

Monitoring, Verification, and Evaluation Component of the WASH Results Programme

Evaluation Synthesis Report – Vol. 1.1

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itad

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Disclaimer

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This clause applies to all pages and information included in this report.

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Executive summary

The WASH Results Programme

The UK Department for International Development's (DFID) Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Results Programme is a £111 million seven-year programme (2014 to 2021). The first round of the programme was implemented between May 2014 and March 2018 and aimed to bring equitable and sustainable water and sanitation services and hygiene practices to 4.5 million people in 11 countries¹. In 2017 the programme was extended, to include a second phase lasting until 2021. The scope of this evaluation is limited to the first contracting round (2014 to 2018)².

The programme was implemented by three supplier consortia contracted to DFID under a payment by results (PbR) financing modality. The WASH Results Programme was one of DFID's - and the wider sector's - first large-scale applications of a PBR contracting modality. Suppliers had no up-front financing; 100% of payments to Suppliers were based on delivery of pre-specified 'results' which were independently verified by a third party.

The nature of the 'results' varied by supplier and varied across the phases of the programme. In the two initial years of the programme (the 'output phase' – January 2014 to December 2015) payments were made for the completion of activities and output-level results. While in the latter two years of the programme (the 'outcome phase' – January 2016 to March 2018), payments were linked almost exclusively to achievement of outcomes, with a small proportion of payments linked to indicators of sustainability of outcomes for one Supplier.

In addition to the PbR financing modality the WASH Results Programme had a number of other key features, the most important of which were:

- **size**, with each supplier contract being worth approximately £25 million; and
- **timing and phasing**, with an output phase (ending by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) deadline of December 2015) that delivered access to water and sanitation services and hygiene promotion campaigns; and an outcome phase (to March 2018), which aimed to ensure the sustainability of the services and behaviour changes achieved.

The Suppliers

The programme was implemented predominantly through INGOs working in partnership with local government and national NGOs. Two suppliers, the Consortium for Sustainable WASH in Fragile Contexts (SWIFT), and the South Asia WASH Results Programme (SAWRP), were consortia of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). The third, Sustainable Sanitation and Hygiene for All (SSH4A), was implemented by a single INGO. Table 1 (overleaf) provides an overview of the three consortia.

¹ South Sudan and Liberia were dropped from the original 13-country programme

² Envisaged as a £70 million four-year programme (May 2014 to March 2018)

Table 1: Consortium composition

Programme and budget	Lead supplier and consortium partners	Countries of operation
SAWRP £24,995,906	Lead: Plan International Consortium partners: WaterAid, Water Sanitation for the Urban Poor (WSUP) and Unilever. Water Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC) and Ipsos MORI Implementing partners: various national NGOs	Pakistan, Bangladesh
SSH4A £24,032,477	Lead: SNV Consortium partners: none Implementing partners: various national NGOs and government partners	Ghana, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, Nepal Dropped: South Sudan in 2016 due to fragile-state context
SWIFT £19,668,078	Lead: Oxfam Consortium Partners: Tearfund, WSUP; the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Implementing partners: Practical Action, Sanergy, Concern Worldwide, and various national NGOs and public water utilities	Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya. Dropped: Liberia in 2014 due to the Ebola crisis)

The SWIFT consortium was led by Oxfam GB and operated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Kenya. In contrast to the other supplier programmes, activities encompassed both urban and rural contexts. SWIFT was the only consortium that included a substantial water supply component in addition to sanitation and hygiene promotion. In DRC, SWIFT delivered water and sanitation and hygiene activities at scale through the national government WASH programme. SWIFT in Kenya operated through a portfolio of small- to medium-sized projects across both urban and rural sanitation and water; with implementation through INGOs.

The SAWRP consortium was led by Plan International and operated in Bangladesh and Pakistan. The focus of SAWRP was on rural sanitation and hygiene, though it included a modest³ water supply component. SAWRP implementation was through community-level programming and implementation in schools. Plan International, WaterAid, and their local implementing partners promoted sanitation and handwashing with soap in poor rural communities using community-led total sanitation (CLTS) and sanitation marketing. Unilever delivered a handwashing campaign in a large number of schools in both countries, though the focus was overwhelmingly in Bangladesh.

SSH4A was solely implemented by SNV and its local implementing partners in seven African countries and Nepal. The SSH4A programme focused only on rural sanitation and hygiene promotion— it had no water supply component. Activities were implemented within the framework of the existing SSH4A programme, which has been operating in a dozen countries in Asia since 2009. The SSH4A approach embodies a tested operational model for working at scale and combines demand creation – mostly using CLTS – with support to sanitation supply chains, behaviour change communication (BCC), and strengthening capacity for WASH governance. Implementation at the field level was predominantly by local government partners, supported to a greater or lesser extent by NGOs (referred to as Local Capacity Builders (LCBs) by SNV).

³ Water supply improvements were not a major feature of the programme (only 3% of beneficiaries), but were included in order to provide access to some of the poorest and most under-served poor communities.

The verification approach

The independent verification of suppliers' results adopted a systems-based approach, meaning it was based on data generated by the supplier's internal monitoring and reporting systems, rather than independent data collection by the monitoring and verification (MV) team. Working with DFID and suppliers, the MV team created a verification system for the programme – tailored specifically to each supplier's monitoring and reporting systems. However the verification approach contained the same core elements:

- **Systems appraisals** of the suppliers' monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems were conducted to assess the likelihood that data would be reliable and reports would be timely and accurate.
- **Field visits** were conducted to better understand supplier M&E systems, to collect primary data that feeds into verification, and to help build relationships with Suppliers.
- **The evidence submitted by suppliers was reviewed**, using a set of minimum standards. Sometimes spot checks were done on the data.
- **After Action reviews were held** to ensure that key learning surrounding measurement and verification of indicators was applied in subsequent verification rounds.

Programme performance

By most measures the programme was very successful in achieving its stated objectives.

The vast majority of output-level targets were achieved by all suppliers, and in many areas with significant overachievement. A prominent reason for exceeding targets was that suppliers had planned for overachievement as part of their risk management strategy. The suppliers also overwhelmingly achieved the outcome targets, with significant overachievement in several areas and modest underachievement in relatively few others. The WASH Results Programme also consistently scored well under DFID's Annual review process; scoring A in 2014 and 2015 and A+ 2016-2018.

The evaluation approach

The WASH Results Programme evaluation was primarily undertaken for learning purposes, not accountability.⁴ The objectives of the evaluation were to assess:

- whether the programme successfully achieved its stated objectives;
- the influence of programme design, including the PbR modality, on this achievement; and
- lessons for applying PbR in WASH programming going forward.

The main focus of the evaluation, and this report, is on how and why and under what circumstances results were achieved. The 27 detailed evaluation questions address all five Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts, and sustainability.

⁴ Operationalisation of the original terms of reference resulted in two distinct workstreams. The Programme Evaluation Workstream (PEW) is addressed in this document. The randomised control trial (RCT), conducted in Pakistan, which examines factors affecting the sustainability of sanitation behaviour change in Pakistan, is described in separate documents.

The mid-term evaluation report (2016) examined progress half way through the programme, focusing particularly on the original design and tendering process, and on the output phase (March 2014 to December 2015, later extended to March 2016). It addressed all relevance evaluation questions, and the effectiveness and efficiency questions as they related to the output phase, and it explored some initial indications of impacts and sustainability.

The endline evaluation activities were conducted from October 2017 to July 2018 and addressed the outstanding effectiveness and efficiency elements, especially as they related to the outcome phase (January 2016 to March 2018), and examined the impact and sustainability evaluation questions.

This final synthesis report incorporates key findings from the midline with the results from the new endline evaluation activities. The findings draw on an analysis of programme documentation; verification data; an analysis of the literature on PbR and WASH practice; two phases of interviews with key informants among all stakeholder groups; and, in particular, the findings from purposively selected case studies undertaken for each of the three suppliers.

Lessons learned

The lessons presented in this section are framed around the core learning objectives of this evaluation as opposed to specific evaluation questions. As an endline evaluation, the evaluators focused on broader lessons relevant for the future for individual suppliers, DFID and/or the WASH sector as a whole. This report does not repeat all of the lessons and recommendations from the midline evaluation (see full list from the midline in Annex A), though several themes carry through. The lessons presented here are further elaborated upon and nuanced in the main body of the report.

(i) Whether the programme successfully achieved its stated objectives

- A. All three supplier consortia were successful in delivering their targets, through there is a question of how replicable this achievement is.** Suppliers achieved, if not exceeded, the vast majority of their contractual targets; partially due to the possibility to shift over-achievement to cover underperformance within some subcategories. However, the tight timetable in the output phase placed a high burden on staff; particularly during the output phase. The WASH Results Programme was exceptional in that it was the first large-scale application of PbR in the WASH sector; it was a high-profile programme which presented great financial and reputational risks for the suppliers. With this came heightened management attention. These exceptional factors are significant because they raise some questions surrounding how replicable the achievements of the programme may be.
- B. Suppliers' programme approaches were generally well aligned with DFID's expectations, but in some cases the fact that DFID did not articulate these expectations more clearly resulted in a missed opportunity.** The programmatic approaches chosen by the suppliers generally met DFID's expectations, such as operating at scale⁵, inclusivity, and sustainability. However, not requiring a focus on community-wide coverage (in sanitation Open Defecation Free (ODF) status) or other best practice for achieving sustainable and inclusive outcomes presented a missed opportunity – though it is noted that in many cases ODF was still pursued as a programme objective by suppliers. DFID not explicitly setting all of their expectations at the bidding stage created a risk for potential suppliers, onto whom the risk of delivery was transferred under a PbR contract.

⁵ Taken here to mean reaching a large number of people.

C. The PbR modality strengthened supplier monitoring systems, though in many cases undertaking improvements to monitoring systems was more burdensome than suppliers anticipated. The monitoring systems of most of the supplier consortia partners required moderate to significant modifications to meet verification requirements. It is important to strike a balance between increased rigour and the corresponding increased cost, because there is a potential opportunity cost with regards to staff time and money in doing ever more intensive monitoring.

D. Suppliers reported substantial learning on how to manage and price risk. Based on the programme's experience, the following approaches worked well, some of which can be considered normal good practice: (1) setting realistic targets; (2) using reliable implementation partners; (3) applying tested approaches; (4) including a contingency fund; (5) considering cost inflation in the total price; (6) considering the risk that partners would not achieve the intended results; and (7) taking advantage of the increased monitoring to facilitate risk management.

(ii) The influence of programme design, including the PbR modality, on this achievement

E. DFID gave suppliers substantial flexibility and freedom to design and implement their own approaches, but this flexibility largely manifested only to higher levels of programme management⁶. Suppliers were able to propose the indicators, and the frequency with which they would be assessed, and each supplier individually negotiated a different 'results framework' with DFID under which they were paid. Suppliers appreciated this flexibility at the design stage, as well as the flexibility allowed during implementation. This flexibility was largely confined to higher levels of programme management, as field teams were tightly managed, and where there were local implementing partners they generally operated on grant agreements which retained financial and activity reporting.

F. Implementation approaches for the three supplier consortia varied widely yet overwhelmingly relied on proven approaches and existing relationships with NGOs and governments. The evaluators uncovered little evidence of genuine innovation in programmatic approaches – meaning that no approaches that were novel to the global WASH sector were developed, though it is important to note evaluators found several instances of adaptive programming.

G. The split between output and outcome phases had mixed results. The urgency of the December 2015 deadline for the output phase in some cases limited suppliers' ability to adapt and posed risks to quality, at least in the short term, and the sustainability of results. While it was clearly beneficial to have longer-term engagement with the institutions (government or community-level) with responsibility for managing services, this could have been achieved without formal phasing. Similarly, while imposing accountability for outcomes was beneficial and improved functionality, this could also have been achieved without formal phasing.

⁶ This lesson is also supported by evidence from the wider PbR literature. See Soucat, A., Dale, E., Mathauer, I., Kutzin, J. (2017) 'Pay-for-Performance Debate: Not Seeing the Forest for the Trees'. *Health Systems & Reform* 2017; 3:74–79; and Renmans, D., Holvoet, N., Orach, C. G. and Criel, B. (2016) 'Opening the "black box" of performance-based financing in low- and lower middle-income countries: a review of the literature'. *Health Policy and Planning*, 31(9), 1297–1309. doi: 10.1093/heapol/czw045

(iii) Lessons for applying PbR in WASH programming in future

- H. **The WASH Results Programme was not a clean test of PbR**, for a variety of reasons, such as the evolution of expectations, the characteristics of the contracting process, and the uniquely tight timetable for the first two years. For example, many programmatic decisions had already been made by suppliers, by verifiers and by DFID before the PbR modality was fully understood, and before the indicators for which suppliers would be judged were negotiated. While the WASH Results Programme offers several interesting and indicative lessons, its contribution to the broader evidence base for PbR in WASH is limited.
- I. **PbR appeared to be a viable option for funding WASH programmes, but 100% PbR was neither necessary nor optimal.** To help manage cash flow and other risks, two suppliers selected several process or activity targets, however these activities were time-consuming to document and verify. These could easily have been reimbursed in a more traditional way, without reducing the overall stimulus a PbR contract provides.
- J. **A PbR approach using disincentives only, without bonus opportunities, put potentially undue, and unintended, burden on suppliers.** Suppliers put in a great deal of effort to not only achieve but overachieve many targets, but were not rewarded for doing so.
- K. **The efforts of suppliers were not solely informed by financial incentives.** The suppliers contracted under the WASH Results Programme had strong organisational values, which led them to take action on aspects not directly linked to payment. In many cases the reputational risk associated with not meeting given targets was also a powerful motivator.
- L. **Clarity on guiding principles of how major events, such as natural disasters or epidemics, would be handled between DFID and suppliers is important in a PbR context.** In two cases involving SWIFT, DFID *de facto* assumed some of the financial risk after events. As the level of risk-sharing and the level of evidence expected was not clearly specified at contract stage, time and resources were invested in negotiating the level of risk sharing.
- M. **The high level of uncertainty at invitation to tender stage discouraged several bidders.** Specifically, the lack of clarity surrounding the results and how they would be verified meant that some private sector actors viewed the programme as very high risk.
- N. **Under the WASH Results Programme, in part because of the lack of clarity on how the PbR modality would operate, the PbR incentives acted within the context of tried and tested implementation approaches than on untested operational models.**
- O. **The lack of an inception phase – to design verification requirements before implementation began – caused inefficiencies because the verification had to be repeatedly adapted as the supplier's systems changed or became better-known by the MV team.**
- P. **The value of including process-related indicators as payment indicators was dependent on context.** The evaluators perceived that the process indicators related to start-up activities were included primarily to minimise the risk of non-payment for the suppliers and to facilitate cash flow in early stages rather than incentivise supplier attention on specific aspects of programming⁷. This was suboptimal and inefficient when these indicators are costly and time-consuming to document and verify. The experience of this

⁷ This indicates that it is less likely that such process indicators would be included in future if a significant part of the programme was grant-funded.

programme shows that more complex aspects of programming (e.g. sustainability prerequisites or learning) which lack agreed standards are difficult to measure. There is value in reporting on process indicators related to these complex aspects of programming when DFID seeks to encourage certain aspects in programme implementation. Though this reporting does not necessarily need to be linked to result-based payment⁸.

- Q. The PbR mechanism was better able to incentivise the desired results in those cases where suppliers had more control over results.** The PbR incentive acted less strongly where implementation was through government, and where activities were incentivising behaviour change.
- R. Larger international partners were better able to handle the pre-financing, risk management, and flexibility necessary under PbR than small organisations.** All three lead suppliers chose to hold a large portion of risk centrally. There were mixed results in the few cases where local implementers were on full or partial PbR contracts, with some shifting positively to a stronger sense of accountability, while others were less able to cope and in some cases had their contracts discontinued.
- S. Establishing appropriate outcome level targets was challenging.** This was because much was beyond the suppliers' direct control, and at the time of contracting there were few established benchmarks for the conversion of WASH outputs into outcomes.
- T. Several lessons emerged on how the PbR modality could best strengthen supplier monitoring systems:** In the WASH Results Programme, explicitly linking payments to outcomes triggered intensive discussion around outcome measurement, and the validity of those measurements in particular. Outcome-level monitoring, as well as accountability, played a facilitative role in ensuring functionality. The increased monitoring also supported supplier risk management strategies. It is also noted that suppliers were generally positive about the MV's contribution to strengthening monitoring.
- U. Several missed opportunities for learning occurred under the WASH Results Programme:** data were primarily used for progress reporting/compliance, as opposed to learning; and the tight schedule in the output phase also limited opportunity for deeper learning and reflection.

⁸ If aspects such as inclusion were linked to a result-based payment, these payments could for example reward the following: (a) Work in under-served geographical areas could be rewarded by allowing a higher unit price-per-beneficiary. (b) Bonus payments could reward survey results which confirm that equity targets and water-point functionality targets have been met after a certain period.

Recommendations for future WASH PbR programmes

These recommendations are primarily for donors, such as DFID, that are considering the use of PbR in future WASH programmes.

1. **At design stage clarify the purpose of using PbR and consider the implications of PbR for the type of supplier expected to bid.** While the *potential* benefits of PbR generally are well documented, it is important to set out in the programme design what the *specific* rationale is for using PbR in this case, and to define the added value that it should bring.
2. **100% PbR may be undesirable – the size of the PbR component should be tailored to the purpose specified and to the feasibility of measuring results** – especially in cases where suppliers require finance in the early stages of implementation to ensure cash flow. We recommend a hybrid design where a part of supplier payments are grant-based, with a smaller percentage used as an incentive for good performance in key areas⁹. If PbR is used to incentivise action related to aspects of programming that are important but difficult to measure¹⁰, then great care should be given to the indicators used
3. **Where possible, streamline the verification burden on suppliers.** This relates both to the indicators used for payment purposes and how the effort is applied by verifiers.
4. **At design stage, the funding agency should, as far as possible, provide more clarity on the results to be achieved and the accompanying verification requirements.** This may include appointing the verification provider before implementation begins and/ or being more prescriptive on standards for verification requirements¹¹.
5. **As far as possible, at tender stage clarify donor/supplier risk-sharing arrangements in the event of exceptional events** including the level and type of evidence expected.
6. **In future programmes ensure there is a sufficient inception phase**, ensuring that verification requirements are clear before any implementation activities begins.
7. **Ensure that the learning by the MV team and suppliers on measuring and verifying key WASH indicators (especially outcome-level indicators) is captured and disseminated at the sector level.**

⁹ Experience with PbR in other sectors also suggests that the value of PbR lies not in reimbursing the direct costs of implementation (as NGOs are already motivated to do this) but in linking PbR payments so as to incentivise only those dimensions which might otherwise be marginalised, albeit unintentionally

¹⁰ These aspects include: creating an enabling environment for sustainability; ensuring meaningful action on equity and inclusion; and allowing space for learning.

¹¹ This recommendation is also supported by evidence from the wider PbR literature. See Witter, S. *et al.* (2018) '(How) does RBF strengthen strategic purchasing of health care? Comparing the experience of Uganda, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the Congo'. Submitted for publication.

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Abbreviations

ASAL	Arid and semi-arid lands
BCC	Behaviour change communication
CCU	Country Coordination Unit
CLTS	Community-led total sanitation
DEQ	Detailed evaluation question
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EQuALS	Evaluation Quality Assurance and Learning Service
FGD	Focus group discussion
HEQ	High-level evaluation question
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
JMP	Joint Monitoring Programme
L&D	Learning and dissemination
LCB	Local Capacity Builder
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MOU	Memorandum of understanding
MV	Monitoring and verification
MVE	Monitoring, verification, and evaluation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODF	Open defecation-free
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
OxPAC	Oxfam, Practical Action, and Concern
PbR	Payment by results
PEW	Programme Evaluation Workstream
Q1	Quarter 1
RBF	Results-based financing
RCT	Randomised control trial
SAF	Sustainability Assessment Framework
SAWRP	South Asia WASH Results Programme, a consortium led by Plan-UK
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
SSH4A	Sustainable Sanitation and Hygiene for All
SWIFT	Sustainable WASH in Fragile Contexts, a consortium led by Oxfam UK
TOR	Terms of reference
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
VEA	<i>Villages et Écoles Assainis</i> (Healthy Villages and Schools)
VFM	Value for money
WASH	Water, sanitation, and hygiene
WEDC	Water Engineering and Development Centre

Key terms used in this document

The following table explains key terms used throughout this document.

Key term	Explanation
Consortium	Three consortia, made up of groups of organisations, were contracted to implement the WASH Results Programme. Separately, the e-Pact consortium was contracted to conduct the monitoring, verification, and evaluation (MVE) component.
Country programme	Refers to activities at country level. There were 13 country programmes in the WASH Results Programme.
Country manager	The main contact person managing implementation in each country, within the three supplier consortia.
Evaluation stakeholder	The organisations and people who have been closely involved in the design of the evaluation and have a stake in its findings, namely DFID and the suppliers.
Equitable	Refers to fairness. An equitable approach means taking account of the particular needs of different sub-groups within society. The outcome of an equitable approach is that all are included, regardless of gender, age (young and old), disability (including mental and physical disabilities), illness (including chronic illness such as HIV/AIDS), poverty, ethnic origin, caste, occupation, political affiliation, religion, sexual orientation, language, or physical location. Those who tend to be neglected or marginalised, whether unconsciously or deliberately, are referred to in the report as 'excluded' individuals or groups.
Impacts	Higher-level results, such as improved health, better educational results, increased income, and improved quality of life. Impacts describe the ultimate benefits enjoyed by WASH service users ¹² . DFID's original theory of change only referred to health impacts—namely, under-five mortality rates, and the proportion of the population affected by diarrhoeal diseases. In this document, we will clearly specify each time we refer to health or non-health impacts.
Lead supplier	The organisation leading each of the three supplier consortia.
Lead verifier	The three lead verifiers led the verification of each of the three supplier contracts. These are employed by Itad within the e-Pact verification team.
MVE provider	e-Pact is providing the MVE under the WASH Results Programme. These activities are split between monitoring and verification (MV) led by Itad, and evaluation services led by Oxford Policy Management (OPM).
Outcomes	The use of improved water supply and sanitation services; maintenance, care and financing of water supply and sanitation facilities; and the practice of good hygiene. In accordance with the WASH Results Programme logframe, 'outcomes' in this document refers to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the number of people using and continuing to use clean drinking water sources; the number of people using and continuing to use improved sanitation facilities; and the number of people handwashing with soap and undertaking other hygienic practices at critical times, and continuing to do so until the end of the outcome-phase deadline of March 2018.
Outputs	Those physical and non-physical items which are delivered by WASH programmes, such as taps, toilets, newly established WASH committees, enhanced skills and knowledge. In accordance with the WASH Results Programme logframe, 'outputs' in this document refers to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the number of people gaining access to clean drinking water; the number of people gaining access to improved sanitation facilities; and

¹² This definition differs from the OECD's definition of 'impacts', which refer to any causal effects of the programme – at output level, outcome level, or 'impact' level.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the number of people reached through hygiene promotion activities through DFID support.
PbR	DFID uses Payment by Results (PbR) as an umbrella term for various performance-based contracts with different types of organisations. Payments to service providers such as the suppliers implementing this programme are classed as ‘results-based financing’ (RBF) (DFID 2014a).
Payment milestones	Suppliers committed to achieving specific deliverables at predefined dates, spread over the duration of their contracts. Suppliers were paid by DFID within a specified period, contingent on verification of the evidence submitted as part of the payment milestone. The payment milestones included payments for inputs, processes, outputs, or outcomes.
Programme level	Refers to evaluation activities or questions which relate to the whole WASH Results Programme, for which there were three suppliers.
Service users	The target population that was intended to benefit from the WASH Results Programme’s activities.
Sub-country programme	Refers to implementation activities carried out by a subset of local partners, within a country programme. There were several local partners within each country programme.
Suppliers	The organisations contracted by DFID to implement the WASH Result Programme.
Sustainable	Sustainability relates to whether WASH services and good hygiene practices continue to work and deliver benefits over time, thus delivering permanent beneficial change in WASH services and hygiene practices (Abrams, no date; WaterAid 2011). This is determined by a variety of factors. In this evaluation, we have therefore approached sustainability in two steps: first, as part of the mid-term evaluation in 2016, we adopted a forward-looking (risk-based) approach, examining the factors which determined the likelihood of outputs and outcomes being sustained until 2018 and beyond. Secondly, as part of the endline evaluation in 2018, we have examined if and why outputs and outcomes were sustained until 2018, assessing as well their likelihood of being sustained beyond the lifetime of the programme.
Target audience of the evaluation	The organisations and people to whom the findings of the evaluation will be disseminated. This includes the evaluation stakeholders, other donors with an interest in PbR, WASH practitioners, and the evaluation community.
Unsuccessful bidders	The organisations which expressed an interest in the WASH Results Programme, but were not selected to implement it.

1 Introduction

DFID contracted the e-Pact consortium to deliver the Monitoring, Verification and Evaluation (MVE) services for the multi-country WASH Results Programme. This final synthesis report integrates key findings and recommendations from the previous midline evaluation (2016) with the results from the endline evaluation activities conducted from October 2017 to July 2018.^{13, 14}

This evaluation falls under the MVE component of the WASH Results Programme, implemented by the e-Pact consortium under DFID's Global Evaluations Framework Agreement. The evaluation component was led by OPM, and the MV component was led by Itad.

1.1 The WASH Results Programme

DFID's WASH Results Programme was a £70 million¹⁵ four-year programme (May 2014 to March 2018) that aimed to bring equitable and sustainable water and sanitation services and hygiene practices to 4.5 million people in 11 countries¹⁶, and thus to improve health by reducing diarrhoea morbidity and child mortality. The programme was implemented by three suppliers contracted to DFID under a PbR financing modality. The supplier sub-programmes were:

- SWIFT, led by Oxfam GB;
- SAWRP, led by Plan International; and
- SSH4A, implemented by the Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV).

Table 1 provides an overview of the three supplier sub-programmes. For further details on the WASH Results Programme, please refer to Section 3.

In 2017, the WASH Results Programme was extended for the delivery of additional outputs and outcomes in nine¹⁷ of the original countries until 2020; however, this extension was not part of the scope of this evaluation. All further mention of the WASH Results Programme only refers to the first phase implemented from 2014 to 2018, unless explicitly noted.

¹³ Operationalisation of the original terms of reference resulted in two distinct workstreams. The PEW is addressed in this document. The RCT conducted in Pakistan, which examines factors affecting the sustainability of sanitation behaviour change in Pakistan, is described in separate documents.

¹⁴ For the original terms of reference for the evaluation, see Annex K.

¹⁵ The original programme received an additional £41million for a total of £111million and was extended until 2021. The focus of this evaluation was only on the period from 2014-2018.

¹⁶ Two countries were dropped from the original 13-country programme.

¹⁷ These countries are: Bangladesh under SAWRP, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) under SWIFT, and Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Nepal under SSH4A.

Table 2: The supplier programmes

Programme and budget	Lead supplier and consortium partners	Countries of operation	Programme components
SAWRP £24,995,906	Lead: Plan International Consortium partners: WaterAid, Water Sanitation for the Urban Poor (WSUP) and Unilever. Water Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC) and Ipsos MORI provided support on monitoring and knowledge management Implementing partners: various national NGOs	Pakistan, Bangladesh	Sanitation; hygiene, including a substantial school hygiene promotion component; and a modest water supply component (all rural)
SSH4A £24,032,477	Lead: SNV (not a consortium) Implementing partners: various national NGOs and government partners	Ghana, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, Nepal (Also South Sudan originally, but dropped in 2016 due to fragile-state context)	Rural sanitation and hygiene only
SWIFT £19,668,078	Lead: Oxfam Consortium Partners: Tearfund, WSUP; the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) supported monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning Implementing partners: Practical Action, Sanergy, Concern Worldwide, and various national NGOs and public water utilities	DRC, Kenya. (Also Liberia originally, but this was terminated in 2014 due to the Ebola crisis)	Water supply, sanitation and hygiene (urban and rural)

The annual reviews of the WRP programme have been consistently positive; scoring A in 2014 and 2015, and A+ 2016-2018.

Regarding progress at the end of the output phase the 2016 Annual Report noted:

‘[...] the conclusion of this review is that the programme has delivered the required outputs by December 2015, and that the programme is well established to achieve acceptable sustained outcome levels over the next two years; although there is a need to ensure that the sustainability targets are achieved.

Consensus is emerging that PbR under the WASH Results Programme has been “a highly effective means of incentivising delivery at scale”. Important factors have been the clarity of expectations of what is to be delivered and the sharpened focus on tracking results in real time. However, concerns have been raised about the effects of the PbR mechanism on issues of: equity; alignment with national stakeholders; and, sustainability of outcomes. In the case of the latter, there should not be an artificial split between output and outcome phases and there is a need for clear indicators.

[...] The programme is strategically relevant for DFID.'

Regarding performance at the end of the outcome phase the 2018 Annual review noted:

'The WASH Results Programme has continued to exceed the milestones and targets set at the outset. This year was potentially more challenging for the suppliers and the monitoring and verification provider than previous years because work was ongoing simultaneously on outcome level work to sustain use of services and hygiene behaviours under the original contract and work on delivering output level results under the contract extensions. This has been done successfully overall, with a significant number of expected outcome milestones exceeded by each supplier and all others being met.'

1.2 Objectives of the evaluation

In June 2014, DFID made a commitment to greater use of PbR for the funding of international development programmes, and DFID signalled the need for more learning on how PbR programmes can be effectively implemented, and under what circumstances.

The evaluation of the WASH Results Programme is therefore primarily being undertaken for learning purposes, not as an accountability exercise. The objectives of the evaluation are to assess:

- (i) whether the programme successfully achieved its stated objectives;
- (ii) the influence of programme design, including the PbR modality, on this achievement; and
- (iii) lessons for applying PbR in WASH programming in future.

With the first phase of the WASH Results Programme now complete (2014–2018), this final synthesis report incorporates key findings from the midline evaluation with the results of the endline evaluation activities.

The overarching evaluation questions address all five OECD DAC criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts, and sustainability.

The use of PbR in the WASH sector specifically is still relatively new. Where it has been applied, this has mostly been in the form results-based aid to a government agency; its use for the contracting of INGOs to deliver community-based WASH projects at scale is rare.¹⁸ Whilst the midline evaluation identified lessons and recommendations that could be of use to the suppliers and to DFID for the remaining implementation period, this endline evaluation focuses on broader lessons learned for future programmes. Lessons from the evaluation are likely to be of great interest not only to DFID and the contracted suppliers, but also to WASH sector stakeholders and INGOs generally.

¹⁸ Note that the use of PbR for contracting INGOs is less rare in other sectors: the earliest use of RBF in health was through performance-based contracts with NGOs in fragile settings such as Haiti, Cambodia, and Afghanistan, starting in the late 1990s. See for example: Eichler, R., Auxila, P., Antoine, U., Desmanglesena, B. (2009) 'Haiti: Going to Scale with a Performance Incentive Model', in: *Performance Incentives for Global Health: Potential and Pitfalls*. Center for Global Development, Washington, DC.

1.3 Evaluation activities

The endline evaluation activities focused on implementation between 2016 and March 2018, when the WASH Results Programme ended. As noted above, this report also incorporates several key findings from the midline evaluation, which focused on implementation between the programme start and December 2015. Refer to Box 1 for more information on the midline evaluation.

Box 1: The midline evaluation report

The midline evaluation report followed the methodology outlined in the Evaluation Design Document¹⁹, submitted in May 2015. The mid-term evaluation examined progress halfway through the four-year WASH Results Programme.

It answered the subset of evaluation questions that relate to the original design and tendering process of the DFID-funded WASH Results Programme, and to its output phase (March 2014–December 2015, later extended to March 2016).

It addressed all relevance evaluation questions, and the effectiveness and efficiency questions as they related to the output phase, and it explored some initial indications of impacts and sustainability.

See Annex A for the executive summary of the midline evaluation report.

In preparation for the endline evaluation activities, the team developed the Endline Design Note²⁰ to document updates and refinements to the methodology to be used for the endline evaluation, including: the detailed evaluation questions (DEQs) to be addressed, our overarching evaluation approach, and our specific methodology for the various components of the evaluation. While the evaluation examines what was achieved, the main focus is on how and why, and under what circumstances, results were achieved.

The endline evaluation activities were conducted from October 2017 to July 2018 and addressed the outstanding effectiveness and efficiency elements, especially as they related to the outcome phase (January 2016 to March 2018), and it re-examined the impact and sustainability evaluation questions.

The evaluation activities included theory of change analysis, process evaluation (including institutional systems review), impact assessment, in-depth country case studies, and contribution analysis for a subset of evaluation questions.

The findings of this report draw on an analysis of programme documentation from the earliest days of the design phase to its conclusion; verification data; ongoing analysis of literature on PbR and WASH practice; two phases of interviews with key informants among all stakeholder groups; and, in particular, the findings from purposively selected case studies undertaken for each of the three suppliers. For summaries of the case studies, refer to Vols. 2.1-2.3.

Table 3 summarises the stakeholder engagement and desk review activities conducted for this endline evaluation.²¹

¹⁹ OPM (2015) 'MVE component of the WASH results Programme: Evaluation design document'.

²⁰ OPM (2018) 'MVE component of the WASH results Programme: Endline evaluation design note'.

²¹ These activities are almost identical to those of the midline with two key exceptions. Interviews with unsuccessful suppliers conducted at midline were not repeated and more effort was put into the remote interviews with the Country Managers for countries not included in the site visits.

Table 3: Summary of endline evaluation activities

Level of investigation	Evaluation activities
Programme level	Review of supplier documentation and verification reports
	Literature review of PbR
	Interviews with DFID staff
	Interviews with lead suppliers
	Remote interviews with all country managers
	Analysis of verified results data
	Interviews with lead verifiers
	Interviews with learning and dissemination (L&D) team
Country-level investigation in three case studies <i>SAWRP: Pakistan</i> <i>SSH4A: Uganda and Tanzania</i> <i>SWIFT: Kenya</i>	Review of country programme documentation
	Interviews with: supplier country staff; other key informants at national level; local implementing partner staff
	Interviews with: Members of targeted communities (service users); other key informants at community level

Evaluation findings are being disseminated to DFID and implementing partners through annual supplier learning workshops, and to the wider sector via other workshops and reports. Dissemination activities are managed by the L&D team within Itad. Refer to Annex B.9 for the Communications and Dissemination Plan.

For more detail on the evaluation methodology, please refer to Annex B. The theory of change is presented in Annex C.

1.4 High-level evaluation questions

The high-level evaluation questions (HEQs) addressing each OECD DAC criterion are provided below. Refer to Annex B.2 for the evaluation matrix, with a comprehensive list of evaluation questions and sub-questions, the evaluation stage(s) in which they were addressed, as well as the data sources and method(s) used for each.

- **HEQ1 – relevance:** Were the programme objectives appropriate and achievable, and to what extent was DFID’s programme design and the consortium sub-programme design consistent with achieving these objectives?
- **HEQ2 – effectiveness:** To what extent and under which circumstances did the programme operate as intended, and which factors helped/hindered the achievement of output and outcome objectives?
- **HEQ3 – efficiency:** Has the programme been designed and implemented in a cost-efficient manner?
- **HEQ4 – impact:** How likely is it that the programme will achieve its final impact objectives while minimising unintended negative consequences?
- **HEQ5 – sustainability:** How likely is it that the WASH outcomes achieved by the programme will be sustained beyond the end of the programme in 2018?

1.5 Reporting of synthesis findings

The endline evaluation of the WRP is presented across five separate volumes. This is due to the size and complexity of the programme. Vol. 1.1 (this report) presents the summary findings across the three Suppliers and addresses the evaluation questions. Vol. 1.2 contains the annexes to this report. Vols. 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 are supplier specific case studies and provide far greater contextual information on each programme and discuss the supplier-specific evidence in greater details under the relevant thematic headings.

Table 4: Evaluation findings reporting

Volume		Contents
Vol. 1.1	Summary report	<i>See below for report structures</i>
Vol. 1.2	Summary report annexes	
Vol. 2.1	SWIFT case study	<p>Further details on consortium structure and implementation.</p> <p>Details of the consortium targets, payment structures and further more detailed information on programme performance.</p> <p>Country contexts.</p> <p>Details of the evaluation approach and data collection for that supplier.</p> <p>Discussion of the supplier specific evidence as it relates to key themes, and an assessment of the strength of the evidence in that area.</p> <p>Details of the scoring of the risk-based frameworks used in the evaluation findings.</p>
Vol. 2.2	SSH4A case study	
Vol. 2.3	SAWRP case study	

1.6 Structure of the remainder of this report

The remainder of this report is structured as follows:

- **Section 2** presents the context for the WASH Results Programme.
- **Section 3** provides an overview of the WASH Results Programme as implemented.
- **Section 4** summarises our findings and analysis.
- **Section 5** contains lessons learned and recommendations.

Additional detail is provided separately in the annexes (Vol. 1.2).

- **Annex A:** Executive summary of the midline evaluation report.
- **Annex B:** Evaluation approach and methodology.
- **Annex C:** Critique of the theories of change and associated assumptions
- **Annex D:** Summary of contribution analysis.
- **Annex E:** Evidence matrices.
- **Annex F:** Overview of data collection.
- **Annex G:** Summary of verification processes.
- **Annex H:** Stakeholder comments on the report.
- **Annex I:** VFM analysis based on price.
- **Annex J:** Annotated bibliography on the application of PbR in WASH development assistance.
- **Annex K:** Original terms of reference.

2 Context for the WASH Results Programme

This section provides background information on the context for, as well as the emergence of, the WASH Results Programme.²² The detailed design of the programme is examined in Section 3.

2.1 International development context

2.1.1 The fundamental importance of WASH

Supporting the improvement of water suppliers and sanitation systems is critical to developing human capital, primarily through their contribution to public health. At the global level, access to improved WASH has been shown to reduce mortality rates in diarrheal disease²³, improve management of cholera outbreaks²⁴ and help reduce transmission risks from neglected tropical diseases²⁵ and acute respiratory infections²⁶. The benefits of WASH extend beyond health. WASH access at households and in institutions has been shown to be an effective means to promote gender equity, disability inclusion as well as supporting the essential needs of children and the vulnerable in society. This increases their ability to realise their rights and live productive lives. Moreover, communities with improved WASH services have access to greater economic development opportunities and are not robbed of their productive time due to sickness or time spent fetching water (especially burdensome for women). Lastly, sustainable WASH access is associated with improved environmental protection (especially from effective containment and faecal sludge management) and indirectly contributes to climate change adaptation efforts.

2.1.2 WASH services in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa

At the start of the WASH Results programme, the MDG era was coming to a close –it was clear that while much progress in the sector had been made, significant challenges remained. Firstly, the sanitation target had been missed by the equivalent of almost 700 million people, mostly in southern Asia but also in many areas of sub-Saharan Africa. Although the MDG goal for improving access to an improved drinking water source was reached, the 2015 assessment indicated that some countries were still left behind, with populations residing in least developed countries most unlikely to have received access to an improved water source, especially within the sub-Saharan African region. Overall, the 2015 assessment revealed that access to improved WASH services was being achieved in an unequal way, with those living at the bottom of the wealth pyramid and those living in rural areas faring the worst.

The countries targeted under the WASH results programme were those facing some of the greatest WASH challenges globally, particularly in terms access to improved sanitation in rural areas.

²² For a more extensive discussion of the origins of the programme, refer to the Midline Evaluation Report

²³ Pruss-Ustun et al (2014) *Burden of disease through inadequate water sanitation and hygiene in low and middle income settings: a retrospective analysis of data from 145 countries*. Tropical Medicine and International Health 19(8) 894-905

²⁴ *Ending cholera: a global roadmap to 2030*. Global Task Force on Cholera Control; October 2017. Accessed from <http://www.who.int/cholera/publications/global-roadmap/en/>

²⁵ *Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for Acceleration and Sustaining Progress on Neglected Tropical Disease: a global Strategy* WHO Geneva, 2016. Accessed from http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/publications/wash-and-ntd-strategy/en/

²⁶ Rabie, T and Curtis, V. (2006): *Handwashing and risk of respiratory infections: a quantitative systematic review*. Tropical Medicine and International Health, 11(3), 258-267.

2.2 Linkages or synergies with other WASH programmes

In all programme countries, other WASH initiatives were also being implemented, which created a more favourable enabling environment within which the WASH Results Programme operated (see full detail in Vols. 2.1-2.3). In several countries – for example for SWIFT in DRC and for Tanzania under SSH4A – programme activities were explicitly implemented within the framework of national WASH programmes and governments were involved in implementation. In other countries, such as for SAWRP in Pakistan, activities were aligned with Pakistan's *de facto* national sanitation strategy, but the government was not directly involved in implementation. In all four case study countries, stakeholders from these national WASH initiatives were interviewed, confirming positive synergies with the WASH Results Programme.

Notwithstanding these synergies, it seems unlikely that there was direct overlap between the implication areas of other WASH initiatives and those of the WASH Results Programme. It was a requirement for suppliers to demonstrate to DFID that they were the only significant actors implementing WASH activities in their locality.

2.3 PbR or results-based aid for WASH

The use of PbR in the WASH sector is relatively new and the available literature is limited, though growing²⁷. Where PbR has been applied, this has more commonly been in the form of results-based aid to a government agency; its use for the contracting of INGOs to deliver community-based WASH projects at scale is rare. Additionally, linking payments to hardware (e.g. water supply infrastructure) has been more common – especially in an urban context – whereas linking payments to software, such as changing behaviours on handwashing, has been more unusual. Given this context, and given DFID's commitment to expanding the use of PbR, lessons from the evaluation are likely to be of great interest not only to DFID and the contracted suppliers, but also to INGOs and other WASH sector stakeholders generally.

2.3.1 DFID's use of PbR in funding WASH programmes

By the end of 2013, 71% of all centrally issued contracts from DFID for all sectors had a PbR component. In 2014, DFID declared its ambition to push innovation in the way that PbR contracts are designed to shift programming towards longer-term results and output- and outcome-based payments. At this time, DFID was only beginning to explore outcome-based aid to address the sustainability of outputs, mainly in the fields of health, infrastructure, and education. DFID's 2014 strategy laid out clear objectives to remain at the forefront of PbR financing; to expand the evidence base for how PbR can deliver better results in different sectors; and to develop internal capacity to manage and guide rigorous, independent, and comparable evaluations for what works best in PbR financing. It is clear from a review of recent DFID publications on PbR that PbR is its preferred payment modality and that DFID has followed through on its commitment to expand the evidence base for PbR in different sectors.²⁸

The WASH Results Programme was the first large-scale DFID programme funded through a PbR mechanism. In addition to the WASH Results Programme, DFID has funded three other large WASH programmes with a PbR mechanism:

²⁷ See, for example www.gpoba.org/node/787.

²⁸ See for example, Clist (2017) and Duvendack (2017).

- In **Support to Rural Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene in Tanzania (2014–2022)**, around half of the contract value, £78.6 million, is to be paid out to local government authorities based on the delivery of results, with particular emphasis on maintenance of rural water supply infrastructure. The 2015 Annual Review of this programme described a delay in the start of the PbR mechanism due to insufficient baseline data, which made verification of results impossible.
- In **Supporting the Transformation of Rural WASH Service Delivery in Mozambique (2015–2020)**, DFID support takes the form of financial aid and technical assistance, where, in part, payment is based on agreed-upon performance indicators, which are verified by an independent monitoring partner. The business case describes how the PbR modality only starts 18 months into implementation, following a kick-off period where financial aid is disbursed as usual. During this kick-off period, DFID works with the Government of Mozambique to define performance indicators that incentivise improved services.

The most recent Annual Review of the 2016–2017 programme year confirms that the performance indicators were collaboratively developed with national, regional, and local levels of government, and a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework is in development by the independent verification partners, in line with agreed performance indicators.

- DFID is also supporting **Accelerating Sanitation and Water for All in Neglected, Off-Track Countries (ASWA I and ASWA II) (2013–2019)**. For ASWA I, payments were not linked to achievements (no PbR), but independent verification of results was still performed (total project value: £45 million). However, for ASWA II, a small PbR component was introduced, relating to the sustainability of open defecation-free (ODF) status. The most recent independent evaluation report of ASWA I summarises lessons learned from the independent M&E process²⁹.

2.3.2 Evaluations of the use of RBF or PbR in WASH

In 2015, Castalia conducted the first comprehensive review of RBF in WASH³⁰. Two-thirds of the RBF WASH projects considered in the Castalia report were funded by the World Bank and/or Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid (GPOBA). The remaining funders included a wide list of donors³¹, as well as the WASH Results Programme. Eighty percent of these WASH projects used GPOBA as the predominant RBF mechanism (as opposed to conditional cash transfers or voucher programmes).

The Castalia review was not able to determine if RBF (or PbR) posed a better alternative to more conventional forms of financing for WASH projects. The review signalled that RBF projects are generally effective in achieving their aims, with three-quarters of WASH projects included in the review achieving results above target levels. RBF projects are at least as efficient as conventionally financed WASH projects. However, there is an absence of data against which to compare RBF WASH projects with conventionally financed WASH projects to determine if RBF is more efficient. At the time of the Castalia publication, no WASH project had published data on the state of service delivery following payment of funds; thus there was insufficient evidence to indicate that WASH results in PbR projects are more sustainable. Establishing a monitoring framework that

²⁹ WYG International Limited (2017) 'IPME Evaluation – Final Report'.

³⁰ Castalia (2015) 'Review of Results-Based Financing Schemes in WASH'. Available at: https://www.ircwash.org/sites/default/files/rbf_in_wash_final_report_full_jan_2015.pdf

³¹ AusAid, US Agency for International Development, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and certain state and national governments (Chile, Brazil, Australia).

covers up to the ‘mean time for failure’ of comparable, conventional WASH systems being supported could generate the data necessary to better assess sustainability of RBF WASH projects.³²

The evaluation of the independent verification of ASWA I concluded that there is a risk that independent verification of results is not possible in countries affected by conflict and natural disasters, and the achievement of results may be delayed due to factors beyond the control of implementing partners. Consensus is necessary in the early stages of the design of the M&E framework on programme ambitions in each country with regard to outputs and outcomes, and timing of verification that balances the upfront funding requirements, enabling conditions, and prerequisites for sustainability. Lastly, independent verification of a multi-country WASH programme is resource-intensive for all parties involved: DFID, the independent M&E team, and suppliers. Sharing lessons between all parties is certainly necessary to build capacity, as reflected in the rationale of the WASH Results Programme.

2.3.3 Evaluations of use of PbR and RBF by DFID in other sectors

Most of the evidence related to the effectiveness of PbR is drawn from the fields of health and education. Two recent reviews have reviewed PbR projects across sectors.

Clist’s 2017 summary report explored what works in PbR for DFID³³. He considered 11 projects directly managed and contracted by DFID and eight larger funds linked to multiple projects. Intervention areas included health, education, employment, energy, WASH, public financial management, social protection, and food security. At the time this report was published, in 2017, the evidence base for what works best was still considered by Clist to be very thin, with the caveat that the evidence base from rigorous evaluations of PbR funding under DFID was expected to double in the coming years. At the time of publication, Clist assessed only a handful of DFID PbR projects as successful, which is not surprising given the lack of robust evidence generated from PbR evaluations. Key areas where greater evidence is required include the following:

- How to get the quality of the performance measure right – ensuring alignment between what is measured and ambitious, yet achievable, results.
- How to design PbR contracts that generate incentives that are appropriate for different cost levels and how to target the interests of appropriate actors at different levels.
- Capturing the additional costs of PbR (verification, management, technical assistance, and risk management of gaming).
- Clarity on how value for money (VFM) is calculated for PbR-only results, especially in cases where PbR results are a sub-component of total funding. Greater clarity on how the added costs of PbR are integrated into VFM calculations is required to compare PbR programmes with each other, and with conventionally funded programmes.

From a broader strategic standpoint, Clist suggested that DFID differentiate between ‘big PbR’ (which have many payments linked to a single high-quality measure, longer agreements, and tend to be with governments and private sector actors, with greater space for autonomy and innovation)

³² The Castalia systematic review was limited by the availability of data. Strengthening the evidence base to assess how and in what ways RBF is a suitable substitute to more conventional funding for WASH projects requires comparable data and greater transparency.

³³ Clist, P. (2017) ‘Full Report: Review of Payment by Results in DFID: Establishing the Evidence Base: Objective 2: What works for Payment by results Mechanisms in DFID Programs’. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/684278/full-report-UEA2-merged.pdf

and ‘small PbR’ (which have lesser quality measures, with greater oversight required to track inputs and negotiate approaches, and which have shorter agreements, and tend to be with NGOs and the private sector, with less space for autonomy and innovation). The evidence base currently emerging on PbR relates to small PbR, and Clist (2017) classified the WRP as ‘small PbR’.

In 2017, Duvendack led a review to assess the evidence base to understand how and in what contexts PbR mechanisms work best in implementation and lead to greater impacts than more conventional funding mechanisms, specifically in developing countries³⁴. The review identified thousands of studies and narrowed down the pool of relevant literature to 100 research reports, based on their selection criteria. The selection used in this review was developed to identify trends and generalisable lessons on how and under what circumstances PbR programmes can achieve their intended outcomes. The review confirmed that the majority of available evidence on the topic is within the fields of health and education, and the evidence from the WASH sector at the time of publication remained scant. The review did confirm a statistically significant positive effect of PbR on targeted results. The review highlighted that the main actors issuing PbR contracts are governments (and their respective international development cooperation bodies: for example, DFID). Other actors issuing PbR contracts include the World Bank, NGOs, development financing organisations, and public–private partnerships. Based on the (predominantly) health studies included, the agents delivering results considered were either the health facility or individuals, and 60% of PbR measures (that trigger payments) were output-related. Fewer examples of PbR mechanisms used in the health sector were linked to outcome-level results.

In Josephson *et al.*’s (2017) review of quality checklists of supply-side health facility-based performance-based financing programmes in low- and lower middle-income countries, they concluded that very few indicators assess health outcomes, as these are difficult to measure, but also are not directly in the control of the providers being incentivised, whereas outputs are.³⁵ Thus it is understandable that the evidence base for how PbR can improve sustainability (outcome level and beyond) is still limited, even within the health sector, where PbR has been in use far longer than in the WASH sector.

A fundamental precondition for the appropriateness of PbR is that indicators should, to the extent possible, be linked to outcomes that can be credibly verified. Clisp and Verschoor underline that setting performance measures and credible verification systems is a deceptively simple task³⁶. The appropriateness and effectiveness of PbR has been shown to be context dependent, especially when PbR is implemented in fragile states. Other contextual factors that impact the appropriateness and effectiveness of PbR identified in other literature include the capacity of the implementing agency to monitor and evaluate results, to manage financial resources under PbR agreements, and to adaptively manage the flexible approach to PbR implementation³⁷. DFID and SIDA have also highlighted the management capacity gap that exists on the part of donors to cost-

³⁴ Duvendack, M. (2017) ‘Full Report: Review of Payment by Results in DFID: Establishing the Evidence Base: Semi-systematic review to understand Payment-by-Results mechanisms in developing countries’. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/684277/full-report-UEA1-merged.pdf

³⁵ Josephson, E., Gergen, J., Coe, M., Ski, S., Madhavan, S., and Bauhoff, S. (2017) ‘How do performance-based financing programmes measure quality of care? A descriptive analysis of 68 quality checklists from 28 low-and middle-income countries’. *Health policy and planning*, 32(8), 1120–1126.

³⁶ Clist, P., Verschoor, A. (2014) ‘The Conceptual Basis of Payment by Results’. Available at: www.gov.uk/dfid-research-outputs/the-conceptual-basis-of-payment-by-results

³⁷ O’Donnel M. and Longhurst, R. (2014) ‘Payment by Results: What it means for UK NGOs’. Available at: www.bond.org.uk/sites/default/files/resource-documents/bond_pbr_what_it_means_for_ngos_nov14.pdf

effectively manage PbR programmes and offer the appropriate technical oversight^{38, 39}. Given the high degree of heterogeneity of contexts considered in the Duvendack review, the review team struggled to tease out generalisable insights from the highly heterogeneous PbR contexts that were considered.

When comparing the experiences of PbR in other sectors to PbR in WASH, it is also noteworthy that in the health sector PbR is predominantly to incentivise a certain quality of service, rather than to reimburse the cost of provision of a service (which covered under a grant). The quality of service can either be incentivised through upside incentives ('carrot and carrot') or by a payment deduction ('carrot and stick'), see Box below.

Box 2: Lessons from the health sector on incentivising 'quality' performance using PbR

In the health sector, incentivising performance has been increasingly linked to rewarding a certain quality of service, rather than rewarding only the provision of a service. Quantifiable quality checklists are needed which measure and reward specific components of quality. Such checklists are context-specific and can relate to the process of implementation as well as the quality of the service delivered. In the health sector two different approaches have been used to incentivise quality performance through PbR:

- The **carrot-and-carrot method** consists of purchasing services and adding a bonus (for example, up to 25%) for the quality performance.
- The **carrot-and-stick method** entails purchasing services but detracting money in the case of bad quality performance. When using this method, one can inflate the carrots a bit, thereby ensuring a certain effect on the quality factor.

Experience from the health sector offers the following lessons:

- **The carrot-and-carrot method is more advisable** where the implementing agencies have limited access to alternative sources of funds and may face cash flow issues.
- Baseline levels of quality make a difference to the effectiveness of either approach: **When implementation quality is already fairly high at baseline, the carrot-and-stick method is more effective** at rewarding the best-performing implementing agencies or facilities. When quality is low at baseline, the carrot-and-carrot method better protects basic implementing agencies' income while penalising low-quality implementing agencies.

The health sector has developed a whole series of quantifiable quality checklists and scorecards for assessing service provision. Essential lessons are that the quality criteria need to be realistic (monitoring data can be collected) and objectively verifiable. Quality checklists should also be updated regularly to incorporate lessons learned and to allow quality standards to be set progressively higher.

[Adapted from: Fritsche (2014)]

2.4 How the context influenced evaluation design

There are several ways in which the context outlined in Sections 2.1 and 2.3 influenced the evaluation design. At its core, the evaluation was designed around case studies of all suppliers, to ensure comprehensive coverage, as well as to examine implementation in diverse country contexts. Case studies allowed us to not only to observe the extent to which change has occurred, but also to produce an account as to why and how this change was brought about, thereby improving the explanatory power of the evaluation.

³⁸ DFID (2014) 'Sharpening incentives to perform: DFID's strategy for payment by results'. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/323868/Sharpening_incentives_to_perform_DFID's_Strategy_on_Payment_by_Results.pdf

³⁹ SIDA (2015) 'Results Based Financing Approaches (RBFA) – what are they?' Available at: www.sida.se/contentassets/1b13c3b7a75947a2a4487e2b0f61267c/18235.pdf

Given that PbR is still relatively new in the WASH sector – and given that the WASH Results Programme was the first large-scale DFID programme funded through a PbR mechanism – the evaluation focused on the *circumstances* under which PbR was effective in WASH programming, in order to be able to inform DFID's programming and the sector more widely. Contribution analysis was seen as the most appropriate methodological framework for teasing out these circumstances.

In the absence of a consensus on how to assess sustainability in WASH, and on which are the most likely pathways to impact, the evaluation used a risk-based framework to score various prerequisites for sustainability and for impacts manifesting.

Annex B explains in detail the methodological framework, types of evaluation activities, and the evaluation case studies undertaken.

2.5 Origins of the WASH Results Programme

The concept of the WASH Results Programme was born out of the UK's pledge, made by the then Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell, in April 2012, to contribute to global MDG commitments by ensuring that 60 million additional people gained access to WASH services by December 2015 (DFID 2014c). A secondary, but important, driver of the programme was DFID's desire to expand its base of potential large-scale WASH providers.⁴⁰

Starting in 2013, DFID published the business case for the WASH Results Programme,⁴¹ one year prior to DFID's publication of its strategy for PbR⁴². The business case recognised that a WASH development programme of this size based on a PbR mechanism would be a risk for both DFID and potential suppliers, who would be inexperienced in its management and implementation, but that it would provide a valuable opportunity to generate evidence on the use of PbR in the WASH development sector.

DFID engaged in a competitive tender process for the WASH Results Programme to cover an estimated shortfall in beneficiary numbers anticipated from existing programmes to meet the UK's MDG commitment.⁴³ Several different funding modalities were considered in the business case.⁴⁴ As part of an ongoing dialogue, DFID met with potential bidders in July 2013, announcing up to five 'large results contracts' and the plan to include a PbR element.⁴⁵ Box 3 below gives an overview of DFID's definitions of PbR.

⁴⁰ This entire subsection has been adapted from the midline evaluation report.

⁴¹ DFID (2013) 'Business Case and Intervention Summary: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Results Programme'. Available at: <https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203572/documents>

⁴² DFID (2014) 'Sharpening incentives to perform: DFID's Strategy for Payment by results'. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/323868/Sharpening_incentives_to_perform_DFIDs_Strategy_on_Payment_by_Results.pdf

⁴³ In June 2013, DFID was still describing the programme as a five-year 'Results Challenge Fund'.

⁴⁴ The business case was approved in August 2013.

⁴⁵ Suppliers had already begun developing their consortiums before the PbR element was announced.

Box 3: DFID's definitions of PbR⁴⁶

DFID uses PbR as an umbrella term for various performance-based contracts entered into with different types of organisations, and has identified three broad typologies of PbR based on the type of organisation that (some of) the risk for the delivery of results is transferred to:

- results-based aid, in which results payments are made to partner governments;
- RBF, in which results payments are made to service providers/suppliers (contracted directly or indirectly via an intermediary); and
- development impact bonds, whereby investors bear some (or all) of the risk of the implementation and delivery of results by putting money upfront into a development programme, and are then paid upon the delivery improved results.

Within these three broad categories, the use of PbR varies in two areas:

- the level of payments on delivery (upfront/ex-post): the WASH Results Programme entailed 100% of payments ex-post; and
- the level of result the payment is linked to (outcomes, outputs, or processes): under the WASH Results Programme, payments were made for processes and outputs and outcomes.

The final terms of reference at proposal stage provided for three contracts.⁴⁷ Full proposals were due by 05 December 2013. DFID issued several rounds of clarifications in response to questions. For example, how some aspects of the PbR mechanism would work in practice was not yet specified. Also, the level of ambition at outcome level was not yet determined as the logframe would only be finalised after suppliers had been appointed.

Three supplier contracts, totalling £75.5 million, were issued for a 48-month programme (1 April 2014 to 31 March 2018). A separate MVE contract, worth £3.46 million and spanning 54 months (May 2014 to November 2018), was agreed a few weeks later than the supplier contracts.⁴⁸

By the time the programme commenced in April/May 2014 the overall programme duration was four years (cf. the five-year ceiling in the business case). A side effect of this shift was that the time-scale for delivery of outputs to beneficiaries was reduced from three years (the initial expectation) to around 18 months (from commencement of contracts to the end-2015 MDGs deadline). This period was, however, followed by a further two-year phase focusing on outcomes and sustainability.

The overarching programme features designed by DFID, and translated by suppliers into various country programmes, are described and analysed in Section 4.

⁴⁶ Source: DFID (2014) 'Sharpening incentives to perform: DFID's strategy for payment by results'.

⁴⁷ The approved business case provided for up to five contracts, targeting 9.8 million people, with a total budget of £109 million.

⁴⁸ As discussed later, this staggered timing created challenges for the verification arrangements in particular.

3 Overview of the WASH Results Programme

This section sets out the key features of the WASH Results Programme, which had a four-year implementation period (April 2014 to March 2018).⁴⁹ It describes the key design features set by DFID, and then explains how these parameters were interpreted by each of the suppliers, which implemented activities across 12 countries.⁵⁰

The programme consisted of a hierarchy of three nested designs:

- **DFID's overall programme design** was described in its business case, terms of reference, and procurement documentation (together with *ad hoc* clarifications of these documents). This is the highest and most general level of the design, and is outlined in Section 3.1.1.3 below. The DFID programme design period covered the initial programme conception in 2012 through to the issuing of tender documentation in the second half of 2013.
- **Each of the contracted suppliers proposed their own programme designs** and results frameworks, two of which related to only two countries⁵¹ (SWIFT and SAWRP), and one of which (SSH4A) was implemented in eight countries.⁵² This is the second level of programme design and is also described later in this section. The supplier programme design period covered late 2013 to the completion of contract negotiations in April 2014.
- **For each supplier, the design of the programme varied by consortium membership, programme components, and country.** This represents a third level of detail, which, together with the differences between country-level implementing partners, provides further context for the evaluation findings set out in Section 4. The period covered by this design phase was that of the programme implementation, namely April 2014 to March 2018. This level is summarised in Vols. 2.1-2.3, covering each of the three suppliers separately.

3.1 DFID's overall programme design

The WASH Results Programme is described by DFID as an 'innovative global portfolio fund'. The overall programme objective was to deliver sustainable access to clean drinking water sources, improved sanitation facilities, and hygiene promotion activities to 4.5 million people, as per DFID's commitment to achieving the MDG targets. See Table 5 for the specific programmatic targets.

⁴⁹ This entire section is adapted from the midline evaluation report.

⁵⁰ Liberia was dropped from the original programme in 2014.

⁵¹ SWIFT originally included a third country - Liberia – the programme was suspended there and later terminated due to the Ebola crisis.

⁵² SSH4A originally included South Sudan which was ultimately dropped in 2016 due to the fragile state context.

Table 5: Targets for the WASH Results Programme

	Outputs	Outcomes ⁵³	Impacts
Targets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.2 million people with access to clean drinking water sources 4.3 million people with access to an improved sanitation facility 9.3 million people reached by hygiene promotion activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 75%–90% of the people reached by December 2015 continue to use clean drinking water sources 70%–100% of the people reached by December 2015 continue to use improved sanitation facilities 10%–15% of the people reached by December 2015 use hygiene-promoting behaviours 	Poor people benefitting from the WASH Results Programme have improved health status, as measured by reduced diarrhoea and child mortality
Time period	By December 2015	By March 2018	By March 2018*

Source: SAWRP contract annex, SWIFT contract annex, and SSH4A contract annex.

*Suppliers were not required to report on impact targets and these were not linked to PbR payments.

Overall output and outcome targets were specified by DFID, with each supplier allowed to bid according to one of two 'lots':

- one contract (SWIFT) was awarded under Lot A (water, sanitation, and hygiene): aiming to reach over 800,000 people with water services, over 450,000 people with sanitation services, and over a million people with hygiene promotion⁵⁴; and
- two contracts (SSH4A and SAWRP) were awarded under Lot B (sanitation and hygiene⁵⁵), aiming to reach over 3.7 million people with improved sanitation, and over 9.3 million people with hygiene promotion⁵⁶.

In 2017, the WASH Results Programme was extended for the delivery of additional outputs and outcomes in nine of the original countries until 2021. However, this extension is not within the scope of this evaluation.

3.1.1.1 Features of DFID's design for this programme

The most prominent feature of the WASH Results Programme was its funding modality, namely PbR. However, other aspects also distinguished it from other WASH programmes, as outlined below:

- Scale** – Each supplier contract was relatively large, averaging £25 million. This is much larger than typical INGO WASH programmes, but a similar order of magnitude to the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) ASWA programme (£45 million).⁵⁷
- Phasing and timing** – The WASH Results Programme consisted of two phases: the output phase, in which the main outputs were to be delivered between April 2014 and December 2015; and an additional two years (the outcome phase) to consolidate efforts in support of sustainability, taking the programme to March 2018. The 'hard deadline' of December 2015 (the close of the MDGs period) marked the transition from output to outcome phase (see Box 4).

⁵³ The range for the outcome target levels is as each of the three supplier consortia had different targets.

⁵⁴ As per contract annex dated March 2015 (post-Liberia revisions).

⁵⁵ Though SAWRP also had some payments that were contingent on water outputs and outcomes.

⁵⁶ As per contract annex dated September 2014 (SAWRP) and December 2014 (SNV).

⁵⁷ DFID indicated that stimulating the establishment of NGO and private sector partnerships for delivery at scale was a key innovation sought via the programme.

- **The PbR financing modality** – Payments to suppliers were triggered by the independently verified delivery of pre-specified ‘results’ (key activities, outputs, and outcomes). Details of the PbR modality are provided in Section 4.1.2. This financing modality is relatively unusual in the WASH sector, especially for software-based interventions, though it is more common for urban hardware interventions; it was quite unusual for DFID’s WASH portfolio: the WASH Results Programme was DFID’s first 100% PbR programme in the WASH sector.
- **MV** – The MV component was a vital element of the PbR model, as it was responsible for independently verifying the suppliers’ delivery of the contractually specified ‘results’, which in turn triggered payment from DFID.
- **Impact** – The theory of change identified improved health, specifically in relation to diarrhoea and under-five mortality, as the ultimate goal of the programme. However, DFID’s design, allowing suppliers’ flexibility in implementation approach, expressed no preference for implementation strategy – for example, there was no specific requirement to implement a geographically-focused programme or to work towards ODF communities. Health achievements were not reported on or verified, and were not linked to any PbR payments.

Box 4: Phasing and timing in the global design

Two comments are made here in regard to the phasing and timing of the programme.

First, the MDGs deadline was the determining feature of the programme structure as the numerical beneficiary targets had to be achieved by December 2015 to meet the UK’s commitments. During preliminary consultations, having a second phase to consolidate efforts in support of sustainability was seen by some stakeholders as counter to good practice; they argued that sustainability should be addressed from the outset in order to have a realistic chance of being realised.

DFID articulated that the inclusion of a post-implementation phase (‘outcome phase’) was an innovative and positive design feature. DFID also expected that measures in support of sustainability should feature in plans and operations from the start of each project. Additionally, having a dedicated outcome phase was expected to allow extra time and resources to be spent to consolidate sustainability measures introduced during the output phase.

Second, as the programme design and procurement period extended beyond early expectations, the implementation period shortened, from five years to four.

(Adapted from the midline evaluation report.)

DFID technical guidance states that ‘if designed and delivered well, potential benefits of PbR include: improved efficiency and effectiveness of delivery from the sharpened incentives in a PbR contract (paying once results are delivered rather than upfront); Increased potential for innovation and flexibility in delivery through not specifying how to achieve results; Increased transparency and accountability for results; and a stronger focus on performance’ (DFID 2014b).

The PbR model was expected to allow suppliers freedom to design and implement their own approaches, so long as the agreed results were delivered. Whilst not explicitly required in the contract, there were also some underlying expectations about how this would be manifested:⁵⁸

- **Innovative private sector partnerships.** As per the business case, there was an expectation that ‘innovative’ private sector partnerships would lead to important learning, especially for NGO partners. Refer to Section 3.2.1 for an overview of the implementing consortia.
- **Innovative interventions.** The business case also noted an expectation that the PbR modality would foster innovative interventions as suppliers would be free to employ whatever

⁵⁸ Each of these themes is further elaborated upon in the midline evaluation report.

approaches they wanted to in order to achieve their results targets.⁵⁹ Further information on how this dynamic manifested itself by supplier is given in Section 4.2.5.

- **Sustainability.** All guiding documentation for the programme emphasised sustainability, acknowledging the importance of services and behaviour changes standing the test of time. The midline noted that sustainability was explicitly built into the programme design in so much as the PbR payment being linked to outcomes incentivised the sustaining of an agreed level of results at least until programme end. However, linking prerequisites for sustainability to payments was not explicitly required by the design (although suppliers were free to do so). Findings relating to variations in sustainability approaches by suppliers, as well as prospects for sustainability, are given in Section 4.5.
- **Inclusiveness or equity.** The business case specified that suppliers must ‘accurately target their interventions at the poorest communities and, more specifically, the poorest groups within these communities’. While the overall programme design prioritised equity and inclusion, like sustainability it was not required that these elements be built into the payment criteria agreed between DFID and each supplier.
- **Learning.** As the use of PbR in WASH was still relatively novel, DFID indicated that ongoing learning and course correction was intended to be a key part of the programme.

Box 5 below provides further detail on the theory behind PbR incentives.

Box 5: Theory behind PbR incentives

The underlying rationale for PbR first assumes that the financial incentive provided by PbR is needed by those contracted to deliver under this arrangement (and that it will therefore incentivise them). Secondly, it assumes that the indicators are correct proxies for the outcomes that are desired, can be accurately measured, and are within the control of the agent to affect (Witter *et al.* 2012). Thirdly, it assumes that suppliers have systems that are capable of responding to, and acting on, the incentives created under a PbR modality (Perrin 2013). Fourthly, it is also assumed that implementation processes are sufficiently flexible that they can be modified to optimise delivery, within the timeframe of each verification cycle.

By not specifying how results should be achieved, it is assumed that suppliers can adjust implementation processes to improve outcomes (Birdsall and Savedoff 2010, Bertone and Meesen 2013). Furthermore, there is an implicit assumption that suppliers have sufficient skills and capacity to monitor progress sufficiently accurately and sufficiently frequently to identify trends in performance and identify the underlying drivers, and that they have effective management systems in place which can adjust implementation processes in response to this learning (improved performance management; Birdsall and Savedoff 2010, Bertone and Meesen 2013).

[Text adapted from midline evaluation report]

3.1.1.2 The MVE role

As the separate MVE provider, Itad (of the e-PACT consortium) was hired to:


‘design and implement a system of third-party results verification (including working with Suppliers to define measurement methods and monitoring, verification and reporting requirements for payment) for those parts of projects operating under a Payment by Results framework. This will be used to verify results and outputs to inform payments. The MVE provider will audit contractors’ results reporting within the contract terms related to payment by results.’

⁵⁹ The evaluators note that there is a potential confusion between innovation as something new or different, and flexibility within an overall guiding framework.

The procurement process for the MVE provider ran later than that for the suppliers, with the contract with e-Pact signed in May 2014.

While the suppliers and the MVE provider each had contracts with DFID, the relationship between the suppliers and the MVE provider was not based on a formal contract. However, a governance framework setting out key principles of engagement among all parties aimed to bridge this gap. Figure 1 illustrates these relationships.

Figure 1: Triangular relationship between DFID, the MV provider, and suppliers⁶⁰



3.1.1.3 DFID's theory of change

As noted in the midline evaluation report, DFID's business case included a rudimentary programme-wide theory of change that was essentially a 'logframe on its side'. It did not specify 'what or who needs to change, and why'; how this change would be brought about; and what key assumptions underlay programme design.

As, the programme-wide theory of change made no reference to the PbR modality, the evaluation team also developed a nested theory of change further articulating how the PbR modality contributed. The PbR modality, in combination with other programme features, was expected to ultimately influence outputs and outcomes at beneficiary level because of the changed behaviour of the service providers.

⁶⁰ E-Pact (2016) 'Payment by Results – The verification approach under the WASH Results Programme'. July 2016.

The way the programme was implemented differed significantly by supplier, but no theories of change were developed by DFID at the sub-programme level⁶¹. The focus instead was placed on the supplier-specific results frameworks against which payments were made. The results frameworks had a high profile in programme operations and in practice the theory of change was not a key point of reference either for DFID or the suppliers.⁶²

Refer to Annex C for the full critique of the theory of change that was conducted during the midline evaluation. This includes updates discussed with DFID at that time, as well as the nested PbR theory of change. The evidence uncovered during the endline evaluation led to only minor updates to the PbR theory of change.

3.2 SWIFT

This section provides only a brief overview of the SWIFT sub-programme; a more detailed discussion of SWIFT implementation and the country contexts is in the supplier case study (Vol. 2.1).

3.2.1 Implementing organisations

The SWIFT consortium was led by **Oxfam GB** and included **Tearfund** and the **ODI**, which led on monitoring, evaluation, and learning. At country level the implementing partners were INGOs and included Concern Worldwide, Sanergy, WSUP, BBC Media Action, Practical Action, and Africa Ahead. SWIFT operated in **DRC** and **Kenya**; Liberia was initially targeted but was terminated in 2014 due to constraints related to the Ebola crisis. This consortium had the largest number of implementing partners and was managed through national consortium managers sitting within Oxfam Kenya and Oxfam DRC.

3.2.2 Supplier targets

Table 6 outlines the deliverables as per the contract. SWIFT's payment packages were made up of a series of 12 deliverables that were assessed at different points of the programme for the various suppliers.

⁶¹ SWIFT was the only supplier to submit country-level theories of change.

⁶² See Midline Evaluation Report

Table 6: SWIFT deliverables as per the contract annex

Deliverable		Consortium target
Hygiene promotion	1. Intermediate result	IEC materials developed to reach 1,027,257 people
	2. Early sustainability	Systems in place for effective hygiene promotion (staff and volunteers trained) to reach 1,027,257 people
	3. Output delivery	IEC materials/ messages disseminated to target population of 1,027,257 people
	4. Outcome delivery	Behaviour change obtained for a target proportion* of the population
Sanitation	5. Intermediate result	Communities triggered/Community Health clubs set up to provide access for 459,814 people
	6. Early sustainability	Systems in place for effective and sustainable management of sanitation services (sanitation promoters trained) to support 459,814 people
	7. Output delivery	459,814 people with access to latrines
	8. Outcome delivery	Use sustained for at least 70% of each target population
Water	9. Intermediate result	Materials bought for water-points and infrastructure, and construction contracts signed that will provide access to 848,367 people
	10. Early sustainability	Systems in place for effective and sustainable management of water services (mechanics trained/equipped, committees trained, supply chain improved, M&E/management information system set up) for 848,367 people
	11. Output delivery	848,367 people with access to clean water
	12. Outcome delivery	Use sustained of at least 75% of water-points

Source: Contract annex dated March 2015 (post-Liberia revisions)

*Note: this was later agreed with DFID and varied by partner.

3.2.3 Country context and targeting of activities

In DRC, SWIFT was implemented within the framework of DRC's national sanitation programme, *Villages et Écoles Assainis* (healthy villages and schools, or VEAs). While government staff had limited involvement in implementation, they were involved in health promotion activities, in certification of *Villages et Écoles Assainis* and in monitoring of sustainability in the outcome phase. SWIFT in Kenya was not linked to any specific national government programme, though SWIFT actively engaged the recently created county governments to, and aligned implementation with their preferred approaches.

Baseline access in Kenya was mixed: in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) region of northern Kenya the level of access to WASH facilities is very low. In small towns and urban Nairobi, the level of WASH access is higher, but partners focused on chronically under-served slums and informal settlements.

While there are varying definitions of 'fragile' states and contexts, in this evaluation the term really only applies to SWIFT's work in DRC and the ASAL region of Kenya, both of which have ongoing security concerns. The context for the urban work in Kenya was acute poverty, weak public institutions, and constraints relating to land tenure and access to public services, but not environmental fragility or conflict.

3.2.4 WASH activities

SWIFT was contracted under Lot A, meaning that, overall, the programme had a substantial water supply component (one-third of beneficiaries), in addition to sanitation and hygiene promotion (two-thirds of beneficiaries). In contrast to the other supplier programmes, activities encompassed both urban and rural contexts.

SWIFT in Kenya was not really a single programme operating at scale, but a portfolio of small- to medium-sized projects. In Kenya, the activities included:

- community-led total sanitation (CLTS) in rural areas, including the provision of free slabs in one Kenya project (Oxfam in Turkana);
- rural hygiene promotion, within and beyond the communities targeted with CLTS;
- rural water supply improvements, including drilling and rehabilitation of boreholes equipped with solar pumps (Oxfam, Practical Action, Concern);
- urban water supply in Nairobi slums (WSUP, Practical Action);
- urban sanitation promotion in Nairobi slums using a social enterprise model, plus school hygiene promotion (Sanergy); and
- hygiene promotion radio broadcasts through mentoring small private and community-based radio stations (BBC Media Action).

Some of the projects were stand-alone initiatives unrelated to others in the consortium, and rural sanitation targets were very modest compared to DRC and other countries in the global WASH Results Programme. Local NGO partners had a limited role, being involved in selected rural sanitation and hygiene promotion projects led by Oxfam and Concern, and were not on PbR contracts. In the case of urban water supply, SWIFT partners worked closely with utilities. An unusual addition to the programme was BBC Media Action support to community-based radio stations, which produced hygiene promotion broadcasts.

The SWIFT interviewees all noted that several of the Kenya ASAL partners were also implementing other WASH programmes in the outcome phase, funded by other donors in response to the drought. Notably, UNICEF had a large relief programme in the region with a big WASH component which involved Concern in particular, which reported receiving a large grant from UNICEF to implement WASH in this period.

The programme in DRC was quite different – here a smaller number of partners delivered results on a much larger scale. In DRC, DFID is providing substantial support to WASH beyond SWIFT. For example, DFID fund the ‘DRC WASH Consortium’ and have WASH programmes in DRC beyond SWIFT.

SWIFT aimed for district-wide coverage in DRC (known as health zone level), but the range of small-to medium-sized project types in Kenya did not offer economies of scale. SWIFT in Kenya was also a rare case among the country programmes in that some partners used operational approaches that were not fully tested and ready for scaling up at the programme start.⁶³

In Kenya and DRC there was a PbR arrangement between the consortium partners where they were paid pro-rata against their results in line with a fixed price per beneficiary. In Kenya Oxfam and Concern Worldwide worked with local implementing partners, and in DRC Oxfam worked with

⁶³ This was the case, for example, of Practical Action’s work in Nairobi on doing large-scale sewage, for Sanergy’s business model in Kenya, and for WSUP in Kenya, which worked in an innovative way with Nairobi Water and Sewerage Company.

local implementing partners in both phases. In all cases the local implementing partners were not on PbR contracts. All other consortium partners implemented directly in their areas without local implementing partners.

In 2017 Oxfam's contract with DFID extended until 2020 with an additional £9,782,547 million in budget allocated to continue the programme in DRC⁶⁴. This extension entailed the delivery of new output and outcome results and in effect represents a new contract as opposed to either a time or cost extension. The extension is commonly referred to as 'SWIFT II' but was not covered within the scope of this evaluation.

3.2.5 Monitoring of results and the sustainability of results

For SWIFT the large number of consortium partners meant that the verification approach had to be tailored to those partners. For example, a separate systems appraisal was conducted for each consortium partner. Furthermore, as the systems for data collection changed between the output and the outcome phase separate verification methodologies and systems appraisals were conducted for the two different systems. SWIFT differed from the other two suppliers in that it did not have an overall sustainability framework and there was no verification of sustainability indicators linked to payment.

Details of the output-phase results were largely drawn from the suppliers' own monitoring systems. The partners in the SWIFT Kenya programme had existing, paper-based monitoring systems at the start, and most of these needed some improvement to meet MVE requirements. In DRC, a bespoke monitoring system was developed at the outset. During the outcome phase supplier-organised surveys were used to assess outcomes.

3.2.6 Results

On the whole, SWIFT met its targets, though with underachievement in some areas. (See Table 5) There were some instances⁶⁵ of cases where projects were cancelled and targets re-allocated or dropped. In the vast majority of cases the output targets were met, with only a small number of instances where partners delivered below target, and this was set in a context of significant overachievement against targets for other partners. It is also noted that DFID offered SWIFT a three-month extension on outputs at the end of the outcome phase – which was necessary for SWIFT partners to meet their output targets – particularly Tearfund in DRC due to the completion of one large water scheme rehabilitation. Without this Tearfund would not have achieved its results, and would have suffered a big financial loss.

⁶⁴ The programme was not continued in Kenya – this was the Suppliers choice rather than enforced by DFID.

⁶⁵ The Liberia country programme and Practical Action's urban sanitation work in Nairobi.

Table 7: SWIFT performance on key deliverables

Deliverable		Consortium wide	Country	Target	Claimed	Verified	% of target*
Hygiene promotion	3. Output delivery	IEC materials/ messages disseminated to population	Kenya		373,353	329,997	
			DRC		703,706	697,257	
			Total	1,027,257	1,077,059	1,027,254	100.0%
	4. Outcome delivery	Behaviour change brought about for at least 15%	Kenya	73,953	73,299	73,299	99.1%
			DRC	104,589	104,589	104,589	100.0%
			Total	178,542	177,888	177,888	99.6%
Sanitation	7. Output delivery	People with access to latrines	Kenya		30,900	30,900	
			DRC		428,914	428,914	
			Total	459,814	459,814	459,814	100.0%
	8. Outcome delivery	Use sustained in target population 75%	Kenya	21,630	21,630	21,630	100.0%
			DRC	300,241	300,241	300,241	100.0%
			Total	321,871	321,871	321,871	100.0%
Water	11. Output delivery	People with access to clean water	Kenya		205,378	201,329	
			DRC		650,166	643,923	
			Total	848,367	855,544	845,252	100%
	12. Outcome delivery	Use sustained in target population 75%	Kenya	189,975	180,418	160,918	84.7%
			DRC	485,300	485,300	485,300	100.0%
			Total	650,166	650,166	643,923	99.0%

Source: Targets – Contract annex dated March 2015 (post-Liberia revisions); achievement – verification reports (figures contain rounding errors)

*** Note: unlike other suppliers the way SWIFT's results were measured the aggregated results do not account for overachievement. Though the results disaggregated by partner and country do – these disaggregated results highlight many areas of significant overachievement.**

3.3 SAWRP

This section provides a brief overview of the SAWRP sub-programme; interested readers are referred to the supplier case study (Vol. 2.3) for a more detailed discussion.

3.3.1 Implementing organisations

The SAWRP consortium was led by Plan International, with WaterAid, Unilever, and WSUP as members; local NGOs as implementing partners; and WEDC and Ipsos MORI as advisory partners. WEDC coordinated and supported on monitoring, with input from Ipsos MORI on data collection formats and data management and analysis.

Activities were implemented in **Bangladesh** and **Pakistan**, each of which had a Consortium Coordination Unit, with a programme director, MVE specialist, and finance coordinator; and towards the end of the output phase the position of Communication/Advocacy Coordinator was also created by CCU Pakistan.

3.3.2 Targets

Table 8 outlines the deliverables as per SAWRP's contract. Unlike the other two supplier consortia, SAWRP's deliverables were exclusively related to output and outcome levels, i.e. there were no input- or process-related payments.

Table 8: SAWRP deliverables as per contract annex

Deliverable		Consortium target
Hygiene	Deliverable 3.1 (output)	6,609,569 poor men, women, and school children across 64 districts reached by handwashing promotion in villages and schools and households
	Deliverable 3.2 (outcome)*	5,948,612 [90% ¹] poor men, women, and children across 64 districts continue to practice handwashing with soap at critical times
Sanitation	Deliverable 2.1 (output)	1,644,175 poor people across 22 districts have access to new household latrines
	Deliverable 2.2 (outcome)	1,150,923 [70% ¹] poor people across 22 districts continue to use basic or improved latrines
Water	Deliverable 1.1 (output)	227,750 poor people across 22 districts have access to safe drinking water sources
	Deliverable 1.2 (outcome)	204,975 [90% ¹] poor people across 22 districts continue to use reliable, safe drinking water sources
Governance-related ²	Deliverable 4.1	Local WASH governance structures operational in all project locations
	Deliverable 4.2	Regional and local governments serving 22 districts continue to plan, coordinate, and monitor WASH activities effectively

Source: Contract annex, dated September 2014

¹ This was the original target in the contract and was later revised through the definition of the indicators.

² N.B. governance-related indicators were included in the annex but were not linked to payment.

3.3.3 Country contexts and targeting of activities

SAWRP projects were aligned with Pakistan's *de facto* national sanitation strategy, known as the Pakistan Approaches to Total Sanitation and Bangladesh's national WASH strategy. National quality standards and CLTS procedures were followed. In Pakistan, the government was not directly involved in implementation: it was involved in ODF certification and in sustainability monitoring in the outcome phase. The programme also supported government-led WASH coordination at local government level.

Baseline access to rural WASH services and hygiene knowledge levels were relatively high in both countries, but this still left a huge number of people under-served, given the high populations. SAWRP explicitly targeted harder-to-reach communities that were not covered by previous WASH interventions: for example, flood-prone areas and schools in poorer areas.^{66, 67}

The interviews with programme managers suggested that the programme was largely implemented independently of other WASH programmes in both countries. Despite this, in Pakistan the evaluation did not identify significant missed opportunities for greater coordination.⁶⁸

3.3.4 WASH activities

SAWRP was contracted under Lot B, hence the focus of the programme was on rural sanitation and hygiene, though it included a modest water supply component so that small water supplies could be provided in cases of acute water stress that potentially impacted on hygiene. SAWRP comprised two independent workstreams:

- Plan International, WaterAid, and their local implementing partners promoted sanitation and handwashing with soap in poor rural communities using CLTS and sanitation marketing. They aimed to deliver results across entire sub-districts. ODF was an explicit aim, and hygiene promotion (handwashing with soap) targeted the same communities through a mixture of household visits, mass meetings, and some mass media promotion.
Water supply improvements were not a major feature of the programme (only 3% of beneficiaries), but were included in order to provide access to some of the poorest and most under-served poor communities, where communities faced acute water supply shortages. WaterAid considered that a substantial water supply component was not feasible under PbR due to the relatively high unit cost of hardware investments. Plan International and WaterAid generally implemented in different districts.
- Unilever delivered a handwashing campaign in a large number of schools in both countries, though the focus was overwhelmingly in Bangladesh. This component had a profound effect on the results profile overall as initially hygiene-only results were reported, following DFID guidance notes. This said, DFID did not count hygiene-only results in the latter half of the WASH Results Programme when reporting against its global targets. This said, DFID does not count hygiene-only results when reporting against its global targets.

The work undertaken under the WASH Results Programme represented a continuation of ongoing WASH initiatives. In Pakistan, for example, Plan International and WaterAid built on their earlier work under the UNICEF-led Rural Sanitation in Flood-Affected Districts programme, which ran from 2010 to 2012, while Unilever expanded its ongoing 'School of 5' handwashing campaign in

⁶⁶ Particularly in Bangladesh.

⁶⁷ Unilever reported using geographical targeting to identify poorer neighbourhoods. The evaluation team were not able to establish the exact poverty criteria used.

⁶⁸ The team have insufficient data to reliably comment on potential synergies in Bangladesh.

both Pakistan and Bangladesh. All partners applied tested operational models and local partners had experience of working at scale as part of flood relief projects.

While most of the programme was implemented via local NGOs, Plan International in Bangladesh opted to work directly with local government institutions (Union Parishad Staff).

Consortium members established relationships with the local implementing partners, who in turn had strong links with the targeted communities. While the lead organisations were subject to the PbR modality and had to pre-finance their work, local implementing partners were protected from PbR risks and were funded through regular grant-based agreements.

In 2017, Plan's contract was extended until 2020 with an additional £13.5 million in budget allocated to continue the programme in Bangladesh.⁶⁹ This extension entailed the delivery of new output and outcome results, and in effect represents a new contract as opposed to either a time or cost extension. The extension is commonly referred to as 'SAWRP II'. The scope of the present evaluation pertains only to the original SAWRP contract.

3.3.5 Monitoring of results and the sustainability of results

During the output phase, SAWRP results were assessed separately for each of the consortium members against their particular set of payment triggers. Results were monitored through paper-based and mobile-based systems in Pakistan and Bangladesh, respectively. Local partners collected output-related data quarterly, which were collated into the mPIMS system, which provided a relevant household ID for each household who has access to a water-point and/or a latrine, these data were disaggregated into disability and demographics of the household.

In the outcome phase, verification was based on surveys looking at programme results overall, and payments were made to the consortium lead, then divided up by the consortium in proportion to each member's contribution to the results. The sustainability of water-points and latrines was monitored via local NGOs' regular systems and through a series of surveys, implemented in a random subset of project communities. For water and sanitation outcomes, the partners implemented the surveys⁷⁰, and the hygiene results were assessed via a survey implemented by Ipsos MORI. Learning and review was facilitated via a Sustainability Assessment Framework developed by WEDC.

3.3.6 Results

Table 9 provides an overview of the output-phase results for SAWRP in Pakistan and Bangladesh. On all indicators in both countries there was substantial overachievement against the target. Overachievement was not paid for, but is included here to illustrate performance.

⁶⁹ The extension was not taken up in Pakistan – this was the supplier's choice, rather than being enforced by DFID.

⁷⁰ The Country Coordination Unit (CCU) played a coordinating role, Ipsos MORI provided the initial training, and enumerators were SAWRP field staff.

Table 9: Output-phase results

Deliverables		Bangladesh			Pakistan		
		Target	Actual	% of target	Target	Actual	% of target
1.1	The number of poor people having access to safe and reliable drinking water sources	137,750	169,706	123%	90,000	110,341	123%
2.1	The number of poor people having access to basic or improved household latrines	644,175	735,405	114%	1,000,000	1,205,582	121%
3.1	The number of poor men, women, and school children that have been reached by handwashing promotion in villages and schools	4,823,570	5,100,766	106%	1,786,000	2,020,793	113%

Source: Monitoring, Verification and Evaluation Framework for Project Outcomes – SAWRP, December 2016 version.

Table 10 presents SAWRP's verified results of the Quarter 1 (Q1) 2017 and Q1 2018 outcome assessments from the outcome surveys and the household survey (hygiene). These results indicate substantial overachievement against the targets by Q4 2017. In the case of water, 100% of the sampled water-points were functional at the time of the survey based on the red-amber-green (RAG) rating and use reports. In the case of sanitation, 99% of the sampled toilets were classified as improved, showed evidence of use, and households reported use. The picture was more mixed for hygiene, though there was significant overachievement on the self-reported practice and observation of a hand-washing facility. There was underachievement on the knowledge indicator in Pakistan at midline and endline, and in Bangladesh at midline.⁷¹

⁷¹ Though this is noted to be associated with measurement issues – see Section 4.2.1.3 of the SAWRP case study in Annex D, for further discussion.

Table 10: Verified outcome-phase results of SAWRP

Area	Indicator and target	Pakistan		Bangladesh		
		Q1 2017	Q4 2017	Q4 2016	Q2 2017	Q4 2017
Water	90% of poor people across the project districts continue to use reliable, safe drinking water sources	100%	100%	97.1%	99.2%	98.6%
Sanitation	75% of poor people across project districts continue to use basic or improved latrines	96.1%	99%	99%	99.1%	99.2%
Hygiene	Reported practice: Percentage of respondents saying 'before eating' increases by: 15 percentage points (pp)(B)/10pp(P)	+9pp (81%)	+33pp	+32pp (77%)	<i>n.a.</i>	+38pp
	Observation: At least 10pp (B&P) more of these interviewer observations should reveal the presence of soap or a soap substitute, compared with baseline	+7pp (74%)	+27pp	+27pp (78%)	<i>n.a.</i>	+32pp
	Knowledge: The percentage of people who can name three or more critical times for handwashing increases by 15pp (B&P) compared to the baseline	+2pp (37%)	+11pp	+9pp (26%)	<i>n.a.</i>	+20pp

Source: Initial submissions of Q1 2017, Q2 2017, and Q4 2017 verification reports

Table 11: Child survey results (Unilever)

Area	Indicator and target	Pakistan*		Bangladesh	
		Midline	Endline	Midline	Endline
Hygiene (child)	Knowledge: Percentage of respondents able to state all five times increases by 10pp	-39% (15%)	-27pp (23%)	+16pp (62%)	+33pp (79%)
	Reported practice: Percentage of respondents saying 'everyday' increases by 10pp	+19pp (74%)	+20pp (80%)	+28pp (73%)	+43pp (88%)
	Observation: For children practising fewer than six steps of quality handwashing at baseline (i.e. or less), the mean number of quality handwashing steps they undertake at mid/endline will increase by +1 step	+2.3 steps (5.7)	+3.0 steps (6.6)	+3.1 steps (6.9)	+4.0 steps (7.8)

Source: Q4 2016 verification report

*Note: The baselines for the midline and endline survey analysis in Pakistan are different because they reflect attrition rates during the surveys. The child surveys are longitudinal cohort studies and the sample size during the midline and endline was reduced if the same children could not be found.

3.4 SSH4A

This section provides a brief overview of the SSH4A sub-programme; the supplier case study (Vol. 2.2) contains more detail on SSH4A implementation.

3.4.1 Implementing organisations

SSH4A was solely implemented by SNV and its local partners – there were no other international consortium members and there was no separate monitoring, evaluation, and learning provider. Activities were implemented in **Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nepal⁷², Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia** for the whole programme duration – and in **South Sudan** for half of the programme (2014–2016). SSH4A was managed from a programme management unit in Nairobi.

3.4.2 Targets

Table 12 outlines SSH4A's deliverables as per the contract annex. These deliverables were spread across a series of 11 'results packages', each containing some or a mix of the results below, or partial payment for progress towards results.

Table 12: SSH4A deliverables (revised)*

Deliverable		Target
Process		Baselines completed and workplans agreed
		Preconditions for demand creation assured – through training of CLTS facilitators, design of informed choice materials, agreement of ODF verification process, and completion of supply chain and consumer studies.
		Alignment with local government – through drafting district sanitation plans, and a report demonstrating local sector alignment
		Progress on sustainability and equity prerequisites – through all country projects reaching benchmark in all key sustainability indicators, though up to two sustainability indicators in each country could fall below benchmark achievement where external factors had influenced progress in these indicators.
Sanitation	Output	2.084 million people with new access to an improved sanitation facility
	Outcome	2.084 million people with sustained use of improved sanitation facilities
Hygiene	Output	2.73 million people reached by hygiene promotion activities
	Outcome	400,000 people practising handwashing with soap at critical times

Source: SSH4A contract annex, dated December 2014 (abridged by authors and updated based on minor changes to sustainability targets)

*Note: Payments for each deliverable were spread across multiple payment rounds. This is not captured here but is discussed below.

3.4.3 Country contexts and targeting of activities

As government alignment was a key element of SSH4A, activities in all eight countries were aligned with national WASH frameworks and implemented through government staff where possible. The exact nature of the activities was tailored to each national WASH context and level of access:

⁷² SSH4A activities in Nepal were suspended for six months following the 2015 earthquake.

- In countries where the access to improved toilets was higher (Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, and Mozambique), SNV focused on the remaining harder-to-reach communities.
- In Tanzania, SNV focused on the upgrading of sanitation facilities and on hygiene promotion, as the country has low levels of open defecation but high levels of unimproved facilities, with sustainability and hygiene challenges.
- In Ghana, SNV focused on targeted behaviour change communication (BCC) to reduce the number of shared latrines.
- In countries where the access to improved toilets was still low (Kenya and Nepal), SNV focused on providing specific support to build the basic capacity of the CLTS rural sanitation actors.

Some countries had high baseline levels of WASH access, whereas others had very low levels of access when programme activities were being designed in 2013.

3.4.4 WASH activities

The SSH4A programme dealt only with rural sanitation and hygiene promotion (Lot B) – it had no water supply component. Activities were implemented within the framework of the existing SSH4A programme, which has been operating in a dozen countries in Asia since 2009. The overall SSH4A approach embodies a tested operational approach for working at scale and combines demand creation – mostly using CLTS – with support to sanitation supply chains, BCC, and strengthening capacity for WASH governance. Attainment of area-wide ODF was a key objective.

In several SSH4A countries under the WASH Results Programme activities were implemented by local government partners, supported to a greater or lesser extent by NGOs referred to as Local Capacity Builders (LCBs) by SNV. These included a mix of existing and new SNV partners, and some (including those in Uganda, Mozambique, Nepal, and Tanzania) were initially contracted on a PbR basis. Overall, SNV's positioning varied within the national WASH sector and other WASH programmes across the nine countries: in Ghana, Kenya, Nepal, and South Sudan, SNV was a bigger player alongside a more under-funded and less structured WASH sector. In contrast, in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia, the existence of national WASH programmes is a strong indication of their governments' commitment to harmonising the sector and attracting significant bilateral and multilateral funding.

In 2017 SNV's contract was extended until 2020, with an additional £13.1 million in budget allocated for a new phase of the programme in Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The implementation activities still followed the SSH4A framework, but new locations were added in most countries and some local implementation partners were changed. These extension activities are outside the scope of this evaluation.

3.4.5 Monitoring of results and the sustainability of results

Largely using the existing SSH4A systems, results were monitored through household surveys, administered through the Akvo Flow mobile-based monitoring system.⁷³

⁷³ See <http://akvo.org/products/akvoflow/>

During the outcome phase, sustainability aspects were monitored through 10 indicators developed by SNV which tracked the existence of various technical, environmental, and institutional prerequisites⁷⁴. Some of these indicators were already being monitored in the output phase.

3.4.6 Results

Table 13 summarises the output and outcome results for sanitation and hygiene. The final results measured by the sustainability indicators are presented in the SSH4A case study report.

Table 13: SSH4A performance on key indicators

Deliverable		Indicator	Target	Population verified (%increase over baseline levels)
Sanitation	Output delivery	People with new access to improved latrines (Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) standard) by December 2015	2,084,000	2,453,881 (30.6%)
	Outcome delivery	People using 'improved' latrines ⁷⁵ by December 2017	2,084,000	2,736,108 ⁷⁶ (+33.1%)
Hygiene	Output delivery	People reached by hygiene promotion by December 2015	2,730,000	6,757,167 (86.7%) ⁷⁷
	Outcome delivery	People practising handwashing with soap at critical times by December 2017	400,000	1,256,095 (+16.6%)

Source: Targets – SSH4A survey reports; achievement – verification reports.

⁷⁴ For the final round of data collection in 2018, in agreement with DFID, only six of the 10 verification indicators were subject to verification. This development is explained in the SSH4A case study.

⁷⁵ This relates to the DFID definition, not the JMP definition. According to JMP, improved sanitation facilities cannot allow rats to access the pit contents.

⁷⁶ The reason why the outcome result in 2017 is higher than the output result is because between 2015 and 2017 additional outputs were reached which are not indicated in this table.

⁷⁷ For this indicator, the percentage indicates the proportion of the population, not the increase over baseline.

4 Findings and analysis

The findings presented below are organised by the DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts, and sustainability.

To facilitate readability, the subsections within each category do not directly follow the evaluation questions, but rather are formulated into a narrative that follows a more natural flow. The beginning of each section contains a table summarising the responses to its evaluation questions.

All findings in this chapter, as well as the table summarising the responses to its evaluation questions, synthesise the results of endline evaluation activities as detailed in the Supplier level case studies. This chapter also includes evidence from the midline evaluation report or occasionally other sources where explicitly noted. The structure and organization of the findings section of the Supplier case studies intentionally have been kept as consistent as possible with this findings section at the synthesis level to aid the reader. In most cases the section numbering is the same between this findings section and the case studies. However, each subsection that follows also includes a reference to the specific subsection in the Supplier case studies with more detail. Refer also to Annex B.13 for the evaluation matrix for a mapping of data sources and methods by detailed evaluation question.

The evaluation activities included theory of change analysis, process evaluation (including institutional systems review), impact assessment, in-depth country case studies and contribution analysis for a subset of detailed evaluation questions (DEQs 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.4, 5.1 and 5.2). The contribution analysis was used to draw causal inferences to explain how change is generated, based on a plausible theory of change and recognizing that the programme is unlikely to be the sole factor producing change but does so in interaction with contextual factors. It helped tease out the factors that contributed to the quality of implementation and achievement of intended outputs and outcomes. Annex B details the methodology and provides more detail on the contribution analysis approach specifically.

4.1 Relevance

This section addresses the DAC criterion of relevance. All of the relevance DEQs were extensively assessed in the midline evaluation. As this is a synthesis report, Table 14 summarises the final evaluation findings for each DEQ, incorporating both midline and endline results as appropriate. However, this section does not seek to repeat the depth at which these topics were addressed in the midline.

The three supplier programmes were quite different: for example, in terms of their organisational make-up, the range of activities undertaken, the number of countries involved, and the extent to which they applied tested operational approaches or used implementation models that needed some fine-tuning. For these reasons, the programmes are not directly comparable.

All three programmes all met their contractual targets. As suppliers selected indicators for each programme independently, the results are also not directly comparable. However, we have highlighted emerging themes to the extent feasible. When reviewing the findings, the evaluators caution readers that the WASH Results Programme was not a clean test of PbR for a variety of reasons, such as the evolution of expectations, the characteristics of the contracting process, and the uniquely tight timetable for the first two years.

Table 14: Summary of relevance DEQ findings (adapted from midline evaluation report)

DEQs	Our conclusion	Strength of evidence	Section
HEQ1 – Were the programme objectives appropriate, and achievable, and to what extent was DFID’s programme design and the consortium sub-programme design consistent with achieving these objectives?			
DEQ 1.1: To what extent were the programme objectives clearly articulated?	Type and scale of anticipated results were clearly defined for outputs, but level of ambition at outcome level was much less clear at the design stage, and when contracts were being negotiated. Similarly, the indicators to be used for each supplier and their measurement was also negotiated during implementation. Objectives relating to equity and sustainability were stated but their relationship to the PbR modality was not explicit.	High	Section 3.1
DEQ 1.2: To what extent does the programme’s design (i.e. the theory of change) set out a clear and realistic process for how programme activities will achieve the intended outputs, outcomes, and impacts?	The theory of change lacked important detail: assumptions were not clearly set out, and the rationale for, and contribution of, PbR was not explained. This evaluation team developed a nested PbR theory of change to facilitate evaluation activities.	High	Annex C
DEQ 1.3: To what extent were the scale and pace of the programme (including the December 2015 deadline) realistic for achieving the intended outputs and outcomes given the capacity of the suppliers and their local partners?	Suppliers largely reached the targets set; however, the urgency of the December 2015 deadline for the output phase in some cases posed risks to quality and the likelihood of sustainable results. The Suppliers established appropriate teams, though some staff reported high stress or other issues due to the pace in the output phase.	High	Section 4.1.1
DEQ 1.4: To what extent was the PbR modality appropriate for achieving sustainable and inclusive WASH outcomes, given the capacity of suppliers and the timeline of the programme?	This programme was not a clean test of whether PbR was appropriate for achieving sustainable and inclusive WASH outcomes, for a variety of reasons, such as the evolution of expectations, the characteristics of the contracting process, and the uniquely tight timetable for the first two years. The PbR modality appears to be one potentially appropriate option (amongst others), especially when these criteria are built into the indicators and payment criteria. However, specific implementation dynamics weakened any direct link between the PbR modality and the prospects for achieving sustainable and inclusive WASH outcomes for this programme. For example, (a) Key decisions on the type of implementation approach were made before the PbR specifics were clear.	High	Section 3.1; Also refer to Sections 4.4.2 and 4.5.2

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (b) Sustainability and/or inclusivity were not required to be built into the indicators though Suppliers could choose to do so. SSH4A is the only Supplier that explicitly linked certain sustainability prerequisites to its payment milestones. (c) The ambitious schedule for the output -phase created unique challenges. The output-outcome split helped or hindered sustainability and inclusion depending on the Supplier's implementation strategy; (e.g. government engagement is important for sustainability, but the tight timeline created a disincentive to involve government agencies). (d) The tight timeline and early uncertainties relating to how the PbR modality would be implemented (e.g. how achievements would be verified) made Suppliers risk-averse in setting targets, and many planned to overachieve from the outset as a risk management strategy. (e) PbR incentives were framed negatively in original design: penalties for not meeting targets but no bonuses for over-delivery. PbR often includes positive incentives as well as negative penalties to guide anticipated results (see Section 2.3.3 for detail). 		
DEQ 1.5: How likely was it that the programme design would encourage 'innovative' private sector partnerships?	The WASH Results Programme was not a clean test of whether PbR would encourage innovative private sector partnerships. The midline found that some private sector bidders were put off by the uncertainty around how the PbR modality would operate. Those bidders that ultimately won had already largely formed their teams before the PbR modality was announced. Private sector participation was relatively limited: no consortia were led by private sector firms, but consortia included some private sector partners (SAWRP included Unilever, SWIFT included Sanergy and SNV partnered with local private sector firms to implement sanitation supply chains, albeit at a small scale).	High	Section 3.1; Also refer to <i>Midline Evaluation Report</i> .
DEQ 1.6: How likely was it that the programme design would encourage the suppliers to propose 'innovative' WASH interventions?	This programme was not a clean test of whether PbR would encourage innovative WASH interventions. This was a stated intention of DFID, but was not required. Early uncertainties relating to how the PbR modality would be implemented, combined with the tight timeline conspired, conspired to discourage genuine innovation, defined here as approaches novel to the global WASH sector, and encouraged suppliers to adopt (mostly) familiar, tested approaches. Evaluators note that some approaches new for a partner in a given country were implemented and promoted that were not novel globally.	High	Section 3.1; also refer to Section 4.2.5 or the Midline Evaluation Report.
DEQ 1.7: How likely was it that the programme design would encourage inclusive outputs and outcomes?	This programme was not a clean test of whether PbR would encourage inclusive outputs and outcomes. This was a stated intention of DFID but was not required in the reporting or payment criteria. However, the suppliers chose to have inclusion implicit or explicit in their activities and all supplier programmes prioritised poor and under-served countries. Yet only some implementing partners deliberately selected hard-to-reach locations. It was not possible to measure the degree of inclusive outcomes as disaggregated results were not consistently available across all suppliers.	High	Section 3.1; also refer to Section 4.4.2

DEQ 1.8: How appropriate was the WASH Results Programme's design for achieving the programme 'learning objectives'?	The design was somewhat appropriate to facilitate learning on PbR. DFID's intended to promote learning, through a dedicated L&D team was set up within the MV team, and annual Supplier Learning Events. However, an explicit lesson-sharing mechanism between suppliers was only introduced in April 2015. Suppliers reported that the tight timeline left insufficient space for learning on PbR in the output phase. Confidentiality issues also impeded learning. Nevertheless, moderate learning on WASH implementation but considerable learning on PbR was achieved.	High	Sections 4.2.8 and 4.5.5
DEQ 1.9. To what extent was the design of each consortium sub-programme appropriate for achieving DFID's key objectives?	Designs were appropriate insofar as they enabled delivery of the scale and type of results sought by DFID, with the exception of some partners within SWIFT Kenya. However, though payments were included related to sustained outcomes; other aspects such as inclusion, sustainability, and government ownership were not built into payment criteria for all supplier and in some contexts these aspects were marginalised. Note that SNV did have sustainability pre-requisites as a payment criteria.	High	Section 4.1

4.1.1 Factors influencing programme design

Out of all the programme features highlighted in Section 3.1, the midline evaluation report listed three intertwined factors as arguably the strongest determinants of how the programme was implemented at the supplier level. These are listed below and are discussed in the following subsections:

- (a) the extremely tight and strict deadline for delivery of beneficiary number results by December 2015;
- (b) the programme 'shape' or phasing, involving output and outcome phases; and
- (c) the PbR modality of payment (including the requirement for rigorous independent verification).

4.1.1.1 Tight timetable to meet MDGs

As noted in the midline, all suppliers reported that, to varying degrees, the substantial time pressure of the MDGs deadline to some extent cancelled out the benefits of having a flexible PbR programme that was non-prescriptive in its implementation approach.⁷⁸ Examples included the following:

- **Sticking with the tried and true.** With the exception of some of the SWIFT components⁷⁹, all suppliers relied on proven implementation approaches and established institutional relationships with local government agencies and NGOs/community-based organisations, in part to minimise risk in meeting the schedule. Adopting tested models and selecting a limited range of projects and partners also facilitated opportunities to achieve economies of scale. In countries that faced significant challenges with meeting targets, work was scaled down or discontinued and those targets shifted to another area, e.g. Kenya shifting targets to DRC under SWIFT.
- **Shortcuts in preparation.** Some local partners were not able to undertake a detailed enough baseline assessment within the timeframe of inception activities, to increase their understanding of the socioeconomic, political, and environmental aspects that may have posed challenges to WASH implementation. In northern Kenya, local partners flagged up the fact that better understanding of the baseline context would have helped them to design different implementation approaches. For SAWRP in Pakistan and for SSH4A in Mozambique, where a baseline was undertaken, the baseline sanitation coverage in the target areas was found to be higher than anticipated, requiring local partners to increase their geographical scope to meet targets – which raised implementation costs due to the need for larger field teams, transport provision, and other support.

⁷⁸ DFID offered a three-month extension to suppliers from January to March 2016 to lessen the pressure of the MDGs deadline; only SWIFT took advantage of this extension because it had faced more delays as a result of its implementation through government.

⁷⁹ SWIFT in Kenya was a package of small- to medium-sized projects that operated largely autonomously. The range of project types in Kenya did not offer economies of scale. SWIFT in Kenya was also a rare case among the country programmes in that some partners used operational approaches that were not fully tested and ready for scaling up at the programme start.

- **Suboptimal learning.** Several NGO partners explained that taking stock of lessons could only happen after completion of the output phase. Adjusting implementation approaches to improve effectiveness was not always possible within the short timeframe of the output phase.⁸⁰

4.1.1.2 Output/outcome phasing

Whilst most programme logframes or results frameworks anticipate the delivery of both outputs and outcomes, having a formalised two-phase structure is unusual for WASH programmes in general. The way the output to outcome split was handled varied widely by supplier and/or country, depending on their overall implementation approach. Therefore, it is difficult to draw broader conclusions at the overarching programme level. While suppliers shifted away from outputs delivery to focusing their efforts on institutional strengthening and continued hygiene promotion in the second phase, the extent of the shift and this discontinuity between phases varied significantly by supplier. However, the implications of how this split was operationalised by supplier are discussed as relevant throughout the findings presented in the subsequent subsections.

In general, SSH4A was implemented as a single coherent programme, with four pillars addressed throughout both phases, and was not divided into separate activities during the output and outcome phases.

For SAWRP, the two phases ultimately had separate strategic focus – with the output phase focusing on CLTS, while the outcome phase focused on building the capacity of local-level institutions (both government and community-based), with continued follow-up promotion and monitoring. As it presented a shift in programming for the country partners, it took several months into the outcome phase to agree and design the new implementation activities.⁸¹

For SWIFT, the Kenya and the DRC programmes were very different. In DRC, SWIFT was implemented in a focused geographical area operating at scale using a standardised approach in rural areas (“Village et Ecoles Assainis” (VEA)) with Community Health Clubs and a ‘semi-urban’ approach; implementation was well aligned with the national government programme (VEA).

However, for SWIFT in Kenya, the division into two phases had varying significance due to the diversity of implementing partners, local contexts, and approaches used. In several cases, the shift from output to outcome phase resulted in a shift away from the delivery of outputs to institutional support, somewhat similar to that in SAWRP, SSH4A, and in the DRC. However, in other cases the same activities continued (e.g. hygiene promotion⁸²), and in one case there was a shift just to monitoring rather than engaging in further activities⁸³.

4.1.1.3 The PbR modality’s emphasis on verified results

Due to the PbR financing modality of the programme, suppliers were only paid for results that had been independently verified. Suppliers needed robust results monitoring and reporting systems which would provide the basis for verification of results, but suppliers were free to propose how they would measure results. This promoted a strong focus on achieving recognisable results during the inception phase, as well as throughout implementation. The verification process which

⁸⁰ For a more detailed discussion of learning, refer to Sections 4.2.8 and 4.5.5.

⁸¹ The SAWRP strategy for the outcome phase was finalised in Q2 2016, two quarters into the outcome phase. Some output delivery (outside of the payment milestones) and the adoption of new programme elements also continued in the outcome phase.

⁸² WSUP in Nairobi extending metered connections.

⁸³ BBC Media Action.

confirmed whether or not the supplier had delivered the agreed results thus became a central element of the programme:

‘PbR puts the spotlight on causality, encouraging attention to be given to “how” planned activities will lead to outputs and to outcomes.’ – SAWRP staff member, midline evaluation stage

The independent verification of suppliers’ results adopted a systems-based approach, meaning it was based on data generated by the supplier’s internal monitoring and reporting systems, rather than independent data collection by the MV team. Historically, the suppliers’ monitoring systems had not received the same level of attention as was needed for this programme. Knowing what would be acceptable was a challenge for suppliers as the requirements only become clear when working with the MV team during the verifiers’ inception phase (May–September 2014).

Suppliers’ internal monitoring and reporting systems and internal quality assurance procedures were developed and/or adapted as necessary to meet the requirements established by the verifiers during the verifiers’ inception phase (May–September 2014). The minimum level of evidence required was agreed with the supplier for each deliverable through a process of negotiation, where the verifier suggested items of evidence and the supplier checked the feasibility of providing this information within the required timeframe.^{84, 85}

For SAWRP and SWIFT, the programme also required more significant ongoing monitoring efforts by suppliers than usual, which was also more than had been expected and budgeted for at tender stage.

4.1.2 Operationalising the PbR modality

This subsection elaborates on how the PbR modality was operationalised by suppliers, addressing its role in consortia selection, establishing targets, and payment indicators.

4.1.2.1 PbR modality role in consortium composition

The PbR model assumes that suppliers have funds available to pre-finance large-scale programmes, and that they can spread risk across a portfolio of activities (Clist and Verschoor 2014). The consortia members had largely been agreed before the PbR modality had been announced. However, the pre-finance requirements played a significant role in finalising the membership of consortia and posed particular challenges for smaller players with limited reserves. Consortia members needed access to sufficient reserves to pre-finance not only their own start-up activities but also the activities of their local implementing partners, unless they were put on PbR contracts as well.⁸⁶

Evaluators also noted at the midline that suppliers had limited prior experience with PbR contracts. This led SAWRP to choose Plan International to lead their consortium as Plan International had prior experience of implementing PbR programmes in education (the Girls Education Challenge Fund), whereas WaterAid did not. Neither Oxfam (SWIFT) nor SNV (SSH4A) had implemented a

⁸⁴ See Midline Evaluation Report

⁸⁵ Refer to Annex G for a more comprehensive summary of the verification process.

⁸⁶ Refer to Box 7 of the midline evaluation report for several examples of where the PbR modality appears to have affected the choice of implementing partners.

PbR programme in WASH before. Also, Oxfam had already chosen its consortium partners before the PbR modality was announced.

4.1.2.2 Establishing supplier-level targets

Each consortium decided at the tender stage what level of WASH outputs could be realistically achieved by December 2015 (output phase), and (provisionally) what level of outcomes could be sustained until March 2018 (outcome phase). Suppliers presented their level of ambition for the transition from outputs to outcomes in their results frameworks, but for SWIFT and SAWRP these targets were not finalised until late in the output phase.

According to feedback at the midline stage from the suppliers, four elements played a key role in determining their stated ambition:

- In a departure from many other PbR programmes, the **PbR modality** for this programme did not reward overachievement (upside incentive), but did penalise underachievement (down-side incentive), which led suppliers to propose realistic if not conservative targets, given the short time available for the output phase, and given that payments were linked to the degree to which results could be sustained until programme end (see Section 2.3.3 for detail).
- **Ambitions were matched to the type of implementing partner chosen:** for example, the SSH4A programme – which was implemented directly through governments in several countries – set lower targets per country than other consortia, to match the implementation capacity of local government. As a result, a similar number of people were reached in each of the nine-country SSH4A programme by December 2015 as by each of the other two-country consortia. In contrast, Unilever (SAWRP) implemented exclusively through local partners and set its ambition based on its own organisational capacity and risk appetite, which was very high in Bangladesh.
- **The baseline level of WASH access in country** was another important factor in setting targets. For example, SNV explained that while initial ambitions were based on rough baseline data from 2012, these ambitions were revised in some countries once an updated baseline survey was undertaken in June/July 2014. Similarly, SAWRP revised the programme's geographical scope after the baseline survey in Pakistan revealed significantly higher baseline levels than partners had estimated. As a result, local partners had to renegotiate financial aspects of their agreement with their consortium partner.
- **Establishing indicators** was another challenging aspect. As noted in the midline evaluation report, variations between how 'results' were defined under different supplier contracts led to substantial challenges in regard to verification procedures and how to define the hygiene output result, particularly with regard to the number of people 'reached' by hygiene promotion. In the WASH sector, there is no widely accepted definition of what 'reached' means and what a minimum level of performance looks like. It was not possible to provide a single definition of 'reached' that was applicable across the wide range of hygiene-related activities undertaken by the three supplier programmes. As a result, each implementing partner agreed separate definitions with the MV team. The definitions of how results were defined are discussed in Section 4.2.1.

Setting the level of ambition for outcome targets involved significant discussions with DFID, as well as input from the MV team on what level of achievement (i.e. outcomes as a percentage of output numbers) could reasonably be expected for the three outcome targets, based on sector experience. For suppliers, setting outcome targets was challenging given that much was beyond the suppliers' direct control – such as for handwashing practices.

A related challenge for suppliers was that there were no established benchmarks in the WASH sector for the conversion of outputs into outcomes (for example, the percentage of those receiving access to water or sanitation services who may realistically be expected to still enjoy use of that service at some subsequent date). Suppliers could only make projections regarding likely levels of water-point functionality and use two years after installation.⁸⁷ However, this was more challenging in regard to the functionality and use of toilets, and the conversion of those who had received hygiene messages into those actually practising handwashing with soap.⁸⁸

4.1.2.3 Approach to PbR indicators for payment

Each supplier set out which results they would be paid for, and when, in a ‘results framework’, which was negotiated with DFID.

Within the context of the anticipated causal pathway illustrated in Figure 2, DFID’s PbR guidelines recommend that indicators for payment should be as close to outcome level as feasible (DFID 2014b). DFID ultimately agreed to some payments for inputs and processes, as well as outputs and outcomes (see Table 15 and Figure 2) to help suppliers manage cash flow, as the WASH Results Programme was a 100% PbR programme.

Figure 2: Generic causal pathway diagram



SAWRP had the most ‘classic’ PbR contract, with results defined only in terms of beneficiaries (outputs and outcome level) – which are the result types most typically associated with PbR. This is reflected in the contrast with the other two suppliers in Figure 3 below. In contrast, SWIFT and SSH4A also included a series of workplan activities, such as the signing of water-point construction contracts, development of BCC materials, and the training of facilitators (referred to as ‘process’ results hereafter). SWIFT and SSH4A listed their management fee and/or the fee for their M&E contractor separately, as an ‘input’ within the typical impact pathway (see Table 15).

SSH4A additionally included the sign-off of district sanitation plans with local government and progress against 10 sustainability prerequisites and was thus the only supplier to link sustainability prerequisites to its payment milestones.


⁸⁷ MV carried out a literature review on what was ‘reasonable’ to help inform these projections – and to inform negotiations with DFID.

⁸⁸ See midline evaluation report

Table 15: Comparison of contracted ‘results’ across suppliers

Result type	SAWRP	SWIFT	SSH4A
Input	None	M&E contractor (ODI) Management fee	Management fee
Process	None	Water-point construction contracts signed; water management structures set up Sanitation promoters trained; number of communities triggered BCC materials completed; hygiene promoters trained	Baselines completed Workplans agreed District sanitation plans in place BCC materials designed Training of facilitators Progress against 10 sustainability prerequisites
Output	Number of people with access to water, sanitation, and hygiene	Number of people with access to water, sanitation, and hygiene	Number of people with access to sanitation and hygiene
Outcome	Number of people using water and sanitation facilities or practising hygiene behaviour	Number of people using water and sanitation facilities or practising hygiene behaviour	Number of people using sanitation facilities or practising hygiene behaviour

Source: Midline evaluation report

Figure 3: Comparison of payments made in response to different results across suppliers

Source: Midline evaluation report – analysis based on supplier contracts and evaluation team coding by payments by result area

Note: ‘Inputs’ here refers to direct payments to international partners supporting monitoring, knowledge management, and learning but not directly involved in programme implementation. ‘Process’ refers to intermediate steps towards the delivery of outputs, such as community mobilisation, training, and the development of IEC materials.

4.1.3 Risk management

Both the PbR modality and the pressure of the MDGs deadline affected how suppliers managed risk within their consortia and allocated targets to different partners and countries. Under the WASH Results Programme, suppliers bore the risk for delivery even in unexpected circumstances. The only exception to the PbR modality was the force majeure clause in the contract.⁸⁹

As noted in the midline evaluation report, there were initial uncertainties regarding the contracting terms which increased risk: such as whether shared latrines and radio-based hygiene promotion were eligible as a basis for payment, or conditions under which payments would be reduced, and circumstances under which the force majeure clause would apply.

Because the risks were highly centralised, suppliers managed this risk in three main ways:⁹⁰

1. All suppliers aimed for beneficiary numbers that were 10%–30% above their contractual target, in the expectation that some results would be disallowed or not achieved. This buffer was designed to ensure that 100% of the target results would be verified and paid for.
2. Suppliers structured their payments over time so that 70%–80% of total payments were made within the first 18 months of the programme (by December 2015), thereby enabling some early cash flow and reducing the level of pre-financing. There was consensus at the March 2016 learning event that SNV's approach of a high proportion of 'process' payments in the first year of the programme was the most astute in terms of enabling early payments and cash flow, however created some unanticipated challenges with verification.
3. Suppliers incorporated a contingency fund into their budgets (between 4% and 12% of the contract value), which could be available to consortium partners. SAWRP partners reported, however, that these funds were not sufficient to cover all possible scenarios, including the reconstruction of WASH facilities after a major unforeseen event, such as a natural disaster. After 22% of latrines in Umerkot (Sindh province of Pakistan) were destroyed following heavy rains, communities were mobilised to repair the damage at their own expense, as is common under the CLTS approach.

Risk-sharing with DFID

There were a few instances where, because of external events, results were not achieved, the two critical examples being the prolonged drought in the ASAL region (which affected SWIFT water results) and the Ebola crisis in West Africa (which resulted in the termination of the SWIFT Liberia programme). In both cases DFID *de facto* assumed some of the financial risks associated with these events post-hoc. In the case of the Liberia programme, this took the form of making accommodations for the start-up and shut-down costs of the Liberia programme in re-negotiation of the contract with SWIFT. In the case of the ASAL drought, once the MV team had corroborated SWIFT's claim that the drought could be considered 'exceptional', accommodation was made in deciding the payment amount related to water-point functionality. For a fuller discussion of both occasions see Section 4.3.1 of the SWIFT case study.

Risk-sharing within consortia

All three lead suppliers chose to hold a large portion of risk centrally, pre-financing their other consortium members (SAWRP) or national NGO partners (SWIFT), or their country teams (for SSH4A). This introduced an additional element of risk for the lead supplier, who needed to factor in

⁸⁹ This was applied to the SWIFT Liberia programme, where activities could not continue due to the Ebola crisis. SWIFT was reimbursed for expenditure incurred at inception.

⁹⁰ See Midline Evaluation Report

the likelihood of consortium partners or country teams failing to deliver, and the need to set up procedures for how to deal with such an eventuality.

The degree to which lead suppliers passed on risks to others was mixed. The lead suppliers of SAWRP and SWIFT did pass PbR risks on to their consortium members (all INGOs). However, in many cases, consortium members did not pass PbR risks on to their country offices (e.g. Oxfam GB did not pass risks on to Oxfam Kenya, and similarly SNV did not pass risks on to SNV country offices). Similarly, the vast majority of lead suppliers were not willing to put their national implementing partners onto PbR contracts, on the basis that these partners would not be able to pre-finance their work or bear the risk of not being reimbursed later. One notable exception was SNV, which used partial PbR contracts in three countries (Mozambique, Nepal, and Uganda) and briefly used a full PbR contract for local partners in Tanzania (see Section 4.3.3 on the implication of this for partners)⁹¹.

In Kenya, the SWIFT consortium partners were in fact all INGOs and Oxfam contracted them on a PbR basis, though local NGOs working under these organisations were funded using grants, as in the past – the same was true in DRC where the consortium partners had implementing partners. Under SAWRP, Plan International and WaterAid chose to hold the PbR risk centrally, pre-financing the country teams and other consortium members – which constituted a considerable burden. In practice, payments to consortium partners were always at least a quarter in arrears, making it necessary for them to draw on other internal funds to bridge gaps in their cash flow.⁹²

Challenges with pricing risk

Under the WASH Results Programme, DFID agreed on payment levels in the contract negotiations, which took place under the competitive tendering process. The majority of activities funded by the WASH Results Programme involved incentivising behaviour change by communities, and involved local and government partners. As a result, the lead suppliers, who held the risk for non-payment, did not necessarily have direct control over the results to be achieved.

During the midline evaluation, suppliers noted uncertainties in how to price in risk in their budget proposals, explaining that in future they would price in the following costs more accurately:

- the cost of pre-financing partners, namely the risk that partners would not achieve the intended results and that the lead suppliers would lose out on the pre-finance payment;
- inflation and salary increases; and
- a buffer for slippage in timing and scope – especially as a result of some additional M&E activities being required which had not been costed.

4.1.4 Level of government engagement

As would be expected when promoting sustainability, all supplier consortia emphasised working in partnership with government and aligned their activities with national WASH policies where possible throughout implementation. For example:

⁹¹ A full PbR contract meant that no advance was given and payment was made every few months, if the agreed milestone was successfully completed. Partial PbR contracts meant that an advance was given and a final payment was made on a milestone basis, when the final target was met (e.g. for Uganda, a 20%–30% advance payment was given, followed by a progress payment of 30%–35% and a final payment of 30%–40%). If achievements did not meet the agreed target, a payment deduction could be made.

⁹² See Midline Evaluation Report

- The implementation model for SAWRP in Pakistan was closely aligned with the national sanitation strategy, Pakistan Approaches to Total Sanitation; and in Bangladesh Plan International worked with the government as its implementing partners.
- Under SWIFT, in Kenya, the government was consulted on activity design and some partners participated in implementation and monitoring work. In DRC, the implementation was aligned with the national VEA approach.
- SSH4A placed a strong emphasis on alignment with government by linking its sanitation and hygiene targets to government district plans, and often involving government partners directly in community-level implementation activities. In those countries where government partners were less involved in implementation, these government partners were involved in the monitoring of progress against these targets.

However, the extent to which the programmes were implemented directly through local government partners varied. As found at the midline stage, the urgency of results delivery affected the choice of implementing partners: one partner under SAWRP⁹³ changed its implementation modus from implementation through government partners to implementation directly through NGO partners. Similarly, some suppliers supplemented government capacity either by seconding staff to local government bodies (Plan in Bangladesh) or by hiring advisers to support them (in several SNV countries⁹⁴). This was done both in recognition of government capacity constraints, which could have caused delays in delivery, and due to the need to gain greater control over implementation activities, with scope to adjust them when needed. However, as counter-examples, several suppliers implemented directly through government structures, namely SWIFT's work implemented directly through the public water utility in Kenya, and SNV's activities in Ghana implemented through government without local partners.

⁹³ While WaterAid also usually implements through local government partners in Pakistan, under this programme they chose to implement directly through NGO partners.

⁹⁴ In Kenya and Tanzania, SNV supported government with district-level advisers, and in Mozambique and Zambia it supported government with sub-district level technicians. In all other countries except Ghana, local NGOs supported government partners.

4.2 Effectiveness

This section addresses the DAC criterion of effectiveness. One of the effectiveness DEQs was comprehensively assessed in the midline evaluation (DEQ 2.1); however, there is substantial new evidence for all other evaluation questions. This section focuses primarily on summarising evidence collected at the endline stage, incorporating midline results where relevant for further context. Table 16 summarises the final evaluation findings for each DEQ.

As noted above, the three supplier programmes were quite different. Whilst they were not directly comparable, this section focuses on highlighting cross-cutting themes, highlighting individual cases where particularly useful to provide context for the lessons and recommendations.

Table 16: Summary of effectiveness DEQ findings

DEQs	Our conclusion	Strength of evidence	Section
HEQ2 – To what extent and under which circumstances did the programme operate as intended and which factors helped/hindered the achievement of output and outcome objectives?			
DEQ 2.1: Did the programme achieve the intended outputs at scale?	Each supplier achieved its total output targets – though this came at a cost, particularly for staff at the local implementing level. Most sub-projects targeted entire districts/sub-districts or operated via the government framework, but these projects did not necessarily deliver access to the entire district/sub-district. ‘At scale’ was not defined in the programme design. [Comprehensively assessed at midline.]	High	Section 4.2.1
DEQ 2.2: To what extent were the prerequisites for achieving inclusive WASH outcomes addressed by suppliers?	Many of the most positive programme features promoting inclusivity were included within activities by the suppliers and were not required by DFID. A stronger focus on inclusion could have been established as a programme aim (regardless of whether it was linked to payment or not), with more consistent monitoring and reporting on inclusion across the WASH Results Programme. For all Suppliers, the PbR modality did not appear to help or hinder their inclusion focus.	Low/medium	Section 4.4.2
DEQ 2.3: To what extent have services continued to function and have behaviours continued to be used since their initial implementation (sustainable outcomes)?	The suppliers overwhelmingly achieved the outcome targets, with significant overachievement in several areas and modest underachievement in a few others. However, the overall level of functionality varied between suppliers, as did the indicators and their measurement, and a direct comparison of functionality is not possible. There was wide variation between countries within consortia and variation between consortia across water, sanitation, and hygiene. [See prospects for long-term sustainability under DEQs 5.1–5.3.]	High	Section 4.2.1
DEQ 2.4: How did programme design and external factors affect the achievement of output and outcome objectives within consortia sub-programmes?	A critical challenge for all suppliers was the tight MDGs deadline; nevertheless, targets were met. Complexity of consortium membership was also key for SWIFT and SAWRP. The influence of external factors was mitigated somewhat by agreement to drop certain countries and shift targets between countries.	Medium	Section 4.2 (all)

DEQ 2.5: Under which circumstances did the PbR framework help/hinder the achievement of the intended outputs and outcomes?	PbR risks sharpened minds on results and each supplier delivered the expected outputs and outcomes. However, the tight MDG deadline overshadowed the effects of the PbR modality. Cash flow concerns led suppliers to include payment for inputs and processes in their results frameworks, which added to the reporting and verification burden.	Low/medium	Section 4.2 (all)
DEQ 2.6: Under which circumstances did the PbR framework affect the quality of programme implementation (positive or negative)?	The quality of processes and outputs was generally reasonable, with no serious quality issues were identified. However there were a small number of cases where the tight MDG deadline posed risks to quality in the short term, with the two-year outcome phase providing opportunities to remedy shortcomings. Outcome-level accountability facilitated ensuring functionality but there is no clear evidence as to whether the PbR modality helped or hindered implementation quality.	Low	Section 4.2.2
DEQ 2.7: Under which circumstances did suppliers implement innovative approaches and focus on learning?	There is little evidence of suppliers adopting innovative operational approaches which were new to the global WASH sector, though management was flexible and responsive to local circumstances. There was an inconsistent focus on learning during output phase due to the tight schedule; this improved somewhat in the outcome phase.	High	Sections 4.2.5, and 4.2.8

4.2.1 Results by supplier

The vast majority of output targets were achieved by all suppliers, and they met, if not exceeded, all contractual targets (DEQ 2.1). One reason for the degree of overachievement was that suppliers had set realistic, if not conservative targets as a risk management strategy, as noted above.

The suppliers also overwhelmingly achieved the outcome targets, with significant overachievement in several areas and modest underachievement in a few others (DEQ 2.3). Results for the outcome phase are summarised for each supplier below. These findings are more fully elaborated in Section 4.2.1 of each of the respective supplier case study reports.

The evaluation was not in a position to comment on the veracity of the results verified by the MV team because – apart from the RCT In Pakistan (reported separately) – no independent surveys were carried out by the evaluation. This was by design as there was such a significant investment by DFID in the MV, and evaluating the MV systems and processes was not an explicit focus of the evaluation.

All of the verified monitoring data are taken to be accurate by the evaluation team, though it is noted that the monitoring data drew on a range of assumptions, and due the nature of the data collection in sample surveys there are limitations as to the extent to which these can be ‘verified’ without third-party data collection.

4.2.1.1 SSH4A outcomes

Broadly speaking, SSH4A reached and exceeded its outcome targets for both sanitation and hygiene. However, there was wide variation in conversion rates across counties, as highlighted below:

- SSH4A's **sanitation** outcome target, which aimed for a population of 2.084 million people⁹⁵ to continue using improved latrines until programme end, was reached and exceeded⁹⁶ but achievements varied considerably between countries. Substantial improvements were seen for Ethiopia, Nepal, Tanzania, and Zambia, varying from 37 to 80 percentage points above baseline levels, but more limited improvements were seen for Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, and Uganda, varying from 10 to 21 percentage points above baseline levels.
- The **hygiene** target was set at 400,000 people continuing to practise handwashing with soap at critical times, and was reached and exceeded (an increase of 16.6 percentage points above baseline levels was achieved). As with sanitation outcomes, achievement varied considerably between countries. Substantial improvements were seen for Ethiopia, Nepal, Tanzania, and Zambia, varying from 21 to 66 percentage points above baseline levels, but more limited improvements were seen for Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, and Uganda, varying from 2.4 to 10.5 percentage points above baseline levels.

4.2.1.2 SWIFT outcomes

SWIFT reached, or nearly reached, all of its outcome targets. In DRC SWIFT performed better overall than in the ASAL region in Kenya, and this is assumed to be primarily due to challenges related to the ASAL region's prolonged drought. The evaluators note that functionality did improve during the outcome phase for each of the three target categories, presumably because the suppliers remained active in ensuring functionality, though this effect was less pronounced in the Kenya ASAL region⁹⁷. The outcome results broadly lend strong support to the notion that the programme activities were effective in sustaining results – though the variation in performance and areas of underachievement highlight that this was variable across the programme. The performance highlights were:

- SWIFT's outcome target for **water** was “use sustained of at least 75% of water points”, for which SWIFT achieved 98.6% of this goal overall, i.e. the vast majority of systems remained functional above the 75% threshold. Though due to the way the data were aggregated it cannot be interpreted as just under 75% of all systems remained functional across SWIFT (i.e. 98.6% achievement does not mean 73.95% functionality).⁹⁸ While several areas overachieved, the ASAL region in Kenya was below 75%. The DRC survey results indicated that over 90% of water points were used by output beneficiaries (as reported via household surveys), and around 80%⁹⁹ of the complex systems in the ASAL region remained functional. Functionality of simple systems in the ASAL region was considerably lower.

⁹⁵ This refers to a total population at programme end, meaning these were not necessarily only the original people targeted. SSH4A could target new beneficiaries to make up for losses.

⁹⁶ An increase of 33% above baseline levels was achieved.

⁹⁷ Due to peculiarities in the way indicators were calculated and aggregated, it is difficult to summarise further here. A more comprehensive discussion is provided in each of the supplier case studies as it pertained to their specific methods of aggregation.

⁹⁸ SWIFT was the only consortium with a substantial water component.

⁹⁹ Both as reported by HH surveys and Functionality reported by Water User Committee

- The **sanitation** outcome target was “use sustained for at least 70% of each target population”¹⁰⁰. 100% of the target was achieved, i.e. beneficiary use of sanitation facilities was consistently above the 70% threshold across the suppliers - continued use of sanitation facilities was between 73% - 87% across partners and countries¹⁰¹.
- For **hygiene**, the outcome target was “behaviour change obtained for at least 15% of each target population”. 99.6% of the target was achieved. Due to the aggregation methods this is not readily translated into an overall figure for beneficiary numbers across partners.¹⁰² The only area of underachievement was in relation to Sanergy’s activities in Nairobi.

4.2.1.3 SAWRP outcomes

The water supply and sanitation use targets were met with considerable overachievement for SAWRP in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. There was, however, a slight shortfall in the case of handwashing practices at points in both countries. Highlights were as follows:

- The **water** outcome target for SAWRP was ‘90% of poor people across the project districts continue to use reliable, safe drinking water sources,’ the results of which were overwhelmingly positive – with significant overachievement against target in both countries.¹⁰³
- The **sanitation** outcome target was ‘75% of poor people across project districts continue to use basic or improved latrines,’ the outcome survey results indicated that 99% of output beneficiaries continued to use facilities – i.e. there was overachievement against the target.¹⁰⁴ As with SWIFT, the sanitation results improved over time. Though not reflected in the results data, suppliers in Pakistan reported an ODF conversion rate of around 98% (note that this has not been verified by e-Pact). By global standards, this is exceptional and is therefore controversial. Programme stakeholders attributed this to concerted and prolonged promotional efforts stimulated by greater accountability for outcome-level results.¹⁰⁵
- SAWRP’s outcome target for **hygiene** changed from one expressed in terms of beneficiary numbers to a composite indicator based around three components (knowledge, reported behaviour, and observed behaviour) with percentage point target increases.¹⁰⁶ Targets were slightly higher in Bangladesh. Also, in Pakistan all sanitation beneficiaries were assumed to also be hygiene beneficiaries.¹⁰⁷ The hygiene target was met in most cases, though there were points in both countries where the target was not met on the knowledge component¹⁰⁸.

¹⁰⁰ The wording was later revised in the Form 2 to “At least 70% of the beneficiaries that are reached at output level continue to use latrines that meet SWIFT standards (*hereafter referred to as 'hygienic' latrines*)” in DRC and the ASAL regions; and “At least 70% of the beneficiaries that are reached at output level continue to use Fresh Life Toilets (FLT)s” for Sanergy

¹⁰¹ See Annex 5 of the Q4 2017 verification report.

¹⁰² The measurement of this indicator is more complex and there is considerable sector debate surrounding the appropriate measurement and measurement validity. Refer to Section 4.2.1 of the SWIFT case study for more elaboration on this issue.

¹⁰³ The results arose from an aggregation of red/amber/green (RAG) ratings where the indicator has a degree of acceptance of non-functionality across the year built into it.

¹⁰⁴ SAWRP used the output-phase beneficiary database as the sample frame for the endline surveys in sanitation. By contrast, SWIFT and SSH4A surveyed the entire population in their implementation areas (including beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries). As such the SAWRP results indicate the extent to which specific output-phase beneficiaries continued to use their facilities, but does not give an indication of the population-wide usage levels in programme communities.

¹⁰⁵ Refer to 4.2.1 of the SAWRP case study for more information on this point.

¹⁰⁶ There was substantial debate regarding the methodology for the compound indicators, which is elaborated further in Section 4.2.1 of the SAWRP case study.

¹⁰⁷ At the output level for example, if a household constructed a latrine during the output phase those household members were assumed to be both sanitation beneficiaries and reached by hygiene promotion.

¹⁰⁸ See SAWRP’s annex for details. There were several changes to the measurement of the hygiene indicator during the outcome phase. Notably that in Pakistan the initial outcome survey included respondents that were beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (this was later changed to include only beneficiaries with the baseline retrospectively adjusted).

4.2.2 Quality – level and issues that impacted on it

This section explores whether aspects in the programme design had an influence on the approach to quality, which relates directly to DEQ 2.6.

The quality of processes and outputs was generally reasonable, with no serious quality issues were identified. Several aspects in the programme design affected quality positively or negatively — such as the tight output-phase timetable or the output/outcome split:

- For SSH4A, the evaluation team found that monitoring progress towards outcomes throughout the programme appeared to increase the quality of latrines and handwashing stations over time. For example, improvements in the technical quality of latrines was driven by SSH4A deliberately promoting ‘small do-able actions’ to improve the quality of the current household latrine, while also promoting options which help households move up the sanitation ladder.
- One SWIFT partner noted that meeting the December 2015 output deadline while maintaining high quality standards was difficult, and the three-month extension facilitated higher quality, e.g. for water tanks. Also, due in part to staff reductions between phases, two other partners reported suboptimal staff levels to engage adequately with communities or county governments in the output phase.
- For SAWRP, stakeholders offered differing opinions on whether the PbR modality itself incentivised a focus on quality or whether the activities simply reflected existing operational priorities. Regardless, the intense mobilisation and monitoring requirements added a layer of scrutiny of the results that acted to incentivise quality, though the pressure to deliver ambitious output targets by December 2015 meant that some processes were rather rushed. However, they were able to ‘catch up’ and improve implementation quality¹⁰⁹ (e.g. latrine quality) via community commitments in the outcome phase.

As a result, there were some cases where the quantity of results was given priority over quality¹¹⁰.

As the individual findings on quality itself (e.g. relating to technology, materials used, capacity building and/or processes) varied considerably between different countries and subcomponents high-level generalisations are not meaningful. Readers should refer to Section 4.2.2 of each of the suppliers’ respective supplier case study reports for a deeper discussion of findings relating to quality.

In relation to the effect of PbR specifically, there was no clear indication that the PbR modality helped or hindered implementation quality, though most stakeholders reported that accountability for outcome-level results meant that they followed up to ensure that the functionality and use of WASH facilities continued until the end of the outcome phase, which positively reflects on the overarching programme design.

4.2.3 PbR influence on effectiveness of suppliers’ monitoring systems

The discussion in this section centres on the degree to which the supplier monitoring systems generated data that were fit-for-purpose – and the influence of the PbR modality on this (DEQs 3.3 and 3.4). How efficient these systems were is considered separately in Section 4.3.3. More details can be found in Section 4.2.3 of the respective supplier case study reports. Refer to Annex G for more elaboration on the verification process of the supplier monitoring systems, and the midline

¹⁰⁹ This was a specific programme aim for Plan International in Pakistan. Though it is noted that output results were paid on the basis of agreed quality standards with DFID – which included the definition of ‘basic’ latrines.

¹¹⁰ See midline evaluation report for specific examples.

evaluation report for an earlier discussion of the effectiveness and efficiency of the monitoring systems through the output phase, the key themes of which are incorporated below.

As suppliers were free to propose how they would measure results for their sub-programme, the resulting monitoring systems varied widely. Monitoring built upon the suppliers' existing monitoring systems to the extent feasible, with SSH4A largely using existing systems whilst SAWRP and SWIFT made more significant modifications.

Suppliers worked with verifiers iteratively to agree what was required and then implemented this as appropriate. The repeated rounds of system appraisals conducted as part of the verification show a clear pattern of improvement of monitoring systems over time.

After an extended period of modifications, the supplier monitoring systems were reasonably fit-for-purpose in the end, with numerous satisfactory points. However, a few challenges remained, as outlined below. That suppliers were only paid for independently verified results due to the PbR modality substantially influenced the monitoring and reporting systems. Explicitly linking payments to outcomes triggered a much deeper discussion around outcome measurement and the validity of those measurements in particular.

SWIFT and SAWRP consistently reported that the MV burden was heavier than with other grant-funded programmes, yet they overwhelmingly noted that it contributed to them strengthening their monitoring systems. One of the most significant areas of improvement related to outcome measurement, especially the level of rigour applied to surveys, given that such rigorous outcome assessment was not common in WASH programmes at the time the WASH Results Programme began, though outcome measurement was already part of the SSH4A approach. Suppliers also reported having more confidence in the results they had achieved.

Suppliers also recognised that the monitoring data supported their risk management. For example, the SSH4A programme management unit carried out a dummy check against the verification forms to make sure the evidence would satisfy all the verification criteria. In those cases where it did not, the supplier had the option of retracting its evidence before it was verified, to allow it to address gaps.¹¹¹ This approach helped to substantially reduce the number of queries verifiers made on the evidence received. SNV also noted that having some of the enumerators on partial PbR contracts substantially improved the quality of survey data.

During the outcome phase SAWRP partners continued to monitor the functionality of latrines and water-points outside of the MV requirements – partially as a risk management strategy. For the extension (SAWRP III) the consortium was able to develop clear monitoring and reporting guidelines from the start. In addition, SAWRP stakeholders reported that having the entire team involved in monitoring activities helped in building the capacity of the whole team.

WaterAid Pakistan reported that being forced to identify meaningful indicators and behaviour change targets was a positive aspect of the PbR modality, and that it had since incorporated some good practices, such as spot checks and back checks, into other, grant-funded projects. Similarly, SNV indicated that it will continue to use surveys to track progress (rather than routine monitoring systems) in future programmes – suggesting that the benefits of monitoring system strengthening will continue beyond the lifetime of the WASH Results Programme. However, few SWIFT partners chose to carry forward the higher standard of monitoring into other programmes.

Any benefits of strengthened monitoring systems were largely confined to the suppliers' partners – and did not include focusing on strengthening government monitoring, in the limited cases where it

¹¹¹ From the midline evaluation report.

was potentially relevant. Regardless, governments had more credible data on sanitation improvements in locations where the programme had worked.

There is also evidence that the verification framework was sufficient to identify some issues related to data collection. Notable examples for SWIFT in the outcome phase included: identifying issues in Sanergy's data transfer protocols and raising concerns over a large number of unexplained non-responses in WSUP's survey, as well as focus group discussion (FGD) evidence not being well triangulated with survey results. In both cases this triggered action through the After-Action Review process with DFID and the MV team, and subsequent systems appraisals identified improvements. Notable examples for SSH4A included how to correctly sample for a population-wide survey, and how to take into account population growth over time. Further examples are listed in the supplier case studies.

SAWRP faced issues related to the measurement of hygiene. One issue was that the baseline figures were unexpectedly high; another challenge was the fact that a sample for one verification round included both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

One broader ongoing challenge was SWIFT and SAWRP's reliance on the use of multipliers for calculating beneficiary numbers for indicator measurement at the output and outcome levels¹¹². While multipliers are common in WASH programmes, the specific values were often contested in this programme, which increased tension as they were linked to supplier payments.

For example, SWIFT faced challenges related to the calculation of the number of people 'reached' with hygiene promotion via radio broadcasts in Kenya's ASAL region. Similarly, SAWRP faced challenges related to calculating school attendance. That the verification protocols triggered scrutiny and debate surrounding these multipliers consequently led to more reliable multipliers and therefore more reliable estimates of beneficiary numbers.

This raises the question of the value of the data generated and for what purposes they are used. Different levels of data quality are needed for different purposes. For example, SWIFT recognised improvements in the strength of its monitoring and the credibility of the data, yet viewed the effort as beyond that needed for programme management, and regarded the investment in more credible data as primarily for upward accountability purposes, or 'compliance'. A further point is that it was primarily quantitative data that were used for key payments; and that focusing on quantitative data ran the risk of distracting from other more qualitative information on the programme functioning, which would also have been useful to programme managers.

4.2.4 Experiences of anticipated heightened management attention

As indicated in the midline evaluation report,¹¹³ all three suppliers noted that the WASH Results Programme was a new departure for the sector and would attract much external attention. Conscious of reputational risk, all suppliers reported going to great lengths to ensure that targets were met.

In the output phase, for example, there were several occasions in Kenya when implementing partners drew on alternative sources of funding to resolve obstacles to progress: Oxfam paid for a

¹¹² SNV did not use multipliers to estimate beneficiaries based on outputs constructed, but instead measured the number of beneficiaries directly through household surveys.

¹¹³ This section is adapted, with non-material changes, from the midline evaluation report.

power supply to a borehole when the utility failed to do so (this was the utility's responsibility under a cost-sharing agreement).¹¹⁴

Other behaviours were, however, less beneficial: Oxfam's management, for example, waived some of its procurement rules to speed up internal processes. Pressure was also put on staff and on local partners to speed up implementation, with additional scrutiny of implementation activities. Not all these examples of the programme being treated as a special case can be regarded as desirable in the longer term. A common theme across suppliers was that the management burden (including M&E) was greater than expected and was an area reportedly under-budgeted for initially.

4.2.5 PbR modality and innovation in practice

This subsection addresses the degree to which innovation in implementation approaches manifested for the suppliers, as well as what (if any) aspects of programme design influenced this.

Innovation in this context is taken to refer to innovations in programme approach – that is, where there was an application of approaches that were novel to the global WASH sector to overcome previous challenges. This framing of innovation around programme approach is rooted in the assumption¹¹⁵ that PbR enables greater scope for innovation by removing donor requirements related to implementation approaches. (DEQ 2.7)

As noted in the midline evaluation report, little evidence of innovations that were novel to the global WASH sector were found as the suppliers implemented mostly familiar, tried and tested programme approaches, in part to reduce the risk of not meeting targets, with the exception of some of SWIFT's activities in the ASAL region in Kenya.¹¹⁶ The SWIFT components that were not fully tested at the start (at least not in the targeted locations) exacerbated PbR-related risks. For example, Sanergy's operational model evolved significantly over the course of the programme due to strategic changes that were not related exclusively to SWIFT – but this meant that the verification and payment criteria had to be revised, such as when the programme focus shifted from public to shared residential toilets.

SSH4A country teams cited examples of cases where implementation approaches were developed or adopted that were not in the original workplan and/or had not been used by SNV in that specific country before.¹¹⁷ Yet, in all cases, these approaches were not new to the global WASH sector, but rather just to SNV in that country.

In terms of technology, minor examples of local innovations mentioned by suppliers included the use of solar-powered water pumps in SWIFT Kenya, mobile-based monitoring by SAWRP, and developing and launching Safi latrines by SNV in Tanzania. These developments were beneficial for the diffusion of new technologies. However, they were not strictly 'innovative', in the sense that they were all technologies used by WASH practitioners elsewhere.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ NGOs sometimes shift funds from other sources to top-up under grant-funded programmes as well.

¹¹⁵ From much of the PbR literature – and was a causal mechanism that was included in the PbR theory of change developed by the evaluation team and used in the contribution analysis.

¹¹⁶ For example, Practical Action and Oxfam's application of CLTS in ASAL were new for them, but the approaches themselves were well established in the sector.

¹¹⁷ For example, SNV added an option to pay back the cost of Safi latrines in instalments in Zambia, and used emo-demo at children vaccination centres to promote handwashing in Tanzania. Refer to Section 4.2.4.1 of the SSH4A case study report for more examples of using known approaches in new contexts.

¹¹⁸ See Midline Evaluation Report

For more details on innovation by supplier refer to Section 4.2.4.1 of their respective supplier case study reports.

4.2.6 PbR modality and flexibility in practice

As with innovation, the framing of flexibility here is rooted in the assumption that under the programme's PbR modality, suppliers were expected to have greater autonomy over implementation activities and over budget allocations as these were not reporting requirements imposed by the donor.¹¹⁹

There was consistent feedback from all suppliers that the PbR modality contributed to there being greater flexibility in budget management and choice of activities at the programme level. The benefits appear to have been more pronounced in the larger country programmes than in SWIFT's diverse small programmes in Kenya's ASAL region.¹²⁰ Also, numerous interviewees noted that the potential for flexibility was mitigated by the tight deadline for the output phase.

As was reported at the midline stage, the main benefit suppliers noted under the WASH Results Programme, in comparison to non-PbR programmes, was having the flexibility to move funds between budget lines. While suppliers still reported spending against budget lines internally, not having to report and justify to DFID any changes in spending against budget lines gave suppliers the flexibility to adjust the activities undertaken. For example, spending allocated to one region could be moved to another if increased efforts were needed there, or more funds could be allocated to community visits if increased efforts were needed in this regard. SWIFT stressed that this transferability was particularly helpful in fragile-state contexts, where it was more challenging to stay within the 10% variation required for each budget line under grant programmes. Several SSH4A country managers noted that they changed the sequencing or scope of activities under various SSH4A pillars.

As the majority of local implementing partners for all three suppliers were on grant agreements or otherwise had highly structured workplans, the flexibility experienced at these levels was significantly lower than that experienced at the international or national level.

In some cases, the MV requirements also limited potential flexibility. For example, a supplier that was considering shifting its focus to a different area had to ensure that a new baseline was established, which was often not feasible in the output phase within the timeframe and budget. However, it was easier to shift additional targets to an existing area. Nevertheless, the SWIFT team noted that transferring targets between areas was not always straightforward, as unit costs varied hugely between projects and locations, and it was essential to work within the overall budget ceiling for the country programme.

In some cases, the choice of implementation partners also limited potential flexibility. Where programmes were implemented through government partners or utilities, the supplier had limited control over any adjustments to the workplan or implementation location. For example, when working with water utilities, SWIFT had limited control over its procurement processes for water supply equipment. For SSH4A, SNV held quarterly planning sessions with local government partners in an attempt to jointly adapt programme activities where necessary.

¹¹⁹ Supplanted by reporting only on results.

¹²⁰ Alternatively, the degree of flexibility from DFID – notably in SWIFT's output-phase extension, allowing the transfer of beneficiaries, and arbitrating on the significance of the drought in Kenya – was significant to partners avoiding significant financial losses.

For more details on flexibility by supplier refer to Section 4.2.4.2 of their respective supplier case study reports.

4.2.7 Experiences of adaptation and learning at the implementation level

This section discusses the degree to which adjustments at the implementation level were made to improve effectiveness, based on insights gained from near real-time monitoring data or evaluations. This is distinguished from innovation in programme approach more broadly, as well as flexibility (as framed above). As with innovation and flexibility this framing is rooted in the context of this programme and an assumption¹²¹ that the PbR modality would incentivise such adaptation at the implementation level to ensure targets were met effectively and therefore facilitate or increase payments.

In the absence of a counterfactual, it was not straightforward for the evaluation to assess whether any adaptation at the implementation level was greater than usual, nor whether the PbR modality specifically brought about more adaptation at the implementation level. One would expect programme management to be responsive to learning, whether or not there is a PbR framework, and this is likely to have been encouraged by the organisations themselves – regardless of PbR.

Given this caveat, for some suppliers it does appear that the pressure to deliver results encouraged a closer examination of which activities were most effective – especially when the regular monitoring data revealed that some activities were clearly not delivering the desired results. This effect appeared to be particularly noticeable under SSH4A: almost all interviewed SNV country teams agreed that having a feedback loop from the progress data was very useful – as it allowed teams to see where progress was faster or slower, and to then prioritise their interventions. One SNV team summarised this as *‘failure was not an option, we needed to find a solution every time’*. A key SSH4A stakeholder reported that the fundamental shift was that programming was driven by the M&E and its feedback loop with adaptive programming – as opposed to programming being driven by milestones in workplans. It appears that having a short feedback cycle between the progress being reported and management action being taken was key, as all SNV country teams reviewed progress data at least on a monthly basis.¹²² Holding reflection meetings with the district partners based on routine monitoring data – a standard approach under SSH4A – was a mechanism through which to them operationalise adaptive programming.

However, other partners reported that the tight timeline and variations in the capacity of local partners limited the ability to adjust programming based on evidence of (lack of) effectiveness. For example, SNV staff noted that the technical ability to respond depended on the capacity of the local implementer, and on the quality of progress data collected, which likely affected the number of issues revealed in a timely fashion. Similarly, SAWRP noted that the limited degree of flexibility at the implementation level due to prescribed workplans and/or the tight timetable during the output phase made significant shifts in implementation at local level unrealistic. Both SWIFT in DRC and SAWRP noted that there was more space to reflect and adapt during the outcome phase PbR.

¹²¹ Included in the PbR theory of change developed by the evaluation team and used in the contribution analysis as a testable proposition.

¹²² Particularly notable was revising BCC approaches – the effectiveness of which was widely questioned in the sector – in order to improve their ability to change handwashing behaviour, such as introducing ‘emo-demos’ in Tanzania to deliver handwashing messaging to mothers in a health clinic setting, because the messages were more effective when delivered to mothers who were concerned about their children’s health.

Nonetheless, the evaluators found evidence of SAWRP and SWIFT taking remedial actions in response to challenges on the ground, such as replacing or repairing non-functioning equipment in response to monitoring data which flagged a drop in functionality. This was partly aided by the fact that in Pakistan, SAWRP local partners spent more time in communities, due to stringent monitoring requirements, which allowed them to respond to local issues faster.¹²³ SWIFT stakeholders reported that the accountability for outcomes triggered action, as opposed to the monitoring data. Partners saw value in the improved monitoring as – combined with greater accountability for outcomes – it helped them improve programme operations.

For more details of adaptation and learning at the implementation level by supplier, refer to Section 4.2.5 of the respective supplier case study reports.

4.2.8 Learning in practice

This section briefly discusses learning activities within the supplier consortia, further details of which are addressed in Section 4.2.6 of each case study report. Wider sectoral learning is discussed in Section 4.5.3.1. First, learning on implementation by each supplier is discussed. Next, programme-wide learning on PbR by the Itad L&D team is discussed. As indicated in the midline evaluation, the design was somewhat appropriate to facilitate learning on PbR: DFID intended to promote learning, thorough a dedicated L&D team was set up within the MV team, and annual Supplier Learning Events. However, an explicit lesson-sharing mechanism between suppliers was only introduced in April 2015.

As noted in the midline evaluation report, Itad's L&D group was the mechanism for enabling learning on PbR across the programme. At various points during the WASH Results Programme implementation the L&D group organised several learning events that brought together the three parties (DFID, suppliers, and the MVE team) implementing the WASH Results Programme. While the majority of these learning events involved only those organisations implementing the programme, the WASH MVE blog (<https://washresultsmve.wordpress.com>) acts as a dissemination channel for key learnings. Table 17 provides an overview of the learning events and outputs produced by the L&D team. The MV team also held annual internal workshops with the evaluation team to consolidate the lessons learned about verification. Further guidance is currently being written by ITAD on how to design a verification system, how to set up a systems-based verification system and how to select good indicators.

Suppliers reported considerable internal learning – with mechanisms built into aspects of the programme design to ensure that this learning was applied across the programme (particularly the after-action reviews under the verification framework). In addition to this it is clear that there were efforts to disseminate learning at the global level: notably at several WEDC conferences and World Water Week in Stockholm in 2018. What varied more was the dissemination at the national sector level – in some cases (particularly Pakistan and Kenya) there could have been a greater focus on consolidating and sharing learning at the national level. Furthermore, both of the learning partner (WEDC and ODI) reported that their learning function was 'crowded out' in favour of supporting the development of monition frameworks – particularly in the first half of the programme. This is partially related to the fact that the monitoring and verification burden was more intensive than the suppliers expected and due in part to the rushed nature of the Output-phase implementation. A similar experience was reported by country level implementation staff that highlighted at these times a focus on learning was constrained by the pressure to deliver results.

¹²³ See midline evaluation report

Each of the three suppliers reported formal and informal learning within their consortia, though the extent of attention given varied between suppliers and countries and all were challenged with regard to having enough time and resources to dedicate to learning, particularly in the first two years. The key internal learning activities of each Supplier consortia are detailed below:

- SSH4A placed a strong emphasis on learning: capacity building and sector strengthening was one of the four pillars of SSH4A and SNV as a knowledge-based organisation placed great importance on capacity building. SNV conducted a variety of within- and across-country learning activities, including regular webinars and annual workshops, to bring together programme staff and government counterparts from all SSH4A countries to capture learning and compare experiences. Country teams found these to be extremely useful as opportunities to exchange experiences and to learn from other countries: for example, on how to deal with the tight MDGs deadline and the PbR modality. Government partners were also invited to SSH4A learning events.¹²⁴ At the midline stage, several SNV staff felt that there was less space for learning in the first two years, due to the time pressure of the MDGs deadline.
- SWIFT stakeholders reported clear learning benefits, largely confined to learning around PbR within the consortium, yet there were also lost opportunities related to further utilising the data collected for verification across the consortia¹²⁵, due in part to the tight schedule in the output phase. During the output phase there were two internal reviews and many meetings between consortium members; a website was also established. While partners noted learning – especially related to how to manage a PbR contract – there was not a conscious effort to share lessons with other sector stakeholders in Kenya, in DRC there was a more clear effort to share this learning at the sector level through national level events on running PbR programmes. Some partners were also explicit that they viewed retaining the learning on managing PbR contracts as part of maintaining a competitive edge over other organisations. In the outcome phase, learning was not emphasised in SWIFT Kenya, but was given substantially more attention in the larger programme in DRC. SWIFT global programme managers noted significant staff development under the programme. Consortium partners valued ODI's role as the learning partner, such as its formative and operational research (predominantly in DRC) and in supporting survey implementation (relevant in both countries). Though ODI noted that its research role was slightly crowded out in favour of supporting monitoring efforts – especially in the output phase. The focus of the monitoring efforts was on upward accountability. Both ODI and SWIFT global management highlighted that there was perhaps a missed opportunity as regarded utilising these data for learning.
- Key SAWRP learning activities included facilitation of multiple workshops and learning with consortium members and implementing partners in Bangladesh and Pakistan, the development of a series of case studies on programme implementation, and presentations at multiple conferences¹²⁶. Partners reported that learning was somewhat marginalised, as staff were preoccupied with quarterly reporting and meeting contractual targets. Nevertheless, there was a great deal of learning through experience, e.g. on programme monitoring and the partnership models. WEDC was the SAWRP learning partner; earlier on in the programme they reported the focus of their support was around developing the monitoring frameworks¹²⁷; with the focus later shifting more towards learning.

¹²⁴ SNV felt it had the internal capacity to foster learning across country teams without a dedicated learning partner.

¹²⁵ This point was a reflection of the learning partner (ODI). Specifically, that should the MV requirements have been clearer from the start there could have been a greater focus on harmonising the data collected across contexts and/or using the data collected for learning purposes.

¹²⁶ Including several of the WEDC conferences, World Water Week in Stockholm and SACOSAN – these are discussed more in Section 4.2.6 of the SAWRP case study and in Section 4.5.6 of this report.

¹²⁷ Particularly in agreeing the indicators and measurement methods of the MVO and MVOC, and in supporting the development of the SAFs.

Overall, moderate learning on WASH implementation but considerable learning on PbR was achieved within the consortia. Learning faced several constraints: First, it was reportedly challenging to find enough time for reflection during the output phase, given the urgency of the MDGs deadline. Secondly, the fact that each supplier had a dedicated lead verifier made it harder for cross-supplier learning to take place between learning events and reflection points. Thirdly, Confidentiality issues also impeded learning between suppliers. Overall, stakeholders noted that more resources would have been needed to better draw on the learning provided by country verifiers.

Table 17: L&D team events and outputs

Type of event	Title	Audience	Outputs
Workshop	DFID Knowledge Sharing Workshop on Behaviour Change in WASH	DFID and Suppliers	Workshop Report (internal)
	Learning Workshop	DFID, Suppliers, MVE team	Workshop Report (internal) Blog: <i>Suggestions to donors commissioning Payment by Results programmes</i>
Conference presentation	Evaluating and verifying Payment By Results Programmes	Public - UK Evaluation Society Conference	Blog: <i>Comparative experiences of evaluating and verifying Payment by Results programmes</i>
Workshop	MV team Learning Event	Private: MVE team	Learning note: E-pact experience of verification Blog: <i>What have we learned about Payment by Results (PbR) programmes from verifying one?</i>
	WASH Results Programme Learning Event	DFID, Suppliers, MVE team	Learning event: DFID WASH Results Programme Blog: <i>The paybacks and pains of Payment by Results (parts 1 and 2)</i>
	MV team Learning Event	MVE	Briefing: On verification outcomes with DFID
Meeting	WASH results programme meeting on sustainability	DFID, Suppliers, MVE team	Summary notes (internal)
	WASH results programme meeting on sustainability 2	DFID, Suppliers, MVE team	Summary notes (internal)
Workshop	MV team Learning Event	Private: MVE team	Summary notes (internal) Blog: <i>Truly exceptional? Handling misfortune within Payment by Results Beyond a burden: what value does verification offer?</i>
	Reflecting on the Outcomes Phase: What do we know now?	DFID, Suppliers, MVE team	Workshop report (internal)
Conference side event	Rewards and Realities of PbR in WASH	Public - World water week side event	Rewards and Realities of Payment By Results in WASH Event Conclusions ¹²⁸

¹²⁸ <https://programme.worldwaterweek.org/event/7818-rewards-and-realities-of-payment-by-results-in-wash>

4.2.9 PbR influence on achievement of outcomes

The PbR framework was a significant factor contributing to the outcome level results, since suppliers had to meet their outcome level targets if they were to avoid a financial penalty (though payments in the outcome phase were generally much smaller than at output level). This does not imply, however, that PbR is the only means by which a funding agency can focus suppliers' attention on outcomes, and in this case the fact that the programme design featured distinct output and outcome phases was also very significant. Most WASH programmes adopt outcome level targets, but few actually measure their achievements in this area; often the focus remains on output delivery right up to programme end. The WASH Results Programme was different in that DFID made it clear from the outset that it would assess progress at both output and outcome level, hence suppliers had to put in place processes both for delivering and measuring outcome level results.

Looking at the sector more broadly, the SDGs are now leading development agencies and governments globally to focus more on outcomes, given the SDG focus on 'safely managed' water supplies and sanitation. These targets cannot be met simply by providing access to infrastructure, hence programmes will increasingly need to focus on outcome level results, with or without PbR.

It is also important to note that the structure of the verification cycles included a mechanism (the 'After action reviews') to ensure that key learning surrounding measurement and verification of indicators was applied in subsequent verification rounds. This is well reflected in improvements in the periodical systems appraisals conducted by the MV team; which document improvements in supplier monitoring process across the programme (see Section 4.2.3 for further details).

4.3 Efficiency

This section addresses the DAC criterion of efficiency. One of the efficiency DEQs was comprehensively assessed in the midline evaluation (DEQ 3.1); however there is substantial new evidence for all other evaluation questions. This section focuses primarily on summarising evidence collected at the endline stage, incorporating midline results where relevant for further context. Table 18 summarises the final evaluation findings for each DEQ.

As noted above, the three supplier programmes were quite different. While they are not directly comparable, this section focuses on highlighting cross-cutting themes, highlighting individual cases where particularly useful to provide context for the lessons and recommendations.

Table 18: Summary of efficiency DEQ findings

DEQs	Our conclusion	Strength of evidence	Section
HEQ3 – Has the programme been designed and implemented in a cost-efficient manner?			
DEQ 3.1: How efficient was the tendering and procurement process and what effect did this have on programme delivery?	Many aspects of the global programme design were unclear at the bidding stage. This resulted in a long procurement process which – in addition to the long design phase – reduced the time available for implementation. [Addressed comprehensively at midline]	High	Section 3, and midline evaluation report
DEQ 3.2:	<i>[DEQ removed in consultation with DFID]</i>		
DEQ 3.3:	<i>[DEQ removed in consultation with DFID]</i>		
DEQ 3.4: To what extent did the PbR modality strengthen the programme monitoring of individual sub-programmes?	The PbR modality clearly strengthened monitoring systems for all suppliers, as well as staff capacity, though the extent varied based upon the applicability of existing systems. The degree to which strengthening is likely to be transferred to other programmes implemented by the same organisations also varies. Linking payments to outcomes triggered deeper discussions around outcome measurement, and the validity of those measurements in particular. Long-term strengthening of government systems was not a feature.	High	Section 4.2.3 and 4.3.6
DEQ 3.5: Under which circumstances did key programme features affect cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness?	Limited conclusions are possible due to lack of cost data shared with the evaluation team. Nonetheless, based on interview evidence, it appears that having fewer partners, each with established relationships, increased efficiency, as did implementing proven models. The diversity of partners and approaches in SWIFT Kenya is likely to have reduced efficiency. Suppliers needed to balance centralised coordination with country autonomy. The substantial time pressure of the MDGs deadline, combined with lack of clarity initially, to some extent cancelled out the benefits of having a flexible PbR programme. The MV process, as implemented, was even more labour-intensive than most suppliers anticipated.	Low	Section 4.1.1 and 4.3.2 See also Annex I
DEQ 3.6: How did the efficiency of the programme management arrangements of individual sub-programmes affect programme delivery?		Medium	
DEQ 3.7: To the extent were new PbR risk-sharing	SAWRP and SWIFT shared risk with their consortium partners at the international supplier	High	Section 4.3.1 and 4.3.3

arrangements applied within consortia, and how did this affect programme delivery?	level, while SNV was the sole supplier for SSH4A. Risk-sharing arrangements generally worked, but would have been further improved by clearer mitigation plans in the case of issues. Most local implementers were on typical grant-like agreements, though they were under increased scrutiny to ensure performance. There were mixed results in the few cases where local implementers were on full or partial PbR contracts, with some shifting positively to a stronger sense of accountability and others struggling, or even having their contracts discontinued.		
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4.3.1 Approach to risk-sharing within consortia

This section summarises how and to what extent payment risk was shared for each sub-programme. The SWIFT and SAWRP consortia partners used similar approaches, with partners accepting individualised risk based upon their own targets in the output phase, then shifting to pooled risk in the outcome phase in most cases. SNV was the sole international implementer for SSH4A, taking on 100% of the risk internally.

For both SWIFT and SAWRP, each partner within the consortium had a PbR arrangement, where each was paid pro-rata for their results achieved during the output phase. This was challenging in cases of underachievement, as it reduced that partner's overall budget and increased the ratio of investments relative to the overall programme budget. SAWRP partners noted they used funds from the rest of their portfolio to help mitigate peaks and troughs in their financial flows.

For the outcome phase, both SWIFT and SAWRP shifted to a more pooled approach, with any issues dealt with on a case-by-case basis. The proportion of the payments made in the outcome phase were only 20-30% of the overall contract value (as per the contract annexes); any issues would have been less likely to have a significant financial impact than payments withheld on outputs. Despite the pooled risk due to join outcome assessment; partners largely implemented their programmes independently.

Issues between SWIFT or SAWRP and DFID relating to risk sharing were dealt with on a case-by-case basis. SWIFT, for example following the drought in the ASAL region affecting results the MV team were asked to gather additional evidence to assist in arbitrating on key decisions related to payment. Following the termination of the programme in Liberia due to the Ebola outbreak, the level of risk sharing between DFID and SWIFT was *de facto* established through the re-negotiation of the contract (where DFID allowed a portion of the contract value to be used for the start-up and close-down costs of the programme in Liberia). SAWRP also had challenges with underachievement of hygiene outcomes in Q1 2017 related to the measurement of results; adjustments were made in the payment amounts considering these.

The lack of clarity relating to the level of risk sharing risk sharing, and standards against which events would be judged 'exceptional', created a situation where the MV's function was both verifying the results, as well as advising DFID on what would be acceptable performance standards or risk sharing options. While the MV team endeavoured to remain a neutral advisor, this dual role created some

tension through a degree of conflict of interest within the triangular relationship involving DFID, the Suppliers, and the MV team¹²⁹.

With the exception of WaterAid Bangladesh's local implementers under SAWRP, all other local implementers for SWIFT and SAWRP were contracted using 'normal' grant agreements.¹³⁰ Regardless, all local implementers were managed closely to ensure performance. Suppliers also planned a built-in level of overachievement in some cases as a risk management strategy.

As SSH4A was led solely by SNV and not implemented by a consortium, the overall DFID payment risk was held solely by SNV and not shared with anyone at the international level.¹³¹ This was a deliberate choice by SNV to simplify any risk-sharing arrangements (midline finding). Within SNV, the programme management unit of SSH4A in Nairobi held the risk and held responsibility for all national budgets, and country offices were not penalised if there was a financial penalty for delayed results or for underperformance. The programme management unit could shift funding between countries and held some funding in reserve, which could be deployed to manage unexpected developments. At a country level, SNV managed the financial risk of underachievement by using full or partial PbR contracts for some local implementers, and by using a partial PbR ethos with local government partners (see Section 4.3.3 for its implications on partners).

Overall, SNV managed the financial risk of underachievement by only agreeing programme-wide targets with DFID. As a result, overachievement in one country could balance underachievement in another. SSH4A is the only consortium which did not have country-specific targets with DFID, though SNV set country-specific targets for internal planning purposes.

This issue is further addressed in Section 4.3.1 of each of the supplier case study reports.

4.3.2 Efficiency of management arrangements

Due to the lack of detailed financial data it is impossible for the evaluators to make a firm appraisal of the efficiency of the management arrangements. The assessment is further complicated by the fact that each supplier took a different approach to the management arrangements. SSH4A, SAWRP, and SWIFT in DRC all applied existing implementation models and often also had established relations, which served to increase efficiency. The diversity of subcomponents, as well as some new approaches for SWIFT in Kenya, is likely to have reduced efficiency, but may have had other offsetting benefits. Highlights by supplier follow:

- SNV was the sole international implementer for SSH4A, and implemented a pre-existing framework. Therefore, the management arrangements and reporting lines appeared to be clear and straightforward, though specific reporting structures varied somewhat by country.
- Oxfam, as the SWIFT lead, was responsible for aggregating results and reporting to DFID. The project management burden was reportedly considerable due to the number of projects and verification requirements – especially during the output phase, when the verification rounds were more frequent. Also, there were many meetings with implementing partners as operational systems were being established, which were viewed as informative though time-

¹²⁹ The Conflict of Interest could arise from, for example, the verifier potentially being predisposed to finding positive results when suppliers used approaches which the verifier recommended and/or finding negatives where the verifier's suggestions were not incorporated by suppliers.

¹³⁰ WaterAid Bangladesh used a system of both upside incentives and penalties.

¹³¹ As discussed above, SNV used partial PbR contracts at the local level in some SSH4A countries where implementation involved NGOs.

consuming. The management burden reduced considerably during the outcome phase, when the partners worked largely independently. It is possible that the large number of partners in Kenya decreased efficiency, though this was not due to the PbR modality.

- The SAWRP consortium was able to take advantage of Plan International and WaterAid's existing working relationship, combined with applying a tested operational model to increase efficiency, though the sub-programme had more administrative layers than would normally be the case. A dedicated Country Co-ordination Unit (CCU) intended to take some of the administrative burden off the country managers. The role of the CCU changed over time from what was initially envisaged, this changing role created some confusion and at times some minor tensions, for example, some felt that the CCU was over-reaching at times, by asking for too much information on programme activities.

For more details by supplier refer to Section 4.3.2 of their respective supplier case study reports.

4.3.3 Effect on relationships with partners and government

The PbR modality did not appear to significantly influence relationships with local implementing partners (either NGOs or governments) in most cases, though several partners reported frustrations with the tight timeline for the output phase. However, SSH4A experienced a different dynamic, with the subset of local implementing partners which SNV put on full or partial PbR contracts. Overall, the social capital resulting from having established relationships with local NGOs and government partners significantly contributed to maintaining good relationships even under tight timelines.

SAWRP Pakistan staff reported that local implementing partners, which, for WaterAid and Plan International, were all NGOs, still felt responsible for meeting agreed targets, even if they were not on PbR contracts – going so far as to contribute their own 'core' funds to cover unexpected expenses. In contrast, SWIFT noted that it was at times challenging to put pressure on local NGOs, especially in DRC, where some NGOs were used to receiving grant funding without strict deadlines.¹³²

In the case of local government partners, country programme managers exerted pressure through regular supervision and monitoring. Both SSH4A and SWIFT reported that the pressure to deliver under the programme put a strain on some valuable relationships because government partners were asked to prioritise programme activities over other ongoing projects. More positively, local government in Pakistan remarked that the increased credibility of the data gave them greater confidence in the results.

Noteworthy was SNV's use of full or partial PbR contracts for local implementers in some SSH4A countries – an approach not used by any other supplier.¹³³ As noted in the midline evaluation report, SNV exerted a high level of management and supervisory control, which strained local implementer confidence, trust, and commitment.

For some local NGO implementers, the risk-sharing arrangement appears to have led to a shift in culture: they had a stronger sense of accountability. However, numerous local implementers for SSH4A on full or partial PbR contracts struggled, for a variety of reasons, including the extreme

¹³² See midline evaluation report for further details

¹³³ SNV used a grant arrangement in Ethiopia, used partial PbR contracts in three countries (Mozambique, Nepal, and Uganda), and briefly used a full PbR contract for local implementers in Tanzania. A full PbR contract meant that no advance was given and payment was made every few months, if the agreed milestone was met. Partial PbR contracts meant that an advance was given and a final payment was made on a milestone basis, when the final target was met. If achievements did not meet the agreed target, a payment deduction could be made.

time pressure of the output phase, lack of experience with performance-based payments, or the degree of documentation required, as well as limited pre-financing capabilities, which created cash flow issues. The dynamic caused stress for many and a few staff left their organisations because they could not deliver at the pace required. SNV also discontinued some contracts due to poor performance.

For SSH4A's government partners, risk-sharing appears to have increased ownership and buy-in. For the three countries where implementation was through local government partners (Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia), SNV followed a partial PbR ethos, with payment made only after submission of evidence. However, payments were linked to completion of activities, as opposed to linked to the population reached. SNV succeeded in instilling government commitment to results through memorandums of understanding (MOUs), by setting non-binding district targets, creating competition between districts, and by only reimbursing expenses based on evidence. In some cases, however – for example in Tanzania – government partners reported that some government staff were uncomfortable working under PbR terms, whilst others were more willing. As with NGO staff, some government staff – especially at the lower levels of government – struggled to pre-finance their expenses.

Refer to Section 4.3.1.2 of each of the supplier case study reports for more details.

4.3.4 Effect on supplier staff

The tight timetable in the output phase, in conjunction with the new PbR modality, increased pressure and challenges, though it also provided learning opportunities for supplier staff. The level of effort needed to meet monitoring requirements was also more than most country teams anticipated. Numerous staff reported working extra hours on nights and weekends, and a few staff left due, at least in part, to the pressure. In some instances, additional staff were added to meet requirements. This suggests that even though the programme achieved – and often overachieved – its targets, this came with sacrifices, particularly for staff at the local implementing level. This finding held across all suppliers:

- **Different country teams varied in their ability to manage this additional pressure** – probably due to a variation in staff competencies and a variation in the staff's previous experience with PbR. For instance, staff for SSH4A Nepal – which was the only country that had previously implemented the SSH4A approach – felt more able to integrate the programme's requirements into their working pattern. In contrast, SSH4A Tanzania staff reported that in hindsight they could have benefited from a more careful risk analysis at the onset, to help foresee some of the challenges they encountered.
- **The pressure to deliver results had various effects on the social capital which organisations had with respect to their national partners.** On the one hand, there were reports that some partners used up part of this social capital, in order to deliver the programme within the tight timeframe. For example, international partners in Kenya said that they tended to give SWIFT priority over their other projects, given the reputational and financial risks associated with the programme. Alternative resources were sometimes used to resolve short-term problems, plug gaps, and ensure a smooth flow of funds, which would not necessarily be sustainable over time. Reputational risk was itself a strong motivator for the suppliers, beyond the financial incentives. On the other hand, several SAWRP staff members felt that the PbR modality enhanced accountability and focused implementation around results, as opposed to implementing workplans.

- **One unexpected benefit reported by some partners was the strengthened role of M&E in programming of the supplier NGOs.** Several SAWRP partners and Practical Action in Kenya said that the pressure to deliver results fostered greater collaboration between departments within the organisation. For example, the M&E team and finance teams' functions had greater overlap and integration. This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.3

Refer to Section 4.3.1.1 of the supplier case study reports for more details.

4.3.5 Supplier views on relations with verifiers

All suppliers reported relations with the verifiers as being cordial, yet also involving some challenges. For example, some noted that developing and agreeing the verification protocols and indicators at the start of the programme was a time-consuming process. During implementation, there were times when multiple requests for clarification or additional information from the MV team was challenging due to the time it took suppliers to collect the information.

Partly to manage the risk of miscommunication across a multi-country programme, SNV decided that all interaction between SNV and the MV team should be centralised. As a result, the country verifier and the country teams could not communicate directly, which made the verifiers' work more challenging at times.¹³⁴

Verification also validated the suppliers' work, which supplier staff appreciated. In addition, in some cases, supplier staff said that it increased government ownership of the programme.

All verifier staff were experienced WASH professionals who felt they had relevant advice to offer on programming but the provision of advice to country teams was not allowed within their verification role. Instead, the MV team was only set up to advise DFID. Verifiers were unsatisfied with this dynamic, yet it would have presented a conflict of interest for them to have been more proactively engaged.¹³⁵

More details on this issue are given in Section 4.3.3.1 of the respective supplier case study reports.

4.3.6 Efficiency of monitoring

This section focuses on the efficiency of supplier monitoring systems. Refer to Section 4.2.3 above for a discussion of effectiveness. More supplier-level details can be found in Section 4.2.3 of the respective supplier case study reports. Refer to Annex G for more elaboration on the verification process of the supplier monitoring systems.

Without cost data it is impossible for the evaluation to make definite conclusions on the efficiency of the monitoring systems for the supplier sub-programmes. Nevertheless, key themes have emerged on what is likely to have either increased or reduced efficiency overall. It is important to stress that meeting MV requirements was fairly expensive relative to norms under grant-funded

¹³⁴ For example, as near the beginning of the programme, it was time consuming for the verification to understand what the differences were in implementation approach between the various countries.

¹³⁵ The terms of reference (TORs) for the verifiers specified them to be technical advisers to DFID, but not to suppliers, to avoid influencing implementation approaches.

WASH programmes and cumbersome because the WASH Results Programme was the first of its kind – a future programme may have a less steep learning curve.

Key elements that improved efficiency of monitoring were the extent to which suppliers could use existing systems, as well as the degree to which the same monitoring approaches and verification indicators could be deployed across all countries, even if it meant that a local implementer's systems had to be adapted to the common framework.

At one extreme, SNV was able to use its existing systems across all SSH4A countries with only minor modifications. However, SSH4A was the only supplier for whom tailored evidence requirements had to be designed for most results packages – especially those in the output phase (when surveys were repeated, the same evidence requirements could be re-used). This was a time-consuming exercise, particularly for 'process milestones', where the evidence submitted sometimes ran to thousands of pages. To simplify the process, SNV made several revisions to the methodology for its sustainability indicators, as the long list of sub-indicators was unwieldy for verification, especially given the increased number of focus groups required. However, the sample was still so small that there was a risk that sustainability results could be skewed by outliers.

Both SAWRP and SWIFT had to make substantial modifications to their systems to meet verifier requests at the beginning of the output phase, which were significantly beyond that anticipated. For example, SAWRP and SWIFT DRC had to develop adapted/tailored monitoring systems for the WASH Results Programme. Once systems for each phase were in place, the level of ongoing effort was fairly predictable, if time-consuming at the level of detail required. Though many of the outcome indicators were not finalised until after the monitoring systems had been established and suppliers reported some challenges in responding to additional evidence requirements for the purposes of verification.

The diversity of components and implementing partners under SWIFT Kenya limited opportunities for economies of scale for the verification process, as verification requirements were negotiated with each implementing partner. This issue was exacerbated by SWIFT's initial impression that existing monitoring systems in Kenya would suffice – only after the programme began did it become clear that changes would be needed, e.g. increasing spot checks by implementing partners.

The requirements for baseline surveys was a particular challenge. For example, SWIFT faced issues when there was a mismatch between the communities surveyed and those locations where work actually proceeded. Some SSH4A countries also faced challenges with baselines, such as when government partners requested SNV to begin operating in additional areas. As noted above, the baseline survey requirement also limited flexibility in terms of shifting targets away from underperforming areas to other locations.

SAWRP staff highlighted another challenge faced during the output phase, when the verifier requested additional information that required teams to revisit villages and households to collect the missing data. SAWRP in Pakistan also highlighted the potential burden the MV process could put on beneficiaries, if visits were not sufficiently coordinated. In the outcome phase, most households were likely to be visited at least three, and up to six times for latrine status checks relating to monitoring or quality assurance, often by people community members did not know (e.g. representing different consortium management levels).

The use of paper-based surveys, later keyed into Excel databases, in some countries decreased efficiency, and there were cases of shifts to some form of mobile-based data collection during the WASH Results Programme.

Suppliers provided some examples, though inconsistently, of how experience with MV under the WASH Results Programme has led to improvements for use in other programmes. For example, WaterAid in Bangladesh adapted some of the monitoring improvements introduced under SAWRP for use in other programmes, such as mechanisms for feeding back the findings of monitoring activities to implementing partners; using mobile phone-based reporting; making spot checks; quality assuring monitoring systems; and strengthening accountability for the delivery of results. Similarly, SNV has adopted some of the quality checks on survey data in other programmes.

In cases where suppliers included process and activity milestones to improve early cash flow and/or for risk management this inadvertently created additional MV workload that could not be built upon over time. The programme generated a vast quantity of data that were largely used only as evidence for payments. For evaluators, there appears to have been a lost opportunity to explore packaging the data in ways that could be of broader use to inform learning by suppliers, DFID, or the sector as a whole.

4.4 Impacts

This section addresses the DAC criterion of impacts. These DEQs were only lightly assessed in the midline evaluation, and there is substantial new evidence. This section focuses primarily on summarising evidence collected at the endline stage, incorporating midline results where relevant for further context. Table 16 summarises the final evaluation findings for each DEQ.

As noted above, the three supplier programmes were quite different. Whilst they are not directly comparable, this section focuses on highlighting cross-cutting themes, highlighting individual cases where particularly useful to provide context for the lessons and recommendations.

Table 19: Summary of impact DEQ findings

DEQs	Our conclusion	Strength of evidence	Section
HEQ4 – How likely is it that the programme will achieve its final impact objectives while minimising unintended negative consequences?			
DEQ 4.1: How likely is it that the programme will achieve its health and non-health impacts ?	The literature on the effectiveness of WASH interventions on delivering health impacts is mixed. That said, there are clearly positive elements of the programme which may have improved the likelihood of health benefits and which should be retained in future programmes. At the same time the evaluation highlights some potential missed opportunities to further increase the likelihood of health impacts.	Low	Section 4.4.1
DEQ 4.2: Under which circumstances did WASH Results Programme activities have any unintended/ unplanned positive or negative impacts ?	Overall, there were no reports of widespread negative beneficiary feedback and any minor negative feedback was in line with what would be expected with similar programmes.	Low	Section 4.4.3

4.4.1 Prospects for health impacts

The logframe includes the ultimate intended impact that ‘*poor people benefiting from the WASH Results Programme have improved health status, as measured by reduced diarrhoea and child mortality*’. The business case additionally mentions a number of non-health impacts which may result from the programme, but which are not explicit in the logframe or theory of change.

It was agreed with DFID that this evaluation would not seek to measure health impacts, partly because the evaluation would be completed before impacts were likely to become apparent but also because the health impacts of WASH interventions are notoriously difficult to measure. Instead, it was agreed that the evaluation would consider the prospects for impact (DEQ 4.1). Annex D.3 of the Evaluation Design Document provides a discussion of the prerequisites for health impacts as a consequence of WASH interventions – based on the literature available at design stage. This is summarised and updated in Annex B, which provides the conceptual grounding for the assessment approach.

A theory-based approach was used to explore the programme’s likelihood of impact, which entailed exploring (i) whether the programme could reasonably be expected to deliver its intended

impacts given the way it was designed and structured, and (ii) the extent to which it was likely to do so, and the reasons why. Our null hypothesis was that the WASH Results Programme would achieve similar health impacts to other WASH programmes of similar scope and scale. Many factors contribute to the presence or absence of water-related disease and most WASH programmes only affect some of them, and/or operate on too small a scale to remove risks to health across entire districts or regions. Within this context, the assessment of the prospects for health impact focused on four questions:

1. To what extent have services and behaviours continued to function and be used since their initial implementation (sustainable outcomes)?
2. To what extent have the utilisation of water and sanitation services and the uptake of hygiene practices reached all members of target populations (inclusive outcomes)?
3. To what extent has the programme advocated for, and successfully influenced, attempts to bring about sustainable WASH services across entire districts (or beyond)?
4. What other obstacles exist to the realisation of the full potential health benefits of the WASH programme, in areas such as nutrition, shelter, livelihoods, and education?

The midline highlighted several factors relevant to the likelihood of health impacts. Firstly, beneficiary numbers may be spread widely geographically, and across subcomponents (water, sanitation, and hygiene). DFID's design expressed no preference for geographically-focused programming, and included no requirement for community-wide ODF achievement – both of which would help achieve a 'critical mass' of promotional intervention, which is more likely to result in health benefits. Annex B.3 contains the evaluation team's summary of the literature on this linkage, noting that since the midline several high-quality impact evaluations have been published in this area. Secondly, the programme allowed proposals under different lots. Lot A programmes included water,¹³⁶ sanitation, and hygiene, while Lot B covered sanitation and hygiene only. A limitation of the SSH4A programme under Lot B was that it offered no scope for resolving those situations where acute water shortages limited a community's ability to adopt hygienic practices. The midline concluded that the degree of integration of water, sanitation, and hygiene activities was not unusually low compared to other programmes globally.

Turning to the endline assessment by question:

1. *To what extent have services and behaviours continued to function and be used since their initial implementation (sustainable outcomes)?*

The targets across the three supplier's regarding functionality were largely achieved; with substantial overachievement in some areas, and the outcome phase was a positive feature of the programme with regards to incentivising suppliers to maintain functionality. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene functionality/sustained behaviour change are discussed in turn with a focus on where health risks may remain.

- **Water** - The water functionality results were largely positive, and in most cases the targets were achieved with improvements in functionality across the outcome phase. However there are cases where SWIFT infrastructure became non-functional¹³⁷. Functionality in the

¹³⁶ Only SWIFT had a substantial water supply component, which included some standalone urban water projects, while SAWRP's water component was fairly small.

¹³⁷ This was attributed to the drought in the region – see Sections 3.4.1 and 4.2.1.1. of the SWIFT case study report for discussion

ASAL region at endline was 66% for simple water systems,¹³⁸ and 79% for complex systems¹³⁹. The critical question with regards to health impacts is what other systems people used when SWIFT infrastructure became non-functional, as Brown *et al.* (2011) highlight that even occasional exposure to unsafe water can undermine health gains. In the case of urban water supply in the ASAL the interview evidence suggests that tanker truck¹⁴⁰ water and water rationing were strategies used by the Water Service Providers during drought periods. In term of health impacts, this means that for those households with non-functional water supply infrastructure, some transmission pathways remained open – potentially undermining health gains.

- **Sanitation** - For SWIFT the target was achieved but the use of latrines was under 80% in all cases; that is, while the target was achieved there still remains a level of non-use of latrines in programme areas. For SSH4A while overall the SSH4A target was achieved there were cases where the result data indicate significant non-functionality in some counties¹⁴¹. The sanitation functionality targets were largely achieved, and in many cases with substantial overachievement. However, within in each consortia the results data do indicate a degree of non-functionality. From a programming perspective this is to a degree expected; though from a health risk perspective it remains the case that some households not using latrines in programme areas is likely introduce some health risks in those areas.
- **Hygiene** - The definition and measurement of hygiene outcomes and the relationship between outputs and outcomes is less well understood for hygiene than for water and sanitation. While the targets were largely met, the results indicate that among those reached with hygiene promotion, as well as the wider population in programme areas, there remain a large number of people not verified as practising handwashing at critical times. This represents a health risk because an individual with poor sanitation and hygiene practices poses a health risk to all neighbouring households, not only to the individual's own health, based on the various ways faecal matter spreads.

2. *To what extent have the utilisation of water and sanitation services and the uptake of hygiene practices reached all members of target populations (inclusive outcomes)?*

As is discussed further in Section 4.4.2, community-wide coverage was not an explicit overall programme aim, and the outcome data vary substantially across suppliers in terms of the degree to which they capture the extent of community-wide coverage. SWIFT and SSH4A data were available to assess coverage levels in programme areas – though not a granular view of the distribution of benefits within communities, or the levels of community-wide achievement – while for SAWRP no suitable data were available to assess coverage levels. For SWIFT, the outcome surveys indicate that the programme achieved its targets, though a sizeable population within programme areas remain without functional services. About half of the SSH4A country programmes achieved more than 90% latrine access – but the remaining countries only reached 50–60%.

Despite SAWRP and SSH4A choosing to aim for ODF achievement, the fact that the WASH Results Programme targets lacked an explicit focus on ODF or other indicators related to the level of community-wide achievement represents a potential missed opportunity in terms of incentivising positive health outcomes. Some recent impact evaluations in sanitation suggest that community-wide reductions in open defecation are an important factor in contributing to

¹³⁸ As reported by water users associations. The survey result for functionality was 55%.

¹³⁹ As reported by water users associations. Actual meter readings confirmed that the systems were delivering sufficient water for their design populations in 82% of cases.

¹⁴⁰ With Oxfam contributing support to this provision

¹⁴¹ Kenya and Mozambique.

positive health outcomes¹⁴². Similarly, not having a requirement to report on the level of coverage of achievements meant that there are varying levels of insight into the distribution of benefits. Beyond explicitly incentivising community-wide outcomes there could have also been a greater focus on monitoring inclusion more consistently across the three suppliers – regardless of whether or not this was linked to payment.

3. *To what extent has the programme advocated for, and successfully influenced, attempts to bring about sustainable WASH services across entire districts (or beyond)?*

Though the WASH Results Programme did not have an explicit advocacy component, in all cases the supplier consortia engaged with the government and community structures to promote sanitation and hygiene for the wider population. For SWIFT and SSH4A this was partially reflected in some of the payment milestones related to payment¹⁴³. In contrast, SAWRP's payment milestones were related only to output- and outcome-level indicators and process payments were not included - this does not imply that this wider engagement did not happen, only that this was not reported to DFID under the verification framework.

The scale of the programme within the districts was another significant factor with regards to district-wide achievement. Here, SSH4A differed from the other consortia in that in all SSH4A areas there was an explicit aim to operate at the district level, with process-related payments linked to building district-level capacity. Similarly, SWIFT in DRC operated at a district-wide scale (known as health zone-wide in DRC) – in fact, achieving a greater scale per district than SNV in terms of the reach within the districts it targeted. In contrast, the SWIFT programme in Kenya included a more diverse set of projects and the scale of each partner's activities in each area was lower. Whilst there was engagement with district-level structures, this was less intensive than in DRC. While SAWRP operated at a relatively large scale in the districts it operated in, and engaged with government structures, there was not an explicit common approach to strengthening district governance or explicitly targeting district-wide coverage.

4. *What other obstacles exist to the realisation of full potential health benefits of the WASH programme, in areas such as nutrition, shelter, livelihoods, and education?*

There is anecdotal evidence that some country programmes attempted to coordinate with other interventions, to ensure that these other interventions could address other obstacles – such as linking communities up to social protection programmes or to programmes able to provide water supply (where this was not covered under the WASH Results Programme). These efforts will have gone some way towards overcoming obstacles. However, not enough data were available to the evaluation team to assess the extent of potential other barriers to health impacts in a systematic manner.

¹⁴² Okullo *et al.* (2017), a study in Kenya, concludes that ODF status has a significant impact on water quality. Harris *et al.* (2018), a study in Mali, concludes that child height-for-age had a significant and positive linear relationship with community latrine coverage, while child weight-for-age and household water quality had nonlinear relationships. Child growth and water quality were not associated with individual household latrine ownership. The extrapolation being that the latrine status of the households surrounding the 'index household' was identified as a more significant influence on health than the latrine ownership status of the 'index household'.

¹⁴³ For example, the SWIFT payment related to 'Early sustainability' often included evidence related to the capacity building efforts of the partners. Similarly, many of the indicators included in SSH4A's early results packages and included in the sustainability indicators clearly highlight SNV's wider engagement and advocacy.

Summary assessment regarding health impacts:

Our assessment noted some positive features of the WASH Results Programme as implemented that are likely to have contributed to the prerequisites for improving health in the target population. Functionality of water-points and latrines remained high until programme end and the outcome phase was seen to have contributed to higher functionality rates than there would have otherwise been.

For water there was a small number of cases where a significant proportion of the WASH Results Programme's water supply infrastructure of a given partner became non-functional. This implies that people had to use other sources – potentially undermining health gains. Similarly, the outcome results themselves indicate that a large proportion of the target population do not practise hygienic handwashing behaviours. This is a challenge in many WASH programmes.

Conversely, that many suppliers aimed for community-wide impacts, despite these not being linked to payment, is likely to contribute to improving health impacts. There are clear examples of suppliers engaging at the district level and building district-level capacity – especially SWIFT in DRC and SSH4A, though to a lesser degree for SWIFT in Kenya and SAWRP. However, where there are data on this aspect, they highlight that there remain many people within programme districts who do not yet have access to services or practise desirable sanitation and hygiene-related behaviours.

In summary, there are clearly positive elements of the programme that should be retained in future programmes; at the same time, our assessment highlights some potential missed opportunities to further increase the likelihood of health impacts.

For a more detailed discussion by supplier across the four areas of investigation readers should refer to Section 4.4.1 of the suppliers' respective supplier case study reports.

4.4.2 Prospects for inclusive outcomes

Annex B.3 outlines the methodological approach taken to review the inclusion focus within the WASH Results Programme.¹⁴⁴ As illustrated in Table 18, a framework of three categories addressing programme planning and implementation, monitoring, and institutional barriers was developed and applied for the case study countries where there were sufficient suitable data.¹⁴⁵

Overall, the programme design and implementation aspects appeared to support an inclusion focus across all three suppliers, with almost all regions assessed as having a medium to high likelihood of achieving inclusive outcomes, in a relatively consistent pattern for the relevant questions. The picture was more mixed by supplier with regards to the monitoring of inclusion, with SSH4A assessed higher than SWIFT or SAWRP for the countries examined. Our review suggests that the risks to inclusion from institutional barriers was comparatively higher for all suppliers, as indicated by the low to medium assessments shown in Table 18 (overleaf). The three areas are discussed in turn below.

¹⁴⁴ Annex B.2 integrates and summarises discussion from the Evaluation Design Document related to the conceptual grounding of the approach and from the Endline Design Note related to how this would be applied.

¹⁴⁵ The framework was only applied with reference to the case study counties, namely Pakistan (SAWRP), Kenya (SWIFT), and Tanzania and Uganda (SSH4A), as the remote interviews with the programme managers in the other WASH Results Programme countries did not provide enough reliable insight to complete the framework.

Table 20: Inclusion framework

Areas of investigation	SWIFT Kenya	SAWRP Pakistan	SSH4A	
			Uganda	Tanzania
Programme planning and implementation				
1. Within targeted locations, did the programme endeavour to meet the needs of all, including communities that were harder to reach or serve?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2. Was technology selection (where relevant) and detailed design undertaken with the full participation of the intended beneficiaries?	Yes	Somewhat	Yes	Yes
3. Within targeted communities, did operational approaches address the needs of marginalised groups/households and of those with physical disabilities and infirmities?	Unlikely	Somewhat	Somewhat	Somewhat
4. Did women participate actively in programme implementation and were they adequately represented in decision-making processes?	Somewhat	Somewhat	Somewhat	Somewhat
Monitoring				
5. Did monitoring at output level generate disaggregated beneficiary data confirming that the programme provided access to WASH facilities for marginalised groups and those with special needs?	Somewhat	Somewhat	Yes	Yes
6. Did outcome-phase surveys confirm the use of WASH facilities and adoption of hygienic behaviour by marginalised groups and those with special needs?	No data available.	Somewhat	Yes	Yes
Addressing institutional barriers				
7. Where relevant, did the suppliers, in collaboration with other development agencies, work to strengthen the policy and institutional environment for equity and inclusion?	Unlikely	Unlikely	Somewhat	Unlikely
8. Where discriminatory practices existed within government institutions, did the suppliers advocate for a more inclusive approach? <i>[May be relevant to urban water projects in Kenya, but probably not to other projects]</i>	Yes*	No data available	No data available.	No data available

* refers only to the implementation of WSUP, where this criterion was deemed appropriate.

Programme planning and implementation. The overall programme design had no requirement for total sanitation, ODF, or any similar articulation of high levels of sanitation usage across targeted communities. Nonetheless, all suppliers undertook sanitation programming through CLTS-type approaches and aimed for community-wide outcomes to greater and lesser degrees, despite this not being a DFID requirement.

Addressing each supplier in turn, SAWRP's programme design featured measures to achieve inclusive outcomes, via: involving marginalised groups in planning and decision making; ensuring that communal facilities met the needs of people with disabilities; and involving children in sanitation and hygiene promotion and encouraging them to be change agents. The SAWRP programme in both countries also selected challenging and/or hard to reach areas to work in.

The SSH4A framework – as well as SNV as an organisation – placed a clear emphasis on inclusion. In each country, SNV chose to operate in marginalised areas with low WASH access and carried out targeted studies to help diagnose who the marginalised groups were and why they had lower access to latrines and/or lower knowledge of handwashing practices. SNV also produced handbooks describing latrine options for those unable to squat.

SWIFT's implementation in Kenya varied by partner – though, broadly speaking, the programme design appeared to support an equity focus – especially with regard to the location selection, or programme targeting. In addition, some individual projects included specific measures intended to ensure that affordable services could be accessed by the poorest and/or by marginalised members of the targeted communities.

Monitoring. The monitoring of the level of inclusion was less consistent across the suppliers. At the output and outcome level, all SSH4A countries explicitly monitored the level of inclusion, routinely disaggregated beneficiary results by gender and wealth quintiles. SWIFT and SAWRP, meanwhile, disaggregated beneficiaries only by gender, and did not adopt a definition of 'poor people', though there was a clear pro-poor focus in their programme designs. As a result, it is not possible to verify to what extent people in the lowest wealth quintile benefited from the WASH Results Programme in the targeted locations across the three suppliers. The focus on monitoring was less clear for SAWRP in Pakistan and for SWIFT in Kenya. Nonetheless, both SAWRP and SWIFT carried out periodic monitoring related to equity¹⁴⁶. As part of the outcome surveys both SAWRP and SWIFT also collected data relevant to inclusion – though these did not form part of the reporting to DFID. There could have been a stronger focus on more consistently monitoring the level of inclusion across the whole WASH Results Programme – regardless of whether or not this was explicitly linked to payment.

Addressing institutional barriers. Strengthening the policy and institutional environment for equity and inclusion was a weak aspect across all suppliers. While SSH4A had a strong focus on capacity building and advocacy at a national level¹⁴⁷, shortage of sectoral funding still poses risks to the ability of central and local government to continue to deliver equitable WASH services across SSH4A countries. Several SNV country managers felt that there was not enough time spent, or emphasis, on address sector-wide barriers to a more inclusive approach¹⁴⁸. This was echoed by managers of SAWRP and SWIFT. Very limited data were available on any efforts by suppliers to advocate against discriminatory practices which exist within government institutions.

¹⁴⁶ For SAWRP, this monitoring was done through SAFs.

¹⁴⁷ For example, in Uganda SSH4A used 'institutional triggering' to sensitise the relevant district government officers on the situation with the sanitation, water and solid waste in Uganda.

¹⁴⁸ The focus on overcoming institutional barriers was slightly greater for Uganda, where SNV sought synergies with social protection programmes that target the poorest people, such as SAGE and Operation Wealth Creation, funded by government.

4.4.3 Effect of PbR modality on inclusion focus

As noted in the midline evaluation report, all supplier programmes prioritised poor and under-served countries, yet only some implementing partners deliberately selected hard-to-reach locations: for example, in Pakistan (Plan International and WaterAid) and Kenya (Oxfam, Practical Action, Concern Worldwide) and Nepal (SNV).

The PbR modality does not appear to have significantly helped nor hindered the inclusion focus of any of the three suppliers. That is, the focus on inclusion within the programme was largely rooted in the organisational values – with the partners undertaking many initiatives to strengthen inclusion outside of the results that were tied to payment. Many of the most positive programme features regarding inclusivity, such as targeting, programme approach, and participation, were embedded within the programme design chosen by suppliers. All suppliers monitored inclusion to some degree, and responded to issues raised by this monitoring, yet there was a missed opportunity, as there was no requirement from DFID for benefits to be community-wide.

For a more detailed discussion by supplier readers should refer to Section 4.4.2 of the respective supplier case study reports for suppliers.

4.4.4 Unintended positive or negative impacts

Due to the design of the evaluation, only limited primary data could be obtained on intended and unintended positive or negative impacts for beneficiaries.¹⁴⁹ The information presented here primarily draws upon the following types of information: (1) community visits as part of midline and endline case studies; (2) supplier feedback at all levels, including from community meetings and focus groups they conducted, as well as their formalised complaint mechanisms; (3) verifier feedback and verification reports; and (4) DFID documentation, including Annual Reviews.

Overall, there were no reports of significant or widespread positive or negative beneficiary feedback. The limited negative feedback received was in line with what would be expected from the programme interventions, including some groups reporting challenges with certain technologies (e.g. the elderly challenged by squatting).

For those activities which were demand-led as opposed to hardware-based, one possible implication of the PbR modality could have been that the pressure to change behaviours would lead to NGOs putting undue pressure on households to build latrines or adapt hygienic handwashing practices. SAWRP staff in Pakistan emphasised that the repeated visits for monitoring strained the relationships with the community due largely to respondent fatigue. SNV Tanzania also reported that local government partners visited households repeatedly, until the household built a latrine. However, there is only anecdotal insight from one NGO partner for SSH4A Uganda that in the output phase some local field staff actually used coercive measures against households that were reluctant to improve their sanitation status¹⁵⁰. Conversely, in Nepal SSH4A took specific steps to stop coercive measures by government staff, which has historically been a common government approach in Nepal¹⁵¹. Similarly, SNV in Ethiopia and Uganda

¹⁴⁹ There was insufficient evaluation endline budget to carry out comprehensive assessments at the community level. To maximise value for money at the endline, it was agreed with DFID that the modest budget originally allocated for community assessments would be reallocated to obtaining more comprehensive feedback from the country managers not involved in case study visits.

¹⁵⁰ Evaluators were unable to further corroborate this claim, nor ascertain how representative this experience was.

¹⁵¹ In Nepal households are issued with a toilet card by the government when they build a latrine. In the past, some district governments withheld services from households without a toilet card – blocking school enrolment, blocking payments by

discouraged enforcement approaches traditionally used by government and community leaders that are known to interfere with demand-led approaches. Without a counterfactual and with very limited interviews at the lowest level of implementers and with communities the evaluation could not ascertain whether the level of community follow-up – a standard ingredient of CLTS – was higher than normal or entailed any coercive measures, or whether this had negative effects on households or on the sustainability of the behaviour change.

The positive and negative effects experienced by supplier staff, partners, and local governments are discussed as relevant in Section 4.3: for example, stress on supplier and partner staff, and increased confidence in results by local governments.

the employment programme, and not issuing birth and death certificates. In response to SNV's advocacy work, the government issued a memo against these types of sanctions in 2016.

4.5 Sustainability

These DEQs related to sustainability were only lightly assessed in the midline evaluation, and there is substantial new evidence. This section focuses primarily on summarising evidence collected at the endline stage, incorporating midline results where relevant for further context. Table 19 summarises the final evaluation findings for each DEQ. This section focuses on highlighting cross-cutting themes and highlighting individual cases where particularly useful to provide context for the lessons and recommendations, a detailed discussion by suppliers can be found in Section 3.5 of the supplier case studies.

It is important to note that the continuing use of water and sanitation facilities at the end of the outcome phase is not the same as the achievement of sustainable service provision. The latter requires the simultaneous fulfilment of numerous pre-requisites at community, local and national government levels, as summarised in Table 21. The achievements at the end of the outcome phase, in other words, are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the achievement of sustainability. In this section we focus on the likelihood of the programme's results demonstrating true sustainability in this non-time-limited sense.

Table 21: Summary of sustainability DEQ findings

DEQs	Our conclusion	Strength of evidence	Section
HEQ5 – How likely is it that the WASH outcomes achieved by the programme will be sustained beyond the end of the programme in 2018?			
DEQ 5.1: To what extent were the individual sub-programmes designed and implemented to maximise the likelihood of achieving long-term sustainable WASH outcomes and impacts?	The design of the individual sub-programmes included addressing elements related to the long-term sustainability of services, particularly in the outcome phase. However, groundwork for sustainability was marginalised in some projects due to the tight output-phase deadline. Suppliers contributed to reducing risks and supporting sustainability in many ways. However, clear inherent risks remain, many of which are beyond the control of suppliers: for example, national-level institutional capacity; some aspects of district-level institutional capacity; and long-term environmental conditions.	Medium	Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2
DEQ 5.2: Under which circumstances has the PbR modality affected the likelihood of long-term sustainability of the outcomes and impacts?	The PbR modality did not appear to help or hinder the suppliers in taking actions supportive of long-term sustainability. However, having payments associated with outcomes incentivised partners to repair infrastructure or revisit communities in order to maintain functionality during the outcome phase.	Medium	Section 4.5.4
DEQ 5.3: Under which circumstances have other programme features affected the likelihood of the long-term sustainability of	Three key factors improved the likelihood of sustainability by enhancing accountability and incentivising it: (i) the outcome phase focused on outcomes (roughly two years of community and government engagement in the period after the delivery	Medium	Section 4.5.1– 4.5.3

the outcomes and impacts?	of outputs), (ii) outcome results were measured, and (iii) payments were contingent on outcome results. In contrast, the rushed output phase in some cases was likely detrimental to efforts to enhance the likelihood of sustainable services.		
DEQ 5.4: Under which circumstances did the WASH Results Programme contribute to enhanced sector learning to inform better evidence-based WASH policy and programming?	Suppliers made numerous efforts to disseminate learning at the global level, though efforts were more varied at national sector level.	Low	Section 4.5.6

4.5.1 Approach to sustainability by suppliers

The degree to which the suppliers articulated their approach to sustainability varied; this is reflected not only in the programme approach and how implementation changed between phases, but also in the approach taken to monitoring progress on sustainability indicators and the payment indicators selected. In many ways SSH4A had the most clearly *articulated* approach to sustainability and was the only supplier to link payments to related progress on sustainability indicators.

The midline findings highlighted significant differences between SWIFT and SAWRP vis-à-vis SSH4A regarding the approach to sustainability. Whilst all suppliers were committed to delivering sustainable WASH services, the abbreviated nature of the output phase and the focus on quantifiable results made it difficult for at least some SWIFT and SAWRP partners to give adequate attention to sustainability; and there were some cases where the quantity of results was given priority over quality¹⁵². In contrast, there were also several examples of cases where partners prioritised initiatives in support of sustainability despite the time pressure in the first half of the programme¹⁵³. The midline evaluation also highlighted that monitoring the enabling conditions for sustainability was a crucial aspect in tracking progress and flagging potential risks to sustainability.

During the outcome phase, the suppliers varied in how they formalised their approach to sustainability. Though a common element of the outcome phase for all suppliers was a focus on the government and community-level structures responsible for managing services in the long term, and throughout the outcome phase Suppliers continued to play an active role in monitoring and ensuring service functionality.

Key elements of each consortia's approach to sustainability are discussed in turn below, with further detail in the supplier case studies¹⁵⁴:

SSH4A. Under the SSH4A approach, building the capacity of local and central government was also one of the four pillars of the SSH4A programme. Across all countries, SSH4A signed MOUs with district government counterparts to ensure handover of service delivery after programme-end,

¹⁵² See the midline evaluation report for specific examples.

¹⁵³ See the midline evaluation report for specific examples.

¹⁵⁴ Sections 3.4.5 in SAWRP case study and Sections 3.5.5 and 3.4.5 in the SSH4A case study

drew up district sanitation plans, trained a cadre of government CLTS facilitators, contributed to the national ODF verification process, and ensured all its efforts were aligned with local government efforts. SNV strengthened private sector capacity on sanitation marketing and set up a supply chain for a locally appropriate improved latrine model across all SSH4A countries. SSH4A included sustainability components in its payment milestones though it was not required by DFID at tender stage. Drawing up district sanitation plans, for example, was an explicit SSH4A deliverable; sanitation marketing was also introduced at an early stage.

SNV monitored progress on sustainability achievements through 10 sustainability indicators, which tracked the existence of various technical, environmental, and institutional prerequisites for sustainability and equity. This is not to say that the other suppliers did not focus on monitoring sustainability, but that as a consortium SSH4A articulated a clearer vision from the start of the programme.

SWIFT. SWIFT in DRC also placed a strong focus on sustainability in the outcome phase, where efforts centred on building the capacity of government and community-level support structures and monitoring. SWIFT also signed MOUs with district government counterparts and contributed to the national ODF verification process. With regards to water, the focus was on professionalising the management of the water services at the local level, though both Oxfam and Tearfund remained active in supporting the water user committees in addressing breakdowns. SWIFT's approach to sustainability varied considerably in Kenya, related to the diverse nature of the sub-programmes. For the ASAL partners, the approach to sustainability in water can be broadly characterised as providing capacity support to the institutions with responsibility for maintaining service functionality beyond the life of SWIFT (water utilities, water user associations, and to a lesser extent the county government). WSUP's work in Nairobi focused even more clearly on institutional strengthening, as there was an explicit MOU with Nairobi Water and Sewerage Company, and a clear handover of responsibilities at the end of the outcome phase. For sanitation and hygiene, the picture is more mixed. BBC Media Action has an ongoing relationship with (at least some of) the local radio stations but had no implementation activities planned during the outcome phase – in which the majority of the capacity building efforts of other partners were focused. As a social enterprise, Sanergy's efforts towards sustainability centred on the financial sustainability of its business model – with the shifts in strategy highlighted above forming a major development during the outcome phase.

Under SWIFT the focus on monitoring institutional strengthening was a stronger programme feature in DRC than in Kenya. In DRC the monitoring of the functioning of the local structures went far beyond what was required for payment related to outcomes, and SWIFT partners actively monitored the functioning of these institutions¹⁵⁵. In Kenya the programme focused its monitoring efforts on the payment indicators and the monitoring of sustainability was primarily through periodic narrative reporting (which was consortium-wide and was also done in DRC).

SAWRP. For SAWRP, the focus in the outcome phase in Pakistan had three main elements: i) continuing household-level promotion activities to try and instil behaviour change, ii) support and guidance to local government stakeholders for continuing the work, and iii) intensive monitoring of functionality, with remedial action taken when needed. In Bangladesh the focus was similar. It was noted that in both countries the suppliers also continued to deliver some outputs.

¹⁵⁵ For example, the criteria used to monitor the functioning of the Water Management Committees were: i) having water safety plans in place; ii) having official internal regulations; iii) having physical offices; iv) having systems in place for managing the finances; v) working in collaboration with local leaders; and vi) still having their maintenance kit. Similar assessments were done in respect of the village committees and sanitation.

SAWRP monitored sustainability through periodic assessments under its Sustainability Assessment Frameworks (SAFs). These frameworks were developed by WEDC and other SAWRP partners under the WASH Results Programme to track progress in relation to four dimensions of sustainability: functionality; equity and inclusion; institutional and financial sustainability; and environmental sustainability. Initially, it was envisaged that two SAF assessments would take place – one in the output phase and one in the outcome phase. Due to pressures in the output phase the first assessment did not happen until early in the outcome phase, but, crucially, it included a feedback mechanism for feeding back into programming by requiring a management response.

Readers should refer to Section 3.4.5 in the supplier case study reports for each supplier, for details of their respective approaches to increasing the likelihood of sustainability, and Section 3.4.6 for details of their approach to monitoring sustainability.

4.5.2 Assessment of prospects for sustainability

The approach taken to evaluation sustainability was rooted in the context of programme implementation by international NGOs working in partnership with local NGOs, and local and national governments. However, most of the content is also applicable to a situation where implementation is by local governments, either directly or through outsourcing. A sustainable service is most fundamentally interpreted as a behaviour or practice which persists over time. However, to place a time limitation on sustainability is unhelpful. Sustainability is certainly about the time dimension, but no limit must be placed on that time dimension. A distinction is therefore made between indications that services or practices have been sustained to the present date, and the way in which we might determine whether services and practices are indeed sustainable over the foreseeable future.

The framework developed for assessing sustainability under this evaluation is an attempt to synthesise the prerequisites; combining both backward-looking and forward-looking elements. The framework also distinguishes between implementation and institutional levels. The fundamental logic being that prerequisites at the user / community level all need to be reinforced at the level of the local administration. Similarly, all actions undertaken at local government level must be supported by the actions of higher-level government organisations and foreign/international NGOs, agencies, and donors. In the framework, repetition is avoided by listing only the highest priority actions at levels higher than the local community. Readers are referred to Annex B.3 for further details of the approach taken to assessing the likelihood of sustainability.

Table 22 combines all of the sustainability frameworks completed for the programme, i.e. wherever sufficient data were available and disaggregated as appropriate, due to differences in country approaches. These frameworks were only applied for SWIFT in Kenya, for SAWRP in Pakistan, and for SSH4A in Uganda and Tanzania.

For the table: risks scoring 1–2 are considered negligible risks and are colour-coded green; risks scoring 3–4 are considered moderate risks and colour-coded amber; risks scoring 6+ are considered high-risk areas and are colour-coded red, and risks of 9 are considered critical and coloured purple. The risk scores are a product of likelihood and impact. The strength of evidence supporting the assessment is included in parenthesis and is high (H), medium (M), or low (L). The same method was used for each case study. Where a criterion is not seen as relevant to a particular organisation's implementation the cell is coloured light grey and marked N/A, and where there was insufficient evidence to make an informed assessment the cell is coloured dark grey and left blank.

Table 22: Sustainability assessment by supplier

Dimension	Criteria for assessment	SWIFT					SAWRP	SSH4A	
		Urban			Rural				
		Water		San	Water	San and hygiene			
		Oxfam ASAL	WSUP	Sanergy	OxPAC ASAL	OxPAC ASAL	Pakistan	Uganda & Tanzania	
User / community level									
Functional	1. Are the selected technologies and systems fit-for-purpose and fit-for-context?	2 (H)	3 (M)		3 (H)	2 (M)	2 (H)	2 (H)	2 (H)
	2. Is the construction quality of physical infrastructure adequate?	2 (L)			2 (H)		4 (M)	4 (L)	4 (M)
Institutional	3. Are the responsibilities of service users and support organisations clearly and appropriately established?	1 (H)	2 (H)		2 (H)	2 (M)	2 (H)	2 (H)	2 (H)
	4. Are service users organised, trained and equipped to undertake management tasks of which they are competent and capable?	N/A	N/A		3 (H)	6 (M)	2 (H)	2 (M)	2 (M)
	5. Do service users have the means and mechanisms to report faults and request and obtain assistance?	2 (M)	2 (H)		3 (H)	3 (H)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Behavioural	6. Has the programme achieved its outcome level targets? (latrine use; adoption of hand washing with soap; and (where relevant) consumption of safe water).	2 (H)	3 (H)		2 (H)	9 (H)	2 (H)	3 (H)	2 (H)
	7. Has there been substantive action during the Outcome-phase to consolidate latrine use and the adoption of hand washing with soap?	N/A	N/A		2 (H)	N/A	3 (M)	3 (H)	3 (H)
Financial	8. Did service users make a substantial capital cost contribution? (For household sanitation, this should be the full capital cost barring cases of exceptional hardship).	3 (M)	1 (H)		2 (H)	4 (L)	2 (H)	2 (H)	1 (H)
	9. Is there real demand for the services developed, demonstrated through use and payment of operating / repair / replacement costs?	2 (H)	1 (M)		4 (H)	3 (H)	3 (M)	3 (H)	3 (M)
	10. Will funds collected meet the full lifecycle costs? If not, are arrangements in place for the shortfall to be met by local government or another permanent organisation?	6 (L)	4 (L)		9 (M)	6 (M)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Environme ntal	11. Has the long-term adequacy of the quality and quantity of water resources been assessed and, if necessary, addressed?	4 (M)	3 (L)		N/A	6 (M)	N/A	N/A	N/A
	12. Have the potential impacts of climate change been assessed and addressed in technology choice and system design?	4 (M)	3 (L)		N/A	6 (M)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Equity	13. Have the pre-requisites for achieving inclusive WASH outcomes been addressed by Suppliers?	3 (H)	3 (M)		3 (H)	3 (H)	3 (M)	2 (H)	2 (H)

Dimension	Criteria for assessment	SWIFT					SAWRP	SSH4A			
		Urban				Rural					
		Water			San		Water		San and hygiene		
		Oxfam ASAL	WSUP		Sanergy		OxPAC ASAL		OxPAC ASAL	Pakistan	Uganda & Tanzania
Local Government level											
Institutional	14. Is external support and guidance (from local government and/or private sector) accessible and responsive to service users’ needs?	4 (M)	3 (M)		2 (H)		6 (L)		4 (H)	6 (H)	4 (M)
	15. In the case of emergencies (e.g. floods) does local government have response arrangements in place to restore services as promptly as possible?	4 (H)			N/A		3 (H)		4 (H)	6 (H)	4 (M)
	16. Do local governments maintain accurate registers of physical assets within their administrative areas, and are asset management plans in place?	1 (L)			N/A		6 (L)		4 (M)	3 (H)	2 (M)
Financial	17. Are goods (e.g. spare parts, sanitary hardware) and support services affordable to service users?	N/A	N/A		3 (M)		3 (L)		6 (M)	4 (H)	4 (L)
National level											
Institutional	18. Are sustainability commitments and actions incorporated into sector strategy?	3 (H)	3 (H)		6 (H)		3 (H)		2 (H)	4 (H)	2 (L)
	19. Is there clarity on the monitoring, management and financing responsibilities of service users, government (each tier), NGOs, donors and the private sector?	2 (H)	2 (H)		2 (H)		3 (M)		2 (H)	6 (H)	4 (M)
	20. Are sufficient funds transferred from national to local government to enable community support and the active monitoring of WASH services?	N/A	N/A		N/A		9 (H)		9 (0)	6 (H)	9 (M)
	21. Where necessary, are adequate measures in place to develop the capacity of government agencies to play an effective role in service delivery or community support?	4 (H)	4 (H)		N/A		6 (H)		3 (H)	3 (H)	3 (M)
	22. Is a viable sector monitoring system in place or under development?	4 (H)	4 (H)		6 (M)		6 (H)		4 (H)	6 (H)	4 (L)
	23. Are measures in place to facilitate learning on sustainability, and the application of that learning?	4 (M)	4 (H)				4 (M)		4 (M)	4 (H)	4 (L)

4.5.3 Discussion by supplier

4.5.3.1 Common themes across suppliers

It is difficult to generalise across the programme – partially due to the diversity of the projects. However, some patterns do emerge, specifically:

- the risks to sustainability were lower at the community level and the worst performing area are lifecycle costing;
- in several cases there was not enough relevant data to comment on environmental risks, but where there was, these risks are moderate; and
- many of the greatest risks to sustainability are related to institutional aspects at the regional and national levels.

Rural sanitation and hygiene is the one subsector where a comparison across suppliers is possible, due to common elements in programming. Rural sanitation is also distinct as a subsector as the responsibility for continuing services rests comparably more (than in the other subsectors) on households, as opposed to local government institutions. This is both related to the nature of the service (predominantly the fact that infrastructure is limited to being only at the household level) and the outcomes sought (related to behaviour), though local and national governments have a prominent role in service monitoring and continued promotion. These facets are reflected in the assessment of the risks to sustainability. Those risks at the community level are generally regarded as lower; this is supported by the strong performance against target regarding functionality, up to the end of the outcome phase. The areas of greatest concern relate to the infrastructure itself, as the impact of latrine collapse on services is high, and a degree of latrine collapse was reported during the outcome phase across suppliers (with remedial action taken by the suppliers).

The risks to service sustainability related to the local and national government levels are seen as much higher than those at the community level. At the local government level these predominantly relate to the capacity of local government to respond to, or to support households to respond to, service failure. Between the national and local government levels a critical risk is the lack of continued funding to local government institutions. While, as acknowledged above, the suppliers worked to build capacity at the district (or equivalent) and community levels the continued funding of rural sanitation is something that is arguably beyond the control of the suppliers to meaningfully influence in the longer term in a programme such as this.

The overall conclusion is that whilst there are many aspects where all suppliers have contributed to reducing the risks and supporting sustainability, clear risks to sustainability remain. However, the actions needed to mitigate many of these risks are beyond the scope of the WASH Results Programme – particularly those related to long-term environmental risk and institutional capacity at the national level, as well as some aspects of district institutional capacity.

The remainder of this section discusses the risks and mitigating actions taken by supplier consortia.

4.5.3.2 SSH4A (rural sanitation and hygiene in Uganda and Tanzania)

The risk-based framework suggests that sustainability risks at community level are generally low. This is because the technologies selected by SNV in Uganda and Tanzania were generally fit-for-purpose and fit-for-context, and sufficient demand was created at community level for households to pay for, construct, and maintain latrines and handwashing stations. While demand has clearly been created, the fact that community structures are voluntary in Uganda and Tanzania, with competing demands on their time and without funding, limits their ability and motivation to continue following up with communities and sustaining behaviour change.

In Uganda and Tanzania, local government and the private sector were needed to provide support and guidance, so that voluntary community structures and households could maintain services in the face of challenges beyond their means to address. In Uganda and Tanzania SNV engaged in strengthened private sector capacity on sanitation marketing¹⁵⁶. Not enough entrepreneurs could be interviewed to assess if the supply chains are sustainable, or to assess to what extent these enterprises have expanded latrine sales outside the SSH4A intervention area¹⁵⁷.

SSH4A has clearly contributed to strengthening government capacity at various levels. There was no noticeable effect of the outcome phase in regard to boosting capacity building in SSH4A countries, with the exception of Uganda¹⁵⁸. Staff and funding shortages at local government level posed risks to the ability of local government to continue supporting communities in both Uganda and Tanzania, and in both countries issues were raised with regard to district-level staffing levels and there being limited budget for promotion activities and travel. In several other countries, SNV mentioned that due to a shortage of government funding for district staff, more emphasis has been placed on voluntary community structures, which can continue operating despite lack of funding. There is a risk that this places a greater burden on households and communities.

In all SSH4A countries, an MOU between SNV and the relevant district government structure was established at the start of the programme, which entailed drawing up a District Sanitation Plan – which was revisited annually – culminating in an exit strategy in 2018. In Tanzania, SNV secured a commitment from the government to continue reporting sanitation and hygiene outcomes to SNV after project-end. Securing this political buy-in has increased the potential for sustainability. SNV has also contributed to strengthening the WASH sector processes more widely. In Uganda, SNV advisers contributed to sanitation planning at district and national level by advising on the ongoing development of the ODF verification protocol. In Tanzania, where SNV implemented directly through government, SNV created strong government ownership and commitment to sanitation, which is likely to continue in project districts beyond programme end. SNV also influenced the planning and implementation of the National Sanitation Campaign beyond project districts. In some countries, SNV also contributed to strengthening the WASH sector monitoring, though the government monitoring systems in Uganda and Tanzania remain mostly paper-based, and the lack of updates means slippage in villages is still difficult to detect.

A shortage of sectoral funding poses risks to the ability of central and local government to continue to support communities across SSH4A countries. In Uganda, SNV has had limited success in

¹⁵⁶ In Uganda this included setting up a supply chain for SaTo pan distribution in collaboration with the INGO Water for People, and working with entrepreneurs to make and sell tippy taps. SNV worked with savings groups (SACCOs) and Village Health Teams to promote the pans at low cost. In Tanzania, SNV similarly set up a supply chain for the Safi latrine, for which there seems to be particular demand in areas of collapsing soils.

¹⁵⁷ In Uganda, SaTo pan availability and jerry can availability (for handwashing) sometimes appeared patchy in remote places.

¹⁵⁸ Where from 2016 onwards (what SNV called Phases IV and X) there was a transition to more activities implemented directly by the district/sub-county teams, with increased focus by SNV on capacity building of local government and community structures, as opposed to capacity building of local implementing partners.

influencing district government WASH budget. In Tanzania, sanitation is not seen a big priority for the government, and the National Sanitation Campaign is dependent on donor funding. Lack of sectoral funding was also mentioned as a key risk by SNV staff in Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nepal, and Zambia.

4.5.3.3 SWIFT (urban and rural water and sanitation in Kenya)

There are some general patterns of note across the SWIFT partners in Kenya: i) broadly speaking, the risks at the community level associated with technology choice and construction, community-level institutions, and behavioural factors are negligible or moderate; ii) community-level risks associated with lifecycle costs financial, operations and maintenance, and environmental issues are a concern in many projects; iii) risks at the local government and national levels are relatively high in the ASAL region; and iv) the urban projects generally had less prominent risks, as compared to the rural projects, with the exception of those associated with revenues being sufficient to meet lifecycle costs.

One finding which is true for both urban and rural ASAL projects is that the enabling environment for sustainability remains weak in several key areas:

- County governments (particularly water and health departments) have a pivotal role to play in terms of backup technical support and ongoing sanitation and hygiene promotion to water users associations and rural communities in general. However, NGOs have very little control or influence over county government priorities, budget allocations, or responsiveness to community needs, and in the context of recent devolution local government spending priorities are increasingly politicised.
- The remoteness of many rural communities makes it difficult and expensive for them to access essential hardware and skills. The promotion of small WASH enterprises, as is often done via sanitation marketing, for example, is probably not viable in such a sparsely populated environment.
- Poverty, compounded by environmental fragility, poses additional challenges to communities, with the return of drought being an ever-present risk. Moreover, SWIFT has been operating alongside humanitarian relief projects under which communities receive direct material assistance and this can make it doubly difficult to resume a development-oriented approach based on self-reliance once the emergency is over.

Beyond this, it is difficult to generalise about the risks across such a diverse range of projects in SWIFT. Key points by supplier are discussed below in turn.

OxPAC urban water. OxPAC worked with Water Service Providers in Lodwar and Kakuma in the ASAL region. The construction quality and functionality towards the end of the outcome phase (aspects under the direct control of SWIFT) was generally seen as adequate and presenting relatively low risk. What presents a greater risk is that the revenues collected are insufficient to maintain systems: a risk that is more pertinent in the ASAL region, which is partially reflective of the different contexts. This is a common risk in many contexts and the evaluation team recognise the efforts of the suppliers in addressing this issue.

WSUP urban water. The sustainability prospects for the Dandora project look very positive: the bulk supply to the settlement has been improved and the transition from illegal connections to legal, shared connections is progressing well. If there continues to be large numbers of illegal connections this would be a threat to the sustainability of the official service, but the risk of this is now considered low as control measures have been successfully enforced. Losses through

leakage also need to be managed but this, too, is manageable given that most of the distribution network is new, and bulk meters are being installed at strategic points to help monitor losses. Another positive is that demand for shared metered connections has been higher than expected. Following the midline survey, WSUP conducted a small affordability survey, which found that the connections are affordable for the great majority of residents (landlords pay for the connections and metered consumption but may pass on some of the costs in increased rent). This being said, there are some people living illegally on railway land at the edge of the settlement, and Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company cannot install services there. Alternative solutions may still need to be sought.

OxPAC rural water. As is common in other contexts, the management of rural systems draws on a community-based management model, and in Kenya this is relatively well formalised, with the Water Users Associations being formally recognised and elected bodies. Though the institutional framework is relatively clear, the assessment highlights some issues with capacity at the Water Users Association level: specifically, that while the associations are equipped to deal with minor operation and maintenance, more serious issues (such as pump breakdown) require support from the county government. The assessment also raises concerns surrounding environmental risks to the long-term sustainability of services. This is also reflected in the functionality results over the outcome phase. In the ASAL region, roughly a third of systems were reported by Water Users Associations as non-functional in the final outcome verification round. This was attributed to the prolonged drought in the region, which was deemed ‘exceptional’, and compensation was made in payments to SWIFT. Nonetheless, looking forward, it is seen as likely that such events will affect service functionality in the future, given the pattern of environmental change in the region due to climate change.

Sanergy Urban Sanitation. As Sanergy operates as a social enterprise the focus of the discussion of sustainability relates to the long-term viability of the business. While institutional factors are important considerations, they are arguably less relevant to Sanergy than in cases where implementation is tied to the continued action of government institutions. When Sanergy made the strategic shift to focus on shared residential toilets, many of the public toilets established during the output phase closed down due to a drop in demand (out of 257 in total, only 202 were still in operation by February 2018). While the technical feasibility of Fresh Life Toilets has been established, Sanergy acknowledges that there remain challenges to becoming financially self-sustaining beyond donor funding. At present, roughly half of the operating costs are reportedly funded by donors. Sanergy is in the process of developing its financial exit strategy. Its medium-term objective is to further reduce the operating cost through increasing the density of its network, and to replace the grant funding with a service contract with Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company or the municipality for the provision and emptying of shared residential toilets. It is far from certain that this will happen, however, given especially that Sanergy serves informal settlements. These are not a government priority and there is no indication so far that the city authorities would be interested in paying for the service.

4.5.3.4 SAWRP (rural sanitation and hygiene in Pakistan)

The assessment highlights that, while much was done to consolidate latrine use during the outcome phase, and to promote simple, affordable technologies that can be maintained at community level, the enabling environment for sustainability remains weak in terms of ongoing support and monitoring by local government agencies beyond the outcome phase. Particular issues here are inadequate operational funding at local level and a lack of clarity over the roles and responsibilities of specific government agencies; arguably factors outside of the control of SAWRP to substantially influence.

Accountability for outcome-phase results incentivised suppliers to ensure the continued functionality and use of water and sanitation facilities up to the end of the outcome phase. However, this is not attributable exclusively to the PbR modality; it seems highly likely that Country Programmes would have done the same under grant funding if they were held accountable for achievements at outcome level.

Country Programmes recognised the importance of developing the capacity and motivation of government to provide a long-term, supportive role to communities once SAWRP had ended. However, the PbR framework defined results only in terms of beneficiary numbers and this tended to marginalise programme efforts on institutional strengthening.

At least two of the implementing partners were expecting to continue operating in some of the programme locations after SAWRP ended. There was potential scope, therefore, for the NGOs to provide further motivational and supportive inputs to some communities: for example, by encouraging maintenance or repairs when latrines filled or were damaged by floods. However, much depended on the motivation of these organisations to do so, the funding available, and the extent to which they could accommodate this additional work alongside their other commitments.

With regards to rural sanitation and hygiene in Pakistan, the assessment highlights that the majority of the risks to sustainability relate to the institutional capacity and motivation of government to support functionality and use. While the partners made clear efforts to strengthen the capacity of local government it remains debatable as to the level of impact a programme of this character (centrally managed, results focused, and using an NGO delivery channel) can reasonably be expected to have on institutional capacity.

4.5.4 Effect of PbR modality on sustainability

The PbR modality does not appear to have significantly helped or hindered the sustainability focus of any of the three suppliers. That is, the focus on sustainability within the programme was largely rooted in the organisational values – with the partners taking steps to tackle specific sustainability prerequisites (see Section 4.5.1). For SAWRP and SWIFT, the timing and intensity of activities related to sustainability was seen to represent a change compared to normal ways of working, in response to the rushed nature of the output phase and there subsequently being an outcome phase. For SSH4A the sustainability approach was well defined prior to implementation and it seems clear that the PbR modality did not *hinder* the extent of the focus on sustainability. If anything, it is plausible that sustainability *benefited* from the flexible programming resulting from PbR, based on anecdotal insights from Nepal. Achieving government buy-in has no standard recipe and sufficient flexibility in programming is needed to allow the implementer to try different ways of getting sustainability prerequisites in place.

Despite being the only supplier to link payments to sustainability prerequisites, SNV does not appear to have changed its sustainability approach as a result of this PbR incentive. Linking payments to internal sustainability indicators carried risks for SNV because putting in place the prerequisites for sustainability was outside the direct control of SNV and required close collaboration with government and the private sector. As a result, SNV only linked around 8% of total payments to sustainability achievements. SNV agreed with DFID in 2017 to drop the requirement to show progress on baseline levels and agreed with DFID that progress would only be verified for six out of 10 indicators – thus in increasing the relative weight of those indicators in relation to payment – but that reporting would continue for all 10 indicators. Despite these steps taken by SNV to reduce the burden of verification, it appears that the extent of the focus on

sustainability by SNV did not change due to the introduction of PbR. Capacity building and sector strengthening remained a core part of the SSH4A approach, regardless of PbR.

The two-year outcome phase appears to have encouraged suppliers to take actions to ensure functionality, and in doing so enhanced the sustainability focus for SAWRP and SWIFT. In the case of the ASAL, key informants highlighted that the length of engagement they had with the community-based and county-level institutions was longer than in normal programming. This was attributed to the length of the outcome phase and the fact that the partners remained accountable for functionality. This was a sentiment that was echoed in Pakistan, where many implementation-level staff remarked that the outcome phase was a departure from normal programming and led them to focus more on activities that supported instilling long-term behaviour change over focusing only on outputs. However, the team note that most of the activities remained similar in character to those conducted as a matter of course in many WASH programmes (e.g. household follow-up visits and capacity building of local government).

4.5.5 Dissemination and learning

This section addresses dissemination and learning from a sectoral perspective, external to the programme. Refer to Section 4.2.8 for internal learning between and within supplier consortia.

As noted in Section 4.2.8, a key mechanism for learning on PbR for the WASH Results Programme was Itad's L&D team, as part of the MV contract, which issued various blogs and learning products and held annual learning events.¹⁵⁹ DFID participated in events as appropriate and reviewed learning products.

With regards to wider sector dissemination, the Suppliers have engaged in global and national level learning activities to varying degrees:

- SSH4A proactively engaged in learning activities to shape wider sector learning at both a national and a global level. At the global level, SNV presented at a variety of conferences, produced several blogs and impact stories for the SNV website, and is planning further learning papers. Country-level activities differed by country, and included regular government district-level planning meetings, joint monitoring visits with government partners, and contributions to national WASH working groups. However, some SSH4A country teams felt that finding time to document learning was a challenge throughout implementation, especially in the output phase. Also, geographic proximity influenced opportunities to share learning. For example, in Ethiopia the SNV country manager was well placed to share learning with the sector working groups, whereas SNV country teams based away from the capital city (as was the case in Zambia) were probably less able to influence.
- SAWRP shared its experience in global and regional fora including SACOSAN VI in 2016 and at a variety of WEDC conferences¹⁶⁰ and a national conference on PbR. It also held a SAWRP UK learning event in Feb 2018. Also some provincial governments jointly published project summary briefs highlighting successes. SAWRP did not have a structured plan to engage in sharing lessons from SAWRP with national governments or other sector stakeholders, but, Plan International, WaterAid and their partners continued to be active

¹⁵⁹ See, for example, the blog at <https://washresultsmve.wordpress.com/>

¹⁶⁰ WEDC conferences (2015 – PbR, 2016 – PbR, and sustainability, 2017 – behaviour change, MHM, MVE, E&I, 2018 – sustainability assessment, institutional sustainability)

supporters of District WASH Forums and supported development of district ODF Plans and suppliers had ongoing dialogue with key provincial government agencies on WASH matters, though this was not related to SAWRP specifically. SAWRP's learning partner, WEDC was in the process of developing a number of learning publications at the time of the evaluation interviews.

- The SWIFT learning approach varied by country. SWIFT has some ongoing operational research in DRC. Learning initiatives in Kenya during the outcome phase included a cross-country learning event in Nairobi in 2017; Oxfam and Practical Action are also developing (separate) papers on the applicability of CLTS in ASAL; and Oxfam has some learning work on utilities, via a research project with Oxford University, though this is not part of SWIFT. The programme has not (so far) been actively involved in sharing lessons from SWIFT with national government or other sector stakeholders in Kenya. In DRC the programme was more active and hosted three events (two on implementing PbR and one on the semi-urban approach). SWIFT also documented much of its learning on the programme website (swiftconsortium.org).

It is clear that there were efforts to disseminate learning at the global level: notably at several WEDC conferences and World Water Week in Stockholm in 2018. What varied more was the dissemination at the national sector level – in some cases (particularly Pakistan and Kenya) there could have been a greater focus on consolidating and sharing learning at the national level.

Furthermore, both of the learning partners (WEDC and ODI) reported that their learning function was 'crowded out' in favour of supporting the development of monition frameworks – particularly in the first half of the programme. This is partially related to the fact that the MV burden was more intensive than the suppliers expected and due to the rushed nature of the output phase implementation. A similar experience was reported by country-level implementation staff, who highlighted that at these times a focus on learning was constrained by the pressure to deliver results.

5 Lessons learned and recommendations

This section first presents some reflections on WASH programming more generally, then moves to the evaluators' lessons learned and recommendations for the WASH Results Programme.

The lessons and recommendations presented in this section are framed around the core objectives of this evaluation, which were to assess:

- whether the programme successfully achieved its stated objectives;
- the influence of programme design, including the PbR modality, on this achievement; and
- lessons for applying PbR in WASH programming in future.

As this is an endline evaluation, the evaluators focused on broader lessons relevant for the future for individual Suppliers, DFID and/or the WASH sector as a whole. This section does not attempt to comprehensively repeat all of the lessons and recommendations from the midline evaluation (see full list from the midline in Annex A), though several themes carry through.

5.1 High-level reflections relating to water, sanitation, and hygiene programming aspects

The findings of this evaluation, together with broader sector learning on sustainability of water and sanitation services and hygiene practices, can contribute to DFID's evolving thinking around sustainable WASH programming.

We highlight three key implications for future WASH programming:

- First, it is important to design in a sustainability focus from the outset - the inclusion of programme design features that may inadvertently or unintentionally lead suppliers to postpone addressing sustainability to later stages can never be endorsed as good practice. An early assessment of context and the risks to sustainability is important to meaningfully being able to take action on sustainability over the course of a programme cycle. Using PbR to incentivise short-term post-implementation functioning and utilisation of services (as in this programme) can be helpful, but finding effective ways to incentivise true sustainability is more challenging; more work is needed to develop and test such incentive frameworks.
- Second, it is important for DFID and its suppliers to clearly conceptualise and measure progress on sustainability. In this programme SAWRP's SAF framework and SNV's Sustainability Indicators exemplify such conceptual frameworks and indicators. Such frameworks provide an important way to initially assess, and then later track progress on addressing the risks to sustainability.¹⁶¹ However it is important to note that such frameworks (including the risk based analysis used in this evaluation) are by nature generic, and certain dimensions will be more or less relevant in different contexts. In WASH programming, generic frameworks and indicators must be modified for context.

¹⁶¹ Although the WASH sector does not currently have a clear set of proxy indicators that have evidence showing their predictive value for future sustainability.

- Third, important aspects of true sustainability – the continued functioning of services and practices with no time limit – lie beyond the control of donors and suppliers engaged in programmes of limited duration (including this one). We have highlighted a number of such external factors, related to the broader enabling environment for sustainable WASH service delivery. These observations offer important lessons for donors and implementers of WASH programmes. Donors and suppliers should consider which aspects of the enabling environment in the country context are particularly critical for sustainability; these should then be addressed within WASH programmes or other parallel initiatives which aim to strengthen institutional arrangements for service delivery. For DFID, an important wider question is the balance to be struck between funding programmes which deliver first-time access and short-term functionality, and those addressing weaknesses in the enabling environment (or the downstream / upstream balance, to use UNICEF’s terminology). In our view programmes addressing first time access should also include aspects of systems strengthening, since the credibility given by the former often gives the “seat at the table” to influence the latter.

5.2 Lessons learned

The lessons presented in this section are framed around the core objectives of this evaluation, which were to assess:

- whether the programme successfully achieved its stated objectives;
- the influence of programme design, including the PbR modality, on this achievement; and
- lessons for applying PbR in WASH programming in future.

As this is an endline evaluation, the evaluators focused on broader lessons relevant for the future for individual Suppliers, DFID and/or the WASH sector as a whole. This section does not attempt to comprehensively repeat all of the lessons and recommendations from the midline evaluation (see full list from the midline in Annex A), though several themes carry through.

5.2.1 Whether the programme successfully achieved its stated objectives

- A. All three supplier consortia were successful in delivering their targets, through there is a question of how replicable this achievement is.** Each supplier achieved its total output targets and overwhelmingly achieved the outcome targets, with significant overachievement in several areas and modest underachievement in a few others. They achieved, if not exceeded, all contractual targets – due to the possibility to shift over-achievement to cover underperformance within some subcategories. However, the tight timetable in the output phase placed a high burden on staff; particularly during the output phase. Numerous staff reported working extra hours on nights and weekends, and a few staff left, due, at least in part, to the pressure. The WASH Results Programme was exceptional in that it was the first large-scale application of PbR in the WASH sector; it was a high-profile programme which presented great financial and reputational risks for the suppliers. With this came heightened management attention. Among the suppliers’ portfolio of projects the WASH Results Programme was very much a ‘special case’. These exceptional factors are significant because they raise some questions surrounding how replicable the achievements of the programme are.
- B. Suppliers’ programme approaches were generally well aligned with DFID’s expectations, but in some cases the fact that DFID did not articulate these expectations more clearly resulted in a missed opportunity.** Despite the tight timetable

for the output phase, combined with the PbR modality, the programmatic approaches chosen by the suppliers generally met DFID's expectations, such as operating at scale¹⁶², inclusivity, and sustainability. However, not requiring a focus on community-wide coverage (in sanitation, ODF status) or other best practice for achieving sustainable and inclusive outcomes presented a missed opportunity – though it is noted that in many cases ODF was still pursued as a programme objective by suppliers. DFID not explicitly setting all of their expectations at the bidding stage created a risk for potential suppliers, onto whom the risk of delivery was transferred under a PbR contract.

- C. The PbR modality strengthened supplier monitoring systems, though in many cases undertaking improvements to monitoring systems was more burdensome than suppliers anticipated.** The monitoring systems of most of the supplier consortia partners required moderate to significant modifications to meet verification requirements. On the one hand, these modifications brought several benefits, including a higher accuracy of monitoring data, and (in the case of the introduction of mobile-based monitoring) increased efficiency of monitoring. On the other hand, two of the three suppliers reported that the burden was heavier than under grant-based programmes throughout implementation. When considering the optimal monitoring intensity, striking a balance between the increased rigour and the corresponding increased opportunity cost -- with regards to staff time and money -- is important.
- D. Suppliers reported substantial learning on how to manage and price risk.** Based on the programme's experience, the following approaches worked well, some of which can be considered normal good practice: (1) setting realistic (if not conservative) targets; (2) using reliable implementation partners; (3) applying tested approaches; (4) including a contingency fund as a buffer for slippage in timing and scope (e.g. due to additional PbR requirements); (5) considering inflation and salary increases in the total price; (6) considering the risk that partners (e.g. local government) would not achieve the intended results and that the lead suppliers would lose out on the pre-financed investments; and (7) taking advantage of the increased monitoring to facilitate risk management.

5.2.2 The influence of programme design, including the PbR modality, on this achievement

- E. DFID gave suppliers substantial flexibility and freedom to design and implement their own approaches, but this flexibility largely manifested only to higher levels of programme management¹⁶³.** Suppliers were able to propose the indicators, and the frequency with which they would be assessed, and each individually negotiated a different 'results framework' with DFID under which they were paid. Suppliers appreciated this flexibility at the design stage, as well as the flexibility allowed during implementation. The most valued aspects of this flexibility were the ability to shift between budget line items without getting higher-level approval, choice of activities at the programme level, and the ability to shift targets between areas, to the extent that monitoring approaches including baseline requirements allowed. This flexibility was largely confined to higher levels of programme management, as field teams were tightly managed, and where there were local implementing partners they generally operated on grant agreements which retained financial and activity reporting.
- F. Implementation approaches for the three supplier consortia varied widely yet overwhelmingly relied on proven approaches and existing relationships with NGOs and governments.** The evaluators uncovered little evidence of genuine innovation in

¹⁶² Taken here to mean reaching a large number of people

¹⁶³ This lesson is also supported by evidence from the wider PbR literature. See Soucat, A., Dale, E., Mathauer, I., Kutzin, J. (2017) 'Pay-for-Performance Debate: Not Seeing the Forest for the Trees'. *Health Systems & Reform* 2017; 3:74–79; and Renmans, D., Holvoet, N., Orach, C. G. and Criel, B. (2016) 'Opening the "black box" of performance-based financing in low- and lower middle-income countries: a review of the literature'. *Health Policy and Planning*, 31(9), 1297–1309. doi: 10.1093/heapol/czw045

programmatic approaches – meaning that no approaches that were novel to the global WASH sector were developed, though it is important to note that evaluators found several instances of adaptive programming. Also, per Clist's (2017) classification, the WASH Results Programme constitutes 'small PbR', which is characterised by lesser quality measures, greater oversight required to track inputs and negotiate approaches, shorter agreements, and a tendency to implement through NGOs and the private sector – all of which Clist suggests combine to create less space for autonomy and innovation.

- G. The split between output and outcome phases had mixed results.** The urgency of the December 2015 deadline for the output phase in some cases limited suppliers' ability to adapt and posed risks to quality, at least in the short term, and the sustainability of results. While it was clearly beneficial to have longer-term engagement with the institutions (government or community-level) with responsibility for managing services, this could have been achieved without formal phasing. Similarly, while imposing accountability for outcomes was beneficial and improved functionality, this could also have been achieved without formal phasing. SSH4A, which created no distinction between output- and outcome phase activities (see detail in Chapter 3), faced fewer challenges in prioritising sustainability than SWIFT or SAWRP, which followed formal phasing.

5.2.3 Lessons for applying PbR in WASH programming in future

- H. The WASH Results Programme was not a clean test of PbR,** for a variety of reasons, such as the evolution of expectations, the characteristics of the contracting process, and the uniquely tight timetable for the first two years. For example, many programmatic decisions had already been made by suppliers, by verifiers and by DFID before the PbR modality was fully understood, and before the indicators for which suppliers would be judged were negotiated. While the WASH Results Programme offers several interesting and indicative lessons, its contribution to the broader evidence base for PbR in WASH is limited.
- I. PbR appeared to be a viable option for funding WASH programmes, but 100% PbR was neither necessary nor optimal.** The WASH Results Programme was DFID's first 100% PbR programme in the WASH sector. To help manage cash flow and other risks, two suppliers selected several process or activity targets, however these activities were time-consuming to document and verify. These could easily have been reimbursed in a more traditional way, without reducing the overall stimulus a PbR contract provides. For example, grant funding could be reserved for inception activities, learning activities, a management fee, or important process-related indicators (see next point).
- J. A PbR approach using disincentives only, without bonus opportunities, put potentially undue, and unintended, burden on Suppliers.** Suppliers put in a great deal of effort to not only achieve but overachieve many targets, but were not rewarded for doing so. The option of including incentives as well as penalties, as done by some other PBR programmes to guide desired results, were not used in this PBR programme (see Section 2.3).
- K. The efforts of suppliers were not solely informed by financial incentives.** As the suppliers contracted under the WASH Results Programme had strong organisational values, which led them to take action on aspects not directly linked to payment, and while much of the evidence suggests that the focus of the programme was related to the payment indicators suppliers were also responsive to DFID's requests and concerns outside of these. Furthermore, in many cases the reputational risk associated with not meeting given targets was a powerful motivator – as illustrated by the heightened senior management attention of the suppliers.

- L. Clarity on guiding principles of how major events, such as natural disasters or epidemics, would be handled between DFID and suppliers was important in a PbR context.** In two cases involving SWIFT, DFID *de facto* assumed some of the financial risk after events, by agreeing to change payment terms due to an Ebola epidemic and due to an exceptional drought. Because the level of risk-sharing and the level of evidence expected was not clearly specified at contract stage, time and resources were invested in negotiating the level of risk sharing on a case-by-case basis, causing inefficiencies.
- M. The high level of uncertainty at invitation to tender stage discouraged several bidders.** Specifically, the lack of clarity surrounding the results and how they would be verified meant that some private sector actors viewed the programme as very high risk. The risk was perceived as lower by INGOs (both successful and unsuccessful bidders), partially due to there being established working relationships between DFID and the INGOs which implemented the WASH Results Programme.
- N. Under the WASH Results Programme, in part because of the lack of clarity on how the PbR modality would operate, the PbR incentives were better able to act on tried and tested implementation approaches than on untested operational models.** Tried and tested implementation approaches had a framework within which incentives could act to tweak delivery. Otherwise, incentives could have acted in either a positive or negative direction, with a risk that they lead to movement away from the overarching objectives. The experience of some SWIFT partners highlights the risk of using untested operational models in the context of a PbR programme: those few partners who used models new to them did not reach the expected output levels.
- O. The lack of an inception phase – to design verification requirements before implementation began – caused inefficiencies because the verification process had to be repeatedly adapted as the supplier’s systems changed or became better-known by the MV team.** For suppliers, responding to evolving MV requirements created inefficiencies in some cases. However evolving MV requirements were also beneficial, because they adapted as the supplier’s systems changed or became better-known by the MV team.
- P. The value of including process-related indicators as payment indicators was dependent on context.** Process related indicators were used for payment in two main ways: i) relating to start-up activities in the early stages of the programme and ii) in the case of SSH4A only, related to progress towards their sustainability indicators (SIs). As mentioned above, the evaluators perceived that the process indicators related to start-up activities were included primarily to minimise the risk of non-payment for the suppliers and to facilitate cash flow in early stages rather than incentivise supplier attention on specific aspects of programming¹⁶⁴. This was suboptimal and inefficient when these indicators are costly and time-consuming to document and verify. The experience of this programme shows that more complex aspects of programming (e.g. sustainability prerequisites or learning – see point ii) above) which lack agreed standards are difficult to measure. There is value in reporting on process indicators related to these complex aspects of programming when DFID seeks to encourage certain aspects in programme implementation. Though this reporting does not necessarily need to be linked to result-based payments¹⁶⁵. Both SWIFT and SAWRP included periodic assessments related to sustainability similar to SNV’s Sustainability Indicators, which led to course corrections in implementation despite not being linked to payment. If progress on these aspects is linked

¹⁶⁴ This indicates that it is less likely that such process indicators would be included in future if a significant part of the programme was grant-funded.

¹⁶⁵ If aspects such as inclusion were linked to a result-based payment, these payments could for example reward the following: (a) Work in under-served geographical areas could be rewarded by allowing a higher unit price-per-beneficiary. (b) Bonus payments could reward survey results which confirm that equity targets and water-point functionality targets have been met after a certain period.

to payment, there is a risk that selecting the wrong indicators could lead to only a superficial engagement with the issues to ensure payment – or, worse, could incentivise activities not relevant or optimal in certain contexts.

- Q. The PbR mechanism was better able to incentivise the desired results in those cases where suppliers had more control over results.** In those cases where implementation was through government, the PbR incentive acted less strongly – and suppliers often used up existing social capital as an additional mechanism. In the case of incentivising behaviour change – which was partly outside of the control of suppliers – the PbR incentive also acted less strongly.
- R. Larger international partners were better able to handle the pre-financing, risk management, and flexibility necessary under PbR than small organisations.** All three lead suppliers chose to hold a large portion of risk centrally, pre-financing their other consortium members (SAWRP) or national partners (SWIFT), or their country teams (for SSH4A). This was possible due to the significant cash reserves held by these organisations, relative to the pre-financing requirements. There were mixed results in the few cases where local implementers were on full or partial PbR contracts, with some shifting positively to a stronger sense of accountability, while others were less able to cope and in some cases had their contracts discontinued.
- S. Establishing appropriate outcome level targets was challenging.** Setting the level of ambition for outcome targets involved significant discussions with DFID, as well as input from the MV team, on what level of achievement could reasonably be expected for the water, sanitation, and hygiene outcome targets because much was beyond the suppliers' direct control. There are few, if any, established benchmarks for the conversion of WASH outputs into outcomes. The challenge of measuring hygiene outcomes has posed challenges for setting targets. The PbR mechanism based on beneficiary numbers also may have inadvertently marginalised other aspects related to institutional strengthening – and created sustainability risks.
- T. Several lessons emerged on how the PbR modality could best strengthen supplier monitoring systems:** In the WASH Results Programme, explicitly linking payments to outcomes triggered intensive discussion around outcome measurement, and the validity of those measurements in particular. Outcome-level monitoring, as well as accountability, played a facilitative role in ensuring functionality. The increased monitoring also supported supplier risk management strategies. It is also noted that suppliers were generally positive about the MV's contribution to strengthening monitoring. Other lessons relating to monitoring include the following:
- Where possible¹⁶⁶, mobile-based monitoring was better suited for verification than paper-based systems.
 - Consortia with fewer institutional layers were more efficient: for example, reducing the risk of duplication of quality assurance efforts.
 - Where suppliers undertook spot checks (small-scale random checks of the monitoring data) before submitting results to verifiers, this was able to reduce the frequency of queries or challenged results.
 - In some cases, verification of results increased local partners' ownership of the programme. For one supplier, showing progress to neighbouring district government staff worked well to motivate all districts to perform better and take ownership of results.

¹⁶⁶ GPS-enabled devices were not allowed by the Pakistani or DRC government, for security reasons.

U. Several missed opportunities for learning occurred under the WASH Results Programme:

Programme: Firstly, while a large quantity of data were produced, the data were primarily used for progress reporting/compliance, as opposed to learning –partially due to the nature of the data: Primarily quantitative data were used for payments, which can be less useful to programme managers than more qualitative information on programme functioning. One consortium learning partner also felt that some of the data were not packaged in a way that was meaningful for learning. Secondly, the tight schedule in the output phase also limited opportunity for deeper learning and reflection. Thirdly, differences in how indicators were calculated between suppliers also made them less comparable for broader learning. Fourthly, having different verifiers for different suppliers was less conducive to facilitating cross-learning, though may well have had other benefits. Itad attempted to mitigate this issue through regular cross-programme learning activities.

5.3 Recommendations for future WASH PbR programmes

These recommendations are primarily for donors, such as DFID, that are considering the use of PbR in future WASH programmes.

1. **At design stage clarify the purpose of using PbR and consider the implications of PbR for the type of supplier expected to bid.** When considering PbR, it is important to think critically about how important financial incentives and disincentives may be to the particular type of supplier involved. While the *potential* benefits of PbR generally are well documented, it is important to set out in the programme design what the *specific* rationale is for using PbR in this case, and to define the added value that it should offer. The mechanism for how PbR is expected to deliver its intended benefits should be clearly set out in a theory of change. This will allow the donor to more easily check under which circumstances intended benefits have, or have, not been manifested, allowing important contributions to be made for sector learning on this topic. The purpose of using PbR should be reflected in the size of the PbR component and the type of result specified, and the indicators used. Furthermore, these should be considered in relation to the type of supplier anticipated – or desired – to bid.
2. **100% PbR is undesirable – the size of the PbR component should be tailored to the purpose specified and to the feasibility of measuring results.** The experience of the WASH Results Programme was that it was resource intensive and methodologically inefficient to measure and verify progress on some ‘process’ aspects. Similarly it was methodologically-challenging to verify hygiene related outcomes, even if it resulted in important sector learning on hand washing measurement. Given the low degree of control which suppliers have over the achievement of WASH behaviour change, we recommend a hybrid design where a part of supplier payments are grant-based, with a smaller percentage used as an incentive for good performance in key areas¹⁶⁷. This incentive could be an upside incentive rather than a penalty. If PbR is used to incentivise action related to aspects of programming which are important but difficult to measure¹⁶⁸, then great care should be given to the indicators used as they will likely be related to processes (and therefore challenging to verify), and furthermore it is unlikely that the indicators defined in advance of commencing a programme will be relevant in all contexts and/or over the

¹⁶⁷ Experience with PbR in other sectors also suggests that the value of PbR lies not in reimbursing the direct costs of implementation (as NGOs are already motivated to do this) but in linking PbR payments so as to incentivise only those dimensions which might otherwise be marginalised, albeit unintentionally

¹⁶⁸ These aspects include: creating an enabling environment for sustainability; ensuring meaningful action on equity and inclusion; and allowing space for learning.

course of programming. Alternatively, if these aspects are not linked directly to payment indicators they could be embedded within programming, either as grant requirements (e.g. requiring outcomes to be community-wide) or reported on over the course of the programme, with a feedback loop established between reporting and implementation (e.g. repeated sustainability assessments over the course of the programme with a management response).

3. **Where possible, streamline the verification burden on suppliers.** This relates both to the indicators used for payment purposes and how the effort is applied by verifiers. Indicators should only be used for payment where there is a clear rationale for doing so, and as far as possible unnecessarily verifying process indicators should be avoided. Complex multi-criteria payment indicators should be avoided because these reduce the power of the incentives¹⁶⁹. Furthermore, a risk-based approach to focusing the verification could be applied. Where verifiers are satisfied that a supplier's internal quality assurance and monitoring systems are of a good standard, then verification need not be undertaken for every milestone, though the verifier would reserve the right to do so at any time.
4. **At design stage, the funding agency should, as far as possible, provide more clarity on the results to be achieved and the accompanying verification requirements.** In some instances there may be a tension between over-specifying requirements prior to contracting, which could restrict suppliers in terms of the programme approaches or areas they select to work in, and minimising uncertainty at tender stage with regards to the MV requirements, which is desirable. This may include appointing the verification provider before implementation begins and/ or being more prescriptive on standards for verification requirements¹⁷⁰. Better defining verification requirements up front will enable suppliers and verifiers to develop better methodologies and operational plans, to deploy the right type and number of personnel, and to get up to speed faster once the programme begins. Guidelines on the evidence requirements for verifying WASH outputs, outcomes, and sustainability prerequisites should be drawn up before implementation begins.
5. **As far as possible, at tender stage clarify donor/supplier risk-sharing arrangements in the event of exceptional events.** While it is unlikely that the level of risk-sharing can be determined in advance of such events, what can sometimes be better specified at contracting stage is the process for deciding on the appropriate level of risk-sharing, including the level and type of evidence expected. This will be more significant where PbR is used in fragile contexts, and the appropriate level of risk-sharing may be a factor when DFID is contracting programmes that work across fragile and non-fragile contexts. In fragile settings, organisational flexibility and social capital may be even more important in regard to suppliers being able to manage the risks of PbR.
6. **In future programmes ensure there is a sufficient inception phase.** At the March 2016 Learning Event there was consensus among suppliers, verifiers, and DFID regarding the benefits of a sufficiently long inception period: ensuring that verification requirements are clear before any implementation activities begins was seen as essential for clarifying MV

¹⁶⁹ This recommendation is also supported by evidence from the wider PbR literature: See Witter, S., Zulfiquar, T., Javeed, S., Khan, A., Bar, A. (2011) 'Paying health workers for performance: a district-based case study in Pakistan'. *Human Resources for Health* 9, 23. www.human-resources-health.com/content/9/1/23

¹⁷⁰ This recommendation is also supported by evidence from the wider PbR literature. See Witter, S. *et al.* (2018) '(How) does RBF strengthen strategic purchasing of health care? Comparing the experience of Uganda, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the Congo'. Submitted for publication.

requirements and for allowing suppliers to sufficiently resource their support to the verification process. The length of the inception phase should be related to the level of uncertainty: the greater the level of uncertainty the longer the planned inception phase should be.

7. **Ensure that the learning by the MV team and suppliers on measuring and verifying key WASH indicators (especially outcome-level indicators) is captured and disseminated at the sector level.** Guidance has been written by ITAD on how to design a verification system, set up a systems-based verification system and select good indicators. This guidance could be used to update DFID's guidance on monitoring key WASH indicators.

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