Some respondents report that PSNP clients have been showing greater interest in loan taking, whereas others note lack of motivation and fear.

PSNP PW clients in this kebele are not that much interested in taking up loans and get involved in some other business that would change their lives. They are less motivated and fear taking up loans. They just expect the transfer only. There are only a few individuals who take loan and get involved in ox fattening and poultry. But, in general, we can say much have been done in this regard since the PW clients are not interested to take loan. *[AMH-ANG-DA]*

Previously people were afraid to take loan and engage in livelihood activities. But now they have changed their attitude and apply for and take loans for livelihood activities. This is good change that should be encouraged. *[AMH-LIB-KFSTF]*

### **8.3.3. Client selection for livelihood support**

The Community Food Security Task Force (CFSTF) is responsible for identifying program clients. It also participates in mobilizing communities for participatory planning for public works and

livelihoods activities. DAs play a facilitating role in PSNP4 implementation and are members of the CFSTF and KFSTF. They support the process of client identification and selection.

We asked the DAs which categories of households had been prioritized to receive livelihood support and how livelihoods households had been selected. Amongst the poorest, selected households were those who did not have outstanding loans and were perceived as having the ability to engage in livelihood activities:

The households selected for the livelihood support are households that are PSNP clients, free from outstanding loan, have the capacity to succeed in livelihood activities, are interested in engaging in livelihood activities and have good/have not bad track record in loan repayment. The process is sensitization, registration, task force approval, business plan preparation, technical training, financial and business training, then finally loan provision. (...) The livelihood support targeting is done with the CFSTF and KFSTF. *[AMH-MEK-DA]*

Focus is on the poorest of the poor and those who are PSNP beneficiaries. We do not include the drunk people who cannot make saving and would not pay back their loans. We prioritize those individuals who can make change through work. The selection is done by KFSTF and DA. This approach is under implementation every year since EFY 2010. *[SNN-SOD-DA]*

We conducted first our assessment in the kebele to get a clue about the prospective clients. We carried out general consultations with the prospective clients. The criteria set for the selection livelihood clients are that they have to be PSNP clients, physically strong and healthy to carry out the activities, and they need to have the willingness and motivation to take part in business activities. *[SNN-BOL-DA]*

In some kebeles, DAs note that there has been reluctance to take up loans to initiate livelihoods activities and selection of clients is largely based on expressed interest. KFSTF respondents corroborated this.

Since the demand in this kebele is low/PW client are not interested to take loan, selection is based on the individual initiation and interest that we provide the livelihood support. So far there is no off farm and employment initiation and implementation in this kebele. *[AMH-ANG-DA]*

The selection of households to receive livelihood support is based on the willingness of individuals to save in RUSSACO. The KFSTF also appraises the behaviour of individuals. *[SNN-BOL-KFSTF]*

PSNP clients who need livelihood support are selected based on their interest and wealth status. *[ORO-FAD-KFSTF]*

Some DAs reported not having active PSNP livelihood activities in the kebele (Libo Kemkem, Fadis, Chiro and Loko Abaya); another was unfamiliar with the process, which may be illustrative of the high turn-over challenge affecting the program.

We also asked MFIs about client selection, and they emphasized criteria such as ownership of a savings account and collateral for loans.

We (OMO) have given the loans to PSNP clients who have no outstanding debt. They are expected to have a land holding certificate which serves as collateral. *[SID-LOK-MFI]*

ACSI: [We select] households and their family members who can provide a guaranty/collateral for the household. In both cases they have to be able bodied to do the livelihood activity. COOP: [We select] clients that are members of the RUSACCOs. PSNP client family members should have RUSACCO membership to be eligible for loan. *[AMH-MEK-MFI]*

#### **8.3.4. Group formation**

The PIM defines the following sequence of technical support to be provided to PSNP clients: group formation, financial literacy and savings promotion, client consultation for livelihood selection, training, business plan preparation and finance approval and referral, and follow-up support. We asked DAs whether they had formed households into livelihood groups, and how this had been done (by gender or mixed, based on geography or on chosen livelihood pathway). In two kebeles surveyed no groups had yet been formed (Arbaminch Zuria, Loko Abaya) and lack of training was noted in one instance (SID-LOK-DA). In another two kebeles, group formation had been attempted but not succeeded.

We have tried to organize them in groups but could not materialize. We did give the support to individual clients. *[SNN-BOL-DA]*

They were organized in group at the beginning on the basis of proximity, at the time when the transfer was given. But now, the groups are very weak and, in some cases, not working. The clients are working individually. *[ORO-CHI-DA]*

Where groups were in place, they had been formed based largely on geographical proximity.

The categorization is based on “gote” (sub-kebele). The clients who are supported engage in various livelihood activities, some on poultry, some on sheep/goat/oxen fattening. We did not categorize them by livelihood group or sex. *[AMH-ANG-DA]*

Yes, we have formed livelihood households into groups. The groups were formed by zone/villages, according to proximity. Men and women were organized together not separately. *[ORO-KUY-DA]*

Yes, we organize into livelihood groups. Each group comprises 6 to 7 members. They form groups on chosen livelihood such as groups for those who have bought male sheep, female sheep, etc. Location is also taken into account so as to make them meet frequently. Regarding mix of men and women, in embroidery, cotton works, etc., usually only women groups are formed while in sheep and other activities both men and women can be part of one group. It is mainly based on experiences and skills. *[SNN-SOD-DA]*

Where groups existed, we asked DAs whether they found these useful for the provision of training and technical assistance. DAs agreed they were useful not only for effective provision of support but also for developing trust and stimulating mutual help between group members.

The supervision, technical support is extended by “gote” (sub-kebele). But when there is training we provide them by calling them to centre the kebele as they live in a scattered manner. A “gote” level categorization is helpful because we get people who are involved in different livelihood support activities and provide them technical and supervision support on a timely manner. [AMH-ANG-DA]

Yes, very much helpful for organizing trainings, sharing of information and for provision of technical support. In addition, the grouping helped/initiated the households themselves to support each other. They also easily share resources including money because working in one group helped them to know each other better and develop trust. If anything occurs in one livelihood household, the incident is reported faster by one of the group members as the problem is considered affecting common interest of the group. [ORO-KUY-DA]

### **8.3.5. Technical support to livelihood clients**

We asked the DAs whether they had provided livelihood technical support to PSNP participants or graduates, and, if so, what kind of support. DAs provide advice on how to set up their activities as well as help in preparation of business plans and financial literacy. Follow up visits are also mentioned.

For those who take loans and get involved in sheep /goat/oxen fattening and poultry production, we provide advice on the proper way of feeding, how to prepare feeding structures (gergem) to reduce wastage of feed, not to use fattened oxen for farming. We give advice and technical support to prepare poultry houses. Before they take the loan, we raise awareness about how to use it appropriately, we prepare the business plan based on the type of business they want to engage. We closely make follow up visits home to home and we meet them when they come to the kebele centre for other purpose. The business plan is mostly done by the head of kebele agricultural office. [AMH-ANG-DA]

Livelihood households received trainings starting with financial literacy training, saving and credit awareness raising, organized in groups, technical training, prepared business plan with the help of DAs and the woreda livelihood team. After the livelihood households received transfers, our livestock experts helped them to select and buy goats and sheep that were good for fattening and rearing. Our livestock expert (DA) visits these households and advises them on the areas that need improvement. [ORO-KUY-DA]

Yes, we select individuals, form groups and send them for technical support. The training body provides training such as on business plan preparation and others. The woreda government requests us to send youth groups when training is organized for the youth. Then we send the groups with support letter. The business plans are prepared by the Youth Affairs office and Cooperative Promotion. Follow up support is conducted by DAs after the loans. The follow up is about what has been done by the loan, where it is, and what changes attained. The follow up is done as per the format from woreda Food Security desk. [SNN-SOD-DA]

When asked what type of support they found most useful, DAs emphasized credit awareness, business planning and follow up assistance.

Advising the clients to take loan and use it for the intended purpose and close supervision and follow up is the most useful support. It is because if the clients are not advised well on how to use the resource they got, and have not been supported technically with close supervision, they will use the loan for some other needs. [AMH-ANG-DA]

Business planning is very important. It is a key to the business. It gives livelihood households a chance and experience to plan properly and logically. The business plans are ideas that were generated by the clients themselves not from outside. So they reflect people's priorities, needs and are within their capacities. [ORO-CHI-DA]

I think the follow-up stage of the livelihood checklist is the most useful to clients because it always gives insights on how things can be improved through technical support and learning process. [SNN-BOL-DA]

The support is useful in that they were able to build home for the chickens and roosters that protected them taken by wild animals. The feed structures for the oxen reduced wastage of feed. The business plan and the follow up helped them to use the loan to the intended purpose. In this way we believe the technical support helped and was useful to the clients. [AMH-ANG-DA]

We also asked the DAs about the frequency of their visits to livelihood clients. Their responses suggest the frequency of their visits varies considerably and tend to be more frequent around the time of loan provision. Reported frequency varies between one a week to once in 3 months.

It depends on the condition. But most commonly we visit them once a month. We also visit some clients fortnightly especially immediately after the credit provision and until they make the animal purchase. [AMH-MEK-DA]

We make home to home visit in every three days a month and on average 30 days per years. The frequency of the visit depends on the accessibility of the area where the clients live in. [AMH-ANG-DA]

We visit livelihood clients about once per week from loan receipts up to changes are attained. This is about 4 times per month. [SNN-SOD-DA]

The visit by the DA depends on the request of the households but on average a livelihood household is visited at least once in 3 months. However, other DAs monitor performance of livelihood households more regularly at least one a month. In addition, whenever LH and livestock experts come for a visit to the Kebele, LH households are the primary targets for a visit; this could be every 6 or 7 months. [ORO-KUY-DA]

### **8.3.6. Business plans**

We asked DAs about business plans and whether they thought these were useful. With the exception of Zeway Dugda, where the DA was not sufficiently informed, and Loko Abaya, where no livelihood technical support had been provided to PSNP participants, all DAs perceived that business plans were useful.

Yes, business plans are useful because the plan specifically state the necessary inputs in which the business activity demands, the amount of the resource needed and the skills



the client need to have in handling the business and be successful. It is implemented in such a way that it could bring the intended result to the clients. It is useful also to make supervision and follow up accordingly. *[AMH-ANG-DA]*

Yes, I do believe business plans are very useful. They help livelihood clients to decide their priorities with respect to their needs and capacities. Once they are clear with these basic areas, they would work hard to make their business profitable as much as possible provided the required technical support is given from the DA. *[SMM-ARB-DA]*

### **8.3.7. Alignment between technical support and credit provision**

We asked KFSTF respondents whether livelihoods clients in their kebele were receiving the combination of both technical support (e.g. business plan preparation) and micro-finance services (credit). Some accounts indicated that the correct sequence of activities was being implemented.

The 13 livelihood clients in the kebele have received training on how to get profitable in business, saving, and how to fatten animals. All the 13 clients have received 13,000 Birr each on loan. They got loan in EFY 2012. *[SNN-ARB-KFSTF]*

Yes, livelihood clients are receiving both technical support and credit service. Targeted livelihood clients will be provided with a menu of livelihood options/ livelihood packages among which they select that best suits them. Then they will be provided relevant technical training. Then business plan is prepared, reviewed and approved upon which the livelihood support/loan is approved. Then they will be assisted to purchase the right animal. After all this, periodical (fortnightly) and routine technical support and supervision is conducted. *[AMH-ANG-KFSTF]*

Yet, in other cases technical support and business plan development is not followed by credit provision due to lack or misuse of funds.

There are some individuals who got support in terms of business plan preparation but practically they were not materialized. This was due to lack of funds to provide loans in the desired amounts as per the business plans. Out of the 30 livelihood clients who begun saving only 10 of them received loans the total amount of which was 5,200 Birr. *[SNN-BOL-KFSTF]*

Clients in our kebele received technical support properly. However, micro-finance agents are making fraud to the clients such as failure to deposit their savings in their account. Instead, they spend the money for personal use and you don't see the saving deposit in their book. *[SNN-SOD-KFSTF]*

One DA noted:

Yes, I have tried even selected and prioritized households according to their readiness. But they hadn't accessed the loan I have anticipated. Accessing finance is the most challenging part in the implementation of the livelihoods program. *[ORO-FAD-DA]*

### **8.3.8. Role of DAs in supporting access to credit**

We asked about the role of DAs in helping households to access credit. DAs play a central role in the process, performing a range of tasks that enable access to credit.

DAs are the main actors in the whole process. They do all the sensitization work first. Then they target the appropriate ones, they train, prepare the business plan, they link the client with the financial institution, do the follow up after the loan is provided. One DA is supposed to serve 50 clients. [AMH-LIB-WLICU]

DAs play big role in implementation of livelihood component of PSNP. They create demand through consultation, advise clients on the feasibility of the business options, prepare business plans, and provide technical training on the selected IGAs. Based on the prepared business plan, they refer clients to the woreda livelihood section. They facilitate saving with ASCI satellite workers and make follow up for the client to get credit. [AMH-LIB-WLICU]

Performance of this key role is challenged by high staff turnover.

We know that DAs involvement in the livelihood support is crucial to make the businesses profitable. However, this crucial input is challenged by high turnover rate of DAs and it requires additional training for the newcomers. [SID-LOK-WLICU]

We know that DAs are engaged in several activities and they are not helping the households as expected. This situation has been aggravated by high DA and staff turnover and therefore the support given by the DAs in helping households to access credits has been limited. [SNN-SOD-WLICU]

We also asked about other kebele officials involved in this process and supporting DAs. While DAs provide technical support to clients, it is the KFSTF that approves business plans.

After the provision of training to the clients, DAs prepare individual client business plan sitting with the clients. Then, the individual business plans are appraised by KFSTF through facilitation of the DA. Then, after approval by the KFSTF the business plan is sent to the woreda. The DA makes follow up on approval of the loan from the woreda. Finally, when the client receives the loan from MFI the DA and woreda provide about 30 minutes orientation to the client. [SNN-ARB-WLICU]

### **8.3.9. Support to off-farm/wage employment pathways**

One-stop service centres in rural towns are supposed to bring together representatives from REMSEDA, TVET and MFIs. These services centres provide referrals for technical training by TVETs and support the development of group and individual business plans/enterprise development/access to credit for the development of micro and small enterprises. They also register the unemployed and refer them to existing job opportunities. We asked DAs whether they had had any contact with the closest one-stop service centres and/or TVET to facilitate

livelihoods clients' participation in the off-farm or wage employment pathways. No DA reported contact with these service providers, and some were not even aware of their existence.

No, I didn't have any contact with any one-stop service centre. There are no such institutions in the kebele. Employment and off-farm pathways are not our options due to the location of the kebele and types of resources we have. *[ORO-FAD-DA]*

We haven't had one stop-service centre neither in our kebele nor in the woreda centre. We didn't get TVET support to off-farm and employment pathways. The clients in the off-farm didn't get any business related training but we tried to fill this gap during the follow-up stage. *[SNN-BOL-DA]*

### **8.3.10. Impact of COVID-19 on the Livelihoods Component**

Perceptions about the impact of Covid-19 on the livelihood component vary across respondents. KFSFS and DAs tend to report little impact whereas MFI highlight significant disruptions. Only two KFSTF respondents noted that lockdown measures and the closure of markets affected access to animal fodder and trading activities in their respective kebeles (in Angolela Tera and Mekdela woredas).

The market was totally lockdown. People were not able to access inputs like foddors, which are essential for fattening, and were forced to sell their animals at low price locally. Those who were involved in off farm activities like selling tea, coffee, and bread, were also severely affected. They were forced to close their business for at least one month. The combination of Covid-19 and drought really affected negatively the performance of livelihood component of PSNP. *[AMH-MEK-KFSTF]*

During the first months of Covid, markets were closed, so clients who fattened animals were unable to sell in the market and those who managed to sell were forced to sell at a lower price. Moreover, newly targeted clients that were trained, developed forage and were ready to take credit were disrupted due to the Covid. So they felt discouraged. *[AMH-ANG-KFSTF]*

The remaining KFSTF respondents, in kebeles with ongoing livelihood supported, reported no disruptions caused by the pandemic.

No PSNP LH components/activities were not disrupted or interrupted due to the COVID pandemic. There are no specific challenges as a result of the COVID-19 that has disrupted implementation of the livelihoods component of the PSNP. *[ORO-FAD-KFSTF]*

We feel that Covid had no major impact on the livelihood component of the PSNP in the kebele, though indirectly there were unfavorable market situations and movement restrictions. *[SNN-BOL-KFSTF]*

We asked DAs whether, in the context of Covid, they had changed plans to support livelihoods in the kebele, including plans to use the livelihoods budget. DAs reported no changes, even in kebeles where disruptions had been noted by KFSTFs. However, one DA noted some interruptions

to targeting work and extensions to loan repayment period, contradicting the perspective by KFSTF above.

In EFY 2012, when we were preparing for targeting livelihood clients, Covid-19 pandemic disrupted our plan a little bit. Markets were not functioning properly and therefore negatively impacted our activities. Therefore, loan repayment period was extended due to this problem. Clients could not take credit timely. There was no livelihoods budget that requires adjustment or postponement to other time. *[SNN-BOL-DA]*

By contrast, MFIs confirmed the negative impact of the pandemic on business activities and transport costs, which in turn affected savings and loan repayments. Some MFIs extended repayment periods as a result.

ACSI: After COVID, because of the information through the mainstream media about loan reliefs provided by the formal banks for the big businesses is misunderstood by the farmers. So, they expected to get loan relief so they stopped to pay their loan specially in two kebeles of the Woreda. This affected loan repayment. But it had no effect on loan disbursement. COOP: Because of COVID the market was closed, so farmers were not able to sell their animals. So, we were forced to give them one additional year to repay their loan (the principal by paying only the interest). *[ANG-MEK-MFI]*

For ACSI COVID affected saving and loan repayment, client took out their saving because of the lockdown and other take Covid as an excuse not to pay their loans. Before Covid we have less outstanding loan but after Covid it increased to the extent that it promoted the culture of not repaying. Similarly, it affected RUSACCOs to the extent that some clients withdrew themselves from membership by taking what they saved. *[ANG-LIB-MFI]*

The COVID pandemic created obstacles in the collection of repayments because markets were closed and clients could not sell their produce. Mobilization of savings was difficult because people could not come to our branch because of the social distancing and restrictions on public gatherings, and our community development workers could not attend different social gatherings and events for savings mobilization. Loan repayment declined from 97% to 92%. *[ORO-KUY-MFI]*

The saving and loan repayment have been negatively affected. The reason for this is the decreased market opportunities. For instance, the market for ox fattening decreased. Savings and loan repayments significantly decreased. These resulted from the impacts of both COVID 19 and flooding in the area. (...) COVID has also increased costs of transport particularly for passengers because of distancing of the passengers' seats. Farmers were not willing to pay such increment. They have low paying capacity. This resulted in lower market access that negatively affected saving and loan repayment. *[SNN-ARB-MFI]*

The pandemic also disrupted Public Works activities.

This time last year, we suspended PW activities for 2 months due to COVID; we also had to change to new types of activities like fencing of public structures that do not require many people working together. These have lowered the overall implementation performance of PW activities. *[ORO-FAD-DA]*

In our kebele the implementation of public works lagged a little bit behind the plan particularly in EFY 2012 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. This was because PW clients were expected to carry out their activities as per the Covid protocol and therefore negatively impacted the outcome of the PW. In terms of quality of PW, however, we attained good results. *[SNN-ARB-DA]*

#### **8.3.11. Impact of political instability on the Livelihoods Component**

We asked KFSTF and DA respondents whether and how conflict had affected PSNP programming to support livelihoods in the kebele. We also asked whether any adjustments were made in support provided to clients affected.

Respondents were unanimous in reporting no disruption to PSNP programming or adjustments to support given to clients, in response to these questions. Yet, the impact of political instability came up in relation to PWs, particularly noticeable in Oromiya.

There was political instability in the last three years, particularly, in 2011 and 2012. Hence, the PW activities were not carried out as planned. *[ORO-CHI-KFSTF]*

We have tried to accomplish PW plans but due to the Covid and, and sometimes when the road from Addis to Harar is blocked by Qeerroo, PW participants in Kebele along the road get nervous and abandon the work and go home. *[ORO-CHI-DA]*

In the last 2 years there is reluctance by PW participants to participate on PW activities, this is a reflection of participants to the political unrest in the country. *[ORO-KUY-DA]*

Natural disasters were also mentioned as a source of disruption to PW activities.

There was lengthy rain in 2012 and crops were damaged in many places. The remaining crops were also damaged by locust. Therefore, the PW participants were forced to seek for daily labor and feed their households to survive (as they were in a desperate situation). Hence, PW clients were not willing to attend the PW activities. Therefore, it was also too difficult to smoothly implement the PW. *[ORO-CHI-KFSTF]*

### **8.4. Uptake of the PSNP Livelihoods Component: Perspectives from household data**

We begin by presenting descriptive results on awareness and take-up of the Livelihoods Component. Our sample is PSNP Clients in Amhara, Oromiya and SNNP. For the purposes of this analysis, a PSNP client is a household that received at least one PSNP payment between Tir 2011 EC and Tahisas 2012 EC. For this time period, there are 2,278 households considered PSNP clients. We use this definition because it most closely matches the recall period for the Livelihoods Component found in the household survey. Note that this recall period is pre-Covid 19.<sup>30</sup> Results are shown in Table 8.4. Only nine percent of the 2,278 PSNP clients in our sample are aware of the Livelihoods Component; this percentage Only nine is highest in Oromiya (13 percent) and

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<sup>30</sup> If we define client status based on receipt of any PSNP transfers between Tir 2012 EC and Tahisas 2013 EC, we obtain near identical results.

lowest in SNNP (7 percent). Only 5 percent of these have joined the livelihood component since Tir 2011 EC. Percentages for participation in specific livelihood activities (selecting a livelihood activity, receiving training) are even smaller, typically around two percent of the full sample.

Selection and options regarding new livelihood pathways are discussed in meetings to encourage households to join. We asked households if, since Tir 2011 EC, they had attended a meeting where the new livelihood options were discussed. Only four percent (91 out of 2278) of PSNP clients reported that they had participated in such meetings. Just two percent reported receiving either technical training or business management training and only three percent had been referred to a microfinance institution or received loans.

**Table 8.4: Share (%) of PSNP clients participating in livelihoods activities**

Regions	Amhara	Oromiya	SNNP	Total
	Percent			
Have you heard about the new PSNP livelihoods activities since Tir 2011 EC?	8	13	7	9
Have you joined the PSNP livelihoods group since Tir 2011 EC?	5	6	6	5
Since Tir 2011, have you attended a meeting where new livelihood options are discussed?	4	4	4	4
Since you joined the livelihoods component, have you started saving (yes=1)	7	7	8	7
Have you selected a livelihoods or income generating activity for your livelihood checklist?	2	2	1	1
Have you received technical training in your selected livelihood	2	2	3	2
Have you received business skills or business management training in your livelihood since	2	2	2	2
Have you been at least once referred by the DA to financial institutions?	5	3	2	3
Have you completed your livelihoods checklist?	2	2	2	2
Since Tir 2011 EC, have you received a loan from a financial institution?	5	2	2	3

Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data

Of the 31 PSNP clients (out of 2,278 or 1.4 percent) that indicated that they had chosen a livelihood pathways, 81 percent stated that they had chosen an on-farm pathway, 16 percent an off-farm pathway and three percent chose wage employment. These percentages are consistent with the qualitative data presented in previous sections.

We were concerned that some respondents might have participated in livelihoods training without realizing that it was part of the livelihoods component of the PSNP. If this was the case, then Table 8.4 might be understating the amount of training that was taking place. For this reason, we asked a more general question to PSNP clients about whether they had received any financial training, or they have been involved in a livelihood group meeting that discussed aspects of financial literacy. Even with this broader definition, training prevalence remain low (Table 8.5).

**Table 8.5: Share of PSNP clients reporting receiving financial literacy training on, or been in a livelihoods group meeting that discussed, the following topics at least once since Tir 2011, by region and type of training**

	Amhara	Oromiya	SNNP	Total
	Percent			
Cash and financial management	4	6	5	5
Financial planning and budgeting	3	5	4	4
Savings – the importance of savings, and how to save	10	7	8	8
Understanding credit	9	7	5	7
Calculating profits	5	6	3	5
Risk management and insurance	8	7	4	6

Source: PSNP4 end-line household survey data. Sample size is 2,278

An important milestone for households to access loans and start off with their business plans is the ability to save regularly with a VLSA, RUSSACO or MFI. Table 8.4 tells us that few households (seven percent) have been able to do so since Tir 2011. Among those households that did begin saving after that date (164 households out of the sample of 2,278 PSNP clients), the mean level of accumulated savings was 599 Birr (Table 8.6). However, this figure is distorted by a very small number of households with high accumulated savings. Using the median, accumulated savings average 250 Birr with relatively little variation across regions. These household level average savings fall within the range of saving rates (roughly between birr 360 – 600) reported in the qualitative interviews.

**Table 8.6: Accumulated savings at VSLA, RUSACO, or MFI, PSNP clients who report they have started saving**

	Accumulated Savings (Birr)		Sample Size
	Mean	Median	
Amhara	691	325	64
Oromiya	529	250	43
SNNP	549	200	57
Total	599	250	164

Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data

Why are households unable to save with financial institutions? When we asked PSNP clients this question, the overwhelming majority (83 percent) stated “I did not have anything to save” (Table 8.7) with little variation across regions. A much smaller fraction (seven percent) stated that they lack access to financial institutions.



**Table 8.7: Reasons for not starting to save in financial institutions**

If you have not started saving, why?	Amhara	Oromiya	SNNP	Total
I did not have anything to save	82	83	85	83
No VSLA, RUSACO, or MFI was available nearby	7	9	6	7
I do not trust any of these financial institutions	2	2	5	3
I was not interested in the saving idea	4	2	1	2
I prefer to save at home, with friends, etc	2	1	1	1
Other reasons (not specified)	4	3	3	3

Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data

Next, we consider access to credit. We wondered if some respondents would not link their access to credit to the Livelihoods Component. If this was the case, then Table 8.4 might be understating credit take-up. It is also possible that some clients were not following the sequence of Livelihood activities described in the PIM; for example, seeking (and possibly obtaining) loans without undergoing the specified training. For both reasons, we asked a more general question (“Have you taken out a loan for productive – income generation – purposes in the last 12 months?”) to both PSNP clients and non-PSNP households. Results are shown in Table 8.8. Even using this broader question addressed to all PSNP client households, only 5.2 percent reported taking out a loan for productive purposes in the previous 12 months. Among non-PSNP clients, 5.3 percent did so – there is no evidence that PSNP clients were more or less likely to take out loans for productive purposes. Further, apart from Amhara, there is no evidence that a DA was more likely to assist in a household getting a loan if that household was a PSNP client.

**Table 8.8: Share of households that report taking out a loan for productive (income generating) purposes in the last 12 months, by PSNP client status and region**

	Amhara	Oromiya	SNNP	All regions
	Percent			
Did you take out a loan (% reporting yes)				
PSNP clients	7.2	3.6	4.2	5.2
Non-PSNP households	5.0	5.6	5.3	5.3
Did a DA assist you in obtaining this loan (% reporting yes)				
PSNP clients	11.0	2.5	3.2	7.2
Non-PSNP households	6.0	2.8	3.6	5.8

Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data

We also asked about the source of these loans. With the important caveat that few households take out loans (see Table 8.8 above). RUSACCOs account for 24 percent, MFIs for 20 percent, friends/neighbors for 16 percent, and relatives for 14 percent of loans obtained. There are no differences by region and no differences by PSNP/non-PSNP status.

Why is loan take-up so low by PSNP clients? There are myriad reasons. We highlight the following. First, about a third simply say that they do not want to take out a loan. Among these households, some simply do not like the idea of going into debt, others are worried that they cannot repay

and a significant fraction (28 percent) of those who do not want a loan perceive that there are no profitable activities available to them that would justify going into debt. Second, about 45 percent of PSNP clients who apply for loans are turned down while another 18 percent experience delays in receiving loans. We do not know the reasons why these loan requests are turned down, but we do know that being a customer of the financial institution is often a prerequisite for getting a loan and that few PSNP clients are able to make regular deposits into these institutions. Third, relatively few (13 percent) report that a financial institution is unavailable.

We end by noting three additional findings. First, large percentages of both PSNP and non-PSNP households report having difficulties repaying existing loans (Table 8.9).<sup>31</sup>

**Table 8.9: Share of households that currently have a loan and report difficulties in making repayments, by PSNP client status and region**

	Amhara	Oromiya	SNNP	All regions
	Percent			
PSNP clients	59	37	89	63
Non-PSNP households	58	61	73	65

Source: PSNP4 endline household survey data

Second, both PSNP and non-PSNP households report similar reasons for these difficulties. Poor harvests are the main problem (reported by 54 percent of PSNP clients and 60 percent of non-PSNP households; relatedly, 8 percent of PSNP clients and 16 percent of non-PSNP households report that poor crop prices led to difficulties in making repayments. Delays in receiving PSNP transfers were reported as the reason for repayment problems in 13 percent of PSNP households.

Lastly, the PIM instructs DAs to follow up with a livelihood client once a loan or a livelihood transfer is awarded to a business plan to: (i) make sure resources are used as planned; and (ii) provide timely technical assistance to the business plan. We asked households how often they have met with a DA since receiving the credit or the livelihood transfer. Only 41 households (out of a sample of 2,278 PSNP clients) reported that they had met with a DA after receiving either a loan related to the Livelihoods Component or Livelihoods Transfer; 70 percent reported meeting a DA either once a month or every two weeks.

## 8.5. Summary

In this chapter, we have assessed progress towards the successful implementation of the Livelihoods Component of PSNP4. The single most important finding is that very few PSNP clients, one percent, have adopted a livelihood activity.

Of the three pathways, the on-farm pathway (crops and animal fattening) is the one most fully implemented. This is the pathway that people have most experience with and have adequate resources for. It is also one that provides immediate benefits and market opportunities. For many woredas this is the only viable pathway available. Of the very few PSNP clients taking up a livelihood, few use the off-farm pathway. Commonly reported challenges facing clients include

<sup>31</sup> Note that this refers to *all* loans taken out by households, not just those associated with the Livelihoods Component of the PSNP.

lack of experience, stricter loan conditions (e.g. shorter grace period), and the need to obtain business licenses. There is also evidence of insufficient training of DAs and support given to PSNP clients to develop business plans for this pathway. The wage employment pathway is non-existent. Lack of employment opportunities and limited skills by PSNP clients remain key constraints to operationalize this pathway and remote locations and high transport costs limit the pursuit of employment opportunities. Poor planning and coordination between the various stakeholders involved is also a challenge. All livelihood activities have been adversely affected by lack of technical support, follow-up and coaching, particularly for off-farm and employment pathways. These are affected by high turnover of field level staff, particularly DAs. Budgetary constraints also limit the capacity to implement monitoring and follow-up activities by woreda officials.

The Covid-19 pandemic has had a varied impact on the livelihood component across woredas/kebeles. Most woredas report having received guidance from the zone or regional level on health and safety procedures and changed PSNP plans accordingly. PWs, transfer payments and retargeting were affected in some areas. There are also reports of cases of business activities of PSNP clients being affected and this impacted negatively on loan repayment. Some MFIs extended repayment periods as a result. At kebele level, however, most respondents reported no changes to plans to address the Covid-19 disruption. Conflict and instability have affected SNNP directly, including PSNP livelihood activities, structures and data.

Only nine percent of the 2,278 PSNP clients in our sample are aware of the Livelihoods Component; this percentage is highest in Oromiya (13 percent) and lowest in SNNP (7 percent). Only 5 percent of these have joined the livelihood component since Tir 2011 EC. Percentages for participation in specific livelihood activities (selecting a livelihood activity, receiving training) are even smaller, two percent of the full sample. Few PSNP clients (seven percent) have been able to save regularly and of this small percentage, median savings is only 250 Birr.

With the important caveat that few households (five percent) take out loans, RUSACCOs account for 24 percent, MFIs for 20 percent, friends/neighbors for 16 percent, and relatives for 14 percent of loans obtained. There are no differences by region and no differences by PSNP/non-PSNP status. Data from MFIs show that the size of loans can be high, anywhere from 4,000-30,000 Birr but the term of the loans is short (usually one year), interest rates high and frequently other conditions (such as depositing savings in the MFI) is a prerequisite for getting a loan. The majority of PSNP clients, 63 percent, who currently have loans report difficulty repaying these.

## Chapter 9: Contingency Budgets

### 9.1. Introduction

The PSNP contingency budget allows the program to expand and contract in response to transitory need.<sup>32</sup> At the start of PSNP 4 it was calculated as 16% of the base transfer budget: 11% held at the federal level and 5% managed by the woredas. These are intended to address transitory needs: by expanding either vertically (increasing the number of months that existing PSNP clients receive support), or horizontally (adding eligible non-PSNP households temporarily to the program payroll in woredas where the PSNP is implemented). Table 9.1 summarizes the purpose and coverage of the two budgets.

**Table 9.1: PSNP contingency budgets**

Funding source and purpose	Trigger	Where resources can be used
<b>Woreda contingency budget</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exclusion errors identified through the appeals process</li> <li>Households with children screened as malnourished</li> <li>Transitory needs of PSNP or non-PSNP clients during small-scale shocks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Appeals</li> <li>Malnutrition screening</li> <li>Early warning system</li> </ul>	Anywhere within a woreda where PSNP is implemented
<b>Federal contingency budget</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Transitory needs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Needs assessments</li> </ul>	Anywhere in regions where PSNP is implemented

Source: PSNP 4 PIM, section 11-2.

In 2017, the government took steps to consolidate PSNP and HFA systems into a single delivery framework since both aim to address transitory food needs. The PSNP midline performance report in 2018 revealed a level of confusion in woredas about the difference between them. After 2017, the federal contingency budget line would no longer be pre-financed (the 11%) but adjusted to zero. Finance would be mobilised from both the government and development partners and held in a dedicated local currency account. Funds would be released based on predicted needs established through the biannual seasonal assessments and allocated to either PSNP or non-PSNP woredas. The woreda contingency budget remained unchanged: pre-financed at 5% and transferred in regular disbursements to the woreda.

The midline performance report concluded that highland and lowlands woredas generally used their contingency budgets appropriately and in line with the PIM. The processes of selection and targeting were seen as fair and transparent in all regions, with the exception of some woredas in Afar where officials were unclear what contingency budgets were and, thus, were unable to explain how they were targeted. Transfers were timely and provided in full in highland regions but this was not always true in lowland woredas. As noted above, there was confusion about the federal contingency budget; only around half of the sampled woredas had received support from it.

<sup>32</sup> The PIM describes transitory needs as arising from shocks – such as drought – that create food insecurity among people who in a normal year maintain their livelihoods without needing support from the PSNP or the emergency response system.

This chapter updates these findings through address **RQ16: Administration of Contingency budgets**. Specifically: (a) How are Woreda contingency budgets used, especially in relation to the *Kebele* Appeals system and temporary inclusion of households with malnourished children? (b) How are households selected to receive support from the Woreda contingency budget? Is this process fair and transparent? (c) How many months of support does each household receive? Do households receive their complete entitlement? Are these transfers timely and predictable (where timelines and predictability refers to their receipt by households)? (d) How are households selected to receive support from the federal contingency budget? Is this process fair and transparent? And (e) How many months of support is provided to households through the federal contingency budget? Do households receive their complete entitlement? Are these transfers timely and predictable? It will contribute to addressing **RQ5: How was PSNP4 adapted to address the Covid-19 pandemic?** Specifically, it will describe changes in the use of contingency budgets, the reasons for those changes and whether these were provided through guidelines from FSCD or if the adaptation was individually tailored by regions or Woreda offices.

We use information from Key Informant Interviews conducted at the Woreda and Kebele level along with quantitative data from the Kebele level to address RQ5. RQ16 is addressed using quantitative data collected at the Woreda and Kebele level and qualitative data collected through Key Informant Interviews at the regional, Woreda and Kebele level.

## 9.2. Federal contingency budget

In 2021, all three highland regions where interviews were carried out (Amhara, Oromiya and SNNP) had received federal contingency support in the past year to respond to shocks and support internally displaced persons (IDPs). Only the RFSTF in Amhara explicitly said that federal contingency funds had been used to respond to the impacts of displacement; SNNP reported that they had not used contingency funds (either woreda or federal) for this purpose, and Oromiya did not address this point (see section 9.6). In Somali, regional officials explained that federal contingency funds were distributed based on assessment and designation of hotspot areas and covered the needs of those who were transitory food insecure. Regional FSTF officials in Afar explained that federal contingency funds were used to extend payment by two months for PSNP beneficiaries. Federal contingency support was provided for different lengths of time: 1-2 months in SNNP, Somali and Afar, six months in Amhara, and between 3 and 7 months in Oromiya (averaging at 4-5 months).

Table 9.2 presents the percentage of woredas that reported receiving funds from the Federal contingency budget and its size as a percentage of the woreda's PSNP4 budget.<sup>33</sup> Overall, about 63 percent of the woredas received funds from the Federal contingency budget but there is some regional variation. 83 percent of the woredas in Afar reported receiving these funds whereas 42 percent in Oromiya reported receiving them. Federal contingency funds constitute about 10 percent of the PSNP4 budget at the woreda level. Oromiya reported the largest percentage (12 percent) and Somali reported the smallest (at 6.2 percent). Most woredas report receiving the funds in cash (41 out of the 51 woredas that received Federal contingency budget funds reported receiving it in cash).

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<sup>33</sup> The results reported in Table 9.2 are based on the woreda quantitative survey. Woreda officials are first asked if they had received money from federal contingency funds (this is reported in the top panel of Table 9.2). If they did report receiving these funds, they are then asked: "What is the size of this FEDERAL contingency budget as a percentage of the woreda's PSNP4 budget?" The mean values, by region, are reported in the lower panel of Table 9.2.

**Table 9.2: Woredas receiving funds from the Federal contingency budget, by region**

	Afar	Amhara	Oromiya	Somali	SNNP	Full Sample
Percentage of woredas received funds from the Federal Contingency budget	83	77	42	50	62	63
Size of this Federal contingency budget as a percentage of the woreda's PSNP 4 budget	10	10	12	6	10	10
No. of woredas receiving Federal contingency funds (among the woredas that receive these funds) as						
Cash	6	11	6	5	13	41
Food	3	3	-	-	-	6
Both cash and food	1	2	1	-	-	4

Notes: Endline woreda survey, Highlands and Lowlands.

Table 9.3 summarises woreda requests to the federal contingency budget and the response. Two highland woredas (Sodo Zurya and Loko Abaya) had not applied in the recent past. Woreda officials in five of six woredas in Somali and Afar stated that they had not applied for federal contingency funds. Their responses suggest there is some lingering confusion concerning recent reforms to contingency budgets.

No, we didn't request additional contingency budget beyond the 5%. The basic reason for not requesting is that we heard that no more request is accepted. Previously before 2010 were asking and we get positive responses but there is no such transfer since the last three years to our woreda. *[SOM-GUR-WTRMTC]*

We never requested that we know there will not positive response from the region. *[SOM-ERR-WTRMTC]*

We didn't request additional contingency fund. Because the region gave us direction not to request additional fund. *[AFA-DUB-WFSTF]*

**Table 9.3: Woreda applications to the federal contingency budget (source: WTRMTC)**

Region	Woreda	Application	Nature of shock	Response
SNNP	Sodo Zurya	No	n/a	n/a
	Boloso Sore	Yes: 2011 & 2012 [EC]	Hotspot kebeles, hailstorms	Received four rounds of support assisting 2,600 people, both PSNP clients and non-PSNP
	Arbaminch Zuria	Yes: 2011 [EC]	Floods and landslides in five kebeles	Received at least 6 months support per household, food and non-food, for 3 months <sup>34</sup>
	Loko Abaya	No	n/a	n/a
Oromiya	Zeway Dugda	Yes	Floods	Received 25% of request, in food, supporting 12,000 households over 7 months
	Kuyu	Yes: 47,642 non-PSNP clients	Landslides	Approved 38% of request (17,898 people), not yet received <sup>35</sup>
	Fadis	Yes: 2011 & 2012 [EC]	Drought, floods, locust damage	Received 36% of request (16,000 out of 44,000 people), and not timely
	Chiro	Yes: many times	Not specified	Not received
Amhara	Mekdela	Yes: every year since 2010 [EC]	Drought, floods, landslides	Received <sup>36</sup>
	Libo Kemkem	Yes: 2011 [EC]	Snow, landslides	Yes: 3 months (two of food, one of cash), for both PSNP and non-PSNP households
	Angolela Tera	Yes: 2011 & 2012 [EC]	Landslides and hailstorms in seven kebeles	Yes: in 2012 [EC] received 6% of request for 6 months' transfer to 40 PSNP households and 7 months' transfer to non-PSNP households. In 2013, received 93% of request. <sup>37</sup>
Somali	Shinile	No	n/a	Yes: in 2010 [EC] received 2 months (cash), reaching 11,357 beneficiaries
	Gursum	No	n/a	Yes: in 2012 [EC], received 2 months (cash), reaching 19,500 beneficiaries
	Errer	No	n/a	Not specified
Afar	Ewa	Yes	Locusts, floods, drought	Not specified
	Elidar	No	n/a	Not specified
	Dubti	No	n/a	Yes

The midline performance report noted that a major challenge identified by highland woredas was that available contingency funds were insufficient to meet the demands made on them. We again asked woredas whether the support they received from the federal level was adequate when set against

<sup>34</sup> The WFSTF also mentions HFA received in 2012 [EC] for two months.

<sup>35</sup> The request was made in September 2013 [EC].

<sup>36</sup> The relevant woreda official was not available at the time of the survey to provide full data.

<sup>37</sup> The relevant woreda official was not available at the time of the survey to provide full data.

need. Only two (Bolosso Sore and Libo Kemkem) felt that it was. Those in Oromiya, in particular, said that they received less than half of what had been requested. The WFSTF in Loko Abaya described the demand created by both predictable and unpredictable need.

Besides the outcomes of the biannual assessments, there are emergencies. For instance, in Hamle 2012 [EC] there was flooding from Bilate River and 3,828 people were affected. They received various support including food and cash. [But] the quota we receive does not usually match the number of needy people... Because of this shortage the most affected are targeted. Those not included are considered in the next round. [SID-LOK-WFSTF]

In terms of total coverage, since the budget requested and the resources allotted by the federal did not match, we cannot claim that most households in need are covered. Based on the nature and severity of the shock there are households who are supported by both channels. [AMH-MEK-WTRMTC]

In our woreda there is an estimated population of 140,000 but the census indicates that it is 37,000. Thus, the quota assigned for our woreda is inadequate, and most households were not targeted even though they are eligible. For this reason, we divide the poor households in to three categories (1st, 2nd and 3rd). Of these, our concern is for the third group, and we focus on these types of households. About 10% of the households are still not covered. [SOM-GUR-WTRMTC]

The main challenge in allocating the humanitarian aid funds was that it paled in comparison to those who needed support. In previous times, the humanitarian assistance covered up to 40% of the beneficiaries but now we do not have it. We are forced to reduce the number of beneficiaries in each household in order to expand coverage to more households. [SOM-ERR-WTRMTC]

### 9.3. Contingency budgets and planning under PSNP4

We asked woreda informants to tell us about any changes in the process of contingency planning in the last two years. Most reported no change in woreda-level planning, the exceptions being Chiro in Oromiya and Libo Kemkem in Amhara where it has become more inclusive and regular.

Yes, there has been change in the way contingency planning is conducted... Before 2012 [EC] the woreda agriculture office (PSNP team) used to prepare the contingency plan alone, rarely involving the DRM office and other pertinent sectors... Since 2012, contingency planning has been conducted jointly with stakeholders including the DRM, health, and education offices that haven't been actively involved before. [ORO-CHI-WTRMTC]

Previously there was no specific schedule to conduct contingency planning. But now it is done in April every year. The plan is based on the early warning assessment done in sample kebeles by the early warning technical team. The assessment results are evaluated by the woreda steering committee and then incorporated in the woreda contingency plan. Previously there were instances when an expert prepared the contingency plan. But now it is strictly done through the multisectoral technical committee and approved by the woreda steering committee. [AMH-LIB-WTRMTC]

No woreda informants reported change in federal-level contingency planning (with the exception of officials in two Somali woredas, see below), other than a reference in Bolosso Sore to a stronger assessment process which may reflect the changes introduced in 2017; similarly, the WFSTF in Loko



Abaya described how the biannual assessments translate into quotas for each woreda. The WTRMTC in Mekdela correctly described the change at the start of PSNP 4 when the regional contingency budget was reduced and moved to the federal level, but not the more recent reforms to the management of federal contingency funds.

Yes, I have seen changes in that the federal contingency budget would be released based on the prevalence of shocks in the woreda, justified by undertaking an appropriate assessment conducted by experts from the federal and regional levels. [SNN-BOL-WTRMTC]

Based on federal biannual assessments, the woreda gets a quota on the basis of the estimated number of people that need assistance to address their food gaps. For instance, following the last *meher* assessment we had a quota to support 18,000 beneficiaries and now the targeting is underway. [And] from the 2012 [EC] *belg* assessment we received support for 5,600 beneficiaries. [SID-LOK-WFSTF]

Since Hamle 2010 [EC] there has been no change in the way contingency planning is done for both the woreda level 5% and the federal level 11%. In the past, a 15% contingency fund was administered by the region, but now it is 11% and administered at the federal level. When a shock occurs which is beyond the capacity of the woreda to manage it with their 5% contingency fund, the woreda prepares a contingency plan and refers the request to the federal government through the regional agriculture bureau. The plan clearly states the type, level, magnitude, and number of people affected by the shock. [AMH-MEK-WTRMTC]

In Somali region, WTRMTC officials in two woredas (Shinile and Error) referred to the closure of the federal contingency budget:

Earlier there was 11% contingency for the region beside the that of the woreda. But for the last two years, there is a change such that 11% is cut and only the woreda 5% remains and usually released and is used. [SOM-SHI-WTRMTC]

Over the past two years, we have the woreda contingency budget only. There were no changes in planning its use. [SOM-ERR-WTRMTC]

#### **9.4. Woreda contingency budget**

This section has three parts: the first discusses how woreda contingency budgets have been used, the second describes the processes of targeting and selection, and the third looks at the level of support provided.

##### **9.4.1. Use of the woreda contingency budget**

Among the woredas included in our survey less than 40 percent reported having a contingency budget (Table 9.5). The prevalence of woreda contingency budget is lower in the lowland regions as compared to the highlands. But even in the highlands less than half of the woredas reported having a contingency budget. Among the woredas that reported having a contingency budget, they reported it being about 6% of the woreda's PSNP4 budget on average. Most woredas that reported having contingency budgets also reported that they provided it in cash.

**Table 9.4: Woreda contingency budget, by region**

	Afar	Amhara	Oromiya	Somali	SNNP	Full Sample
Percentage of woredas that have a Woreda Contingency budget	25	41	47	20	43	38
Size of the Woreda contingency budget as a percentage of the woreda's PSNP 4 budget	5	10	5	5	5	6
Among the woredas that have a contingency budget, number of woredas that provide them as						
Cash	-	7	6	2	9	24
Food	3	1	-	-	-	4
Both cash and food	-	1	3	-	-	4

Notes: Endline woreda survey, Highlands and Lowlands

The midline survey in 2018 found that most woredas in the highlands used their contingency budgets to address (budget permitting) exclusion errors identified through the PSNP appeals process; to support households with children screened as malnourished; and to meet the transitory needs of either PSNP or non-PSNP households affected by small-scale shocks. In this final evaluation we again asked WTRMTC and WFSTF members to describe how the contingency budget was used. The results from highland and lowland regions are summarised in Table 9.5.

**Table 9.5: Use of the woreda contingency budget (sources: WTRMTC & WFSTF)**

Region	Woreda	Characteristics of households or individuals assisted
SNNP	Sodo Zurya	Affected by shocks (flooding, hailstorms, fire) Caring for malnourished children Appealed their exclusion from PSNP
	Boloso Sore	Excluded from PSNP Affected by shocks (landslides, hailstorms) Caring for malnourished children Internally displaced Living with HIV in last 2 years Affected by Covid-19
	Arbaminch Zuria	Excluded from PSNP Affected by shocks (landslides) Caring for malnourished children
	Loko Abaya	Affected by shocks (flooding, landslides, storms) Living with HIV Caring for malnourished children Elderly and without support
Oromiya	Zeway Dugda	Affected by shocks (non-PSNP households) Caring for malnourished children
	Kuyu	Excluded from PSNP Included in PSNP but with large families
	Fadis	Excluded from PSNP Caring for malnourished children
	Chiro	Included in PSNP but with large families Caring for malnourished children Affected by shocks
Amhara	Mekdela	Appealed their exclusion from PSNP Caring for malnourished children Affected by shocks (drought)
	Libo Kemkem	Appealed their exclusion from PSNP Caring for malnourished children (non-PSNP households) Affected by shocks (drought, hailstorms, flooding), including those which have graduated and slide back due to shocks
	Angolela Tera	Affected by shocks (snow, hailstorms, flooding, landslides, fire) Affected by targeting decisions (either exclusion or household cap)
Somali	Shinile	Appealed their exclusion from PSNP Included in PSNP but with large families Affected by shocks
	Gursum	Affected by shocks
	Error	Affected by shocks (drought, flood, fire, locusts) Included in PSNP but with large families Caring for malnourished children Disabled and/or chronically ill Excluded from PSNP
Afar	Ewa	Excluded from PSNP Affected by shocks (non-PSNP households; migrating due to drought)
	Elidar	Excluded from PSNP Affected by shocks (flooding, displacement, fire) Appealed their exclusion from PSNP
	Dubti	Excluded from PSNP Appealed their exclusion from PSNP Caring for malnourished children Affected by shocks (flooding)

The findings again suggest broad compliance with the requirements of the PIM. As we found at the midline, some woredas (Bolosso Sore, Loko Abaya, Error) also target individuals with particular needs, including those with HIV, the elderly who lack support, and those affected by Covid-19.

Table 9.6 summarizes the information collected in the quantitative woreda survey on the allocation of Federal and Woreda contingency budget, number of households supported. Most woredas reported using money from both the Federal and Woreda contingency funds to assist households with malnourished children. A smaller number of woredas reported providing payments for “top-up” funds or cover non-PSNP households to cope with a transitory shock. However, in terms of absolute number of households covered, the highest average number of households covered under Federal and Woreda contingency funds are those that are non-PSNP households that need to cope with transitory shock followed by those households that were included as a result of successful appeals submitted through the grievance redressal mechanism.

**Table 9.6: Use of Federal and Woreda contingency budget, by region**

	Afar	Amhara	Oromiya	Somali	SNNP	Total
No. of woredas that provide payments from both Federal and Woreda contingency funds to...						
Households that have malnourished children Existing PSNP clients as 'top-up' funds to cope with transitory shocks	9	21	21	13	21	85
non-PSNP clients ordinarily, not in need of PSNP support, on a temporary basis to cope with a transitory shock	2	3	2	2	7	16
	3	5	1	2	8	19
No. of households in the woreda... Received payments from Woreda contingency funds as a result of successful appeals submitted through the grievance redress mechanism	72	1449	219	769	1362	877
Received payments from the Federal and/or the Woreda contingency funds because they had children who had had been screened as malnourished	0	392	181	1072	1646	799
Received payments from the Federal and/or the Woreda contingency funds as a 'top-up' of the transfers of existing PSNP clients for whom the current level of transfers is unable to deal with a transitory shock	22	394	284	273	131	204
Received payments from the Federal and/or the Woreda contingency funds to non-PSNP clients ordinarily, not in need of PSNP support, on a temporary basis to cope with a transitory shock	110	1796	55	1242	853	894

Notes: Endline woreda survey, Highlands and Lowlands

Our qualitative data triangulate these findings. All highland woredas except Kuyu and Angolela Tera use their contingency budgets to support families caring for malnourished children. Only woreda informants in SNNP and Amhara explicitly reference the PSNP appeals system as a means of identifying additional households. Those in Oromiya focus on how the contingency budget helps those whom the PSNP does not routinely benefit, or whom it underserves; they mention the resource constraints on targeting and the household cap, the impact of which has become more acute as households have

become larger. Their answers suggest that the food shortages faced by these households may not be transitory.

The contingency fund was used to support poor food-insecure households that were not targeted by PSNP and households with many family members that were not fully targeted due to the household cap and are faced with serious food shortages... The fund is used for increasing the caseload and also supporting PSNP households by increasing the number of months they receive the transfer. *[ORO-KUY-WTRMTC]*

The contingency fund has been used to support PSNP clients with a larger family size beyond the household cap.... PSNP targeting has restricted the number of household members eligible for entitlement. Since then, the family size has increased. Even in the beginning, households with a number larger than the household cap were not allowed to register more than this. Hence, the contingency fund has been used to assist such households. *[ORO-CHI-WTRMTC]*

In Afar and Somali, officials in all six woredas indicated that the contingency budgets are used to respond to households affected by shocks. However, only two mentioned that they include support for families of malnourished children as a criteria when allocating the contingency budget.

The 5% contingency budget is used usually to cover shock affected households through increasing the number of household members. In this case it is used for both cases: to increase caseloads for both PSNP households and non-PSNP households who are the most affected. *[SOM-GUR-TRMTC]*

We mainly use it to cover shocks for households affected by disasters like drought, flooding, wind, fire, and locusts, for non-PSNP households. *[SOM-ERR-WTRMTC]*

We use the 5% contingency budget for those who were not part of the PSNP but were affected by natural disasters like floods and the locust infestation. *[AFA-EWA-WFSTF]*

The contingency food support is distributed to people affected by hazards like flooding, for displaced peoples, by fire etc. *[AFA-ELI-WFSTF]*

Woreda contingency budgets therefore assist both PSNP and non-PSNP households, depending on the purpose.

We have used the woreda contingency budget for the last two years to increase the caseload [in order] to address appeal cases, to increase the number of months of transfer, to cover shocks as part of HFA, and to support the transitory inclusion of non-PSNP households with malnourished children. *[AMH-LIB-WFSTF]*

The 5% woreda contingency budget was used to increase the PSNP caseload by targeting poor households that were not included during the initial PSNP targeting because of resource limitation and were hit by shocks from flooding. *[ORO-ZEW-WTRMTC]*

The woreda contingency budget was used for three main areas including appeals management, responding to sudden shocks and supporting households with malnourished children. Usually, 90% of the contingency funds are used for appeals managements. Appeals include people affected by exclusion errors, targeting errors, needy households with more than five children who are affected by the household cap, and to support new families (newlyweds). *[SOM-SHI-WTRMTC]*

We can further triangulate these responses via our quantitative community surveys (Table 9.7). On average 25.7 percent report receiving the additional funds to include households that successfully appealed to be included in the PSNP. About 32 percent reported receiving the additional funds to include households that had malnourished children. 34 percent reported receiving the funds to include households that experienced a transitory shock while 13 percent reported using the funds as “top-up” funds for existing PSNP beneficiaries.

**Table 9.7: Kebele perspective on additional funds received, by region**

	Afar	Amhara	Oromiya	Somali	SNNP	Total
Percent received additional funds from the Woreda to...						
Include households who had successfully appealed to be included in the PSNP	39	11	39	18	28	2
Include households who had malnourished children	55	15	43	6	44	32
Include non-PSNP clients who had experienced transitory shock	48	35	39	6	39	34
Provide 'top-up' funds to some existing PSNP household	3	14	17	9	18	13

Notes: Endline community survey, Highlands and Lowlands

#### **9.4.2. Targeting**

The midline survey concluded that the selection process applied PSNP eligibility criteria and was self-reported by all highland and most of the lowland woredas as fair and transparent. The same appears true in 2021.

The fullest description of the selection process (Mekdela in Amhara) distinguishes between the three principal purposes of the woreda contingency fund. Officials describe how the PSNP appeals system identifies wrongly excluded households, while kebele health workers screen those with malnourished children. In the case of shocks, the process is multi-layered and participatory, with mechanisms for public accountability and appeal.

The woreda early warning team collects early warning information and makes a report to the woreda agricultural office early warning unit. The woreda cabinet discusses and reviews this information, allocates a quota to each PSNP kebele, and officially communicates this to them. In similar manner, the KFSTF distributes their quota to each *got* (sub-kebele) based on the severity and nature of the shock-affected areas in their locality. Based on this quota, the CFSTF with the participation of the community carries out wealth ranking and identifies those households who should be supported. Then the CFSTF sends the list of selected households with a minute attached to the KFSTF. The KFSTF reviews, evaluates and endorses the final list and publicly posts it, then sends it to the woreda with an official letter and minute attached. Nine days are given in case there are appeals. If there are appropriate appeals, the WFSTF makes the correction and sends the final list to the BoFED to be registered on the payroll. Since we do the selection process in such a way, we can claim in practical terms that it is transparent and fair. *[AMH-MEK-WTRMTC]*

All other woredas describe some of the same elements, emphasising that the selection process uses the established PSNP targeting committees and is informed by community wealth ranking, that

decisions are documented and publicised in the kebele, and that those who feel aggrieved have access to the KACs and, if not satisfied, to the woreda food security unit on appeal. In Somali and Afar, officials emphasised that, given the use of PSNP targeting and appeals structures, that elders and other locally respected figures are involved, which helps to promote fairness in who is selected. In some cases (presumably rapid-onset shocks) the process may start with an appeal from the KFSTF to the WFSTF which then evaluates the need and advises the kebele on targeting. In others, there are slight adjustments to procedures, such as appeals resolved within the kebele before the list is forwarded to the woreda (Oromiya). The WFSTF in Sodo Zurya commented on the high number of appeals.

Community appeals are common at the woreda food security desk and woreda staff are overloaded by appellants. *[SNN-SOD-WFSTF]*

Almost all woredas, across both the highlands and lowlands, reported that the process is fair and transparent. Where concerns were raised (Loko Abaya, Angolela Tera and Errer), these were attributed to the behaviour of the kebele leadership, the allocation of HFA, and the amount of woreda contingency resource compared to levels of need.

Regarding fairness and transparency, though it cannot be claimed 100%, about 50% is fair because of the selfishness of the kebele leadership. *[SID-LOK-WTRMTC]*

The complaints we hear are about the emergency relief targeting. Because the kebele leadership try to include everybody in the kebele to get cheap popularity. Then, when we reject this and present it to the community for evaluation, complaints emerge. But the targeting process and actors are all the same for PSNP, the woreda contingency, and the HFA. *[AMH-ANG-WFSTF]*

The contingency budget is very small per kebele. This creates lots of complaints. Previously, when HFA food was available, such complaints were less. *[SOM-ERR-WFSTF]*

#### **9.4.3. Level of support**

As we did at midline, we again asked woreda informants to tell us about the last time the woreda contingency budget was used: how many months of support each household received, whether this was their complete entitlement, and whether the transfers were timely and predictable. The results are summarised in Table 9.8.

**Table 9.8: Delivery of the woreda contingency budget in highland woredas**

Region	Woreda	Number of months of support; completeness; timeliness
SNNP	Sodo Zurya	6 months, in two tranches of 3 months Paid in cash, up to household cap Delay in transfer of 2013 [EC] contingency budget to woreda
	Boloso Sore	2 months, in 2012 [EC] Timely and predictable
	Arbaminch Zuria	2 months, in 2012 [EC] Paid in cash, based on daily wage rate (48 Birr pp pd) Complete, timely, and predictable
	Loko Abaya	3 months, in 2012 [EC] Complete, timely, and predictable Delay in transfer of 2013 [EC] contingency budget to woreda
Oromiya	Zeway Dugda	6 months Paid in food and cash, same as PSNP transfer size (15kg grain, 1.5kg pulses, 400g oil / 255 Birr pp pm) Complete and timely
	Kuyu	6 months Same transfer size as routine PSNP clients Complete, usually timely, sometimes delayed
	Fadis	6 months Same transfer size as routine PSNP clients Timely
	Chiro	6 months (3 months food, 3 months cash) Complete
Amhara	Mekdela	6 months, in 2012 [EC] Complete, but not predictable
	Libo Kemkem	6 months, in 2012 [EC] Complete and predictable Delay in transfer of 2013 [EC] contingency budget to woreda
	Angolela Tera	6 months Complete, but not as predictable as PSNP
Somali	Shinile	6 months Same as PSNP transfer size Delay in transfer
	Gursum	No information
	Error	6 months Same as PSNP transfer size Predictable (paid in final 2 months of public works implementation)
Afar	Ewa	6 months Same as PSNP transfer size (15 kg grain per person) Not timely or predictable
	Elidar	6 months Same as PSNP transfer size (15 kg grain per person) Not timely or predictable
	Dubti	6 months Same as PSNP transfer size (15 kg grain per person) Not timely or predictable

In the Highland regions, support is provided for periods of between two and six months, at rates equivalent to those of the routine PSNP transfers. These transfers were perceived by woreda officials to be timely, predictable, and provided in full. There were exceptions. Delayed transfers of the



contingency budget were reported in parts of SNNP, Sidama, and Amhara. The WTRMTC in Kuyu also noted delays. Concerns were also raised about predictability.

We have been using the PSNP 5% woreda contingency fund since Hamle 2010 except this year. In 2013 [EC] we did not receive it, the reason for which we are not clear about. [AMH-MEK-WTRMTC]

Usually this transfer comes on time, but there were times when it was received later than we wanted / asked for. [ORO-KUY-WFSTF]

We cannot say that it is predictable because at one time they release 50% of the budget and at another time a quarter of it. But when we receive the budget, we make the transfer as soon as possible. [AMH-MEK-WTRMTC]

In the Afar and Somali, support was provided for six months and at rates equivalent to those of the routine PSNP transfers. However, most woreda officials stated that transfers to households covered by the contingency budget were neither timely nor predictable.

The transfers are not timely and predictable because after selecting the beneficiaries and getting approval from the woreda cabinet, we requested that the regional government provide the transfers. However, the regional government didn't provide according to our schedule. [AFA-ELI-WFSTF]

The transfers are not timely and predictable. We didn't know the reason but it is always delayed. [AFA-DUB-WFSTF]

The timeliness and the predictability were similar to that of PSNP beneficiaries. The payment is usually delayed. [SOM-SHI-WFSTF]

These findings about the number of months for which this support is provided are consistent with the data generated by our quantitative woreda and kebele levels surveys, Table 9.9.

**Table 9.9: Level of support of Federal and Woreda contingency budget, by region**

	Afar	Amhara	Oromiya	Somali	SNNP	Total
<b>Woreda perspective</b>						
No. of months, on average, payments from the Federal and/or the Woreda contingency fund were received by:						
Households that had children who had been screened as malnourished	5	3	5	6	5	4
Non-PSNP clients ordinarily, not in need of PSNP support, but included on a temporary basis to cope with a transitory shock	.	4	5	6	6	5
<b>Kebele Perspective</b>						
No. of months PSNP transfers received by:						
Households included because they had malnourished children	6.3	2.3	2.5	4.3	3.4	3.5
Non-PSNP households temporarily included due to a transitory shock	3.6	1.8	1.5	3.3	3.2	2.6

Notes: End-line woreda and community survey, Highlands and Lowlands

## 9.5. Contingency budgets and COVID-19

We asked woreda and regional officials whether the woreda or federal contingency budgets were used to respond to the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic. Their answers were mixed, and in some cases contradictory. It appears that federal contingency budgets were used for this purpose in all regions, but that woreda contingency budgets were only used in SNNP, including Sidama. In Somali region, none of the three woredas visited for the qualitative evaluation had received contingency funds to respond specifically to Covid-19; however, woreda officials were aware that other woredas in the region had done so. As described above, and confirmed by regional and woreda officials alike, federal funds were used to extend the payment period for public works beneficiaries by two months.

According to regional informants, the federal contingency budget has been used to mitigate the effects of Covid-19, in slightly different ways:

We paid clients affected by Covid-19 in the months of Meskerem, Tikmet, and Hidar, from the federal contingency budget. *[SNN-RTRMTC]*

Yes, the federal contingency budget was used one time to respond to the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic in the form of two months' transfer at one time; this was carried out last September of this year. *[ORO-RTRMTC]*

The federal contingency budget is used to respond to the impacts of Covid-19 in a few identified hotspot woredas. *[AMH-RTRMTC]*

With the exception of the WTRMTC in Fadis, which also mentioned a two months' transfer in September 2013 [EC] that was paid without the requirement to work, no woreda informant in Oromiya or Amhara said that contingency budgets (woreda or federal) had been used to respond to Covid-19. In Sidama and SNNP, the information was contradictory. All four WFSTFs described how the woreda contingency budget had assisted those affected by Covid-19, while the WTRMTCs said that it had not. The WTRMTC in Loko Abaya referred only to two months of assistance from the federal level.

When the demand for casual labour in cities decreased, the contingency budget was used to address the needs of these people who used to depend on their labour before the outbreak of Covid. About 120 beneficiaries were assisted by the woreda contingency. *[SNN-SOD-WFSTF]*

We approved and used the woreda contingency budget for one month in response to the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic as it distracted people from several engagements. We selected the neediest people and distributed the support accordingly. *[SNN-ARB-WFSTF]*

Yes, [there were] efforts in 2012 [EC] to reach people whose income was affected due to Covid. Particularly those individuals involved in small business in the woreda capital (Antate), such as coffee sellers, street vendors, loaders, and unloaders, were supported through the contingency budget. *[SID-LOK-WFSTF]*

The federal made an additional two months' support for Hidar and Tahisas 2013 [EC] for public works clients to address the negative economic impacts of Covid. This included about 12,070 clients with a transfer of about five million Birr. *[SID-LOK-WTRMTC]*

Yes, we had used contingency funds for Covid-related impacts like fewer movements for animals to markets when movement by road was restricted. This badly affected those involved in marketing livestock. This and related factors forced us to use contingency budget of the PSNP. *[AFA-EWA-WFSTF]*

## 9.6. Contingency budgets and conflict/displacement

We asked woreda and regional officials whether woreda or federal contingency budgets were used to respond to the impacts of conflict or displacement. Of the 17 woredas sampled, eight (Sodo Zurya, Arbaminch Zuria, Kuyu, Chiro, Shinile, Ewa, Elidar and Dubti ) reported that they experienced no conflict and were not hosting IDPs. Two (Boloso Sore and Zeway Dugda) had used their contingency budgets to assist IDPs.<sup>38</sup>

We haven't experienced conflict in our woreda, but we supported IDPs coming from another place using woreda contingency budget. *[SNN-BOL-WFSTF]*

Yes, we have used contingency budget to respond to displaced people from Somali region who came to this woreda in 2011 [EC]. They were given transfer for six months. *[ORO-ZEW- WFSTF]*

Six others (Loko Abaya, Fadis, Mekdela, Libo Kemkem, Angolela Tera, and Errer) were hosting displaced people who were being assisted from regional or federal sources (in some cases HFA, in others not clearly specified).

There are two kebeles affected by conflict in this woreda. There are IDP displaced from Oromiya and these IDPs receive the HFA quota of the hosting kebele. *[SOM-ERR-WFSTF]*

Regional officials in Amhara confirmed that federal contingency budgets were being used to address the impact of displacement, while those in Oromiya said that displaced PSNP clients were being assisted by their host woreda. The RTRMTC in SNNP said that neither federal nor woreda contingency budgets were being used in cases of conflict or displacement, contrary to the information from woreda informants in Boloso Sore. Officials in Gursum (Somali) raised a different example, where the caseload from thirteen conflict-affected kebeles was shifted from Oromiya to Somali. When these kebeles were incorporated into Gursum, there was a gap in provision initially for PSNP clients. WFP responded until these kebeles were added to the Somali Region PSNP caseload.

## 9.7. Summary

This section summarises the findings against the research questions.

**16a: How are woreda contingency budgets used, especially in relation to the kebele appeals system and temporary inclusion of households with malnourished children?** Woreda contingency budgets are used for the three purposes outlined in the PIM: to deal with exclusion errors, to support households with children screened as malnourished, and to assist those affected by localised shocks. All woredas in Afar and Somali indicated that woreda contingency budgets were used to support people affected by shocks. Across all regions, some also target individuals with specific needs, such as those living with HIV or affected by Covid-19, the elderly who lack support, or those displaced from other regions. All woredas (in the highlands) except one reported that they assist households caring for malnourished children, but only woredas in SNNP and Amhara explicitly referenced the PSNP appeals system as a means of identifying excluded households. Those in Oromiya, Somali and Afar emphasised those not targeted by PSNP due to resource constraints or whose needs were not being fully met by the program (particularly large families).

**16b: How are households selected to receive support from the woreda contingency budget? Is this process fair and transparent?** The selection process uses PSNP targeting and appeals committees and

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<sup>38</sup> The Boloso Sore transcript explicitly refers to the woreda contingency budget being used for this purpose. The Zeway Dugda transcript does not specify woreda or federal, although the former is more likely.

incorporates measures designed to enhance public accountability and consent (such as community wealth ranking and the posting of decisions in a public place). The description of the selection process was consistent across regions. All woreda officials believe that it is fair and transparent. However, Sodo Zurja in SNNP reported that a large number of complaints reach woreda officials.

**16c: How many months of support does each household receive? Do households receive their complete entitlement? Are these transfers timely and predictable?** Support provided through contingency funds is given for a period of two and six months. Woreda officials perceive that it is self-reported to be timely, predictable, and provided in full. However, in 2013 [EC] several regions experienced delays in the woreda contingency budget being received in the woreda, and there were concerns about predictability in parts of Amhara. By contrast, woreda officials in Afar and Somali stated that transfers to households from the contingency budget were neither timely nor predictable.

**16d: How are households selected to receive support from the federal contingency budget? Is this process fair and transparent?** The selection process also uses PSNP structures and procedures and is self-reported by officials as fair and transparent. It is guided by assessment reports which determine the quotas given to each woreda, which then allocate quotas to affected kebeles. In Afar and Somali, officials point to the involvement of locally respected figures, such as elders, in targeting decisions as something that helps to promote selection that is fair and transparent.

**16e: How does the federal contingency budget protect people against larger than 'localized' shocks?**

Most woredas believe that federal contingency funds are not sufficient to protect all those in need. In some cases, woredas receive only a proportion of the support they request from the federal level. In others, the level of need is simply greater than the resources available, particularly when unanticipated crises compound predictable food shortages among populations where vulnerability is already high. In some woredas, federal contingency funds are used to assist IDPs.

With respect to **RQ5: How was PSNP4 adapted to address the Covid-19 pandemic**, it does not appear that there were any adaptations undertaken specifically because of Covid-19. There was no evidence that regions or woredas had received explicit guidance on this from the FSCD. When asked whether the woreda or federal contingency budgets were used to respond to the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic, woreda and regional officials provided mixed and contradictory responses. It appears that federal contingency budgets were used for this purpose in all regions, but that woreda contingency budgets were, generally, not used for this purpose.

## Chapter 10: Graduation

### 10.1. Introduction

The original vision for graduation of households from the PSNP, going back to 2006, was that through the provision of regular and predictable transfers, complemented by a range of household, community and environmental asset-building (the “productive” part of the safety net), households would become more resilient and self-reliant. This vision still holds, however the process by which this is expected to happen has evolved over the years. In PSNP4 graduation is facilitated through support to specific livelihood pathways, climate resilient investments through public works, lump-sum livelihood asset transfers, training and extension, access to microfinance, and help to transition to off-farm employment.

The issue of graduation received extensive discussion in previous work assessing the implementation of the PSNP3 (Berhane et al, 2015; Berhane et al, 2013). The baseline evaluation of PSNP4 (Berhane et al, 2017) took stock of the status of graduation in all the regions and woredas as well as establishing a baseline for the roll-out of some of the new design features for facilitating graduation within PSNP4 – such as, evidence-based graduation, one year notice of graduation, livelihood transfer packages and the livelihood pathways component. Graduation was also investigated in the midline evaluation of 2018. Key findings were these:

- The quantitative household data, and the qualitative data collected at regional and woreda levels, indicated that there had been virtually no graduation since 2016. This was largely due to the severe 2016/17 droughts which were seen as having significantly slowed progress towards enhanced food security. The limited roll out of the livelihoods package (including limited access to credit) and the cap on payments were also seen as constrainters to graduation. Consequently, it was impossible to tell whether the processes were being followed or whether the correct households were being graduated.
- There was regional variation on awareness of benchmarks. In Amhara they were set by the region. In Oromiya, regional authorities assumed that this was done at the woreda level. In SNNP, there was an assumption that benchmarks were dictated by federal authorities. At the household level, understanding of graduation criteria was characterized by widespread confusion.

This chapter updates these findings. As such, it speaks directly to **RQ14: Assessing Graduation** and indirectly contributes to our understanding of **RQ9: For how long PSNP households were in the program?** However, as we document below, graduation essentially ground to a halt in EC 2011 and EC 2012. Across Amhara, Oromiya and SNNP, fewer than three percent of PSNP clients were graduated and in many woredas, no graduation took place at all. Given that core finding, the chapter is structured as follows. In sections 10.2 and 10.3, we further document this core finding and briefly note whether PSNP processes for graduation, and support to graduates, took place for the small number of graduated households in our sample. In sections 10.4, 10.5 and 10.6 we consider three explanations for these low levels of graduation: poor understanding of graduation procedures and benchmarks (section 10.4); limitations of the livelihood component (section 10.5); and the role played by COVID and other shocks (section 10.6). We note how respondents envisage graduation going forward in section 10.7 before summarizing in section 10.8.

We draw on both qualitative and quantitative data to address these research questions. The household level data indicates who graduated, how the graduation process was implemented and

what support was received by graduating households. The qualitative work focuses on documenting understandings, processes and instructions relating to PSNP graduation that were developed at different administrative and how/whether these were transmitted to lower administrative levels. As we did in earlier evaluations, we restrict attention to the Highlands.<sup>39</sup>

## 10.2. Prevalence of graduation

Table 10.1 presents our core finding. There has been virtually no graduation since EC2011. The first column draws from our quantitative household survey. Restricting the sample to households who had ever been PSNP clients (and excluding “self-graduating households”), it shows that the percentage of households graduated was 4.0 percent in Amhara, 3.6 percent in Oromiya and 1.0 percent in SNNP. The qualitative data shows essentially the same results. There is evidence of a small amount of graduation in Amhara, less in Oromiya - Kuyu Woreda reported that just 12 PSNP clients had graduated in the two previous years while Zway Dugda, Fedis and Chiro Woredas all reported there were no graduation in the last three years – and essentially none in SNNP.<sup>40</sup>

## 10.3. Support available for graduates

Woreda LICU officials were asked about the support that PSNP graduates receive. Most said there was no graduation or there is not enough support to graduates after graduation.

In order for PSNP-graduates not get back to food insecurity situation different supports such as, credit access, technical support, transfer for one year free of PW should be provided as per the PIM. But little was done to prepare PSNP clients for graduation as per the PIM because absence/shortage of finance for credit has limited our better achievement in this regard. *[ORO-ZEW-LICU]*

After graduation the clients do not get loan support and technical support. But they get follow up on the problems they are facing as per the checklist to prevent them from fall-back. *[SNN-BOL-WLICU]*

However, respondents in Amhara region, Kuyu (Oromiya) and Chiro (Oromiya) woredas said that clients will have access to technical support and loans after they have graduated as well as one additional year of transfers without the requirement to conduct public works.

After graduation the graduated households are given one-year grace period where they obtain their transfer without involving in PW. They can access loan and get technical assistance equally with that of the remaining PSNP households. Graduation was successful and helpful, but the drought is dragging them to where they are/ poverty level thus we believe graduates need more support *[ANG-AT-LICU]*.

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<sup>39</sup> Graduation has not formally taken place in the Lowlands. The complementary Livelihood Component activities have not been undertaken nor has the Graduation Prediction System been put in place. In only one woreda, in Somali, did any graduation occur between 2018 and 2021.

<sup>40</sup> Some kebele staff in Oromia noted that they felt pressured by woreda officials to graduate households. However, they appear to have graduated fewer households than requested.

We were instructed to graduate 50% (27 out of 54 PW clients) regardless any benchmark for graduation. *[ORO-ZEW- KFSTF]*

We were instructed to graduate 50% of PSNP clients but we have planned to graduate 10 PSNP clients against the quota given to us by the Woreda. *[ORO-CHI- KFSTF]*

**Table 10.1: Prevalence of graduation, by region and data source**

	Data Source			
	Household quantitative survey	Woreda- LICU	Woreda -FSTF	KFSTF/DA
<b>AMHARA (Region)</b>	4% (46 households)	Yes	Yes	-
		Woreda specific information		
<b>Mekdela</b>	-	98 graduates in 2011 112 in 2012	5200 since 2010.	12 graduates in 2021 Temporary pause due to drought and COVID
<b>Angolela Tara</b>	-	13 in 2011 14 in 2012	Yes, we have graduation every year.	4 in 2011 No graduation in 2012 due to COVID.
<b>Libo Kemkem</b>	-	Yes, every year	Yes, every year	5 graduates in 2011 5 graduates in 2012
<b>OROMIA</b>	3% (39 households)	Yes. 50% of PSNP clients expected to graduate this year.	Yes	-
		Woreda specific information		
<b>Zway Duguda</b>	-	No	No due to recurring shocks and political instability in the region,	No
<b>Kuyu</b>	-	6 graduates in 2013 but planning to graduate 74 PSNP clients this year.	5 graduates in 2011 7 graduates in 2012	2 graduates in 2011 3 graduates in 2012
<b>Fedis</b>	-	No	No, but we have a 50% quota for this year	No. Plan to graduate 7 clients by end-year
<b>Chiro</b>	-	No	No, but we have a 50% quota for this year	No
<b>SNNPR</b>	1% (11 households)	-	Yes, but very small numbers	-
		Woreda specific information		
<b>Boloso Sore</b>	-	Yes	No	Yes. 7 graduates in 2011
<b>Sodo Zuriya</b>	-	No	No	No, suspended due to COVID
<b>Arbaminch Zuria</b>	-	Yes	No due to COVID; political reform, inflation	No
<b>Loko Abaya</b>	-	No. Plan to graduate clients in EC 2013	No	No

Notes: Source. Qualitative surveys.

Consistent with these qualitative data, responses from households who indicated that they had been graduated indicated relatively little support given (apart from recognition at a public ceremony). Contrary to the PIM, few graduates continued to receive PSNP payments for 12 months after they were notified that they were to be graduated. Of the small number of clients (48) who continued to receive payments having been notified that they were to be graduated, 22 (46 percent) chose to receive a lumpsum payment.

**Table 10.2: Processes and support to clients who graduate from the PSNP, by region**

Household ...	Amhara	Oromiya	SNNP	All Highland Regions
... was interviewed to assess suitability for graduation	15	8	0	10
... was told why they were graduated	24	26	18	24
... continued to receive PSNP payments for 12 months after being notified that you would be graduated	17	15	9	16
... was recognized at a public ceremony	38	33	100	40

Notes: Sample restricted to households who had graduated since EC2011. Source: Quantitative household survey, 2021.

#### 10.4. Why low levels of graduation (1): Procedures and benchmarks

One reason why graduation may have been limited was because regional, woreda or kebele authorities were uncertain about how graduation was supposed to work. Here, we use our qualitative data to describe understandings at all levels of graduation procedures, then focus specifically on graduation benchmarks.

##### **Graduation procedures**

Respondents from the RFSTF, the RLICU, WLICUs, WFSTFs, KFSTFs, and DAs in the Amhara region all reported that the process for graduation is well known by stakeholders at the kebele level, including PSNP clients. Moreover, they narrated the process more or less in the same way. Graduation in this region is based on results of wealth assessment and using a benchmark (9000 birrs/head/yr.). The DA/CFSTF identifies those who qualify to graduate. The community evaluate the results of the DA/CFSTF and KFSTF. Clients can make complaints to KAC if they don't agree with the works of DA/CFSTF and KFSTF.

The process for graduation is well known by stakeholders at Woreda and kebele level and also by the clients. But graduation is not happening to the full potential because the kebeles are not keen to graduate people. In the HAB program 1.1 million people graduated whereas it is only 173,000 clients that are graduated during the livelihood program. This difference is because of the different attention given to graduation in the two programs. [AMH-RLICU]

The process is known by all the stakeholders as it passes through all stages in the PSNP structures -- it involves the DA, Social workers, CFSTF, KFSTF/WFSTF, KAC, and the client themselves. [AMH-LIB-DA]



In Oromiya, the regional and woreda level respondents (excepting Fadis WFSTF) explained that the graduation process is well known by stakeholders at the kebele level, including clients.

R1: Yes, the process was well known by the stakeholders.

R2: The WFSTF as well as the KFSTF are involved in setting benchmarks for their own woredas, conducting asset/wealth listing of PSNP clients and screening prospective graduates for verification by the community.

R3: The appeal committee is also involved in handling complaints if arise.

R4: Hence, the process is transparent. *[ORO-RLICU]*

The graduation criteria and its process are well known by DAs, CFST, KFST and WFSTF. Wealth ranking and annual assets registration of the PSNP clients are to be done to identify potential graduates. PSNP clients also know that they will graduate up on reaching the benchmark for graduation. *[ORO-FAD-WLICU]*

However, Oromiya DAs, apart from Kuyu, were not sure of the procedures. One reason for this, expressed by a DA in Zway Duguda was that because there was no graduation in the kebeles he was responsible for, they were unable to comment on the graduation procedures, fairness or transparency.

In SNNPR the RFSTF indicated that the process of graduation was known by the stakeholders, although there was no clear guideline on how to implement it. Responses from woreda level officials were not always consistent with that view and were sometimes contradictory. For instance, in Boloso Sore and Sodo Zuria Woredas, the LICU and FSTF respondents were at odds in whether they believed the graduation process to be understood and transparent to kebele level stakeholders. The lack of graduation in EC 2011 and 2012 meant that it was difficult to comment on the transparency of the graduation process.

Yes, it is well known by stakeholders including the kebele level and for PSNP clients. The process was transparent. *[SNN-BOL-WLICU]*

We know that there is no equal understanding of the process of graduation by key stakeholders of the programme including kebele staffs and PSNP clients. *[SNN-BOL-WFSTF]*

No, the process of graduation of our kebele and the criteria applied for graduation were not equally known by all stakeholders particularly PSNP clients at kebele level. *[SNN-SOD-KFSTF]*

As was the case in Oromiya, DAs in SNNP, apart from one woreda (Boloso Sore) were unable to comment on procedures because there had been no graduation in their kebeles. In Loko Abaya, now in Sidama region, woreda and kebele level respondents indicated that the process for graduation is not well known by stakeholders at kebele level and clients.

To summarize, in Amhara, where the most graduation had taken place, understanding of graduation processes was highest. In Oromiya and SNNP, understanding of these processes was weaker and becomes weaker as we move from the regional to the woreda to the kebele and DA level. However, it is less clear if this weak understanding of graduation processes is a cause of low levels of graduation or a consequence, as noted by several respondents.

### ***Knowledge of graduation benchmark***

Only Amhara has an agreed and consistently applied benchmark for graduation. In Oromiya and SNNP, the setting of benchmarks has been delegated to woredas with the result that there are disparities in these benchmarks across and within regions. All respondents from Amhara unanimously stated that

the benchmark for graduation is 9000 birr/person/year and many of them were very clear and consistent in their description of the graduation process. A few Kebele FSTF members noted that they did not tell the client the exact benchmark amount to prevent clients from underreporting and hiding their assets.

Yes, the region has benchmarks for graduation. The benchmark for graduation is Birr 9000 per client per year. This is done by collecting households' socioeconomic data to quantify their per capita wealth. Yes, the benchmarks for graduation are communicated to woredas. *[AMH-RFSTF]*

Yes, the woreda have a benchmark for graduation which is 9000 birr per household which is calculated based on socio-economic assessment of the households. Each asset, livestock, crop production (excluding consumption amount), permanent plants, cash at hand/saving book and others assets are valued with the market value of the area and divided by the number of the family members. If it is 9000 birr he would be graduated. This benchmark is communicated to kebeles and PSNP clients. *[AMH-LIB-WLICU]*

By contrast, in both SNNP and Oromiya there were varying responses about the graduation benchmark between regions and across and within woredas. Regional respondents in both the LICU and FSTF offices in Oromiya stated that the setting of benchmarks is the responsibility of the woredas.

There is no benchmark for graduation at a regional level, each Woreda has different socioeconomic situation, based on this truth, Woredas develop their own graduation benchmarks. *[ORO-RFSTF]*

Woredas confirmed that they had received no benchmark from the region. However it was clear that there was some confusion about how to set the benchmark and what the benchmark actually was. For instance, different benchmarks were given by the WLICU and WFSTF in the woreda of Zeway Dugda:

Yes, based on the previous benchmark, the woreda FSTF has set benchmark for graduation to be Birr 35,000.00. This time no benchmark was given by the region. *[ORO-ZEW-LICU]*

Yes we have benchmark for graduation it is 50 to 60 thousand birr for a household to graduate. *[ORO-ZEW- FSTF]*

Despite the apparent hands-off approach taken by the region towards benchmarks, an interview with the LICU official in Fadis highlighted the tension between region and woreda over benchmark setting:

R1: In the previous phase of the PSNP (PSNP-3) the benchmark used to be provided from region and the benchmark was Birr 18,500.00.

R2: However, the majority of those who graduated were re-targeted in the PSNP-4. Hence, the region left mandate of setting benchmark for woredas.

R3: Hence, we set benchmark to be Birr 50,000.00 but by this we could only find 2% to graduate.

R4: This was not accepted by the region and there was pressure to graduate at least 50%. Hence, we reduced the benchmark for the Woreda to be Birr 35,000.00.

R5: We have not yet graduated. List of graduates is prepared but not yet communicated. *[ORO-FAD-WLICU]*

The situation in SNNP appears, at levels (regional, woreda, kebele) to have been especially confusing.

We have tried two methods to fix benchmarks for graduation. The first one called Graduation Prediction System (GPS) method and other Household Economic Assessment (HEA) method. The first method couldn't be put into practice as it was found to be impracticable, whereas cascading of the HEA method was stopped due to COVID. [SNN-RLICU]

The graduation benchmark is the one that existed during PSNP-3. Now for PSNP-5 there is a new thinking for graduation termed as a "big push". We understand that the graduation benchmark during PSNP-4 was on hold due to this new thinking. [SNN-RFSTF]

We set benchmarks of 2998 Birr/HH member, but we didn't put this into practice. No, we didn't communicate this to kebeles and PSNP clients. [SNN-ARB-WFSTF]

The woreda has no benchmarks for graduation. Though there is wealth registration "it gets ranked but not marked" for graduation. Registration of wealth of all PSNP clients is held annually. [SNN-BOL-WLICU]

We don't have any idea about graduation. [SNN-LOK-WLICU]

To summarize, graduation benchmarks are clearly understood in Amhara and have been effectively communicated to woreda and kebele authorities. There is less clarity surrounding graduation benchmarks in Oromiya and no clarity at all in SNNP. In SNNP, there is a suggestion that graduation has been put on hold until benchmarks have been sorted out.

## **10.5. Why low levels of graduation (2): Livelihood pathways and graduation**

We asked respondents at region, woreda and kebele levels how they thought the design of the PSNP4 – specifically the three livelihood pathways -- had helped to promote successful/sustainable graduation. Many indicated that they believed the design of pathways to be good and the strategy for graduation made sense on paper, yet in reality positive change was not forthcoming. This was attributed to a range of things, including the household cap, drought and lack of funds, however the consistent issue that emerged was that only the on-farm pathway had been productively implemented.

The promotion of the three livelihood pathways was a good strategy but due to the reasons on the ground we have only worked on the crop and livestock pathway. [ORO-RFSTF]

Due to limitations of the private sector and absence of employment opportunity, the off-farm and employment pathways have not helped to facilitate graduation. We had to focus on crop and livestock which are susceptible to the challenges mentioned earlier. [ORO-CHI-WLICU]

Talking about pathways, two of them, that is, employment pathways and off-farm pathways, were not relevant to us because there are no natural and business opportunities to implement them.

R3. The crop and livestock pathways were good strategies for our woreda but due to resource limitations we haven't performed as much as we wanted to. [ORO-FAD-WFSTF]

The design of PSNP-4 is very good. We try to graduate households using the three livelihood pathways. All the three are important. However, the employment pathway is temporary. Often it has no permanent employment but only temporary. The other drawback of the employment pathway is that there are youth who drop out from school to get employed due to their problems. [SNNP-BOL-WLICU]

The design has no problem in making people to food secure and graduate sustainably, rather the problem is the implementation of the livelihood pathways. For instance, the off-farm pathway faced difficulty because of the loan repayment grace period is short which is six month after the day the loan is being given. Thus, people are not interested to be involved in this pathway. Had it been at least one year it would have been feasible. The employment pathway have no detail procedural approach and legal framework that enforces employees to accept the referral linkage. It depends on the will of the employers. The linkage with PSNP capital project also created conflict of interest among the youth from PSNP families and non PSNP families. [AMH-LIB-WFSTF]

A few respondents praised the on-farm pathway to graduation, specifically emphasizing livestock as a successful strategy. However, even these positive views came with caveats regarding drought and localized shocks that meant that graduation from the PSNP was not easy to achieve. Strikingly, there was not one positive view on experience with the employment pathway. The perceived problems were to do with 'lack of employment opportunities' and 'lack of interest from clients who do not have appropriate skills':

R2: Employment opportunity creation is dependent on available employment opportunity in the area, which is very limited.

R3: The PSNP clients were less interested in off-farm pathway because they have limited experience and their background is farming where they have a relative advantage. [ORO-ZEW-WLICU]

The employment pathway is not given much attention and people are not interested to go far and be employed as the payment is not attractive. [AMH-ANG-WLICU]

We indicated that the on-farm pathway is the major livelihood support area implemented in our woreda. We can say that it worked well in our woreda. But, the other two pathways have not been implemented successfully. Clients generally don't prefer to take loans for off-farm pathway as the repayment period is shorter than the on-farm pathway. Moreover, the on-farm activities in the woreda have good market opportunities which attracted more clients to it. On the other hand, the employment pathway has not materialized. We started some communication with Yirgalem TVET to arrange trainings for prospective clients. [SID-LOK-WLICU]

### **10.6. Why low levels of graduation (3): COVID and other shocks**

Assessments of the effects of COVID on graduation varied by region and respondent. This is exemplified by comments made during our focus group and key informant discussions in Amhara. WLICUs, WFSTFs, and DAs in each woreda surveyed all stated that COVID had no impact on graduation.

The impact of COVID is marginal in affecting the plan for graduation and the potential to graduate households. Things are working normally. [AMH-LIB-WFSTF]

However, the Amhara RLICU claimed that COVID affected the livelihood component because training and meetings were not practically possible.

COVID affected the livelihood component because training and meetings were not practically possible. COVID also affected some clients because marketplaces were closed for some time. Employment pathway was not possible as COVID restricts mobility. This effects of COVID will also affect graduation even though it is not highly pronounced. [AMH-RLICU]

Marketplace closures and its implications for graduation were also noted by a WLICU.

It has not interrupted graduation, but COVID meant that some of our livelihood clients were forced to sell their product at a low price since the market was closed. There are clients who delayed their loan repayment for 8 to 10 days. *[AMH-ANG-WLICU]*

KFSTF respondents in Mekdela and Angolela Tera gave other reasons why COVID had affected graduation.

In 2012 we have identified 12 households to be graduated, but a combination of Covid-19 and drought interrupted the plan as the KFSTF decided that it is not the time to make them graduated. The drought, if it continues this way, would have the potential to interrupt graduation in the future. *[AMH-MEK-KFSTF]*

Yes, there was no graduation in 2012 due to COVID. Because we thought COVID will have a great impact the KFSTF decided not to graduate clients in 2012 budget year. *[AMH-ANG-KFSTF]*

In Oromiya, a similar divergence of views was seen. The regional FSTF and LICU explained that COVID has affected graduation and the potential for households to graduate because it affected the overall implementation of the PSNP components and weakened support the region could give to woredas and clients. By contrast, respondents at Woreda and Kebele level all stated that COVID had no impact on graduation.

In SNNP, the regional LICU disagreed with the regional FSTF about whether COVID had interrupted graduation. At the woreda level, some – but not all – woredas perceived that COVID had an impact on graduation.

Yes, COVID had significantly affected the plans for graduation. This was in term of hindrance to go down for follow up, interrupted repayment and disbursement of loans for one year, and interruption of follow up of the graduates (graduates of EC2010 and 2011) compounded by dry climatic conditions has negatively affected graduation. *[SNN-BOL-WLICU]*

Yes, we witnessed that Covid was one of the key factors that delayed graduation. This is because PSNP clients were restricted from attending their activities regularly and they could not go to the nearby markets either to sell or to buy. We could not convene clients for possible discussion at community and kebele level due to the Covid protocol. *[SNN-ARB-WFSTP]*

At the kebele level, again some (but not all) DAs noted that COVID might have affected graduation as it had led to restrictions on public gatherings.

Yes, I believe that COVID has also contributed to the plans for graduation as the COVID protocol prohibited gathering of people for discussion. It had negative economic impacts on household livelihoods which obliged the postponement of graduation in our kebele *[SNN-ARB-DA]*

When asked directly, no respondent in any of our qualitative interviews suggested that conflict and displacement affected graduation. In fact, the majority specifically said that conflict had no impact at all. A few respondents referred vaguely to political unrest (see below), but this did not appear to cause problems for graduation. This is due primarily to the fact that the study woredas have not experienced conflict.

Summarizing, divergent views were expressed on the impact that COVID had on graduation. Strikingly, no respondents stated that they had received direct instructions to stop or slow graduation because of the pandemic. Instead, COVID was seen to have interfered with the processes associated with preparing households to graduate, most notably: the closure of marketplaces (which adversely affected the off-farm employment pathways and the profitability of livelihood-related activities; and prohibitions on meetings and gatherings.

### 10.7. Plans for future graduation

Across all regions LICU and FSTF officials indicated that they had plans and visions to graduate PSNP clients. The RFSTF respondent in Amhara indicated that this was 30% of the PW clients; other regions were less specific. All regional respondents linked the potential for graduation to a combined provision of support that includes livelihood transfers, livelihood support, loans, transfers and technical support.

We believe the potential for graduation is high and a number of clients can graduate from the program. The RLICU contribute to graduation knowing that it is the result of a combined effort of PW, transfer and livelihood interventions. So, our focus is creating asset for our clients. Graduation is not the mandate of RLICU. It is the mandate of the Regional Food Security Directorate. *[AM-RLICU]*

We plan to graduate households based on plans on provision of loans and their ability to build assets. Graduation itself is promoted as an activity. *[SNN\_RFSTF]*

They also recognized the constraints to this vision, with SNNP respondents being keen to state them.

However, there are conditions that made graduation not succeed as expected. As indicated before, these include shortage of funds (small size of livelihood transfers, low coverage), and lack of integration of packages that make the interventions more successful. *[SNN\_RFSTF]*

We know that about 20,000 PSNP clients graduated during 2011 and 2012 budget years. The strategy doesn't consider livelihood as a means to graduate clients. It was not even indicated in the design document. There was no clear strategy for helping people to become food secure. *[SNN\_RLICU]*

Woreda level officials (LICU and FSTF) in Oromiya and Amhara were also clear on what was needed for successful graduation, indicating that a package of support including credit, livelihood support, and savings were critical to sustainable change in food security and livelihoods. They were also aware, however, of a range of issues that constrained this vision from being realized, including poor loan repayment, lack of training and lack of funds.

R1. The vision is to graduate households out of PSNP by supporting them to be self-sufficient in a sustainable way.

R2. This was to be achieved through provision or creation of access to financial resources, provision of training and helping clients to develop business plans and engage in small businesses that will help them diversify their income sources and increase HH income *[ORO-KUY-FSTF]*

The strategy we used for graduation has taken into consideration those households who are resilient for at least for one year if they face a shock. This is through encouraging self-graduation through extending advisory services to them to help them see opportunities to change their life. It is also by encouraging them to take loans and to get involved in businesses

that suit them. After they graduate we extend their transfer for one year and they retain their client card to use it to access loans. *[AMH-MEK-WLICU]*

R2. There were concerted efforts in providing trainings, but we haven't done much in creating access to finances.

R3. One of assumed financial sources was loan payments from past loan (Given almost 10+ years ago from the WB) but repayment is so low that we haven't provided the credit as planned.

R4. Overall plan achievement is low. *[ORO-ZEW-WFSTF]*

We haven't achieved the plan, because there is no access to finances and no loan capital *[ORO-KUY-WFSTF]*

There was a plan to graduate about 80% of PSNP clients at first. R2. This plan was suspended due to the different shocks occurred in the region. *[ORO-CHI-WFSTF]*

We have graduation plans every year with the use of various strategies that provide livelihood loans, livelihood transfer/support and with capital budget by building irrigation that creates a strong asset base. But, due to shocks of various kinds we are not able to graduate all the households since they do not meet the benchmark. *[AMH-LIB-WFSTF]*

Staff in two SNNP woredas were not entirely clear of graduation criteria or plans. While there had been graduation according to quotas some years ago, in Loko Abaya (Sidama), Arbaminch Zuria and Sodo Zuria there has been no graduation in EY 2011 and 2012.

Since 2008 EFY there was a plan for graduation to be undertaken in 2010 EFY. And there was a graduation plan for 2011 EFY. However, because of the shortage of funds for loans many clients did not get the support. Thus, the attainment of graduation was below the plan. There are also some who got loans but showed poor performance because of shocks. *[SNN-BOL-LICU]*

There was no graduation in our woreda for the last two years and we don't know about vision of sustainable graduation. *[SNN-SOD-LICU]*

Our woreda expected to graduate the PSNP clients according to what was called Graduation Prediction System (GPS). This was purely based on the socioeconomic status of clients. Moreover, we considered providing livelihood support services to clients to help them to become food secure and sustainably graduate from the programme. However, we did not undertake the graduation of any PSNP clients in EC 2011, 2012, and 2013. *[SNN-ARB-LICU]*

We know that there was a plan to sustainably graduate PSNP clients in our woreda which was based on attaining food security status at household level. We did not have graduation in 2011 and 2012 due to COVID and the political uprising that happened in the area. So, it is difficult to explain the achievement of the plan as there was no graduation in 2011 and 2012. *[SNN-BOL-WFSTF]*

There was also concern, particularly in Oromiya, about past experiences with graduation, specifically the premature graduation of households as a result, in part, of pressures from regional officials.

In 2006 E.C. 60% of PSNP clients were graduated without properly assessing the livelihoods of the PSNP households. In order to not repeat the same mistake graduation should only focus

on households, who have created wealth to sustain their livelihood in a better way. [ORO-ZEW-WLICU]

R2. Graduation quotas are given from the region without taking into account the local situation. For example, this year we are told to graduate 50% of PSNP clients -- this is 3513 clients.

R4. To somehow comply with the number given by the region, we reduced the benchmark taking only 30% of the 54000 which makes the benchmark 16,200 birr. Even then, we can graduate only 630 clients which is a big discrepancy from what is expected of us by the region. [ORO-FAD-WFSTF]

## 10.8. Summary

We begin by summarizing our key findings before returning to RQs 14 and 9.

Our core result is that virtually no graduation has taken place since the midline survey in 2018. Both our quantitative and qualitative data show this. Respondents to our qualitative surveys did not provide a single reason why this occurred; however, several re-occurring themes emerge. We highlight three: (1) As noted in the introduction, in PSNP4 graduation is to be facilitated through a variety of supporting activities including specific livelihood pathways, lump-sum livelihood asset transfers, training and extension, access to microfinance, and help to transition to off-farm employment. Apart from the livestock pathway, respondents perceive that it has not been possible to provide these supporting activities at a scale that would permit meaningful levels of graduation. The employment pathway is seen as having been particularly problematic. Other forms of support, for example, continued access to PSNP transfers for 12 months, have also been lacking; (2) COVID appears to have played an indirect role. Strikingly, no respondents stated that they had received direct instructions to stop or slow graduation because of the pandemic. Instead, COVID was seen to have interfered with the processes associated with preparing households to graduate, most notably the closure of marketplaces (which adversely affected the off-farm employment pathways and the profitability of livelihood-related activities) and prohibitions on meetings and gatherings; and (3) In some localities, most notably SNNP (but not Amhara), there is a poor understanding of how graduation is supposed to work. The absence of graduation benchmarks in SNNP exemplifies this.

Given these findings, we note the following with respect to RQ14:

*RQ14(a): To what extent are the right households (as defined by the eligibility criteria in the PIM) graduated from the PSNP?* It is not possible to answer this question because: (i) There are simply not enough graduated households to assess whether the right households are being graduated; and (ii) In a number of localities, especially SNNP, there are no graduation benchmarks which could be used to assess whether the “right” households graduated.

*RQ14(b): How is graduation carried out (as compared with the PIM)? To what extent do households and communities participate in the process of identifying and selecting households for graduation?* In Amhara, respondents to our qualitative surveys at all levels provide similar descriptions. A wealth assessment is carried out using a region-wide uniform benchmark. The DA/CFSTF identifies those who qualify to graduate. The community evaluates the results of the DA/CFSTF and KFSTF. Clients can register complaints to the KAC if they do not agree with the DA/CFSTF and KFSTF assessments. In other regions, officials responsible for graduation were less clear on these processes, in part because so little graduation had taken place. Because there has been so little graduation, it is not possible to use our quantitative household data to assess the extent to which households participate in this process.



*RQ14(c): Is the graduation process transparent? Are people aware of the graduation criteria? Does this experience differ between male and female-headed households?* Most regional respondents were aware of the requirements of graduation benchmarks, but the responsibility for setting these benchmarks were different across the regions. In Amhara, there was a clear uniform benchmark understood at all levels, whereas in Oromiya and SNNP this responsibility seemed to have been devolved to woredas. This has led to some confusion at the woreda level, with differing benchmarks across woredas. At the household level, there are too few graduated households to assess quantitatively whether graduation is understood or is perceived to be transparent. That said, the absence of clear criteria in some localities, together with the fact that few graduated households were interviewed prior to graduation, or told that they would be graduating, suggests that graduation is not fully transparent.

*RQ14(d): Do people (those selected for graduation, those who remain in receipt of PSNP transfers, and others) perceive the fairness and accuracy of the graduation process?* There are not enough graduated households to answer this question quantitatively.

*RQ14(e): For households that have graduated from the PSNP, what support (technical, financial, or other) have they received to ensure that they do not fall back into the PSNP?* Most graduated households have not received technical or financial support.

*RQ14(f): Have graduates from PSNP sustained / built their assets and livelihoods?* There are not enough graduated households to answer this question quantitatively.

Lastly, we note that the finding that there has been little graduation is consistent with the results discussed in chapter 4 on targeting. Specifically, with respect to RQ9 (For how long PSNP households were in the program?), they indicate that households are not being moved in-and-out; rather, those selected during the early years of PSNP4 have remained in the program.