Impact Evaluation of DFIDs Electoral Programmes in Pakistan

SEPTEMBER 2014

MYSBAH BALAGAMWALA

HARIS GAZDAR

Collective for Social Science Research

The Collective for Social Science Research was established in 2001 with a small core staff of researchers in the social sciences who have extensive experience conducting multidisciplinary research both in Pakistan and internationally. Areas of research interest include social policy, economics, poverty, gender studies, health, labour, migration, and conflict. The Collective's research, advisory, and consultancy partnerships include local and international academic institutes, government and non-governmental organizations, and international development agencies.

The Collective is recognized for three main areas of innovation in the practice of applied social sciences in Pakistan: the introduction of a political economy perspective in macro- and micro-issues; the attention to informal collective action and social networks; and the combination of quantitative and qualitative research methodologies. The Collective's objective is to produce high quality academic research in the social sciences and to foster informed debate on social, political and economic issues and policies.

About This Report

COLLECTIVE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

173-I, Block 2, PECHS, Karachi-75400   TEL: 021-34551482, FAX: 021-34547532

EMAIL: info@researchcollective.org   www.researchcollective.org

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

Objectives of the evaluation

The evaluation aims to assess the effectiveness of DFID's election programmes and to inform the design of future election programmes in Pakistan. DIFD's election programmes in Pakistan are SERP (Supporting Electoral Reforms in Pakistan and STAEP (Supporting Transparency, Accountability and Electoral Processes) which correspond with the supply and demand sides of electoral reforms respectively. The impact evaluation looks specifically at the contribution of SERP and STAEP to voter turnout in the 2013 elections and to strengthening of democratic processes in Pakistan.

The activities associated with SERP and STAEP occupy a relatively narrow but strategically-placed range of technical and advocacy interventions around electoral processes. There are inherent difficulties in attributing impact under conditions where processes which generate outcomes of interest are complex and subject to large shocks. Pakistan is undergoing a transition to democracy and given Pakistan's political history, the 2008-2013 period marks an important phase in this transition. Established political elites have emerged in the form of stable political parties and they have been able to arrive at cooperative compacts**.**

A methodological challenge in attributing impact of SERP and STAEP to outcomes is the absence of a counterfactual which could be used to isolate the effect of the programme from other factors which also influences outcomes. This evaluation, therefore, uses Contribution Analysis which uses the programmes' Theory of Change and compares it to evidence collected through quantitative and qualitative methods to come up with a plausible narrative of how the intervention might have contributed to voter turnout and democracy strengthening.

Achievement of outputs

SERP was able to achieve some important landmarks in collaboration with the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and its role was generally viewed as positive by stakeholders, however, not in the way envisaged by the programme. It was not effective in meeting many of its outputs related to improving the institutional capacity of the ECP as project plans were often shelved to meet short-term priorities of the ECP.

While STAEP also achieved a major part of its outputs, it faced serious challenges in some areas due to ambitious targets. The election observation exercise undertaken by STAEP was extensive and commendable, even if it fell short of some of the targets. It faced particular difficulty in reporting on its election observation findings 'credibly and in a timely manner' Additionally, STAEP campaigns around missing (women) voters which were not, strictly, logframe outputs, may have contributed positively to overall programme impact.

Voter turnout

Voter turnout is one of the outcome indicators for this evaluation. Voter turnout is known to have increased considerably between 2008 and 2013 even though official figures are not comparable due to questions about veracity of the electoral rolls in the base year. The target for this indicator was an increase from 45 per cent in 2008 to 50 per cent in 2013. As a proportion of the population as a whole, the voter turnout rate increased from 21.6 per cent in 2008 to 25.3 per cent in 2013 - a 17 per cent increase. This compares well with the 11 per cent increase target in the logframe but falls short of the 22 per cent rise claimed on the basis of official data.

National-level stakeholders and experts broadly concur with the Theory of Change that improved election management can lead to greater voter participation. Quantitative data also validated the Theory of Change assumption that greater confidence in election management processes will encourage higher voter participation.

Qualitative fieldwork at the constituency- and community-levels showed, however, that at the grassroots, the linkage between election management and voter participation is weaker than assumed in the Theory of Change. Voter registration is closely associated with the intention to vote for a specific party or candidate rather than any generic sense of civic responsibility and electoral choices are dominated by local political factors.

Voting decisions are not based on individual agency but on group-based behaviour. Voting blocs are present across fieldwork constituencies even if they vary in the details of their composition. Families and extended families are almost universally the basic components of voting blocs which align into political factions of various types. Voter registration and actual voting are driven and facilitated by local factional leaders who are direct participants in the electoral system.

The analysis of the political context highlighted the democratic transition as a central factor with the role of election management bodies as being secondary and derivative. The primary factor behind the democratic transition is agreement between political elites (represented in stable parties) and the state apparatus elites (military, judiciary and bureaucracy) on the restoration and continuation of constitutional government. While the preferences of ordinary citizens play an important part in the democratic transition, they manifest themselves through the actions of these elites.   This observation dilutes the link between election support programme outputs and election management outcomes as envisaged in the Theory of Change.

The main factor in the increase in voter participation between 2008 and 2013 was increased electoral competitiveness in some regions of the country. The widespread pre-election expectation among political elites at the national and constituency levels that electoral processes will be relatively free and fair contributed to greater competitiveness. There was vigorous electoral participation of political parties, particularly those who were in the opposition at the federal level. Political parties' 'investment' in elections was based on the assumption that they had a fair chance of winning. The overall atmosphere of scrutiny including judicial and media independence from the executive bolstered the expectations that elections will be relatively free and fair. At the community level what mattered in this regard was the conviction of local factional leaders that the candidates or parties they supported could win. These factional leaders, in turn, mobilized voters to get registered and to turn out.

SERP and STAEP made a relatively minor but significant contribution to increased voter participation in the 2013 general elections. SERP made its contribution through its work with the ECP which helped to enhance the pre-election image of the organization for professional competence. Many of the activities which helped SERP contribute to ECP's pre-election image were outside its original workplan.

STAEP's well-publicised plan to carry out large-scale election observation, though not the observation itself, contributed to the overall atmosphere of scrutiny which prevailed in the run up to the elections. STAEP outputs, such as those relating to Constituency Relations Groups (CRGs), facilitation of NADRA mobile services, and mobilization of women voters at the 'zero-voting' polling stations were too small in scale to have any impact on outcomes. Even if the aggregate impact of these local campaigns was small,

they did highlight the fact of the existence of 'zero voting' polling stations. Similarly, STAEP's advocacy campaign on missing (women) voters which was not strictly part of logframe outputs helped to place a key inclusion issue on the agenda.

Democracy strengthening
Democracy strengthening, for the purposes of this evaluation, has been measured using the 'free and fair elections' and 'political participation' scores in the IDEA framework for assessing democracy which has been implemented in Pakistan by PILDAT. The 'free and fair elections' score rose from 58 to 70 from 2011 to 2013 – corresponding with the intervention period. The 'political participation' score registered a smaller increase in the same period – from 55 to 58. The PILDAT-IDEA scoring suggests that there are discrete moments – coinciding respectively with the 2008 and 2013 elections – which account for much of the improvement in the democracy scores. These elections, therefore, can be regarded as conspicuous events which shaped expert perceptions of the direction of change**.**   It was a general perception that while some forms of violence, coercion and electoral malpractice might have been generic, there was less evidence of this in 2013.

SERP made a minor but significant contribution to the broader goal of democracy strengthening through its assistance to the ECP. Its main contribution here was with regard to the acceptability of election results by political stakeholders, who in turn, were constrained by their own prior participation in shaping electoral processes. SERP had facilitated technical improvements in the ECP as well as some of the political and legislative initiatives leading up to the elections.

An assessment of STAEP's contribution to democracy strengthening depends critically on the time horizon that is chosen to assess impact. The 2013 general elections represented the most conspicuous political event which was to occur during the lifetime of the programme and would shape the course of democracy in Pakistan. STAEP's contribution to democracy strengthening was minor but significant in the run-up to the elections. As in the case of voter participation, STAEP was one of the many stakeholders whose activities helped to create an expectation that elections will be relatively free and fair.

FAFEN's election observation failed to live up to the ambitious expectations set, and there are doubts about the extent to which this key STAEP output was actually delivered. The loss of reputation suffered due to erroneous reporting soon after the elections, and the inability to produce a consistent report on the elections since then, meant that STAEP's election observation was unable to make a significant contribution to democracy strengthening over a longer time horizon, as stipulated in the Theory of Change

Lessons for future programming
Contextual political analysis at the macro and meso levels needs to be explicitly brought into programme justification and design. The more generic narrative linking improved election management with individual responses such as the propensity to vote, perceptions of legitimacy of electoral processes, and wider civic engagement, is both valid and necessary. It does not take into account a range of political factors that are specific to time and place, which will influence outcomes.

Programme design needs to integrate data requirements for populating the Theory of Change, targeting programme activities and monitoring progress.

Election support programmes should create 'firefighting' windows as part of the programme which allows requests for technical assistance to be explicitly acknowledged as programme activities (e.g. SERP assistance to ECP), and for changes in work plans to acknowledge responses to political contingencies (e.g. STAEP missing voters' campaign).

There needs to be a reassessment of the idea than any single network of organisations, particularly one whose membership consists of diverse organization types, can deliver reliable election monitoring at the national level. Objectives of election observation and its link with outcomes need to be more clearly spelled out. Programme design needs to acknowledge the limited availability of high-quality election observation, and to use these strategically for the purposes of deterrence (to violation), and for evidence-based ideas for course correction and reform.

Social exclusion needs to be explicitly incorporated into the design of future election support programmes. There is two-way link between social exclusion and political participation: those who are socially excluded are also more likely to be excluded from political participation, and political participation offers entry points for the socially excluded.   Considering that the democratic transition is largely driven by non-intervention factors, and that political participation can be an important strategic instrument for the socially excluded, it is difficult to justify election support programmes that do not have an explicit focus on social exclusion.

Introduction

1. **This report presents an impact evaluation of DFID Pakistan's portfolio of election programmes, looking specifically at their contribution to voter turnout in the 2013 elections and to strengthening of democratic processes in Pakistan.** It builds upon the Inception Report (Collective for Social Science Research, 2013) which provided a detailed plan for the evaluation based on interviews with programme implementers, desk review of secondary materials including relevant empirical literature and programme documents and a stock-taking of existing quantitative data. The objective of this evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of DFID's election programmes and to inform the design of future election programmes in Pakistan and other similar countries.

2. **DIFD Pakistan's election programmes are STAEP (Supporting Transparency, Accountability and Electoral Processes) and SERP (Supporting Electoral Reforms in Pakistan). These two programmes correspond, broadly speaking, with the demand and supply sides of democratic elections respectively.** The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre Helpdesk report on 'Electoral Support Interventions' classifies such support into two types of programmes: electoral observation and electoral assistance (Haider, 2011). While STAEP focuses on the demand-side of elections and includes elements of electoral assistance as well as electoral observation, SERP is a supply-side programme which is mostly concerned with electoral assistance

3. These programmes are foregrounded in the context of a transition from military to constitutional civilian government in Pakistan in 2008, and concerns about the fragility of democratic institutions in the face of the military's political influence. In the period covered by SERP and STAEP a range of national and global events, circumstances, issues, mobilisations, conflicts, and acts of leadership have helped shape the democratic landscape in Pakistan. The activities associated with SERP and STAEP occupy a relatively narrow but strategically-placed range of technical and advocacy interventions around electoral processes. **This evaluation, therefore, pays explicit attention to the broader political context.**

4. **The two main evaluation indicators which are being used - voter turnout and democracy strengthening - comprehensively capture the joint intended outputs and outcomes of SERP and STAEP.** The two programmes are intended to play complementary roles in impacting voter turnout and strengthening of democratic processes in Pakistan.

5. The evaluation report begins with a brief description of the two election programmes that are being evaluated and their progress on the achievement of outputs. Section 1 also provides an overview of the evaluation methodology. Section 2 summarises our findings compiled and collected through qualitative methods including interviews with stakeholders at the policy/programme level and community-level fieldwork. This is supplemented by an analysis of secondary data and a review of contextual determinants of political outcomes in Pakistan. These findings are based on background papers written by members of the evaluation team (Afzal, 2014; Balagamwala and Gazdar, 2014; Cheema and Javid, 2014; Roberts, 2014) which are provided in the Appendix to this report.[1]

---

[1] Quantitative analysis was conducted by Madiha Afzal, stakeholder interviews at the policy/programme level were carried out by Hannah Roberts and Ali Cheema and Hassan Javid wrote about context factors that shape political outcomes in Pakistan. The authors are responsible for the report on community-based fieldwork and interviews with constituency-level stakeholders.

Sections 3 and 4 utilise the findings (summarised in Section 2) to analyse the impact of DFID Pakistan's election programmes on voter turnout and democracy strengthening respectively. Section 5 is a brief statement which qualifies the results and analysis presented in this report. We conclude the report in Section 6 by highlighting key lessons for future election support programmes.

Section One – Review of programmes and evaluation methodology

1.1. Support to Electoral Reform in Pakistan (SERP)

6. **SERP is a supply-side programme that provides technical assistance to the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), the national body responsible for carrying out elections in Pakistan.** The programme, managed by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), started in April 2012 with the objective of building the capacity of the ECP to implement its Five Year Strategic Plan. The desired impact of the programme is a 'stable, inclusive and tolerant democracy in Pakistan' while at the outcome level, the programme hopes to achieve a 'more credible and inclusive election process'. The programme's outputs are divided into three main components:
   i. Democratic legal framework – Helping ECP draft electoral reform proposals to submit for parliamentary approval and improving ECP regulations such that stakeholder considerations are taken into account and international standards are met.
   ii. Electoral management capacity – Improving ECPs capacity to conduct elections by re-structuring the organisation, assist in hiring of qualified staff and building their capacity by developing training materials and conducting training sessions. This also includes strengthening ECP's capacity to update and maintain accurate electoral rolls and improve operations by implementing new technologies, strengthening media outreach, bringing about improvement in election policies and procuring ballot boxes for elections.
   iii. Voter and civic education –Training ECP officials for voter education outreach with a particular focus on women, engaging with local organisations to expand voter education efforts and establishing an election information portal on the internet.

1.1.1. Summary of existing reviews

7. Progress reports that have been prepared by DFID and IFES during the course of the programme provide detailed insights into the workings, successes and shortcomings of the programme.[2] An Annual Review for the programme was conducted by DFID in January 2013, at the end of the first nine months of SERP, outlined progress against targets for outputs (see Table 1 for a review of outputs achieved). Additionally IFES, as implementing partner, submitted quarterly reports to DFID that provide details of the progress and activities of the programme. This section outlines the key points from reports produced by DFID and IFES.

8. The SERP programme commenced in April 2012 but faced a challenging start. The Supreme Court (SC) had ruled on several electoral matters on which the ECP was called upon to deliver. The ECP's own focus too had been on preparation of fresh electoral rolls rather than on reforms. Reform activities under SERP were suspended for a brief time and instead IFES helped ECP undertake a detailed analysis of the SC judgment. In the first year of the programme, IFES finalized the Terms of Reference to set up a political finance unit at the ECP, appointed a Gender Focal Point at the ECP

---

[2] DFID (2013), IFES (2012a), IFES (2012b), IFES (2012c), IFES (2012d)

and facilitated the ECP Steering committee and sub-committees. Trainings for the ECP staff were started and concept notes for proposed reforms were prepared. It moved ahead towards drafting ECP's code of conduct for various groups of stakeholders, developing guidelines for updating the electoral rolls, preparing ECP's voter education plan and a voter education handbook for Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and developing and getting approval for a Federal Election Academy Training plan. Although by the end of 2012, some productive actions did take place many planned activities did not materialize often due to the imminent priorities of the ECP. By the first quarter of 2013, IFES had helped ECP successfully launch separate codes of conduct for political parties, contesting candidates, observers, polling staff and security. IFES also assisted the ECP in creating a nomination booklet for contesting candidates, in procuring 41,000 ballot boxes, in producing factsheets on various election-related components and it helped ECP's Electoral Legal Framework Committee to prepare a draft unified law for long-term legislative reform.

9. **The programme achieved some landmarks in collaboration with the ECP, especially with regard to improved electoral rolls and civic/voter education, but fell short on other outputs.** The DFID Annual Review 2012 observed that the "project plans are often undermined by the short-term priorities of the ECP" as internal reforms planned for enhancing the institutional capacity of the ECP went almost neglected and most of the concept notes that were prepared were shelved for the time period. Similarly, the project's investment in training of core staff with a longer-term capacity building perspective was hampered by the more urgent short-term needs of the ECP. Keeping this reality in mind, the Annual Review recommended that IFES should "explore post-election options for increasing in-house ECP capacity."

Table 1: SERP – Achievement of outputs

Output		Annual Review 2012
1.1	Improved legal framework that ensures transparent electoral procedures that promote genuine and competitive elections	Some targets met – Supported ECP in drafting laws (not enacted). Provided other assistance to ECP outside of workplan
1.2	Coordination with the international community for the advocacy of electoral reforms	Output added after annual review which recognised IFES' role in facilitating elections support group of donors and implementers
2.1	Strengthened institutional capacity of the ECP to manage the electoral process	Target not met
2.2	Increased professionalism and competence of election officials	No milestone set for training of permanent staff; targets for ECP staff training achieved however training relevant to 2013 elections only
2.3	Improved and accurate electoral rolls that can be updated and challenged for any inaccuracies	Target not met but major improvements in electoral rolls made
2.4	Enhanced capacity of ECP to conduct electoral operations	Targets over-achieved
3.1	Strengthened ECP capacity in the conduct of voter/civic education	Target over-achieved
3.2	Increased voter outreach by local organisations	No milestone set– local organisations asked to submit proposals for voter education projects

1.2. Supporting Transparency and Accountability and Electoral Processes in Pakistan (STAEP)

10. **STAEP started in January 2011 as a three-year programme to be completed in December 2013 but was extended till August 2014 to provide support to local government elections which were to take place at the start of 2014**. STAEP is managed by The Asia Foundation (TAF) while the main implementing partner is the Free and Fair Elections Network (FAFEN), a consortium of about 30 civil society organisations across Pakistan. The expected outcome of STAEP is 'democratic processes in Pakistan are more open, inclusive, efficient and accountable to citizens' which will lead to 'more effective, transparent and accountable governance that addresses critical challenges that Pakistan faces'. STAEP's outputs, mostly on the demand-side of election processes, can be classified into four components:

   i.   Citizen's engagement – Participation of citizens in governance and democratic processes is promoted under STAEP through the creation of Constituency Relations Groups (CRGs). One CRG per constituency has been formed in 200 out of 272 constituencies and these are facilitated by FAFEN partner organisations. CRGs which consist of local residents hold meetings with elected representatives and government officials in which they raise demands (of service delivery and freedom of information) on behalf of residents of their respective constituencies. Moreover, CRG members highlight issues which are meant to be raised by parliamentarians in their respective assembles. CRGs are also responsible for monitoring public institutions.

   ii.   Inclusive elections, and better organised and more responsive political parties – Elections were to be made more inclusive through increasing voter registration by facilitating citizens with Computerised National Identity Card (CNIC) registration and through targeted voter education campaigns in 564 female-only polling stations where there was zero-turnout in the 2008 elections. This component also includes engagement with political party workers by educating them about the 18th Amendment and by building a consensus among them to follow the Code of Conduct drafted for the elections.

   iii. Monitoring of elections – Elections will be better managed through monitoring of elections. FAFEN was to create a network of domestic observers in all constituencies and coordinate their activities and report results of the monitoring exercise credibly and in a timely manner.

   iv.   Capacity and credibility of FAFEN organisations – Activities were operationalized to strengthen the capacity of FAFEN secretariat and implementing organisation by adopting robust internal governance and institutional performance systems and to build recognition and credibility as an independent civil society network.

   v.   FAFEN's exit strategy – This component was added in the Third Annual Review which was conducted after the elections. It focuses on FAFEN building relationships with other Voice and Accountability initiatives at the district, provincial and national levels in order to optimize the benefits of investments made for improved governance. It also includes the creation of a Voice and Accountability Support Group which is to meet at least six times before the completion of the project.

1.2.1. Summary of existing reviews

11. Similar to SERP, various reports were prepared for STAEP which documented the achievements and limitations of the programme (see Table 2 for a summary of reviews of achievement of outputs).[3] The first Annual Review for 2011 concluded that the programme's "outputs moderately did not meet expectations." Originally the programme had been working towards five outputs, but the Annual Review felt that two outputs (increased engagement of disenfranchised groups and greater outreach of more balanced media) "substantially did not meet the expectations." Consequently, it was decided to eliminate those two outputs and to reallocate resources amongst the remaining three outputs which caused a significant re-alignment of the log-frame.

12. The next Annual Review for STAEP indicated that "outputs met expectations." **Notable achievements in 2012 were the start of a nationwide campaign for CNIC and voter registration, training of politicians and political workers on the 18th Amendment, use of FAFEN's Online Programme Tracker through which information was streamlined and attaining targets set out for CRGs**. The process of accreditation of election observers also continued though with some hurdles and Organizational Capacity Assessment reports were shared with implementing partners. Moreover, FAFEN organisations continued to observe by-elections and hold cross-party consultations and trainings. Similar activities continued in 2013 in the run-up to the elections in May. FAFEN also launched a targeted comprehensive voter education programme in the catchment area of the zero-turnout polling stations.

13. **CRG Beneficiary Feedback reports raised some poignant questions regarding the efficacy of the CRG component of the programme.** In principle, the CRGs were meant to be independent channels of communication between public representatives and their constituents. The Annual Review 2012 found, however, that CRGs were dependent on STAEP partner organisations for access to officials and representatives. With STAEP partners rather than the citizens themselves in the lead, the Beneficiary Feedback report notes that the working of CRGs "undermine rather than strengthen democratic processes." It was recommended that a clear vision and guidelines for the sustainability of the CRGs should be articulated. Concerns regarding the functioning of CRGs were raised again, however, in the 2013 Annual Review.

14. **The 2013 Annual Review, conducted after the 2013 general elections, gives an overall A+ grade to STAEP i.e. outputs moderately exceeded expectations.** The review points out the 'tremendous achievements' of the programme with regards to CNIC/voter registration, election oversight and monitoring, reaching out to the disenfranchised sections of the population and socially excluded groups, and helping communities in addressing local issues. The fielding of around 40,000 trained election observers has been specially labelled as a "landmark achievement."

15. **Election observation was arguably the most challenging of STAEP's outputs with ambitious targets set for the scale of the exercise.** The Annual Review gives "election observation" the top-most ranking as STAEP reportedly surpassed the milestone of observing 60 per cent of all polling stations in 2013 by observing 73 per cent of all polling stations. However, we have reason to question this statistic as according to FAFENs own report,[4] 38,274 polling stations were observed (the Annual

---

[3] DFID, 2011a; DFID, 2012c; DFID, 2014; Qaisrani & Hussain, 2012; The Asia Foundation, 2012a; The Asia Foundation 2012b; The Asia Foundation 2013a; The Asia Foundation, 2013b

[4] This is a summary of the report. A final report was still not available in May 2014.

Review reports the number to be 37,077 polling stations) which is equivalent to 55 per cent of the 69,801 polling stations established by the ECP. Even if we account for polling stations where elections did not take place on May 11, **the number of polling stations observed does not exceed the perhaps overly ambitious 60 per cent target**. A final report on FAFENs election observation is still not available. FAFEN has published a report on the elections after a delay of several months, but we find that it is neither consistent nor conclusive (FAFEN 2014a). The source of data used for the Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) exercise is not clear and there are errors in the interpretation and analysis of results. A detailed comment on the report can be found in Annex 5.

16. Besides doubts about the accuracy of the statistic, **the output indicator does not take into account the quality or the credibility of these results.** The day after the elections, FAFEN released a statement in which it alleged that it had found a number of polling stations where turnout was over a 100 per cent. This statement was based on incorrect calculations which were hurriedly done by FAFEN, and while their statement was eventually retracted, there was a negative impact on FAFEN's credibility as an election observation organisation. Subsequently, under less adversarial conditions, the ECP also admitted to procedural errors which vindicated some of the positions taken by FAFEN. **Under the adversarial conditions which prevailed at the time of the elections, it is our opinion that FAFEN and its network organisations were unable to "report credibly and in a timely manner on all aspects of election day in polling stations" as stipulated under Output 2.1 of the STAEP logframe.**

17. Recognition and credibility of FAFEN as an independent civil society network is one of STAEP's outputs. To achieve the target for this output, FAFEN was to be rated as credible by 59 per cent of stakeholders. An opinion survey (The Asia Foundation, 2013) was conducted in which fifty stakeholders - FAFEN partners and donors, CRG members, media and government officials and parliamentarians - were interviewed**.** FAFEN's credibility was rated as "Highly Favourable" by 52 per cent and "Somewhat Favourable" by 35 per cent of survey respondents. This rating is at odds with findings from key informants interviews conducted for this evaluation (see Section 2.2) where FAFEN's lack of credibility, and reliability as an election observation organisation was highlighted as one of STAEP's main weaknesses. Moreover, a reading of the survey report brings forth some concerns about the usability and accuracy of the reported numbers. Almost half of the fifty stakeholders who were asked to rate FAFENs credibility were affiliated with organisations that are directly connected with STAEP , for example, TAF, FAFENs implementing partners and CRG members which raises questions about the independence of the report. Moreover, we find that there are inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the reporting of the data.[5] **It is our opinion, therefore, that the Annual Review's positive assessment of this output (recognition and credibility of FAFEN) may not be warranted.**

---

[5] For example, in the body of the report (The Asia Foundation, 2013a), it is stated that FAFEN's credibility was viewed as 'highly favourable' by 47 per cent and 'somewhat favourable' by 39 per cent. These figures are reported in the Executive Summary and in the Annual Review as 52 per cent and 35 per cent respectively. An illustration of a common problem with the numbers in the report is as follows: it is reported that of the government officials who were asked to rate the programme's transparency 43 per cent said it was "Not Transparent", 29 per cent said it was "Somewhat Transparent", and 57 per cent said it was "Highly Transparent". These figures add up to more than 100 per cent.

Table 2: STAEP – Achievement of outputs

	Output Indicator	Annual Review 2011	Annual Review 2012	Annual Review 2013
OUTPUT 1: Citizens' groups monitor performance of elected representatives and public institutions and raise demands which are increasingly met				
1.1	Demands raised in CRG meetings and direct engagement with elected and public officials	Baselines/targets not established – CRGs criticised for not being inclusive	Target exceeded – CRGs made inclusive; concerns about quality of demands	Target over-achieved – capacity of CRGs questioned
1.2	Citizens identified constituency issues raised in assemblies	Indicator added later	Target not achieved	Target not achieved
1.3	Public demands for better services met	Baselines/targets not established	Target exceeded – concerns about quality	Target over-achieved
OUTPUT 2: Elections are better managed and more inclusive and peaceful and political parties are better organised and more responsive to citizens				
2.1	FAFEN monitors elections and reports credibly and in a timely manner	Baselines/targets not established – all by-elections observed	Target achieved	Target over-achieved – refer to Para 15 for validity of this claim
2.2	STAEP supported CNIC registration	Voter registration target not met	Target over-achieved	Target over-achieved
2.3	Parties/candidates implement Code of Conduct in 100 constituencies	Target not met – Delay by ECP in developing Code of Conduct	Target not met – Code of Conduct not approved	Target over-achieved – Code of Conduct signed but not always implemented
2.4	Politicians better informed about 18th Amendment	Indicator added later	Target over-achieved	Target achieved
2.5	Female turnout in previously zero-turnout polling stations	Indicator added later	No milestone set for 2012	Target achieved
OUTPUT 3: Increased capacity of FAFEN organisations and associates to monitor governance issues, manage systems and accounts, access new funding and improve their credibility				
3.1	Robust internal governance and institutional performance systems in FAFEN organisations and secretariat	Baselines/targets not established – Internal systems developed	Targets achieved – issues with gender representation	Targets achieved – issues with gender representation and capacity to analyse data
3.2	Recognition and credibility of FAFEN as independent civil society network	Baselines/targets not established	Targets achieved – baseline established	Targets achieved - refer to Para 17 for validity of this claim
OUTPUT 4: STAEP exit strategy in place with defined actions and results				
4.1	Working relationships with other Voice and Accountability initiatives	Output added later	Output added later	No target
4.2	Voice and Accountability Support Group meets	Output added later	Output added later	Target not achieved

1.3. Theory of change

18. We based our understanding of the Theory of Change on programme documents (DFID, 2010; DFID, 2011b; DFID 2012a; DFID 2012b) and the Terms of Reference for this evaluation (see Annex 7) which we set out in detail in the Inception Report (Section 3.1, Collective for Social Science Research 2013). **The proposed evaluation indicator is the framework for democracy measurement proposed by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance or IDEA (International IDEA, 2008) and implemented in Pakistan by the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), and voter turnout rate in the 2013 elections.**

19. Activities on the supply-side interventions (notably, changes in election laws, and ECP and CSO capacity) and the demand-side (notably, voter registration and election monitoring) would lead to strengthened capacity for election management and the better management of elections. This output, in turn, would lead to more credible, inclusive and accountable electoral processes because technically stronger election management would make electoral processes more credible, inclusive and accountable. This will happen because stronger election management on the one hand and effective monitoring on the other will reduce the scope for interference in the electoral process, and will elicit public and political party confidence in the credibility of elections.[6]

### 1.4. Evaluation methodology – Contribution Analysis

20. The Theory of Change which guides SERP and STAEP acknowledges the involvement of many other historical, institutional and political factors and in the period of these programmes a range of events and circumstances have helped shape the democratic landscape in Pakistan. **The activities associated with SERP and STAEP occupy a relatively narrow but strategically-placed range of technical and advocacy interventions around electoral processes. There are inherent difficulties in attributing impact under conditions where processes which generate outcomes of interest are complex and subject to large shocks.** An equally big challenge in attributing impact of STAEP and SERP programmes is the absence of a counterfactual which could be used to isolate the effect of the programme from other factors which also influence outcomes. The methodology used for this evaluation, therefore, had to be such that it recognised and addressed these complexities.

21. Contribution Analysis is a form of theory-based evaluation which does not seek to attribute the impact of an intervention on the outcome but tries to comment on whether and how the intervention might have *contributed* to achieving the outcome (White and Phillips, 2012). Using the theory of change, this methodology compares the achievements of the project (DFIDs election programmes) against evidence collected through a range of quantitative and qualitative methods to come up with "plausible conclusions" about the contribution made by the intervention to observed outcomes of interest (voter turnout and strengthening of democracy) (Mayne, 2008). In this evaluation 'evidence' has been collected through stakeholder interviews, community-based fieldwork, quantitative analysis of election data and voter behaviour surveys and a contextual analysis of determinants that shape political outcomes in Pakistan (see Figure 1). For further details about the methodology refer to Annex 2 and the Inception Report (Collective for Social Science Research, 2013).

---

[6] The links in the Theory of Change are illustrated in Figure 1

Figure 1: Assembling the Contribution Analysis

Qualitative Analysis - Policy-level, how election management capacity translates into election process Citizens' interaction with electoral process, perceptions, inclusion	Quantitative Analysis – Correlates of turnout in Pakistan, and relative role of intervention factors in change

Improved election management capacity → **More credible and inclusive election process** → **Higher turnout Democracy strengthened**

1. Which links are strong?
2. How credible is theory?
3. Do stakeholders agree?
4. Main weaknesses

Contextual analysis – broader non-intervention factors

Source: Collective for Social Science Research (2013)

Section Two – Findings

22. This section summarizes findings from the various elements in this evaluation as they relate to the contribution analysis. Our research framework, informed by the Theory of Change, posed a wide range of questions about assumptions underlying intervention design, actual outputs, and contribution of outputs to outcomes. While some questions overlap between different elements of the evaluation, many others are relevant only for some elements. The complete findings are extensive and can be found in the detailed background papers for each of the elements of the study: analysis of quantitative data (Afzal, 2014); key informant interviews at the policy level (Roberts, 2014); constituency-based key informant interviews and community-level qualitative fieldwork (Balagamwala and Gazdar, 2014); analysis of broader political context (Cheema and Javid, 2014). In this section we summarize those findings, by element, which are particularly relevant to the contribution story which is assembled in Sections 3 and 4.

2.1. Quantitative analysis

Analysis of ECP data

23. Table 3 reports summary statistics of election data made available by the ECP for the 2008 and 2013 elections. **Voter turnout increased by 10.5 percentage points between the two elections as average turnout rate across constituencies grew from 44 per cent in 2008 to 55 per cent in 2013**. In the same period, the number of registered voters increased by 9.11 per cent while total votes polled grew by 37 per cent. The range (maximum and minimum numbers) for each of these statistics shows that in some constituencies registration and voting actually declined or stagnated while in others they increased by large margins. The decline in registered voters in around a third of all National Assembly constituencies, despite an overall increase in registered voters nationally, is most likely due to the removal of unverified voters from the 2008 electoral rolls – an indication of improvement of electoral processes. **The removal of unverified voters, including photo IDs on electoral rolls and the computerisation of the voter register were major advances in electoral processes in Pakistan to which SERP made a significant contribution.**

Table 3: Summary of election data

	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Turnout: 2008 (%)	44.75	11.06	12.85	67.33
Turnout: 2013 (%)	55.16	9.76	11.9	69.96
Turnout growth (percentage points)	10.51	7.65	-17.76	29.62
Registration growth (%)	9.11	20.31	-60.02	73.47
Total votes growth (%)	37.19	29.07	-59.77	189.37

    i.   Turnout growth = Voter turnout 2013 – Voter turnout 2008 (per constituency)
    ii.   Registration growth = (Registered voters in 2013 – Registered voters in 2008)/ Registered voters in 2008 (per constituency)
    iii.   Total votes growth = (Total voters in 2013 – Total voters in 2008)/ Total voters in 2008 (per constituency)
    iv.   Mean refers to average across all constituencies

Source: Afzal (2014)

24. **There were variations across and within provinces in changes in votes polled and number of registered voters.** Votes polled in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) grew on average by 80 per cent while in Balochistan the figure stood at 4 per cent (this can be explained to some extent by differences in population growth across regions).[7] Similarly, there was a decline in the number of registered voters in Balochistan, no change in Sindh but an increase of 17 per cent in Khyber Pakthunkhwa (KP). Within Balochistan too there were differences between the 'Baloch belt' – where in most areas there was a call for a boycott by a few Baloch nationalist groups –and the Pashtun regions. In the former, there was a decline of 10 per cent in total polled votes while in the latter there was a 29 per cent growth in votes. Other regions where there were large changes in votes (a difference of more than 75 per cent) include Swat, - which had a low turnout in 2008 possibly due to Taliban-related conflict in the area – Mardan and Charsadda in KP and Lahore in Punjab. Interestingly, in all these constituencies, a newcomer party (the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf or PTI) had a candidate who either won or was a runner-up. We also find that voter turnout is positively

---

[7] See Afzal, 2014 for detailed statistics

associated with the presence of newcomers (i.e. the PTI) in the election particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and Islamabad and to a lesser extent in Punjab. [8]

25. **There was an increase in the percentage of rejected votes in the 2013 elections – on average, 3.2 per cent of votes in a constituency were rejected compared to 2.7 per cent in 2008.** Two constituencies had an unusually high proportion of invalid votes – NA-221 Hyderabad-cum-Matiari (17.5 per cent) and NA-266 Nasirabad-cum-Jaffarabad (15.8 per cent). Moreover, there were 35 constituencies where the difference in the winning margin was less than the percentage of invalid votes and in 22 of these constituencies the percentage of invalid votes was greater than the national average.

*Analysis of sample survey*s

26. A number of surveys were carried out under STAEP and SERP to collect data on voting behaviour and knowledge in order to inform programme activities and to set programme targets and monitor outputs.[9] The baseline surveys (Behavioural, Attitudes and Perceptions Survey (BAAPS) 2011 and IFES 2010) did not ask respondents about their intention to vote and so it is not possible to measure change in voting behaviour using these surveys. However, two surveys – BAAPS 2013 and FAFEN ITV 2013 - asked respondents if they had voted in the 2008 elections and whether they intended to vote in the 2013 elections (other surveys asked either of the two questions). Using these two surveys, we can compare whether there was a change in the voting behaviour of respondents between 2008 and 2013. **Taking the FAFEN ITV dataset as an illustration,[10] we find that 72 per cent of respondents who were eligible to vote in 2008 did so, while 66.8 per cent intended to vote in the 2013 elections. This implies a decline in the decision to vote.**

27. Afzal (2014) uses these datasets to carry out multivariate regressions to determine the correlates of the intention to vote and the likelihood of being registered as a voter. These results need to be interpreted with some care as opinion survey responses can be at great variance with actual outcomes. Some of the datasets used here, for example, find that 90 per cent of those registered to vote said that they would actually vote. The actual voter turnout in 2013 was 55 per cent. **Even if opinion surveys have limitations with respect to predicting outcomes such as voter turnout rates, they are useful for establishing associations between individual characteristics and voting behaviour**.

28. **Voter registration was found to be correlated with gender (female disadvantage), age (older citizens were more likely to be registered), education and income. Intention to vote was also correlated with gender (fewer women stating the intent to vote, controlling for other factors), and age.** The correlation with education and income was ambiguous and the results for

---

[8] In constituencies where a PTI candidate won, average growth in votes was 58 per cent compared to 38 per cent for PML-N constituencies and 28 per cent for PPP constituencies. Of the constituencies which PTI won, those that were in KP, where PTI was able to form a provincial government, had an increase of 70 per cent in total votes polled, whereas those in Punjab had on average a 44 per cent growth in total votes.

[9] The evaluation team had five datasets available to them – IFES Voter Education Survey 2010, IFES National Survey of Voter Registration 2012, FAFENs Behavioural, Attitudes and Perceptions Survey (BAAPS) 2011, FAFENs BAAPS Midline Survey 2013 and FAFENs Intention to Vote Survey (ITV) 2013. The Inception Report contains a description of these datasets. Note that summary statistics for the variables used are not presented here as they are available in survey reports.

[10] The BAAPS 2013, not reported here, has similar figures and findings.

region/ethnicity/language variables are not consistent across datasets. With regards to attitudes towards electoral processes, **greater confidence in the elections and confidence in the ECP were found to be significantly correlated with both the intention to vote and being registered to vote**. This adds to the validation of the Theory of Change especially with respect to SERP which provides technical assistance to improve the functioning of the ECP.[11]

29. Using ECP data on the 2013 elections, Afzal (2014) found that the **difference in registration growth and total votes growth between constituencies that had a CRG (200 of them) and those that did not is insignificant**.[12] Of the surveys commissioned by DFID's election programmes only the BAAPS Midline dataset asked about CRGs. The sample for this survey was drawn from localities where there was a CRG member. Even so, only 2 per cent of the sample reported having any knowledge of the CRG.

2.2. Key informant interviews programme/policy level[13]

30. To gain an understanding about the electoral process in Pakistan and the role played by SERP and STAEP, informed analysts and mangers of election-related programmes were interviewed (Roberts, 2014). Interviewees were senior representatives of organisations who carried out election programmes (which includes SERP and STAEP), government officials connected with election management programmes and policies and those responsible for shaping opinions and monitoring performance of the government (i.e. the media and civil society). A complete list of stakeholders interviewed can be found in Annex 3.[14]

31. **Stakeholders, to a large extent, attributed increase in turnout and advancements in the electoral process to non-intervention factors. The increase in voter turnout was credited to political competition** (especially with reference to the emergence of new parties such as the PTI), political frustration (citizens wanted to vote out the incumbent government), improved electoral processes such as **better electoral rolls** and **the "8300" text messaging service[15]**, improvements in the appointment and mechanism of the caretaker government and the influence of the media in creating interest among the public. However, key informants were not confident whether these factors would last till the next elections as there may not be as much political competition, the anti-incumbency effect might reduce and the controversy regarding the results of the 2013 election might cause voter disillusionment**. For improvements in voter turnout, strengthening of supply-side of electoral processes was viewed to be more effective than increasing demand through voter education.**

32. S**takeholders were mixed in their views about the performance of the ECP –** some expressed appreciation of the role played by the ECP in improving electoral processes, while others felt that things had not improved since the 2008 elections. Positive changes in the ECP included the trust and good reputation held by the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim, improvements in accuracy of electoral rolls, the 8300 text messaging service and the willingness of

---

[11] Refer to Afzal, 2014 for detailed results of these regressions
[12] Refer to Afzal, 2014 for detailed statistics
[13] For a more detailed account of key informant interviews conducted for the evaluation, please see Roberts, 2014
[14] See Collective for Social Science Research, 2013 and Roberts, 2014 for a discussion on selection of stakeholders
[15] This refers to the service provided by the ECP through which citizens could check voter registration details by sending their CNIC numbers via text message to the number 8300.

the ECP to consult with political parties and the media for their inputs. However, the ECP was criticised for not overseeing the work of the Returning Officers (ROs), for its lack of transparency with regards to publishing polling station-wise election results, and for insufficient engagement with stakeholders. Some informants were of the view that the ECP had not held political parties accountable for internal elections, and had allowed candidates to get away with concealing their assets in their applications for qualification. It was also held that the ECP failed to respond effectively to allegations of malpractices and the findings of election tribunals.

33. According to respondents, change in the ECP was driven largely by non-intervention factors. There was less centralised pressure on the ECP to rig the elections as the appointment of the CEC and members of the ECP decision-making body was done via a parliamentary process which was agreed upon by all major political parties. Also seen as important were actions taken by external bodies such as the Supreme Court, parliament with regards to legislative changes, and NADRA in facilitating improvements in electoral rolls and implementation of the 8300 SMS. Before and during the 2013 elections, there was an increase in public pressure coupled with scrutiny by the media and other civil society organisations.

34. With regards to election programmes, **SERPs role was viewed as positive by most stakeholders, however, not in the way envisaged by the programme**. It was felt that while it may have been successful in providing improved electoral processes in the May 2013 elections, it has not yet been effective in achieving its stated objective of improving the capacity of the ECP to be able to independently conduct credible and inclusive elections. The ECP's reliance on technical assistance from donors for core activities was highlighted as one of its main weaknesses and the lack of a capable second-level of leadership was raised as a point of concern.

35. As far as STAEP is concerned, stakeholder had mixed views. **Some stakeholders praised FAFEN's achievement of operating a large nationwide network in a difficult environment and providing a sense of scrutiny to the election process.** Other positive contributions of FAFEN included its identification of late changes in the polling scheme, mobilization in stations where women had not voted in 2008, working with NADRA in promoting CNIC uptake, and at the last moment producing accreditation cards for tens of thousands of observers for the ECP.

36. **However, stakeholders also felt that despite fielding a large organisation FAFEN was unable to effectively deliver on its key function of election observation.[16]** They were especially criticised for inaccurately claiming some polling stations had more than a 100 per cent turnout which raised concerns about the accuracy and credibility of their data and damaged their reputation. Even before the elections, there was criticism of FAFEN's approach to recording pre-election violence. According to one respondent, FAFEN "focused on details such as banner sizes but missed the killings". FAFEN was acknowledged as having provided information, but was criticised for not offering any accompanying analysis. Stakeholders were critical of there being no final report and recommendations following the May 2013 elections. Some interviewees also questioned the capacity and management systems of FAFEN and wondered how much FAFEN was "actually out there", and if they had the numbers they claimed. Key informants were concerned about the virtual

---

[16] As argued above, the programme might have set overly ambitious targets for the scale of the election observation exercise, and might have underestimated challenges such as capacity constraints and the adversarial environment prevailing at election time.

monopoly FAFEN has on domestic observation as they felt that a lack of competition had reduced accountability and affected its incentive to deliver on time.

2.3. Qualitative fieldwork

37. Qualitative fieldwork was carried out in selected constituencies to directly hear from ordinary citizens, voters and non-voters, as well as individuals engaged with the actual management of elections at the grassroots level.[17] The qualitative fieldwork was designed to pay special attention to local social structures and power relations which might shape individuals' access to and use of electoral processes, and also to help understand possible ways in which electoral processes (or improvements sought in them) might in turn alter these social structures and power relations. The focus was on a variety of types of cases – through individual interviews as well as Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) – to represent categories of particular interest to the evaluation. We were interested, of course, in those who were considered to be socially excluded or marginalized in relation to existing social structures and power relations. We were also interested in exceptional instances of change and continuity in order to embellish our interpretation of statistical analyses and received knowledge about political agency in Pakistan. In this sub-section, we present findings from interviews of constituency-level stakeholders followed by a synopsis of findings from community-based fieldwork.

38. **Qualitative fieldwork was carried out in eight selected constituencies (two in each province)**. At the constituency level, key informant interviews were conducted with the ECP district office, the FAFEN partner organisation working in that constituency, at least one individual from each of the following categories: election observer working for FAFEN, CRG member and polling agents who are representatives of political parties at a polling station. At the community level, we conducted at least two in-depth individual interviews and two focus group discussions using pre-set criteria for selection of respondents. For a list of selected constituencies and interactions conducted at the community level refer to Annex 4.[18]

2.3.1. Constituency-level key informant interviews

2013 elections

39. **Key informants broadly felt that the voter registration process in the 2013 elections was well-managed and successful.**

40. **There was a common narrative among constituency-level key informants that, despite particular reservations, the elections had been well-managed and that there was a considerable improvement in comparison with earlier elections.** Concerns were voiced about delays in the arrival of voting staff or material, lack of coordination between the ECP staff and Returning Officers (seconded by the judiciary), sub-par training of election staff, inability to handle large crowds and to prevent unfair practices. In at least three constituencies key informants said elections were free but not fair, implying that while everyone was allowed to vote, there were instance of malpractice. A

---

[17] For details on how sample constituencies were selected, please see Balagamwala and Gazdar, 2014
[18] A detailed methodology can be found in Balagamwala and Gazdar, 2014

repeated complaint made by ECP District Officers was regarding the failure of the Results Management System (RMS) on Election Day which led to a delay in the announcement of results.

Election programmes

41. In our interactions at the constituency level, **informants referred to the implementation (and sometimes success) of various programmes** (voter registration drives, voter education programmes, election observation, CRGs) but we found **little visibility of these programmes at the community level.** There are a number of understandable reasons for this lack of visibility. The supply-side interventions worked mostly at the level of national stakeholders, notably the ECP. The demand-side interventions under STAEP did have a presence at the constituency level, but this was organized through local FAFEN partner Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) who, in many instances, further sub-contracted activities to community-based organisations. Election monitoring was the most ambitious STAEP activity in terms of scale, but ordinary citizens (voters and non-voters) were not in a good position to know if their polling station was actually being observed by election monitors. In any case, our sample of fieldwork sites (8 in total) is too small to make any inferences about intervention presence.

42. **Election observation, while widely viewed as a success by informants, faced limitations as result of the challenging environment it operated in and because of the large-scale of its activities.** Interviews with election observers revealed that they had received limited training before the elections which raises doubts about the capacity of observers to monitor elections. There were also some cases in our sample where FAFEN observers faced difficulty such as in NA-261 Pishin-cum-Ziarat, where an observer was given a tough time by political party workers or in Karachi where observers were not allowed to enter certain polling stations. In some constituencies, observers were unable to report for duty as their accreditation cards were not received on time.

43. **CRG members who were interviewed highlighted their achievements such as meeting with elected representatives and government officials and solving local level service-delivery concerns like functioning of health and education facilities, sewerage problems and infrastructure provision.** Some CRG members were also involved with other activities carried out by FAFEN partners such as the voter registration drive, voter education programmes and election observation. However, within a CRG not all members were equally active. For instance in NA-4 only one member represented the CRG at meetings with government officials and in NA-10 women from rural areas did not attend most meetings. CRG members also complained that over time there was a reduction in motivation and CRG representatives were not confident of the role they or the CRG played. We also found that in some cases selection of members was on the discretion of coordinators – for instance, in Karachi, most CRG members belonged to a single neighbourhood.

44. **There was tension between the goal of breaking patronage-based politics on the one hand, and in practice promoting such politics on the other.** CRG activities often revolved around lobbying an elected representative for local public goods in one particular neighbourhood. This form of political transaction has been widely criticized for displacing the potential of electoral politics to act as instrument for general accountability and political participation.

Role of local factors

45. **Local forces, issues and conditions are vital to the implementation of electoral programmes as they can either facilitate the achievement of a programme goal or can serve as a barrier to its roll-out and success.** Voter registration, for example, has been termed as a big success by key informants both at the policy/programme level and the constituency-level. However, it is also widely acknowledged that a significant contribution to voter registration efforts was made by political party workers at the community level. Similarly, an increase in security at polling stations was seen as an important factor as it ensured that citizens came out to vote in certain areas but even here, as our interviews in selected communities show, local forces can be held responsible for facilitating increased security (in Jacobabad two rival factions made an agreement to hold peaceful elections) or disrupting security (in Gwadar threats by local political forces gave rise to security concerns). From the point of view of election programmes, in at least two constituencies (NA 272 and NA 209), FAFEN partners felt that programme activities should be less generic in their approach and instead be more contextual with attention being paid to the specific conditions of each region.

Social exclusion

46. **Gender is, arguably, the most important dimension of social exclusion in Pakistan, and this is reflected in the election support programmes.[19] Other dimensions of social exclusion such as economic class, caste, ethnicity, religious identity and migration status, receive relatively little attention**. Among key informants (both programme managers and ECP officials) there was awareness of individuals or groups being left out of the electoral process such as displaced persons (in Jacobabad and Bhakkar), migrants or those without landed property. However, there had not been any effort to incorporate this understanding into programme activities and to reach out to these marginalised individuals. CRGs, coordinated by FAFEN partner organisations, we were told have socially marginalised individuals such as women and the poor. Exceptionally, we were told that the CRG in Peshawar NA-4 had a member who happened to be from a historically marginalized *nai* (barber) caste. Such representation, however, was often found to be nominal as individuals from excluded groups were not active members.

2.3.2. Community-based fieldwork

47. **There were different types of social structures and political conditions across our fieldwork sites** which included urban areas of Lahore and Karachi, rural constituencies in Bhakkar, Jacobabad, and Pishin, and what can only be classified as peri-urban areas in Gwadar and Mardan, and Peshawar. Even across these diverse conditions, however, some factors were observed in common.[20]

Individual voting vs. group behaviour

48. **An individual citizen's engagement with the electoral process was generally mediated by groups. Group-based behaviour rather than the citizen-state compact, therefore, characterized voter motivation but it is not as though the citizen-state relationship was entirely absent in voting behaviour.** There were some individuals who saw voting in directly transactional terms between themselves and the government. Beneficiaries of the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) in

---

[19] Details of gender-focused interventions at the community-level are discussed further below in Section 2.3.2.
[20] For more details findings from this community-based qualitative survey, refer to Balagamwala and Gazdar, 2014

some constituencies noted that they voted for the party which provided the programme – presumably as a sign of acknowledgement, gratitude, loyalty or even as a way of ensuring the continuation of the programme. Then there were other cases of men and women for whom voting was primarily about political or policy issues at the national or provincial levels, even if the political issue at stake was a negative one (voting out a government that was disliked, or to protest against inflation), or one linked to a broad and undefined message of change (supporting a new party like PTI). There were relatively few instances where individuals who saw the process of voting itself as a norm or public duty, even though there were many who identified themselves as supporters of particular parties.

49. **We found that there were diverse forms of group-based behaviour which cannot be simply identified as 'clientelist' motivations for voting as done in the literature**. National and provincial assembly constituencies are too large, in any case, to simply work on the basis of personalized patron-client relations. Although our fieldwork sites had very different economic and social conditions and political conditional, some factors were observed in common.

50. **Local factions with different degrees of vertical coherence and stability, which shaped voting blocs, were present everywhere.** In some places the faction was a stable vertically integrated organization from the catchment area of a polling station all the way up to the national assembly constituency.[21] This was the case in Bhakkar and Jacobabad where two competing factions with stable sources of support in local communities mobilized on the basis of kinship ties as well as economic dependence. Local factions were present in urban and peri-urban sites as well and as in the case of Bhakkar and Jacobabad, factions ultimately relied on individuals in families and groups of families voting together.

51. Local factions or voting blocs were not always involved in clientelist relations with patrons seeking their votes. In the case of Karachi, for example, the local voting blocs simply corresponded with group identity – and identity was an instrument of relative political power in the local setting. The same was true in a different manner in Peshawar. In Gwadar the mobilization was carried out by a local leader who was not an economic patron, but who nevertheless was a political entrepreneur on whom people relied for a range of contingencies. **The presence of voting blocs based on kinship, patronage, or identity, or some combination of these, across the country means that the theoretical propositions about voter behaviour premised on the basic model of a pivotal voter need to be interpreted with reference to groups in Pakistan.**

52. **The family was a significant constituent of voting blocs. It was considered the norm across fieldwork sites for an individual's voting behaviour – not just who to vote for, but whether to vote at all** – to be shaped by the family. This was more conspicuously the case for women voters and exceptions to this norm were reported as remarkable cases.

Importance of local factors

53. **Actual experiences with the electoral process in general, and on election-day in particular, were strongly influenced by local rather than national or provincial factors**. In some places where voters reported improvements over the previous elections, local factors were at play. In Mardan, for

---

[21] In Bhakkar, in fact, we were told that two dominant factions influence outcomes in not one but two neighbouring NA seats.

example, a number of voters who were enthusiastic supporters of a candidate who was not from the traditional factions of the area were cited as a reason for greater voter mobilization and turnout. This candidate who won the seat was subsequently assassinated in an attack claimed by the Taliban. For many of his local supporters his murder seemed to confirm the view that it is difficult to bring about political change through democratic means and the optimism generated by this new entrant was, therefore, dissipated by his tragic death. In Jacobabad, it was reported that the election was peaceful this time round because of a prior agreement between the two main factional leaders to keep their armed supporters in check.

54. **While some forms of violence, coercion and electoral malpractice might have been generic, according to our informants there was less evidence of this in 2013**. From the viewpoint of the individual citizen, this change too was mostly attributed to local factors. In Karachi, for example, we were able to document two levels of coercion which appeared to be connected. There was the case of a local temple custodian leader who was entangled in a drawn-out conflict with poor residents over control of land surrounding the temple. The custodian and the poor residents supported rival political parties which in turn were involved in a city-wide conflict over polling stations. While our informants reported having voted peacefully at their polling station, they also said that later in the day that polling station as well as others in the neighbourhood were captured by armed supporters of one of these parties.

Norms

55. **Norms of legitimacy are interpreted differently at the community level than at the national, provincial or even the constituency level.** In general, community-level perceptions are more candid about what actually happens on the ground and set different standards of 'good' and 'fair' elections. It is clearly not the case that national or provincial level stakeholders are unaware of ground realities with respect to voter manipulation, exclusions, election-day malpractice, violence and post-election violations of process. It is likely, however, that at higher levels of aggregation stakeholders tend to adjust their expectations by taking into account the fact that it is 'normal' to have many deviations from the prescribed process. At the local level, these deviations are more conspicuous and while acknowledged, are rationalized by applying different standards of legitimacy. The existence of established norms of long-standing with respect to the electoral process is a reflection of the fact that elections have been held with varying degrees of fairness even under Pakistan's periods of military government. The democratic transition, therefore, does not necessarily imply fresh exposure of citizens to competitive elections.

Voter and CNIC registration

56. **Unlike national and constituency level informants who generally held a positive opinion about the registration process before the 2013 elections, at the community level actual experiences ranged from 'no better' to 'worse than before'**. Responses about reasons for not registering to vote revealed important facets of how voter registration and voting are not seen as distinct choices. Those who regard themselves as voters have reasons for voting – some of them discussed above – and it follows directly that they would register. It was easier, therefore, to get responses on constraints to voter registration than on reasons for not registering. FAFEN were not the only ones, moreover, who directed the NADRA mobile service. Other local political and social activists were also known to have made efforts for particular communities. Actual experience with CNIC registration varied across individuals. Some were able to take advantage of mobile services offered

by NADRA while others reported facing great difficulty, cost and delay. There were positive cases where women in poor households who had registered with NADRA in order to qualify for the BISP were also able to be registered as voters. These variations did not have any clear regional patterns, and were driven by individual circumstances

57. Another set of problems faced by citizens with respect to registration in the recent elections, which was particularly acute in some constituencies, was the **apparent disenfranchisement of past voters**. Some of those who had voted before were unable to find their names in the current electoral roll. There were others who went to the polling station where they had voted before to discover that their vote was now registered elsewhere. Some of these previous voters were probably disenfranchised due to the removal of voters who were not verified by NADRA, and were missed for some reason in the door-to-door survey. Others, who found that their votes were registered far away from home, were, most likely, victims of bureaucratic oversight on the part of the ECP.

SMS service

58. **The SMS service for voter information (8300) was not found to have been used at all by informants at the community level**. For some of the most marginalized potential voters then – women and the poor, who are more likely to be illiterate than the non-poor – the service was not accessible. The impression that this service could be used to bridge information gaps between the ECP and individual voters, therefore, was largely unfounded at least in the communities that we visited. In many of these communities there are strong negative attitudes about women having independent control of a mobile phone. The service, in any case, is only of direct use to those who are literate. Even citizens in the communities we visited were not aware of the service or did not use it.

Access to polling stations

59. **The placement of polling stations and errors in the voter registration process meant that access was an issue across a number of sites for voters.** In some of the rural sites the nearest polling station was several kilometres away and this meant that voters were dependent on the arrangement of transport facilities for access. It was widely reported that transport, in these areas, was almost invariably provided by candidates or their local supporters.   In at least one urban constituency too, voters complained that their votes had been registered at polling stations far away from their homes. Once these potential voters arrived at the polling station they were once again dependent on candidates and their supporters for information about the voting process

Social exclusion and marginality

60. **The CNIC condition, while being rightly praised as a route towards more reliable electoral rolls, also had the effect of excluding the more marginalized citizens**. Despite being a mandatory condition for all adult citizens, there remains a deficit in coverage. Women are less likely to have CNICs than men. The same is thought to be true for marginalized identity groups and those who have faced historical social discrimination due to caste, occupation, lifestyle and religion. We also found individuals who are marginalized due to personal traits – such as disability –were not registered as voters because they also did not have CNICs. Even among those who have CNICs, voter registration may have been limited due to an individual's ability to navigate the registration system. Moreover, as noted earlier, outright discriminatory practices made registration for some of

the poorest citizens dependent on powerful local patrons who also happened to be leaders of political factions.

61. **The only dimension of marginality which the election support programmes addressed explicitly was gender – and particularly those polling stations in which not a single woman voter cast her ballot in the 2008 elections.** We included two such constituencies in our fieldwork. Community-level informants in NA-209 Jacobabad, it was reported that FAFEN voter education for women had been conducted prior to the 2013 elections. But this happened to be a polling station where voting was halted in 2008 due to political violence. [22] There was no problem here of women being stopped from voting because they were women. In the other such polling station (in NA-4 Peshawar) community-level informants were not aware of any specific programme for women voters. Here most women were not allowed to vote even in 2013 and those who did attempt to vote did so at the initiative of young men who supported PTI.[23] Then there was a polling station where women had voted in 2008, but where polling was halted in 2013 due to election-day violence. In other constituencies – that is, those without the problem of zero per cent polling in 2008 – there was no recollection at the community level of any intervention for targeting women to register their votes or to exercise their right to vote.

62. **The situation regarding the outreach of the election support programmes in addressing other dimensions of exclusion and marginality was even less evident at the community level.** As noted above, FAFEN staff in Bhakkar concurred with the view of local ECP and other government officials that the landless could only be registered as voters if their credentials were verified by their landlords. In Mardan, where migrants of long-standing from neighbouring mountainous regions form a large part of the landless workforce, the FAFEN representative took the view that these groups of people were actually nomads who did not have the right to vote. He informed our team that the law bars the mentally disabled from voting, and being peripatetic was a mental illness, hence the justification for their exclusion. In Gwadar, where the election was strongly influenced by a boycott call on the part of Baloch nationalist organizations, some of the most marginalized communities such as the traditional Medh fisherfolk were excluded for pseudo-administrative reasons.

63. **The election support programmes were also not salient factors in the various instances we documented of agency and change on the part of the marginalized.** In Bhakkar, for example, where the duopoly of two vertical factions was challenged by a newcomer, the change agent was a religious sectarian group which mobilized voters on grounds of religious persecution. In Jacobabad, we found women voters who defied their local landlord and voted for his rival political grouping because of their connection with a government cash transfer programme. In Mardan, the change agent was a local charismatic politician who garnered the support of voters, particularly women voters, by convincing them of his sincerity for change.

64. **Conflict and violence around the electoral process was not neutral with respect to social exclusion and marginality.** We documented two cases of polling stations where balloting had been halted

---

[22] Re-polling was meant to occur at this polling station but one of the candidates boycotted this and as a result in official records votes polled for the polling station is shown as 0.

[23] In 2013, PTI party workers had opposed the decision taken by the local *Jirga* of not allowing women to vote. However, a fight broke out at the polling station after rumours were spread that supporters of PTI were paying women to vote.

due to election-day violence – one in 2008, the other in 2013. It was perhaps no coincidence that both cases involved women's polling stations. It is likely that those who perpetrated election day violence calculated that women's ability to exercise their right to vote is more fragile compared with men, and hence the application of force to suspend voting. Violence or the threat of violence inevitably emanated from those with greater local political power, and also some degree of access to state institutions to ensure impunity. In Gwadar where the nationalist boycott resulted in a low turnout, the local political elite either supported or were cowed into going along with the boycott call. In Pishin where a number of polling stations were in communities which were under Taliban control, the turnout was, nevertheless high, with reports of violence being used by a party with Taliban associations in order to increase its vote share. Here the Taliban and their supporters had emerged as a new elite and signalled their rise with the deployment of violence. In Bhakkar and Jacobabad where vertical factions dominated, it was clear to everyone that the threat of violence remained implied, and originated from the powerful local landlords who headed the rival factions. In Lahore the threat of violence was present but more subtle, and was directed by local political faction through the state personnel responsible for election management – for example, by threatening and ejecting election monitors. In Karachi, the same was done by armed supporters of rival parties.

2.4. Contextual factors

65. An important part of this evaluation is an analysis of contextual, non-intervention, factors which might have accounted for the achievement or otherwise of intervention outcomes.[24] The Theory of Change which links intervention outputs to outputs such as voter turnout and democracy strengthening acknowledges the presence of a range of non-intervention factors. The contextual analysis for this study (Cheema and Javid, 2014) gives a detailed account of political developments in Pakistan over time, and particularly since around 2008, to identify the main factors which shaped democratic outcomes.

66. The contextual analysis identifies a number of stakeholders who are of critical importance for the transition to democracy, as well as for outcomes of election support programmes such as voter turnouts and democracy strengthening. **Pakistan is undergoing a transition to democracy and given Pakistan's political history, the 2008-2013 period marks an important phase in this transition. Established political elites have emerged in the form of stable political parties and they have been able to arrive at cooperative compacts** – most notably the Charter of Democracy. The contradictions between political elites and state apparatus elites – such as the bureaucracy, military and the judiciary particularly the latter two – remain. The political elites, despite cooperation, are also engaged in rivalry in which some of their segments can combine with the state apparatus elites for particular purposes – hence the significance of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) which represented cooperation between Musharraf and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) on one side, and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) and the judiciary on the other. **Serious challenges from the state apparatus elite in the 2008 to 2013 period, however, continued to be seen off by the political elites through mutual cooperation.**

---

[24] See Cheema and Javid, 2014 for an in-depth discussion on the contextual factors that shape political outcomes in Pakistan

67. External factors have been important, particularly with discernible shifts in the US (and the UK) postures towards engagement with the political elites, which in turn would have influenced the incentive and behaviour of political and apparatus elites alike. **Election assistance programmes, to the extent that they signal external engagement with the electoral process, might have encouraged cooperative behaviour on the part of the political elites, and at least nominal adherence to democratic norms on the part of the state apparatus elite.** One implication of this nominal adherence to process was that the electoral process was not micro-managed, as has sometimes been the case in the past, to ensure particular results. This apparent absence of a coherent and detailed plan and covert operations around such a plan meant that local factors were conspicuous in both the extent as well as the nature of violations of prescribed process.

68. **Pakistan can be said to be on its way towards building a procedural democracy – or a polyarchy, in which the main elites agree to cooperate on the procedures for forming governments**. This does not automatically imply a transition towards a substantive democracy in which voters and citizens in general participate actively in governance, define their interests and hold elected representatives to account. Some aspects of procedural democracy in Pakistan – for example greater federalism – can lead to progress towards substantive democracy by expanding the base of polyarchy in the first instance, and then engaging the broader citizenry further. Successive elections may also lead to substantive democracy if political institutions like parties are strengthened and traditional forms of influencing electoral outcomes through patronage, wealth and the power nexus at the local level between the political elites and the bureaucracy and judiciary are challenged. The emergence of the PTI illustrates, at least to some extent, the fact that procedural democracy might encourage the entry of new players who might challenge the existing nexus – even though the PTI was not entirely successful in this regard in Punjab.

69. **Cooperation within the political elite**, and **nominal adherence of the state apparatus elite to its constitutional mandate**, meant that the role of organisations such as NADRA and ECP which were responsible for managing various parts of the electoral process, were **perceived as acting with relative autonomy and freedom from political pressure**. Complaints about judicial interference in ECP operations, as well as election manipulation at the local level were probably considered by national level observers – such as political experts whose opinions are sought in democracy strengthening scores – as relatively less damaging than the past practice of direct military involvement in electoral manipulation.

Conclusion

70. **The findings reported in this section are used in Sections 3 and 4 to assemble the contribution story for each of the two outcome indicators – voter turnout and democracy strengthening respectively.** The analysis presented in the next two sections is entirely based on empirical findings and opinions reported here. At the end of each of those two sections we have included a table which provides an overview of findings on key questions in the contribution analysis from the relevant element of the study (see Table 4 and Table 6). These tables are meant to act as bridges between the empirical findings reported in this section with the analysis in Sections 3 and 4.

Section Three – Contribution Analysis: Voter Turnout

3.1. Indicator

71. **The official voter turnout rates are not comparable between 2008 and 2013 because of questions about veracity of the electoral rolls in the base year.[25]** The target for this outcome indicator was an increase in 45 per cent in 2008 to 50 per cent in 2013. While the actual rate in 2013 was 55 per cent, the ECP's cancellation of a large number of unverified votes from the 2008 rolls means that the true turnout rate was probably higher than 45 per cent in the base year.

72. **There was positive change in the outcome indicator even if the scale of change is likely to have been more modest than suggested by official data.** The total number of votes cast registered a significant increase. As a proportion of the population as a whole (and not registered voters or the eligible population) the voter turnout rate increased from 21.6 per cent in 2008 to 25.3 per cent in 2013 - a 17 per cent increase. This compares well with the 11 per cent increase target in the logframe but falls short of the 22 per cent rise claimed on the basis of official data which calculate voter turnout rate as a proportion of registered voters.

73. Opinion surveys based on current intentions and a recall of past voting behaviour provide alternatives to actual voter turnout data for tracking change in voter turnout. The BAAPS 2013 and FAFEN ITV 2013 surveys asked respondents about their intention to vote in 2013, and also whether or not they had actually voted in 2008. Of those who had attained the age of 18 years by 2008 72 per cent said they had voted. In 2013 67 per cent of those aged 18 or above said they intended to vote – a decline of 5 percentage points since 2008.

74. **Neither the ECP data, nor the programmes' own surveys provide reliable information on changes in the outcome indicator over the time span of the interventions.** In principle, the effectiveness of an intervention should be measured by comparing outcomes in the baseline period with the end-line. STAEP started in 2011 and SERP in 2012. The 2008 baseline, therefore, was already dated by 3-4 years by the time the programmes started. If, as envisaged in the Theory of Change, voter turnout responds to the legitimacy of elections, the key event which would have shaped perceptions had already occurred in 2008. It would have been possible to measure change if the baseline survey for the interventions (e.g. BAAPS 2011) had asked respondents about their intention to vote, and then compared this with the intention to vote in the mid-line or immediate run-up to the general elections (BAAPS 2013, ITV 2013). Unfortunately, the baseline survey omitted the question about the intention to vote in 2011, thus rendering such a comparison impossible.

3.2. Theory of change links

75. **National-level stakeholders and experts broadly concur with the Theory of Change that improved election management can lead to greater voter participation. They generally believed that supply-side interventions such as improvements in ECP performance had a bigger role to play in encouraging turnout than demand-side measures such as voter education**. Quantitative data also

---

[25] For a more detailed discussion on the voter turnout indicator, please see Collective for Social Science Research, 2013

validated the Theory of Change assumption that greater confidence in election management processes will encourage higher voter participation. These data further confirmed the importance of focusing on particular groups of citizens such as women, younger people, and poorer and socially marginalized groups for both supply and demand side interventions.

76. **Qualitative fieldwork at the constituency and community-levels showed, however, that at the grassroots, the linkage between election management and voter participation is weaker than assumed in the Theory of Change**. Voter registration is closely associated with the intention to vote for a specific party or candidate rather than any generic sense of civic responsibility. Electoral choices are dominated by local political factors. In general, voting decisions are not based on individual agency but on group-based behaviour. Voting blocs are present across fieldwork constituencies even if they vary in the details of their composition. Families and extended families are almost universally the basic components of voting blocs which align into political factions of various types. Voter registration and actual voting are driven and facilitated by local factional leaders who are direct participants in the electoral system.

77. Another, more indirect link, between election management and voter turnout is the idea that better election management encourages the entry of newcomers, hence increasing choice, and this in turn encourages greater voter participation. **At the community level, informants are ambivalent about the connection between electoral choice and their propensity to participate.** There was excitement and optimism among voters in some areas about the presence of new parties and candidates. Others thought that the presence of too many candidates creates confusion and chaos. Yet others said that their idea of a well-managed election was one where their preferred candidate won.

78. **The analysis of the political context highlighted the democratic transition as a central factor with the role of election management bodies as being secondary and derivative.** The primary factor behind the democratic transition is **agreement between political elites** (represented in stable parties**) and the state apparatus elites** (military, judiciary and bureaucracy) on the restoration and continuation of constitutional government. While the preferences of ordinary citizens play an important part in the democratic transition, they manifest themselves through the actions of these elites. This observation **dilutes the link between election support programme outputs and election management outcomes as envisaged in the Theory of Change.**

3.3. Intervention contribution

79. **The main factor in the increase in voter participation between 2008 and 2013 was increased electoral competitiveness in some regions of the country.** The increase in the national voter turnout was driven by four out of the six administrative regions – the provinces of Punjab and KP, Islamabad Capital Territory, and FATA. In Sindh, the increase was relatively small and in Balochistan voter participation as a proportion of the population actually declined. ECP data show that the competitiveness of elections was an important factor in the rise in voter participation, and the highest gains were in constituencies where the new party (PTI) did particularly well. A parallel source of voter interest in these regions lay in the negative motivation of wanting to vote out unpopular incumbents. These views were expressed by key informants at the national level as well as community-based respondents.

80. **The widespread pre-election expectation among political elites at the national and constituency levels that electoral processes will be relatively free and fair contributed to greater competitiveness.** There was vigorous electoral participation of political parties, particularly those who were in the opposition at the federal level. **Political parties' 'investment' in elections was based on the assumption that they had a fair chance of winning.** According to the key informants at the national level, the agreement between parliamentary parties on modalities for appointing the Chief Election Commissioner and caretaker administrations played an important part in this regard. Initiatives by the ECP which demonstrated a commitment to effective election management – for example, the introduction of the SMS information service – contributed to positive elite perceptions. The overall atmosphere of scrutiny including judicial and media independence from the executive bolstered the expectations that elections will be relatively free and fair. At the community level what mattered in this regard was the conviction of local factional leaders that the candidates or parties they supported could win. These factional leaders, in turn, mobilized voters to get registered and to turn out.

81. **Actual election management on the day also mattered, but only insofar as polling day violations deterred already mobilized voters from actually voting.** Examples from our qualitative fieldwork included a case in Karachi where polling stations had been 'captured' by supporters of political parties, and in a constituency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where supporters of a losing candidate had forced the closing down of a women's polling station. It might be argued that the same was true in Balochistan where a boycott call by nationalist organisations prompted fears of election day violence and hence a low turn-out.

Supply-side interventions

82. **SERP's support to the ECP made a positive contribution to the latter's pre-election image as an effective and professional body.** SERP assisted the ECP in fulfilling a number of its legal and constitutional obligations, and in responding positively to demands on the ECP placed by the judiciary and the constitutional procedure. SERP also helped the ECP in fostering greater confidence among political parties by facilitating agreement on a code of conduct for the elections. SERP's role in helping the ECP with voter registration and generating more accurate electoral rolls sent out an early signal of improvements in electoral processes. Technical assistance with respect to hardware (such as new ballot boxes) and systems (such as interactive communication with voters) further enhanced the ECP's professional image. Some of these activities were outside of the remit of SERP and were undertaken in response to urgent ECP requests.

83. **A number of SERP outputs remained undelivered or were partially delivered due to organizational issues within the ECP.** A comprehensive ECP reform programme was postponed due to the organisation's preoccupation with the election cycle. Capacity-building of ECP staff for election work had limited effect due to the lack of ECP control over the postings of personnel who had been deputed from other bodies.

Demand-side interventions

84. **Direct voter mobilization was largely driven by non-intervention factors and STAEPs role in this regard was insignificant.** STAEP facilitated voter registration through the direction of NADRA mobile services to particular localities where around 200,000 citizens were issued CNICs. This fulfilled the logframe output target but was too small a number to make any impact on overall voter

registration. It was not clear if STAEP's direction of the NADRA mobile services had a net positive effect, given that those services were going to be used somewhere in any case. Community-level observations showed that STAEP interventions in voter registration were not focused on the socially excluded and its staff concurred with some of the existing local prejudices with respect to marginalized communities. STAEP fulfilled its output with respect to 'zero voting' women's polling stations. This too, however, was too small an intervention to have any impact on overall voter participation.

85. **Actual STAEP activities which might have contributed to greater engagement between citizens and their elected representatives made no impact on voter mobilization.** While STAEP outputs relating to the constituency relations groups (CRGs) were reportedly fulfilled, these were too small in scale to have any impact on voter outcomes. The activities of CRGs were not visible at the constituency and community levels. Community-level observations showed that many of the CRG members contacted at the constituency level were unaware of what the groups were supposed to do. STAEP's own BAAPS 2013 found that less than 2 per cent of the respondents in neighbourhoods where a CRG member was active even knew about the CRG.   Our small and unrepresentative sample of election observers also revealed that there were gaps in STAEP's knowledge of the contact details of individual who were supposed to have constituted a durable election monitoring network.

86. **STAEP contributed to pre-election perceptions that the electoral contest will be relatively free and fair through its widely-publicised plan for large-scale election monitoring.** The announcement that STAEP would observe actual polling at a large proportion of polling stations contributed to the overall atmosphere of scrutiny around the elections.[26] There were positive synergies of this plan with the announced presence of international observers, the perception that the ECP was open to cooperation with independent observers, and the expected independence of the media and the judiciary. STAEP's interactions with political workers through capacity building and training activities would have underlined this message at the local level.

Contribution to outcomes

87. SERP and STAEP made a **relatively minor but significant contribution** to increased voter participation in the 2013 general elections.

88. SERP made its contribution through its work with the ECP which helped to enhance the pre-election image of the organization for professional competence**. Many of the activities which helped SERP contribute to ECP's pre-election image were outside its original workplan**.

89. **STAEP's well-publicised plan to carry out large-scale election observation, though not the observation itself, contributed to the overall atmosphere of scrutiny which prevailed in the run up to the elections.** STAEP outputs, such as those relating to CRGs, facilitation of NADRA mobile services, and mobilization of women voters at the 'zero voting' polling stations were too small in scale to have any impact on outcomes.

---

[26] This perception held up to the eve of the elections and would not have been affected by how the actual election observation exercise was rolled-out

Table 4: Voter turnout – summary of findings

	Quantitative analysis	Policy level	Constituency level	Community-based	Contextual analysis
Indicator					
Voter turnout increased	Strong evidence variations across and within regions	Strong agreement			
Improvements in registration	Mixed evidence - Variations between constituencies	Strong agreement	Strong agreement	Mixed evidence	
Links					
Improved election management leads to increase in voter participation	Strong evidence from opinion surveys	Strong agreement – supply-side factors more effective; observation leads to perception of scrutiny	Weak agreement - Local factors matter for election management and voter turnout	Weak evidence - if reduce violence; local factors more important	Weak evidence – democratic transition, political compacts more important
Greater electoral choice increases voter turnout	Some evidence exists	Strong agreement		Qualified agreement – parties/candidates mobilise voters	Cooperation between parties also important for stable elections
Intervention contribution					
Contribution to the pre-election image of the ECP		Mixed opinions - SERP led to improved ECP image but unable to build ECP capacity	Mixed evidence	Mixed evidence – local factors shape election management experiences	Speculative opinion – signalling device for political elites
Contribution to *ex ante* environment of scrutiny		Strong agreement			Speculative opinion – signalling device for political elites who mobilise voters
Contribution to direct voter mobilisation	Weak evidence – no clear difference of CRG impact	Mixed opinions - non-intervention factors dominate		Weak evidence – limited visibility of programmes, non-intervention factors dominate	

Section Four – Contribution Analysis: Democracy Strengthening

4.1. Indicator

90. **Democracy strengthening, for the purposes of this evaluation, has been measured using the 'free and fair elections' and 'political participation' scores in the IDEA framework for assessing democracy which has been implemented in Pakistan by PILDAT.[27]** There are six specific areas under the category of 'free and fair elections' including appointment to government office by elections, citizen accessibility and freedom during voting procedures, fairness of procedures for candidate registration, range of choice allowed by electoral/party system, composition of electorate reflected in legislature, and electoral turnout ratio and results' acceptability. These themes deal directly with electoral processes and have been covered to some extent in the discussion on voter turnout. The 'political participation' category has four areas: range of voluntary citizen group/associations, citizen participation in voluntary public activity, women participation in political life/public office, and equal access for all social groups to public office. These four questions are not directly linked to party politics, and are more to do with the nature and quality of democracy in civil society. They are likely to change more slowly than the parameters listed under 'free and fair elections' which are subject to administrative behaviour, and party-political dynamics.

91. **Both the scores show improvements over time.** The 'free and fair elections' score rose from 58 to 70 from 2011 to 2013 – corresponding with the intervention period. The 'political participation' score registered a smaller increase in the same period – from 55 to 58. Historically both scores showed their most rapid gains from the pre-2008 period to 2010. The democracy strengthening score does not claim to be a representative opinion of the country as a whole, the considered view of a panel of experts consisting of around 20 individuals. These individuals, virtually by design, belong to the intellectual elite, and do not necessarily reflect the full range of ethnic, regional and ideological diversity. The number of women in the group rarely has exceeded three in any year of reporting. Elite opinions do matter, however, and as the contextual analysis has shown, in a transition situation cooperation and rivalry between various elites are important drivers of electoral and democratic processes. **Our key informant interviews at the national level concur with the PILDAT-IDEA experts that there are significant improvements in Pakistan with respect to free and fair elections, as well as political participation.**

92. Before analysing the links and intervention contributions, however, it is useful to examine the factors which might have led to these elite perceptions. The PILDAT-IDEA scoring suggests that there are discrete moments – coinciding respectively with the 2008 and 2013 elections – which account for much of the improvement in the democracy scores. These elections, therefore, can be regarded as conspicuous events which shaped expert perceptions of the direction of change. Doubtless, the PILDAT-IDEA experts as well as our key informants, many of whom would concur with our own contextual analysis, form their opinions at least in part, by trying to read the evidence on cooperation between various elite segments with respect to electoral and democratic processes. **The importance of conspicuous events in shaping perceptions is further confirmed by the fact that**

---

[27] For a more detailed discussion on the democracy strengthening indicator, please see Collective for Social Science Research, 2013

'political participation' scores which should typically change relatively slowly in response to the democratization of civil spaces also improved rapidly around the election period.

4.2. Theory of Change links

93. The Theory of Change assumption that improvements in election management can lead to democracy strengthening is inarguable at a general level. Better election management, after all, is not merely an instrument for getting a stronger democracy. A democracy is stronger, by definition, if elections are better managed, more transparent and legitimate. The possible links between specific indicators of democracy strengthening and DFID election programmes are examined here.

Table 5: SERP and STAEP activities that contribute to democracy strengthening

Democracy Strengthening Indicator	SERP activity	STAEP activity
Appointment to government office by elections	Supply-side support to ECP	Demand-side activities relating to election management
Citizen accessibility and freedom during voting procedures	Support to ECP/NADRA including voter registration	Support to NADRA/communities for registration Election observation
Fairness of procedures for candidate registration		
Range of choice allowed by electoral/party system		
Composition of electorate reflected in legislature		
Electoral turnout ratio and results' acceptability	Supply-side support to ECP	Demand-side activities relating to election management Election observation
Range of voluntary citizen group/associations		Constituency relations groups (CRG)
Citizen participation in voluntary public activity		CRG activities
Women participation in political life/public office		CRG membership, mobilisation of women voters
Equal access for all social groups to public office		

94. **Out of the ten democracy strengthening indicators used in the PILDAT-IDEA framework, three have possible links with activities and outputs of both SERP and STAEP.** The **appointment to government office by elections** is, of course, an outcome of the electoral democracy. To the extent that SERP and STAEP supported improved election management, they might have contributed to this outcome. **Citizens' accessibility and freedom during voting procedures** involve a range of issues in voter participation from registration to mobilization to actual voting. We have already discussed this in detail with respect to the election programmes' contribution to voter participation in Section 3. The third indicator, '**electoral turnout ratio and results' acceptability'** combines two separate questions, one of which has already been addressed in Section 3. We argued there that because

voter participation depends on prior investment into the electoral process on the part of political elites, it depends quite largely on **expectations** that elections will be free and fair.

95. **The acceptability of results, however, is dependent on what happens on polling day and its interpretation by various stakeholders. It is linked, therefore, not just with prior assumptions about election management, but with actual outcomes.** SERP activities would have influenced the acceptability of results to the extent that they contributed to the ECP's ability to deliver free and fair elections on the day. The STAEP activity which matters most in this regard is the actual conduct of election observation and its reporting.

96. A further three democracy strengthening indicators have possible links with STAEP (but not SERP) activities. Constituency relations groups (CRGs) might have acted upon political participation indicators such as the range of voluntary citizens' groups and their activity. In actual fact, as we have already argued in Section 3 above, the scale of CRGs was relatively small to have had a perceptible impact. If taken to scale, women's membership of CRGs might have also had an impact on women's participation in political life. The only other STAEP activity which might have impact women's participation in politics was the mobilization of women voters in the 'zero voting' polling stations. This, as we have already discussed in Section 3, was also at too small a scale to have had an impact at the national level. Even if the aggregate impact of these local campaigns was small, they did highlight the fact of the existence of 'zero voting' polling stations. **Similarly, STAEP's advocacy campaign on missing (women) voters which was not strictly part of logframe outputs helped to place a key inclusion issue on the agenda.**

4.3. Intervention contribution

Elected government

97. **The main factor in progress towards elected government in the place of non-elected government is agreements between and within political and state apparatus elites.** These agreements, as argued in the analysis of the political context for the evaluation, were premised on negotiated settlements, often facilitated by the international community. The role of election management bodies was a secondary and derivative one. In fact, major changes in election management were themselves outcomes of agreements between parliamentary parties on the one hand, and the parliament and the judiciary on the other. **Election support programmes had no role to play in this regard.**

Voter registration procedures

98. The contribution of the interventions to voter participation outcomes have already been discussed in detail in Section 3. Whether and to what extent the voter registration procedures improved is a related but distinct question. **National level key informants held the view that electoral rolls had improved due to the involvement of NADRA in voter registration.** This opinion also prevailed at the constituency level where ECP officials as well as other stakeholders including political activists and FAFEN affiliates thought that the 'cleaning up' of the rolls and the use of CNICs was an important step forward in eliminating electoral fraud. **At the community level, voter registration was seen by some as having become more difficult.**

Acceptability of election results

99. **The acceptance of election results by losing parties was premised partly on political and constitutional considerations, and partly on perceptions about election management. It was quickly acknowledged in the aftermath of polling that elections had been relatively free and fair, and that while there were many instances of malpractice, these did not significantly alter the overall outcome.** This view was held by a range of neutral observers, and had some impact on the decision of losing parties to accept the results. Political factors were also at play. The two main national contenders (PPP and PTI) who lost at the federal level both won provincial governments in the same elections, and thus had a stake in accepting the results**.** These parties and others further qualified their acceptance of the results on the grounds that they did not want to derail the democratic process or to create opportunities for non-constitutional forces.

Supply side interventions

100. **To the extent that SERP had assisted the ECP in the run-up to polling day it contributed to the acceptability of the results.** The fact that losing parties were constrained due to their prior agreement with the election management process, some of which was facilitated by SERP, made it harder for them to reject the results outright. **This does not imply, of course, that there is agreement about the actual quality of election management in 2013.** While our key informants at the national and constituency levels were generally positive in their assessment, there were also many points of adverse comparison in relation to 2008. There were serious allegations of fraud in which constituency-level informants implicated collusion between candidates, the administration and ECP staff. The failure of the ECP to quickly publish polling station level data – as they had done in 2008 (albeit months later) – was cited by some national level key informants as an important lapse in the transparency of the electoral process. There is also concern among key informants about the increase in the number of invalid votes.

Demand side interventions

101. **STAEP was unable to play a significant role in improving the legitimacy of elections due to ambitious targets and an underestimation of challenges involved the delivery of credible and timely large-scale election observation.** It is not the task of election observers, obviously, to legitimize any particular election. Their role is to contribute to the legitimacy of elections in the long run by reporting credibly and reliably on violations, with the view to deterring those violations in on-going and future contests. This means that they should either provide credible evidence of violations or lend weight to the acceptability of the results. While large-scale election observation had been widely publicized prior to the elections, and contributed (as we have argued in Section 3), to an overall atmosphere of scrutiny, actual observation fell short of its objectives. STAEP credibility was called to question when early reporting of some its findings were successfully challenged by the ECP. Questions about the success of election-day observation remained when STAEP was unable to publish a consistent report on its findings.

Contribution to outcome

102. **SERP made a minor but significant contribution to the broader goal of democracy strengthening through its assistance to the ECP.** Its main contribution here was with regard to the acceptability of election results by political stakeholders, who in turn, were constrained by their own

prior participation in shaping electoral processes. SERP had facilitated technical improvements in the ECP as well as some of the political and legislative initiatives leading up to the elections.

103.   **An assessment of STAEP's contribution to democracy strengthening depends critically on the time horizon that is chosen to assess impact.** The 2013 general elections represented the most conspicuous political event which was to occur during the lifetime of the programme and would shape the course of democracy in Pakistan. STAEP's contribution to democracy strengthening was minor but significant in the run-up to the elections. As in the case of voter participation (discussed in Section 3), STAEP was one of the many stakeholders whose activities helped to create an expectation that elections will be relatively free and fair.

104.   FAFEN's **election observation failed to live up to the ambitious expectations set,** and there are doubts about the extent to which this key STAEP output was actually delivered. The loss of reputation suffered due to erroneous reporting soon after the elections, and the inability to produce a consistent report on the elections since then, meant that STAEP's election observation was unable to make a significant contribution to democracy strengthening over a longer time horizon, as stipulated in the Theory of Change.[28]

---

[28] Implications for future election observation design are spelled out in Section 6.2 below.

Table 6: Democracy strengthening – summary of findings

	Quantitative analysis	Policy level	Constituency-level	Community-based	Contextual analysis
Indicator					
Perceptions		Strong agreement; transition between elected governments conspicuous in shaping perceptions	Elections perceived to be free but not fair	Less evidence of election malpractice in 2013 but local norms of legitimacy different	Cooperation between political elites shapes perceptions
Links					
Improved election management makes elections and politics more socially inclusive	Strong evidence - women less likely to vote. No clear evidence about other dimensions of exclusion		Evidence of systematic exclusion of certain types of individuals from electoral process	Mixed evidence - exclusion of certain type of individuals, but instances of agency for some marginalised groups	
Improved election management strengthens democracy through greater legitimacy and acceptability of results		Strong agreement		Norms of legitimacy of elections differ at community-level	Weak evidence Acceptability of results depends on political cooperation
Intervention contribution					
Contribution to transition between elected governments		No agreement			Disagreement –role of election management bodies seen as derivative
Supply-side interventions contributed to increasing legitimacy of elections		Mixed evidence – Contributed to pre-election image of ECP but ECP performance compromised due to non-intervention factors	Mixed evidence	Weak evidence – local factors determine acceptability and election day experiences	Mixed evidence – signalling device, shapes perceptions

Demand-side interventions contributed to increasing legitimacy of elections		No agreement - Unable to deliver and STAEPs credibility questioned	Mixed evidence on success and implementation of election observation ; local factors matter	No evidence	Mixed evidence – signalling device, shapes perceptions

Section Five – Qualifications

105.   The contribution story we have assembled addresses output to outcome mapping from a number of different angles. We have generally accepted at face value programme reporting on outputs, and our own observations where they relate to outputs are limited to the relatively limited primary fieldwork we were able to conduct. While some new facts have come to light as a result of this fieldwork, we do not claim to have authoritative findings on programme outputs. We do take seriously key informant views on programme outputs because these mostly concur with programme reporting itself, or are based on publicly available information.

106.   Our critique of outcome indicators and their measurement is also based on a close reading of the data and methods and the examination of logical consistencies.[29] In the absence of documentary evidence in some cases – for example with respect to the details of the 2013 PIDAT-IDEA scores – we have resorted to some degree of speculative reasoning. This too, however, is based on what we have learnt from key informants about factors behind expert opinions of recent political developments in Pakistan. We feel secure in pointing to the salience of conspicuous political events in shaping perceptions of improvement with respect to a range of (often unrelated) democracy indicators.

107.   A number of our insights into the Theory of Change – or the links between outputs and outcomes – come from an analysis of quantitative data and our own purposive qualitative fieldwork in selected constituencies. Through a combination of these two sources, and in the light of key informant interviews, we have been able to form opinions about whether and how intervention factors might have influenced outcomes. Our observations about voter behaviour and perceptions and our critique of the relatively simplistic assumptions of the Theory of Change based on these observations is line with previous studies in Pakistan. While we say nothing new in pointing out the importance of group-based behaviour or local political factors, where our fieldwork adds value is in probing the precise nature of these factors in different communities, and in examining how the macro-level understanding of change might have played at the grass-roots level.

Section Six – Lessons for Future Programming

6.1. Greater attention to drivers of political behaviour and change at macro, meso and micro levels

108.   **The research for this evaluation showed the importance of non-intervention political drivers in the proper framing of the Theory of Change, as well as programme design.** The key stakeholders in the democratic transition at the national or the macro level are the political and state apparatus elites, particularly the former.   The sustainability of the democratic transition remained pegged to cooperation as well as competition among political elites. Equally important is the nominal (at the very least) compliance of the state apparatus elites with constitutional governance. Democratic transition and political stability depend on cooperative relations between otherwise competitive

---

[29] For a detailed critique of outcome indicators, please see Collective for Social Science Research, 2013

and rival elites.   The behaviour and capacity of other stakeholders, such election management bodies, are important but secondary factors.

109.   **It was also shown that in a large and diverse country like Pakistan, there can be significant differences in meso-level political factors between regions, ethnic groups and other segments of the population.** Conditions for the democratic transition – understood in terms of a cooperative competition among political elites – will vary across the country. In some population segments technical improvements in election management capacity will have a bigger impact than others, depending on the nature and stage of the transition or, indeed, its absence. The 'new party' factor was important in KP, whereas in ethnic Baloch regions the boycott call on the part of ethnic-nationalist groups dominated the 2013 elections.

110.   **At the micro-level or for individuals, outcomes matter more than processes, and political choices are more likely to be driven by local factional considerations rather than higher principles of accountability.** Families and local factional leaders play important intermediary roles between citizens and the state, particularly for women, but not only women. This neither means that individuals have no agency, nor that all group-based behaviour is linked to patrimonial transactional politics. We have shown that there is a great deal of variation in the manner in which individuals and groups interact with the electoral process.

111.   **Contextual political analysis at the macro and meso levels needs to be explicitly brought into programme justification and design.** The more generic narrative linking improved election management with individual responses such as the propensity to vote, perceptions of legitimacy of electoral processes, and wider civic engagement, is both valid and necessary. It does not take into account a range of political factors that are specific to time and place, which will influence outcomes.

112.   Examples of the type of contextual political analysis which should inform the Theory of Change and programme design:

- Identify a realistic time horizon for democracy strengthening
    - Lifetime of the current parliament and assemblies?
    - Up to the next 'n' electoral cycles?
- Identify key national and provincial stakeholders who are relevant to the democratic transition in this time frame
    - Political parties and leaders and their social bases
    - State apparatus elites
    - Civil society players
    - Media
    - Social groupings based on class and identity
    - Organised interest groups
- Examine how cooperation and rivalry between and within various political and state apparatus elites will promote or obstruct the democratic transition
- Identify areas where technical assistance on the supply and demand side can facilitate democracy-strengthening cooperation between stakeholders
    - Election processes and reforms
    - Formal and informal forums for interaction and negotiation on specific political issues identified as pertinent to the national, provincial and sub-provincial levels

- Identify areas where technical assistance on the supply and demand side can help to channel rivalry into democratic contest
  - Assistance to democratic stakeholders in converting rival positions into alternative policies
- Anticipate key threats to constitutional functioning
  - Civil-military relations
  - Issues of mandate between parliament and judiciary
  - Security threats

113. Correspondingly, **the Theory of Change and programme design need to pay attention to the actual modalities of interaction between citizens and the electoral process at the grassroots.** Depending on the scope of and scale of the programme, and its presence at the community level, it needs to develop a more detailed understanding of actual political processes at the grassroots. Any programme design that envisages a community-level presence/intervention needs to conduct local political analysis incorporating:

- Local stakeholders' and political dynamics
- Conflicts and disputes
- Social groupings
- Dimensions of social exclusion and their political manifestations (this is addressed further in 6.4)
- Interaction between individuals and the political process
- Salient changes in structure and agency
- Implications for prioritization of interventions
  - Demand-making and access to representatives
  - Voter education and facilitation

6.2. Realistic view of organizational constraints and risks

114. Although programme design and the Theory of Change already pay attention to constraints and risks, both at the level of outputs, as well as in going from outputs to outcomes, **it is necessary to grade these constraints risks more carefully, and to explicitly address these in programme design.** We find that programme design took account of contingent factors – such as the commitment of the elites to continue engagement with the democratic transition – but did not do enough to design around other constraints and risks, particularly around organizational and human capital factors, which were eventually encountered.

115. There were organizational issues, particularly in relation with the ECP, which meant that a number of activities and outputs of SERP, and some related to STAEP, could not be achieved. **In other areas the programmes delivered useful outputs which were not part of their formal work plans, but need to be acknowledged. For example, the ECP ended up utilizing SERP to a great extent and STAEP to a smaller extent, for help with activities which were essential to election management. STAEP campaigns on missing (women) voters helped to place a key issue on the public and political agenda.**

- Election support programmes should create **'firefighting' windows** as part of the programme which allows requests for technical assistance to explicitly acknowledged as programme

activities (e.g. SERP assistance to ECP), and for changes in work plans to acknowledge responses to political contingencies (e.g. STAEP missing voters' campaign).

116. **Although STAEP was reported as having achieved most of its outputs, there are questions about the quality of the network actually created on the ground.** FAFEN's undoubted organizational strength in terms of outreach in 200 NA constituencies through partner organisations needs to be assessed more critically keeping in mind the nature of activities, outputs and outcomes that the programme was expected to deliver. Specifically, how useful was this network for the two key field activities: CRGs and election monitoring? We found that CRG activities were dominated, on the ground, by lobbying for local public goods, which was in line with the patrimonial mode of existing political transactions. The fact that organisations which were part of the network had diverse areas of specialization – mostly in the development sector – meant that these organisations were predisposed towards creating CRGs which would undertake lobbying for local public goods. It would have been challenging, in any case, for an organization to engage in activities other than such lobbying, say in the area of political education, and maintain a reputation for independence and neutrality which its election monitoring role would require:

- There needs to be a reassessment of the idea than any single network of organisations, particularly one whose membership consists of diverse organization types, can deliver reliable election monitoring at the national level
- Objectives of election observation and its link with outcomes need to be more clearly spelled out
- Programme design needs to acknowledge the limited availability of high quality election observation, and to use these strategically for
  - purposes of deterrence (to violation)
  - evidence-based ideas for course correction and reform

6.3. Data issues and indicators

117. **We found insufficient integration between programme design and the collection of data which were needed for supporting the programmes or monitoring their outcome targets.** A number of surveys carried out by the programme had missing information on key variables for important periods of time. The baseline BAAPS 2011, for example, did not include a question on current intention to vote, or the level of current confidence in ECP and election processes. While these variables were present in a subsequent round of the survey, and in other STAEP and SERP surveys, it was not possible to compare findings with the baseline period. It is not clear if these data were used for programme implementation.

118. Programme design referred to voter turnout rates in the 2008 elections as baseline but did not flag issues with the use of this statistic – the fact electoral rolls in 2008 were known to have a large number of unverified entries, as well as the problem of using election outcomes in 2008 to monitor the progress of programmes which started in 2011 and 2012. While ECP data from 2008 were used for identifying 'zero per cent' women voter polling stations for intervention, it is not clear if other ECP data from 2008 were used to direct programme activities.

119. Finally, **the programmes were not aware that the PILDAT-IDEA democracy scoring will be used to measure outcomes.** The methodology for arriving at the score for 2013 was made explicit by

PILDAT-IDEA and there are indications that conspicuous events shaped elite opinions of the democratic process and these were reflected in the scores.

120.   Programme design needs to integrate data requirements for:
- Populating the Theory of Change
- Targeting programme activities
- Monitoring progress

6.4. Explicit focus on social exclusion

121.   There were only two sets of activities which might have had an explicit focus on the multiple dimensions of social marginality and exclusion across Pakistan. There was a campaign at the '564 zero per cent' polling stations to mobilise women voters. FAFEN partners and CRG members were also reported to have assisted with the registration of votes among poor communities by directing NADRA mobile services to particularly excluded communities. The scale of these activities, however, was relatively small compared with the deficit in the political participation of women and marginalized and excluded communities. In some cases, it was found that FAFEN staff was themselves unclear about the voting rights of marginalized groups. SERP programme implementers did not see social exclusion as part of its mandate.

122.   **Social exclusion needs to be explicitly incorporated into the design of future election support programmes.** Our research for the assessment confirmed the two-way link between social exclusion and political participation. While those who are socially excluded are also more likely to be excluded from political participation, it is also true that political participation offers entry points for the socially excluded. This is one area where election support programmes can add significant value to existing supply and demand side activities already being conducted by other stakeholders. Considering that the democratic transition is largely driven by non-intervention factors, and that political participation can be an important strategic instrument for the socially excluded, it is difficult to justify election support programmes that do not have an explicit focus on social exclusion. Programme design should, therefore, include a social exclusion analysis incorporating:

- The programme's definition of social exclusion in its own context
    - o Multiple dimensions are generally used: gender, class, caste, ethnicity, religious identity, kinship group, political affiliation, migration status, homelessness, disability
    - o A rigorous social exclusion analysis will empirical identify which of these dimensions (and their combinations) are of primary interest
- Identification of salient processes of social exclusion in programme communities
    - o The level of detail will depend on the scope of the programme – if programme design envisages interventions at the NA constituency level (as in STAEP) it should conduct an analysis at that level
    - o If the programme is at the national level it still needs to identify processes and corresponding groups
- An understanding of existing interaction between social exclusion and political participation
    - o How does social exclusion hinder political participation in the relevant communities?
    - o How does political participation help to counter social exclusion?
    - o How do political parties and leaders interact with the socially excluded? At various levels?

- o Are there cases of emerging leaders from among the excluded groups? Through what channels? How might they challenge social exclusion, if at all?
- Identification of programme/intervention priorities with respect to countering social exclusion
  - o Do we need to focus on particular groups?
  - o Do certain forms of discrimination need to be raised as broader political issues at the local, sub-provincial, provincial and national levels
  - o Do certain forms of official practice which reinforce social exclusion need to be altered through
    - ▪ Procedures
    - ▪ Sensitization of staff
    - ▪ Explicit presence of members of excluded groups
- Setting explicit and verifiable programme targets with respect to countering social exclusion

Annexes

Annex 1– Bibliography

Afzal, M. (2014). DFID Election Programmes in Pakistan - Background Quantitative Report.

Balagamwala, M., & Gazdar, H. (2014). Impact Evaluation of DFIDs Electoral Programmes in Pakistan - Findings from Qualitative Research: Collective for Social Science Research.

Cheema, A., & Javid, H. (2014). Contextual Determinants of Democracy in Pakistan: IDEAS.

Collective for Social Science Research. (2013). Evaluation of STAEP and SERP - Inception Report.

DFID. (2010). STAEP Project Document.

DFID. (2011a). STAEP Annual Review 2011

DFID. (2011b). STAEP Logical Framework: DFID

DFID. (2012a). SERP Intervention Summary & Business Case.

DFID. (2012b). SERP Logical Framework

DFID. (2012c). STAEP Annual Review 2012.

DFID. (2013). SERP Annual Review 2012

DFID. (2014). STAEP Annual Review 2013.

Election Commission of Pakistan. (2013). *Polling Scheme, General Elections 2013*.

FAFEN. (2014a). 2013 Elections, National Assembly Election Results Analysis - Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT), Comparative Turnout and Party Trends: Free and Fair Election Network.

FAFEN. (2014b). Election Day Observation - Key Findings: Free and Fair Election Network.

Haider, H. (2012). Monitoring and Evaluation of Electoral Support (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report) Birmingham, UK: Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, University of Birmingham.

IFES. (2012a). SERP Annual Report 2012.

IFES. (2012b). SERP Quarterly Report April-June 2012.

IFES. (2012c). SERP Quarterly Report Jan-Mar 2012.

IFES. (2012d). SERP Quarterly Report July-Sept 2012.

International IDEA. (2008). Assessing the Quality of Democracy: An Overview of the International IDEA Framework (pp. 33).

Mayne, J. (2008). Contribution Analysis: An Approach to Exploring Cause and Effect. In Institutional Learning and Change (ILAC) (Ed.), *ILAC Brief*.

PILDAT. (2011). Assessment of the Quality of Democracy in Pakistan (pp. 116).

PILDAT. (2012). Assessment of the Quality of Democracy in Pakistan.

PILDAT. (2013). Assessment of the Quality of Democracy in the First 100 Days of National and Provincial Governments.

Qaisrani, S., & Hussain, S. (2012). STAEP - Beneficiary Feedback Survey: DFID.

Roberts, H. (2014). Key Informant Interviews for an Evaluation of SERP and STAEP.

The Asia Foundation. (2012a). STAEP Half Yearly Report Jan-June 2012 (pp. 37).

The Asia Foundation. (2012b). STAEP Half Yearly Report July-Dec 2012 (pp. 37).

The Asia Foundation. (2013a). Organizational Credibility and Reputation Study of FAFEN - An Endline Report.

The Asia Foundation. (2013b). STAEP Half Yearly report Jan-June 2013 (pp. 34).

White, H., & Phillips, D. (2012). Addressing Attribution of Cause and Effect in Small n Impact Evaluations: Towards an Integrated Framework. *3ie Working Paper 15,* International Initiative for Impact Evaluations (3ie)

Annex 2 – Contribution Analysis

Contribution analysis is a 'theory-based' approach to evaluation which has been developed by John Mayne (White and Phillips, 2012). It has been consolidated into steps which work towards building a "contribution story" which consists of evidence that shows the contribution made by an intervention to an outcome along with other factors that could have influenced outcomes. Contribution analysis is an iterative process whereby evidence is gathered or collected at various stages to build up a story which can then be assessed and strengthened with further evidence and/or analysis. For the purposes of this evaluation, the following steps have been undertaken as part of contribution analysis (adapted from Mayne, 2008) - Steps 1 to 4 were completed and presented in the Inception Report while this evaluation reports covers Steps 5 and 6.

Step One: Set attribution problem
Evaluation questions and objectives have been outlined in the introduction and in greater detail in the Inception Report. These questions will determine the specific cause-effect questions being addressed

Step Two: Develop the theory of change and risks to it
Well-developed theories of change and log frames are available both the programmes. These outline how the programme's inputs are expected to achieve outputs, outcomes and eventually impacts. Under this section of the Contribution Analysis methodology, the theory of change was critically reviewed with specific comments on the logical chain and assumptions (refer to Inception Report).

Step Three: Gather existing evidence on the theory of change
In this step, evidence that existed at the inception stage of our evaluation was gathered. This includes evidence on results and activities that included key achievements of the programmes and if outputs were achieved according to set milestones. This was obtained from progress reports and annual reviews of STAEP and SERP and through preliminary interviewed with managing partners of the two programmes (IFES, TAF and FAFEN). Evidence on assumptions and other influencing factors was collected to show the extent to which the assumptions outlined by the Theory of Change are valid through literature review of existing empirical literature on determinants of voter turnout and democratic strengthening.

Step Four: Assembling a preliminary contribution story
The evidence gathered in the inception phase was assembled together and presented in the inception report. At that stage, we recognised that we did not have a "contribution story" but our review and critique of the theory of change was a step towards it. In the inception report, we also identified the data that needed to be collected to build a "contribution story".

Step Five: Seek out additional evidence
Evidence to verify the theory of change was collected through quantitative and qualitative methods to test the assumptions in the theory. Three different categories of evidence have been collected which added to evidence that already existed:

   i.   Evidence on results and activities – Evidence on the achievements and failures of the programme through interviews with individuals involved in STAEP and SERP and other key informants with knowledge of and involvement in the electoral process in 2013. These were done at policy/programme level as well as the constituency level. Community-level findings added to the evidence.

ii. Evidence on assumptions – Additional evidence on assumptions was gathered through quantitative analysis and qualitative data collection. Qualitative methods were used to bridge analytical gaps arising from quantitative analysis about possible linkages between interventions and outcomes.

iii. Evidence on other influencing factors – Evidence was collected to examine other important non-intervention factors that may have had an influence on voter turnouts and strengthening of democracy. The methods used were the same as those outlined above i.e. quantitative analysis and qualitative fieldwork. In addition to these, an analysis of the broader contextual factors that determine political outcomes was also undertaken which gives a narrative of non-intervention factors that shape political outcomes and the key players and processes involved in the democratic transition.

Step Six: Revise and strengthen the contribution story
The final stage of the Contribution Analysis is assembling all of the various components into one inter-linked narrative structured around the Theory of Change (see Figure 2). In this case, we use the results of the four main components of the study – viz quantitative analysis of voter turnout, interview-based analysis of policy and programme changes, community based qualitative fieldwork on citizen's interaction with electoral processes, and a broader contextual analysis of political outcomes – to construct a plausible narrative about the contribution of the interventions to the two outcomes of interest – voter turnout and democracy strengthening. The Contribution Analysis also offers comments on the relative evidential strength of each of the links in the contribution story.

Annex 3– Key informants interviewed at the policy/programme level

No.	Designation of Respondent	Name of Organization
1	Country Director & Deputy Country Director	IFES
2	Chief Executive	FAFEN
3	Programs Director	TAF
4	Chief Technical Officer	UNDP
5	Chief of Party	NDI
6	Senior Programme Officer	IRI
7	Senior Gender Advisor	UNWOMEN
8	Country Director & Deputy Country Director	DRI
9	Chairman	NADRA
10	Executive Director	CCE
11	Chief Executive	SPO
12	Member of the EU Delegation	EU delegation to Pakistan
13	South Asia Senior Analyst	International Crisis Group (ICG)
14	President	PILDAT
15	Governance Advisor	USAID
16	Senior Programs Officer	CIDA
17	Senior Council Member	HRCP
18	Director Public Relations	ECP
19	Additional Secretary – Administrative affairs	Federal Ministry of Law and Justice
20	Chief Reporter	DAWN News
21	Chief Reporter	Express Tribune
22	Court Correspondent and TV Anchor	Waqt News
23	Senior Vice President	Awami National Party (ANP)

Annex 4– Qualitative fieldwork

Table A: Selected sites

Constituency Name	Province	CRG	564 polling stations	Mostly urban
NA-4, Peshawar-IV	KP	Yes	Yes	Yes
NA-10, Mardan-II	KP	Yes	No	No
NA-73, Bhakkar-I	Punjab	Yes	No	No
NA-124, Lahore-VII	Punjab	No	No	Yes
NA-209, Jacobabad-cum-Kashmore (Old Jacobabad-II)	Sindh	Yes	Yes	No
NA-249, Karachi-XI	Sindh	Yes	No	Yes
NA-261, Pishin-cum-Ziarat	Balochistan	Yes	No [30]	No
NA-272, Kech-cum-Gwadar	Balochistan	Yes	No	No

Table B: Community-level interactions

	Social Hierarchy			Gender			Age			
Individual Interviews	**Marginalized**	**Mainstream**	**All**	**Female**	**Male**	**All**	**18-30**	**31-60**	**60+**	**All**
Voted	8	2		5	5		3	5	2	
Not Voted	12	1		7	6		3	8	2	
Not Registered	3	2		4	1		4	0	1	
	23	5	28	16	12	28	10	13	5	28
FGDs	**Marginalized**	**Mainstream**	**All**	**Female**	**Male**	**All**	**18-30**	**31-60**	**60+**	**All**
Voted	8	2		6	4		2	7	1	
Not Voted	7	1		5	3		3	3	2	
Not Registered	2	0		1	1		2	0	0	
	17	3	20	12	8	20	7	10	3	20
Total Interactions	**Marginalized**	**Mainstream**	**All**	**Female**	**Male**	**All**	**18-30**	**31-60**	**60+**	**All**
Voted	16	4		11	9		5	12	3	
Not Voted	19	2		12	9		6	11	4	
Not Registered	5	2		5	2		6	0	1	
	40	8	48	28	20	48	17	23	8	48

---

[30] NA 261 had some of the '564 polling stations', however, our field team was unable to work in these areas due to security concerns present

Annex 5 – Note on FAFENs report on National Assembly Election Results Analysis, Jan 2014

FAFEN published its report on the May 2013 National Assembly elections in January 2014. The report presents an analysis of voter turnout and trends in winning patterns in each constituency along with results from the Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) exercise undertaken by FAFEN in a sample of polling stations (8,495 out of 69,895). It also provides a constituency-wise report on election-day violations. Many of the key results are only reported for individual constituencies and not aggregated into useable categories.

In the STAEP logframe PVT is cited as one of the output indicators for election observation. This link between the PVT and election observation suggests that PVT data were collected by election observers as part of their observation activities at the vote-counting stage. In fact, there is some confusion with respect to the source of the PVT data. According to the report, 'the PVT is based on direct observation of vote counting in a scientifically-verifiable, robust sample of the polling stations in each constituency' implying data used in PVT calculations is that which has been collected by election observers.

The report then goes on to state that Form XVIs of sample polling stations were used. It notes that there were obtained using four different methods:

- Category A refers to Form XIVs received from the polling stations on the day of elections that are signed and stamped, are legible and have all the information properly documented.
- Category B refers to legible forms collected on the election-day that do not have the polling official's signature or stamp or all the information.
- Category C forms are those collected from the polling station on election-day that may not have the polling official's signature and/or stamp and/or have some over writing and/or not legible.
- Category D forms are the ones collected from the Returning Officer's secretariat on or after the election-day or have the results compiled by FAFEN's election-day observers on prescribed forms issued to them. Such forms have been mostly employed to verify data of the first three categories and for accounting for the data of polling stations for which the data could not be collected from the polling station on the day of the election.

The report provides a count of the category of forms for each constituency but does not provide totals for the country. Casual analysis of constituency-wise results suggests great variation across constituencies in the source of Form XVIs. Category D is not further classified into forms which were obtained after election-day from ECP officials and those based on direction observations of FAFEN election observers. This is unfortunate, given that direct observation would have been the most independent source of data for checking ECP results. It is a matter of some concern, moreover, that the tabulations and the analysis make use of Category B and Category C forms. The report includes data from constituencies such as NA-272 Gwadar-cum-Kech where election observation did not take place.

The PVT data, therefore, are not based on direct observations at vote counts but on official results issued at the polling station by ECP officials at the vote count. The report does acknowledge that the PVT can only be used to check the correspondence between polling station level counting and aggregation at the constituency level. As we have shown above, the analysis does not distinguish between direct FAFEN observation (by election observers – or a subset of Category D) and other sources of data.

From the existing tabulations and analysis, therefore, it is not possible to say if the PVT sample represents some benchmark of 'free and fair elections' against which the overall ECP results are being compared. This might have been the case if the analysis had been based on those polling stations where the PVT data had been gathered directly by FAFEN observers, and where it was judged that elections had been relatively free and fair. The way the results have been presented thus far, it is not clear why the PVT sample ought to be used as a benchmark or comparator for ECP results. The PVT data are mostly from ECP sources, which is also the case for the ECP results. We have no way of knowing if the PVT sample represents relatively free and fair elections against which we might have compared ECP results.

In the analysis of PVT data, the FAFEN report makes two main sets of comparison with ECP results. First, it compares the turnout rates at the PVT sample polling stations with ECP results. The size of the PVT sample is large enough for it to detect differences with ECP results with a narrow margin of error. For the country as a whole, the PVT sample predicts a turnout rate of 54.7 per cent, with a margin of +/- 0.03 per cent. In other words, if the PVT sample were a base for 'free and fair elections', the national turnout rate would have ranged from 54.67 per cent to 54.73 per cent. In actual fact the turnout rate in ECP results was found to be 55.7 per cent. Moreover it was reported that, at the constituency level, the turnout rate from the ECP results was within the statistical acceptable range (compared with the PVT sample) only in 62 out of the 264 constituencies where observation took place. Unfortunately, the FAFEN report does not provide further analysis of these outliers.

The second comparison is between the vote shares of the top three candidates in a constituency. These results too are reported in terms of ranges – the PVT sample is able to predict the statistically acceptable range within which the vote share of a particular candidate would have lay. The PVT sample while large enough to predict turnout rates within a relatively narrow margin of error, is not large enough to predict vote shares with similar precision. In most cases the statistically acceptable range of the winning candidate and the runner-up overlap. In these cases it is not possible on the basis of the PVT sample to accurately predict if the ECP result was a true reflection of reality. The FAFEN report, however, interprets these results incorrectly. It reports that the ECP result differed from the PVT sample only 18 out of 264 constituencies, and then probes only these constituencies. Within these 18 it finds that the ECP result was 'equivalent' to the PVT sample because the vote shares of the winning and runner-up candidates as reported by the ECP were within the statistically acceptable range predicted by the PVT sample. This is clearly an erroneous interpretation. The correct interpretation is that in these cases the PVT sample was too small to be able to precisely predict the outcome. The supposed 'equivalence' between the PVT sample and ECP results is in reality the finding that it is not possible to accurately distinguish between the two sources – and not that the two sources produce the same outcome.

The FAFEN report provides a cursory account of election-day observations with regards to violations at polling stations. A more detailed report is meant to be published at a later date, but only a summary based on the same data was published in March 2014. The January 2014 lists a number of categories of possible election-day violation, and then reports the number of counts observed in the polling stations observed in a particular constituency. This indicates that rich data might have been collected during observation. There are observations, for example, about the number of polling booths captured by a party or candidate. Such observations might have been utilised to rank constituencies by some index of electoral process quality, which in turn might have informed the analysis of PVT sample data on voter turnout and vote shares.

In some cases the actual reporting does not make clear what the unit of counting (violations) might be. For NA 108, for example, it is reported that there were six counts where "Polling officials didn't check the stamp and signature on the back of each NA ballot". It is not clear if this occurred with respect to six ballots, it was the practice of six polling officials, or if this was the practice of one/all polling officials in six polling stations. Another source of confusion is the use of "0" to denote missing values in some cases. For constituencies where election observation did not take place, a "0" has been recorded for each violation which makes it appear that there were none in the constituency. This raises the question that a "0" in other constituencies might also imply the absence of reporting rather than the absence of a violation. In principle, it should be possible to extract useable data from the large amount of information collected.

To sum up, there are a number of unanswered questions with regard with FAFEN's election observation and PVT data analysis:

- It is not clear if the PVT sample should be used as a benchmark for relatively free and fair elections against which the ECP results can be gauged.
- The reporting of election-day violations is confusing and seems to be under-utilised.
- The finding about variations in turnout rates between the PVT sample and ECP results needed to be probed further.
- The comparison of PVT sample and ECP results on candidate vote shares is based on an incorrect understanding of the power of the sample to accurately predict actual outcomes.

Annex 6– Abbreviations

ANP – Awami National Party
ACE – Association for Creation of Employment
BAAPS – Behavioural Attitudinal and Perceptions Survey
BEEJ – Balochistan Environmental & Educational Journey
BISP – Benazir Income Support Programme
CCE – Centre for Civic Education
CEC – Chief Election Commissioner
CIDA – Canadian Agency for International Development
CRG – Constituency Relations Group
CNIC – Computerised National Identity Card
CSO – Civil Society Organisation
DEC – District Election Commissioner
DFID – Department for International Development
DRI – Democracy Reporting International
ECP – Election Commission of Pakistan
FAFEN – Free and Fair Elections Network
FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GSF – Goth Seenghar Foundation
HRCP – Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
ICT – Islamabad Capital Territory
ICG – International Crisis Group
IFES – International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IRSP- Integrated Regional Support Program
ITV – Intention to Vote
IRI – International Republican Institute
IDEA – Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
KP – Khyber Paktunkhwa
KRC – Katchi Raabta Committee
NA – National Assembly
NADRA – National Database and Registration Authority
NGO – Non Governmental Organization
NP – National Party
NRO – National Reconciliation Ordinance
PILDAT – Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency
PML-N – Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)
PPP – Pakistan Peoples Party
PTI – Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf
PVT – Parallel Vote Tabulation
RMS – Results Management System
RO – Returning Officer
SC – Supreme Court of Pakistan
SERP – Supporting Electoral Reform in Pakistan

SMS – Short Message Service

SPO – Strengthening Participatory Organization

STAEP – Supporting Transparency, Accountability and Electoral Processes

TAF – The Asia Foundation

UNDP – United Nations Development Program

Annex 7 – Terms of Reference

Impact Evaluation for STAEP (Supporting Transparency Accountability and Electoral Processes) and SERP (Supporting Electoral Reforms in Pakistan)

1.   Background

The 2013 general elections were held on 11 May 2013. These are a significant landmark as it is the first time that a parliament in Pakistan has completed its term and handed over power through a democratic process. DFID has two main elections programmes, SERP and STAEP.

>   **a.**   Support to Electoral Reform in Pakistan (SERP)

Programme approach: SERP provides technical assistance (TA) to the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) through the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). The scope for technical assistance covers trainings of ECP staff, conception, design and implementation of organisational systems at ECP, interpretation of legislations and related electoral rulings and technical backstopping to ECP on political finance, polling staff training, electoral legislation and voter education.

Theory of change: The fragility of democracy and instability of the political process in Pakistan is at least in part due to the lack of credibility of the electoral process. With more effective, inclusive electoral institutions (output) that are better able to resist interference, act independently and uphold international election standards, there will be more confidence in the electoral process and the election results will be more likely to be perceived as credible (outcome). The main output to outcome assumption is that increasing electoral institutions' capacity will give men and women (including political parties) confidence to engage with electoral processes, making the elections more credible and the results more likely to be accepted. In addition, the outcome to impact assumption is that increased capacity of the electoral processes and institutions will increase stability and the potential for poverty reduction. This assumption is based on evidence[31] and is one that has formed part of previous DFID Pakistan Governance Business Cases.

The results for the programme include:

- a <u>legal framework</u> for both federal and local elections that meets an additional five international standards; is unified into one law; and includes 25% of civil society's recommendations;
- <u>increased institutional capacity of the ECP</u> to manage future elections that results in: the ECP achieving an additional 25 high priority objectives from its Strategic Plan; increased professionalism and competence of election officials; 20 additional organisations (including political parties and observer groups) having increased confidence in the voter list; and enhanced capacity of the ECP to conduct electoral operations (e.g. media outreach; adjudication of complaints; transparent constituency delimitation); and
- <u>increased understanding of target citizens of the electoral/voting process </u> with a particular focus on women.

---

31 See for example Goldstone, J.A. and Ulfelder, J. (2004) How to construct stable democracies and OECD (2010) The State's legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity , Paris, OECD

The programme runs from March 2012- December 2014 and is jointly funded by DFID, CIDA and EU. The total programme budget is £13m (DFID contribution: £5.68m). For the full SERP business case see: http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=203039)

Geographical Coverage: SERP provides technical assistance to Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)- a federal and thus covers whole country.

b. Supporting Transparency Accountability and Electoral Processes in Pakistan (STAEP)

Programme approach: DFID is supporting the Free and Fair Elections Network (FAFEN) for the implementation of STAEP (Supporting Transparency, Accountability, Transparency, and Electoral Process in Pakistan) through The Asia Foundation (TAF) for the period of three years (beginning 2011 – end 2013). FAFEN has been monitoring elections and related democratic processes in Pakistan since 2006 and with DFID support since February 2011. They have been able to expand their cover from 150 to 200 constituencies (out of 272 in the whole country). FAFEN implements the programme through its member organisations, which are leading CSOs in Pakistan. The beneficiaries are community groups of citizens, and target populations of traditionally disenfranchised citizens, including youth, women, religious minorities and the poor.

Theory of change: Democracy be sustained better if there are effective mechanisms for citizen participation to both engage in democratic processes and hold democratic institutions accountable for setting and implementing a meaningful public agenda responsive to the citizens needs. With greater citizens engagements (through STAEP interventions such as governance monitorning, parliamentary oversight, demands identification and advocacy at constituency level, domestic election observation, and voter education), democratic institions are more inclusive, transparent and responsive to the citizens.

Key elections and transparency related outputs are:

- Domestic Elections observation (60% polling stations of all bi- and general elections). More than 40,000 domestic observers were trained and deployed for these general elections.
- Facilitation of CNIC registration (152,000 CNIC registration, 103,000 women) have been facilitated as of end of December 2012)
- Voter education and mobilization of female voters in 564 polling stations where women turnout was zero per cent in 2008 general elections.
- Building consensus amongst political parties (15) to follow elections code of conduct
- Training of 1200 political parties workers and officials on understanding of 18th constitutional amendment
- Governance monitoring in 200 constituencies (120 districts) on health, education, rule of law and price control.
- Active citizenship in 200 constituencies for identification of service delivery and freedom of information demands through 200 Constituency Relations Groups (CRGs). CRGs also work on follow up of demands with public officials and elected representatives.

STAEP is jointly funded by Dutch (6%) and DFID (94%). DFID contribution is £11.5m (elections related

budget is approximately £5m). The project document and the 2011 Annual Review can be found at http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=202289. The project period is Jan2011-Dec 2013. *Geographical Coverage:* STAEP is operational in 120 districts (out of 135) of Pakistan across all provinces.

2.   Evaluation purpose, objectives and questions

Justification for evaluating SERP and STAEP

The DFID Pakistan Evaluation Strategy[32], sets out the commitment to evaluate 50% of DFID supported programmes. Programmes need not be evaluated in their entirety and an evaluation should be focused on a number of discrete evaluation questions.

The criteria to determine which programmes to evaluate are:
- **Strategically important to DFID/P or DFID/HMG**: SERP and STAEP contribute to the Governance results set out in the DFID Pakistan's Operational plan and to the global DFID objective in seeking the inclusion of women and minorities.
- **Innovative**: The evaluation will assess if the synergies of working on both the demand and supply side of elections has achieved the shared objectives of the SERP and STAEP programmes.
- **High-risk**: learn lessons from working on elections and strengthening democracy in the volatile, violence prone Pakistan context.
- **Size: Together the two projects total just above 18 million sterling and make up 20% of governance spent in DFID-Pakistan portfolio.**
- **Where there is demand for evaluation:** DFID and partners want to better understand the impact of what they have achieved. Election support has not yet been the subject of an impact evaluation in a fragile context despite being a regular part of DFID programmes.[33]

Evaluation purpose

The evaluation will be used to provide evidence of the contribution that SERP and STAEP have made to any changes in voter turnout and strengthening democratic processes. This evidence will inform conclusions about the programme's effectiveness in the Project Completion Review due in November 2013, for accountability purposes. The evaluation will also support the design of future election programmes in Pakistan and other DFID country offices working in similar contexts. Evaluation findings will be used to update both our evidence base and theory of change on elections programming. While the evaluation needs to be as rigorous as possible in addressing the above purposes there is need to provide results that can be applied in a timely manner into further support to the elections cycle as noted under 'Timing'.

Evaluation objectives

The main objective of the evaluation is to estimate the contribution that the elections portfolio of DFID Pakistan has made to:
   o   voter turnout in the 2013 elections.

---

[32] http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/evaluation/dfid-pk-eval-strat.pdf
[33] Impact evaluations on elections programme of UNDP, however, are available for countries such a Afghanistan and others.

      o   strengthening of democratic processes in Pakistan.

The SERP and STAEP programmes are distinct but complementary. STAEP focuses on the demand/citizens side of the elections and SERP focuses on the supply/government side. The outcome level indicator for both programmes is to increase voter turnout from 44% in 2008 to 50% with 40% turnout of registered women voters in 2013.

DFID/P and its implementing partners seek to understand the relationships between work done by the two programmes and other non-programme factors that may have helped to increase voter turnout, especially any changes in the participation of women and excluded groups, and its impact on strengthening democratisation in practice.

DFID has considered undertaking a full process evaluation alongside the proposed impact evaluation to understand how programme implementation has contributed to any observed changes in key programme indicators. A process evaluation could also have helped to highlight specific lessons on how SERP and STAEP were delivered and the ways in which this could have improved. However, in the future DFID Pakistan is likely to take a different approach in terms of scope and outputs to deepening democracy. There is a risk that the lessons from a process evaluation of the current programmes would be to specific to support these changes. An understanding of the different external (non-programme) and programme factors that contribute to voter turnout and strengthening democratic processes is likely to prove more useful for future programmes. The limited time to conduct the evaluation and budget constraints also mean that a combined process and impact evaluation is not feasible. The focus will therefore be on providing evidence of the contribution that the programmes have made to voter turnout and deepening democracy. As well as broader evidence that improves our understanding of the drivers of these indicators.

Evaluation questions

The following questions follow from the evaluation objectives but are not fixed and evaluation suppliers can suggest amendments (but should include a justification for new or amended questions).

Voter turnout
- What factors affect voter turnout in Pakistan?
- To what extent are the outputs delivered by STAEP/SERP consistent with this evidence? In particular, what is the effect of citizen/voter education on voter turnout and which improvements in the electoral processes are most effective in promoting voter turnout?
- How is the turnout of different groups of voters (e.g. women, youth, other marginalised groups) affected by different interventions?
- What in practice influenced people to vote and what was the contribution made by both programmes to people's decision to take these steps:
    - In the lead up to elections: for example CNIC registration, voting practise, awareness of rights and value of voting - empowerment etc.
    - On polling days: proximity and accessibility of polling booths to women, minorities, people with disabilities, transparency of process.

Strengthening democracy
- What factors are associated with strengthening democracy in Pakistan?

- To what extent are the assumption in the SERP and STAEP theories of change consistent with this evidence about how democracy can be strengthened?
- To what extent do domestic observations (STAEP) and improvements in the electoral processes (STAEP) contribute to increased public confidence in and credibility of electoral systems of Pakistan?
- **To identify and analyse any unintended effects, both positive and negative, including any external factors affecting the success or failure of the interventions e.g. violence in elections.**

3. Method

Methodological considerations

The key methodological challenges for this evaluation are:

- Operationalising the evaluation questions. Voter turnout is well defined and comparatively straightforward to measure. Strengthening democracy is a broader term, which is both harder to define and measure. DFID refer to International IDEA's Democracy Assessment Framework as a proxy to measure the strengthening of democracy in Pakistan[34]. Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) also do periodic evaluation of Pakistan against this framework and this is listed as a resource as well in the Annex A. We are especially interested in the indicators on 'Free and Fair Elections' and 'Political Participation' (specifically of women, marginalized and excluded groups) as they are relevant to both programmes and theory of change.
- Understanding the factors that affect voter turn-out and strengthen democracy. Collating and synthesising the best available evidence for these factors will require looking at literature on Pakistan but also beyond. Given the limited time available for the evaluation, proposals should indicate how they will undertake this element of the work, including minimising the risk of bias.
- Evaluation timing. The Pakistan elections were held on 11 May 2013 and therefore many of the programmes' activities have already been delivered. There are a range of data that exist, including measures taken before the election but any missing data will need to be collected retrospectively, posing challenges for the recall of reliable information (e.g. pre-election attitudes towards voting). A list of existing data is summarised below with further detail in Annex A.
- Attirubtion. DFID is seeking to commission an impact evaluation but recognises that directly attributing any changes in voter turnout or strengthening democracy will be challenging. No control or comparison groups exist currently to provide a counterfactual and given the timing constraints identified above it will be challenging to generate these retrospectively, since much of the support has already been provided to beneficiaries. DFID is therefore interested in proposals that can generate plausible counterfactuals without using comparison groups. See Stern et al[35] and White and Philips[36] for more details on these approaches.

---

[34] http://www.idea.int/sod/framework/framework.cfm
[35] Stern et al (2012) Causes and their effects as defined in Broadening the range of designs and methods for impact evaluations - Report of a study commissioned by the Department for International Development https://www.gov.uk/.../file/67427/design-method-**impact**-eval.pdf
[36] White and Phillips (2012) Addressing attribution of cause and effect in small n impact evaluations: towards an integrated framework 3ie http://www.3ieimpact.org/evaluation/working-papers/working-paper-15/

Methods options

The method suggested in this ToR is indicative. Applicants are encouraged to propose alternative and innovative approaches that reflect international best practice and new thinking.

The evaluation will likely follow a mixed method approach and include both quantitative and qualitative measures for data collection and analysis. As part of the proposal, applicants must define a method that ensures a high level of rigour in both data collection and analysis. The proposed method should be appropriate to the purpose and rigorous in its approach with justifications of the selection of preferred methods based on available literature, and previous studies, and a clear conceptual foundation.

The qualitative methods in particular should have a strong conceptual basis to ensure that robust and credible results emerge and should include but not necessarily be limited to focus group discussions, biographies and key informant interviews. At the end of the inception stage of the evaluation, the consutlants will be encouraged to suggest additional or alternative approaches that would add value to, increase the impact of, or improve the value for money obtained from the evaluation, within the overall agreed framework.

All data will be disaggregated along social and economic indicators including gender. This disaggregation will, in general, follow the definitions developed by the Government, unless alternatives are explicitly required to highlight a particular issue.

The methodological approach should be formulated to ensure that both the process and design of the evaluation provide results that are useful and clear in both content and format to the Government of Pakistan, DFID and other donors to the programmes, and should specifically make practical recommendations for how evolving strategy, policy, and interventions should be implemented and scaled up in Pakistan.

The evaluation team will be responsible for developing the detailed method and advising DFID on the best approach to maximise both the validity of findings and their usefulness in defining the interventions. Whilst undertaking the evaluation, the researchers will be responsible for bringing to DFID's attention any additional opportunities that would add value to the research or any potential shortcomings to the method or analysis.

Given the challenges of measuring the contribution the programmes have made to the observed outcome measures, it is suggested that the evaluation be conducted in two stages.

Phase 1 – Design

- Review existing project documentation, available data sources and ensure that the theory of change linkages, project interventions and evaluation questions are relevant and useful.
- Existing data will include the following sources (more details are provided in Annex A):
    - Baseline available for voter turnout in 2008 elections (polling station level)
    - Intention to voter survey (3,870 respondents) – baseline from 2010, a follow up survey done in 2012 with the same sample. A follow up survey in summer 2013 will also be available.
    - Focus group discussion and qualitative report on reasons for not voting in polling areas with zero % women voter turnout.
    - IFES voter education survey.

- Independent DFID Annual reviews of both SERP and STAEP against the LFAs
- Beneficiary feedback for two districts done under STAEP
- Quarterly progress reports for STAEP and SERP
- Baseline data for both SERP and STAEP LFAs
- IRI surveys on intention to vote every 3 months.
- PILDAT's report on quality of democracy in Pakistan
- FAFEN, EU, NDI and UNWOMEN's elections observation report
- EU's report on 'democracy and institutions' (available in summer 2013)

- Review existing literature on the factors that affect voter turnout and strengthening democracy. This does not need to be a full systematic review (because of time constraints) but proposals should indicate how they will reduce bias inherent in undertaking this exercise within a few weeks.

- Produce a detailed evaluation design, including an evaluation framework that includes analysis of existing data and identification of needs for additional data.

- Proposals should include a suggested sampling strategy. Whilst the detailed sampling will be clarified at the design phase responses to this terms of reference should provide an outline approach and discuss strengths and weaknesses of different options. For example how many sample districts (total districts in the country are 140) would be appropriate and how would they be selected. Approaches should cover sampling for each data collection method proposed. Universal data will be available on elections turn out.

- Consider the use of broader impact evaluation design and methods in line with guidance provided in DFID's "Broadening the Range of Designs and Methods for Impact Evaluations"[37], including the use of qualitative as well as quantitative data; information from beneficiary feedback, focus groups, other studies as listed under 'data sources' and any additional methods and sources seen as necessary to achieve the purpose and objectives of the evaluation. For example, using techniques such as contribution analysis to estimate the extent to which any observed change in outcome measures relates to the programme rather than to other factors. The following is an example outline of the areas to consider when thinking about design options, related to voter turn-out.
  - Use existing data to determine trends in voter turn-out over time in Pakistan, using existing data.
  - Analyse changes in voter turn-out for different sections of the population and provincially.
  - Use the data from the research into factors that affect voter turn-out in Pakistan and internationally to compare this to the programmes' theories of change.
  - Compare the theory of change to what was delivered in practice, using any existing data and primary data collection to assess measures such as perceptions of programme activities meeting their stated aims (e.g. qualitative interviews with participants in Constituency Relations Groups).
  - Given existing research evidence and the evidence on the programmes' performance, describe the extent to which the programme is likely to have contributed to any observed change in voter turn-out, compared to other factors.

  This process will probably be iterative and only aim to tell a plausible story of each programme's contribution rather than definitive attribution. This approach is only an example of a number of possible options for one indicator; innovative proposals for assessing the impact of the programme are welcomed.

Whilst Phase 1 of the programme will include a refinement of the evaluation design, responses to the ToR should, as a minimum include the following.

---

[37] https://www.gov.uk/.../file/67427/design-method-**impact**-eval.pdf

- The process that will be used to refine evaluation questions, in consultation with stakeholders
- The proposed methods for answering these questions including what data will be collected, from whom (providing justification for the sampling strategy) and using what tools or approaches (e.g. desk review, interviews, surveys).
- A discussion of the limitations of the method/s (e.g. the strength of statements that can be made about the programme's impact).
- The proposed analytical techniques.
- A dissemination strategy.

Phase 2 – Analysis

Phase two of the evaluation will involve the implementation of the evaluation approach agreed in Phase 1.

- Collection of data from the field study will be planned and delivered based on the methods outlined in the first phase, incorporating any changes agreed with stakeholders. Proposals should include outline expected activities during the field stage, with associated budgets, but it is accepted that these will be subject to change following the initial phase (although the overall budget will need to remain the same). It is expected that the team will mobilise both national and international staff in Pakistan during the field study stage. . Taking into account the proposed timescale for the evaluation emphasis should be placed on the use of available data sets with the addition of only essential surveys and other data collection tools. Data collection: Justification for the need for any additional primary data collection to be clearly stated. If additional data is needed this should probably be in the form of sample surveys across representative locations aimed at verifying available data, or resolving inconsistencies.
- The data collected will be analysed using the methods identified in the first phase and agreed with DFID. It is expected that interim findings will be shared at early stages with DFID, other donors and Government. DFID requires a combined report that provides integrated findings (against the evaluation questions), rather than separate reports for each programme (see deliverable section for reporting requirements).

4. Skills and qualifications

The evaluation team should have a sound understanding of research designs and research methods, understand the strengths and limitations of different approaches and how to accurately interpret and present findings to both researchers and non-researchers.

The evaluation team will have a strong presence in and experience of Pakistan. They should have experience of undertaking evaluations of governance programmes and preferably of conducting elections and democracy research and evaluation. The evaluation questions and challenges discussed above, strongly indicate that a non-experimental approach will be required. The evaluation team should be able to demonstrate a track-record of conducting these type of evaluations, for example, methods such as contribution analysis.

The team will have a demonstrated ability to communicate complex studies and findings in an accessible way for non-technical readers, including presentation of data in visually appealing ways, highly

structured and rigorous summaries of research findings and robust and accessible synthesis of key lessons from across different studies.

The evaluation team will need to have a mix of the following skills and experience.
- Expertise in development and refinment of theories of change
- Expertise in governance and elections
- Quantitative research methods and particularly their use in non-experimental evaluations
- Qualitative research methods and particularly their use in non-experimental evaluations
- Expertise and knowledge of Pakistan
- Experience in gender and inclusion
- Research communications and uptake
- Team mix should have both international as well as Pakistan experience
- Lead adviser should have at least 10 years of evaluations experience of lead while technical specialists should have at least 5 years experience.

5.   Logistics and procedures

- The evaluation provider will be expected to supply their own logistic requirements including office space and transport.
- The evaluation provider is expected to undertake the evaluation independently, recruiting its own staff for evaluation design, data collection and analysis, and report production. It will be expected that the same firm will be retained throughout the project period, depending upon satisfactory completion of deliverables, to ensure consistency of evaluationsexecution and to build on historical knowledge. Bidders should comment on how independence can be maintained from the programme implementing entity, given the need for a very close working relationship through the life of this evaluation.
- The evaluation will be published in full by the evaluation provider. Data sets will be made available to other researchers for analysis, with due consideration given for the privacy of respondents.
- It is expected that the evaluation should conform to OECD-DAC principles of accuracy and credibility, and to the evaluation principles set out in the UK's 2009 policy on evaluation for international development. Bidders should set out how they will ensure the study is ethically sound and with which relevant ethical protocols it will comply.
- Relationship with partners: DFID has a good relationship with both government and civil society stakeholders. ECP regularly acknowledges the technical assistance provided by DFID and other donors though they always want more. Civil Society partners also acknowledge DFID support and technical oversight. As such, lack of cooperation from partners is not going to be an issue. CIDA and EU, other donors of the programme will also need to be consulted on the both the process and outcomes of the evaluation.

6.   Reporting and contracting arrangements

The consultant(s) will report to Amir Goraya (Governance Adviser, Democracy and Accountability Team in DFID Pakistan). This steering committee will consist of members of DFID's evaluation cadre, Head of Democracy and Accountability Team in DFID, other programme team members and representatives of other donors. The steering committee will QA the design, conduct and findings of the evaluation and will meet on monthly basis at least.

7. Timing and outputs

The consultants/company should expect to begin in July 2013. The evaluation should be finalised by end-Nobember depending on availability of some data sources.

DFID evaluation unit/programme team will provide the consultants with the resources and baselines as mentioned in Annex A. The consultancy should be awarded in early July and the consultants will be expected to use these resources for design and analysis immediately.

The evaluation findings should be available by end-November 2013 at the latest so that the evaluation's results will feed into SERP's activities for local elections and post-elections electoral reform, and to the Project Completion Report of the STAEP project.

The next 3 months will be used to contract, design and implement a range of information gathering methodologies to assess and triangulate the impact of citizen/voter education under STAEP and SERP.

The evaluation team is expected to have the following deliverables.

- **Inception report:** The first deliverable of the assignment is an inception report covering the elements described on phase 1 of the evaluation. The inception report should clearly lay out the evaluation team's understanding of the issues to be addressed in the exercise; the evaluation framework including the evaluation questions and indicators, an assessment of the information and data available, and a data collection plan; and a detailed evaluation work plan.
- **Data collection:** The evaluation team collecting data in accordance with the inception report design.
- **Data Analysis:** The evaluation team conducting an in depth analysis of the data gathered on external and internal (programme) factors that support or adversely affect voter turnout and strengthening democracy.
- **Partners' meeting on preliminary findings:** After the data analysis is finalized a meeting should be organized to present and validate preliminary findings. Participants of this meeting should include (but not be limited to) DFID, CIDA, EU, Government of Pakistan and delvery partners..
- **Draft report:** After the partner's meeting the evaluation team will prepare the first draft report. The final evaluation report should include i) an executive summary, ii) introduction and rationale, iii) evaluation method, iv) findings, v) conclusions, lessons and recommendations, and vi) annexes. The criteria against which the quality of the report will be judged is set out in Annex E.
- **Review of draft report:** The evaluation team sends the report for corrections and feedback of DFID. Subsequently, the feedback is shared with the evaluation team for incorporation and submission into the final report.
- **Final report:** The evaluation team finalised the evaluation report after incorporating the feedback. The report will then be sent for external peer-review by DFID. Agreed changes will need to be made by the evaluation team prior to publication.

An indicative timetable is below.

Phase	Tasks	Deliverables	Days - National	Days - international	Total days	Approx start/finish dates
1 Design	Review literature		5	5	10	19/07-9/08
	Evaluation design	Evaluation framework	10	10	20	
2 Inception and analysis	Analyse data sets and programme reports		5	5	10	12/08-20/09
	Prepare data collection tools	Survey methods/ justification	3	3	6	
	Train data collection/ enumerators		5	2	7	
	Data collection		5	5	10	
	Data analysis	Data sets	5	5	10	
	Beneficiary feedback	Reports	10	5	15	
	Report drafting	Draft Report	5	5	10	23/09-25/10
	Feedback from DFIDP					22/11
	Revise report	Final report	3	3	6	13/12
					104	

8. Budget

The consultants will be responsible for contracting and paying personnel to carry out data collection at local level. DFID takes no responsibility for the contracting and payment of these staff.

Annex A: Resources Available

Resources available	Indicators/Questions	Resources needed with Cost
Baseline available for voter turnout in 2008 elections (polling station level) Update on 2013 elections will be available by end-May	Indicators: voter turn out Disaggregated by gender (for 2013 only) and geography at polling station level	

FAFEN - Intention to voter survey (3,870 respondents) – baseline from 2010, a follow up survey done in 2012 with the same sample.	• Did people vote previously.
	• What voter education they have received
	• Do they intend to vote
	   • Data is disaggregated by demographics and intervention-non-intervention areas
	   • A post-elections refresh will also be done with same set of respondents	

Focus group discussion and qualitative report on reasons for not voting in polling areas with zero % women voter turnout.	Reasons cited as barriers to women voting	
IFES voter education survey.	• Knowledge about and engagement in politics/democracy • Awareness about voter registration • Awareness about ECP	
IRI surveys on intention to vote every 3 months.	Intention to vote survey disaggregated by gender and other demographics – also includes political parties	
• Independent Annual reviews of both SERP and STAEP against the LFAs and the baselines • FAFEN online programme tracker which contains all the activities, data and results generated by STAEP • Quarterly progress reports for STAEP and SERP	• number of demands raised at project areas • number of demands met at project areas • number of politicians trained on 18th amendment • capacity building against X areas of Y sub-grantees • by-elections and general elections observed domestically • number of CNICs (computerized national identity cards facilitated) • Strengthening and implementation of ECP legal framework to improve the electoral process • Engagement of electoral stakeholders for advocacy of electoral reforms	

	• Number of electoral operations systems and procedural improvements proposed by IFES and approved by the ECP • Number of components of ECP's voter/civic education plan implemented with IFES assistance. • Number of voter/civic education campaigns conducted by CSOs and supported by IFES; Number of citizens reached by these campaigns (gender disaggregated data)	
PILDAT assessment on quality of democracy in Pakistan (2008-2012)	• democracy beyond the state • civil society and popular participation • Representative and accountable government • Citizenship, law and rights	
Beneficiary feedback for two districts done under STAEP	• How project beneficiaries feel engaged with the project activities, and how do they own the results/interventions	
PILDAT's assessments of ECP's 5 year strategic plan	• Progress against ECP's reform objectives and goals in the strategic plan	

Annex B: Duty of Care

The Supplier is responsible for the safety and well-being of their Personnel (as defined in Section 2 of the Contract) and Third Parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property.

6.2 DFID will share available information with the Supplier on security status and developments in-country where appropriate.

6.3 This Procurement will require the Supplier to operate in conflict-affected areas and parts of it are highly insecure. The security situation is volatile and subject to change at short notice. The Supplier should be comfortable working in such an environment and should be capable of deploying to any areas required within the region in order to deliver the Contract. The Supplier is responsible for ensuring that appropriate arrangements, processes and procedures are in place for their Personnel, taking into account the environment they will be working in and the level of risk involved in delivery of the Contract (such as working in dangerous, fragile and hostile environments etc.). The Supplier must ensure their Personnel receive the required level of training and safety in the field training prior to deployment.

6.4 Tenderers must develop their Tender on the basis of being fully responsible for Duty of Care in line with the details provided above and they must confirm in their Tender that:

- They fully accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care.
- They understand the potential risks and have the knowledge and experience to develop an effective risk plan.
- They have the capability to manage their Duty of Care responsibilities throughout the life of the contract.

6.5 If you are unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care as detailed above, your Tender will be viewed as non-compliant and excluded from further evaluation.

Acceptance of responsibility must be supported with evidence of capability and DFID reserves the right to clarify any aspect of this evidence. In providing evidence Tenderers should consider the following questions:

- Have you completed an initial assessment of potential risks that demonstrates your knowledge and understanding, and are you satisfied that you understand the risk management implications (not solely relying on information provided by DFID)?
- Have you prepared an outline plan that you consider appropriate to manage these risks at this stage (or will you do so if you are awarded the contract) and are you confident/comfortable that you can implement this effectively?
- Have you ensured or will you ensure that your staff are appropriately trained (including specialist training where required) before they are deployed and will you ensure that on-going training is provided where necessary?
- Have you an appropriate mechanism in place to monitor risk on a live / on-going basis (or will you put one in place if you are awarded the contract)?

- Have you ensured or will you ensure that your staff are provided with and have access to suitable equipment and will you ensure that this is reviewed and provided on an on-going basis?
- Have you appropriate systems in place to manage an emergency / incident if one

Annex C: Summary Risk Assessment Matrix

Theme	DFID Risk Score	DFID Risk Score	DFID Risk Score	DFID Risk Score	DFID Risk Score	DFID Risk Score	DFID Risk Score
	Kyber-Pakhtunkwha including areas of Peshawar, Charsadda, Kohat, Tank, Bannu, Lakki and Dera Ismail Khan, the city of Peshawar and districts south of the city Swat, Buner and Lower Dir	Kalesh Valley, Bamoboret Valley, Arandu District to the south and west of Chitral	Federally Administered Tribal Areas,	North and West Balichostan	Quetta	Sindh – Karachi Sindh Province; Nawabash and parts of Interior Sindh to the north of Nawabash	Punjab – Lahore – Islamabad
Overall Rating	4	4	4	4	4	4	3
FCO Travel Advice	4	3	4	4	3	3	3
Host Nation Travel Advice	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available	Not available
Transportation	3	3	4	4	3	2	2
Security	4	4	4	4	4	4	3
Civil Unrest	3	3	3	4	3	4	3
Violence/crime	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Terrorism	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
War	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Hurricane	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Earthquake	3	3	3	3	3	3	2
Flood	2	2	2	2	2	3	3
Medical Services	3	3	4	3	3	2	2
Nature of Project	3	3	3	3	3	3	3

Intervention							

1 Very Low Risk	2 Low Risk	3 Medium Risk	4 High Risk	5 Very High Risk
Low		Medium	High Risk	

COLLECTIVE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

173-I, Block 2, PECHS,

KARACHI-75400

TEL: 021-34551482, FAX: 021-34547532

EMAIL: info@researchcollective.org

www.researchcollective.org